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HISTORY OF ENGLAND

FROM 1815

VOL. V.

A

HISTORY OF ENGLAND

FROM THE

CONCLUSION OF THE GREAT WAR IN 1815

BY

SPENCER WALPOLE

AUTHOR OF 'THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT HON. SPENCER PERCEVAL'

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HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

CHAPTER XXIII.

The position of the Ministry.

CIRCUMSTANCES in 1850 had tended to strengthen the position of the Whig ministry. The policy pursued at the Foreign Office was as popular in the country as it was unpopular in the House of Lords. The people, only slightly acquainted with Don Pacifico's case, but satisfied that Palmerston had asserted the rights of the British citizen abroad, approved his action; and his colleagues, though disliking his procedure, shared the popularity which attached to his measures. The attack, which at one moment seemed likely to wreck the Government, thus improved its prospects, and its stability was further increased by the unfortunate accident which immediately afterwards led to the death of Peel. Thenceforward, Russell was deprived of the services of the man who was at once his most powerful champion and his most formidable rival. So long as Peel lived, a large number of reflecting persons regretted that the reins of Government were entrusted to other hands; with his death, most moderate men desired the continuance of Russell in office. No other alternative apparently existed except the formation of a Protectionist ministry. Thus a session which had seemed pregnant with ruin to the Administration concluded without sensibly weakening its position, and the storms which had raged in June were succeeded

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by a great calm. Before two months of the recess were over, however, Britain, from John o'Groat's to the Land's End, was convulsed by a new agitation, which, raised without warning and stimulated without reflection, threw the ministry into disrepute.

The Church of Rome in England.

Nearly three centuries before the Russell Administration, the Reformation had deprived the Church of Rome of an official home on English soil; the tone of thought and the existence of penal laws had, since that time, made a Catholic reaction unlikely. But a few people had remained faithful to the Church of their forefathers, and a handful of priests had braved the risks attendant on the discharge of their duties to it. Rome, moreover, succeeded in maintaining some sort of organisation in England. In the first instance her Church was placed under an arch-priest. From 1623 to 1688 it was placed under a Vicar Apostolic, that is a Bishop, nominally appointed to some foreign see, with a brief enabling him to discharge episcopal duties in Great Britain.[1] This policy was not very successful. Smith, the second Vicar Apostolic,[2] was banished in 1629, and, though he lived till 1655, never returned to England. The Pope did not venture on appointing a successor to him for thirty years. In 1685, encouraged probably by the notorious Catholicism of the Court, he made John Leyburne, a member of an old English family, and a prelate who 'behaved on all occasions like a wise and honest man,'[3] Vicar Apostolic of all England. Three years afterwards, on the eve of the Revolution, he divided England into four Vicariates.[4] This arrangement

[1] William Bishop, Bishop of Chalcedon, was the first Vicar Apostolic. The brief will be found in Brady's *Annals of the Catholic Hierarchy in England and Scotland*, p. 68.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

[3] *Macaulay*, vol. ii. p. 469. Mr. Brady says that Macaulay is mistaken in calling him a Dominican. It is perhaps more significant that Macaulay, writing three years before 1850, calls him a Bishop, vol. ii. p. 565.

[4] Brady's *Catholic Hierarchy*, p. 146.

endured till 1840. In that year Gregory XVI. doubled the vicariates, and appointed eight Vicars Apostolic.

The Roman Church is a cautious but persistent suitor. She had made a fresh advance; she was awaiting a fresh opportunity. The eight Vicars Apostolic asked the Pope to promote the efficiency of their Church by restoring the hierarchy. The time seemed ripe for the change. (1) In defiance of the Act of 1829, Roman Catholic bishops had been appointed to several Irish sees, and no objection had been raised to their appointment. (2) An Act of Parliament dealing with charitable bequests in Ireland had authorised the appointment of a Commission on which Roman Catholics were enabled to serve;[1] and the prelates of the Church of Rome placed upon it had been distinctly recognised in it as 'our trusty and well-beloved' archbishops. (3) In 1847 Clarendon had induced Lord Grey to recognise the jurisdiction of Roman Catholic bishops in the colonies.[2] (4) The great religious movement whose history has been traced in a previous chapter had led to the conversion of many clergymen and laymen to the Church of Rome.[3] Encouraged, or misled, by these circumstances the Pope prepared Apostolic letters, distributing the eight vicariates into eight bishoprics. He showed the letters which he had prepared to Minto, who happened to be at Rome on a special embassy to the Italian States. Minto paid so little heed to the matter that he did not take the trouble to make himself acquainted with the documents which were laid before him.[4] The Revolu-

[1] *Ante*, vol. iv. p. 246.

[2] For debates on this, see *Hansard*, vol. c. p. 1210; vol. cii. p. 439.

[3] There is an account of these conversions in *ibid.*, vol. cxiv. p. 37; and cf. *ante*, vol. iv. p. 430.

[4] The documents seem really to have been laid before Minto. Cf. Brady's *Catholic Hierarchy*, p. 355, but Minto omitted to ascertain their contents. *Hansard*, vol. cxiv. pp. 155 and 179. Perhaps he paid less attention to the matter because the ministry of which he was a member was at the time introducing a bill to re-establish diplomatic relations with Rome. *Hansard*, vol. xcvi. p. 169. The bill passed the Lords (*ibid.*, p. 1384), but was dropped in consequence of the Revolution of 1848.

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tion, occurring immediately afterwards, gave the Pope other things to think about than the re-establishment of the English hierarchy.' For two years nothing more was heard of the conversion of vicariates into bishoprics.

The Pope's Brief of 1850

But the scheme had not been abandoned; and, in the autumn of 1850, the Pope, restored to the Vatican by French bayonets, issued a brief for 're-establishing and extending the Catholic faith in England.' England and Wales were divided into twelve sees. One of them, Westminster, was made into an archbishopric; and Wiseman, an Irishman by extraction, who had been Vicar Apostolic of the London District, and Bishop of Melipotamus, was promoted to it. Shortly afterwards a new distinction was conferred upon him, and the new archbishop was made a cardinal.[1]

creates a ferment in England.

The publication of the brief created a ferment in England. The effect of the Pope's language was increased by a pastoral from the new archbishop, in which he talked of governing, and continuing to govern, his see with episcopal jurisdiction; and by the declaration of an eminent convert that the people of England, who for so many years have been separated from the see of Rome, are about of their own free will to be added to the Holy Church. For the moment, High Churchmen and Low Churchmen forgot their differences in their eagerness to punish a usurpation of what was called the Queen's prerogative. The Prime Minister, instead of attempting to moderate the tempest, added violence to the storm by denouncing, in a letter to the Bishop of Durham, the late aggression of the Pope as 'insolent and insidious, . . . , inconsistent with the Queen's supremacy, with the rights of our bishops and clergy, and with the spiritual independence of the

[1] There is a copy of the brief in Brady's *Catholic Hierarchy*, p. 358.

nation.' In many English and Welsh counties meetings were held, denouncing the Pope's action, and pledging the nation to resist the attempt on its liberties.[1]

The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill.

Amidst the excitement which was thus occasioned, Parliament met. The Speech from the Throne alluded to the strong feelings excited by 'the recent assumption of ecclesiastical titles conferred by a foreign Power.' It announced the Queen's 'resolution to maintain the rights of [her] crown and the independence of the nation against all encroachment, from whatever quarter it may proceed;' and it declared that a measure would be introduced into Parliament to maintain, 'under God's blessing, the religious liberty which is so justly prized by the people.' It hardly required such words as these to fan the spreading flame. In the debate on the Address, hardly any notice was taken of any subject except the 'triple tyrant's insolent pretension.'[2] On the first Friday in the session, Russell introduced a measure forbidding the assumption of territorial titles by the priests and prelates of the Roman Catholic Church; declaring all gifts made to them, and all acts done by them, under those titles null and void; and forfeiting to the Crown all property bequeathed to them.[3] He hoped by these provisions to prevent 'an insult to the Crown, an interference with the rights of the

[1] *Ann. Reg.*, 1850, Hist., p. 198. All the biographies of the period, of course, contain matter regarding the crisis. Cf., *e.g.*, Stephens' *Hook*, p. 454, Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. ii. p. 335. The author, who was then a child, taken to see Kean play King John, recollects the thunders of applause with which King John's speech was received by the audience.

Tell him this tale; and from the mouth of England
Add thus much more—That no Italian priest
Shall tithe or toll in our dominions, &c.

[2] The words are from Inglis, who sighed for the days of Perceval as minister, who 'would have sent a fleet to Cività Vecchia and have compelled the triple tyrant to renounce his insolent pretension.' *Hansard*, vol. cxiv. p. 82. But other speakers used language almost as strong. Stanley, *e.g.*, spoke of the insolent aggression, p. 25; Dudley Stuart, of 'the gross piece of insolence,' p. 151. Hume said 'no notice had been taken of any other matter,' p. 100.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 187.

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Established Church, and an attack upon the independence of the nation.'[1]

Its reception.

The sense of the House was with Russell. Leave for the introduction of the bill was granted by a majority of more than six to one.[2] But the motion made on the 7th was only carried, after four nights' debate, on the 14th of February. The small body of Irish and English Roman Catholics naturally resisted to the utmost of their power a measure which could not but be offensive to them. Advanced Liberals, like Cobden, Milner Gibson, and Mr. Bright, voted against the ministry; while Graham and Mr. Gladstone, on whom the mantle of Peel had fallen, stayed away from the division. There was much then, both in the debate and in the division list, to fill the ministry with anxiety. It was, perhaps, more significant that the measure which aroused opposition among some of the minister's ordinary supporters excited no enthusiasm among his usual opponents. Disraeli admitted the gravity of the occasion, but laughed at the smallness of the remedy. Mr. Bright pointed out the glaring inconsistency between the measure and the Durham letter. The letter had declared that the danger to the Church from within was infinitely greater than the danger from without. Yet the measure dealt with the danger which was of little significance, and attempted no remedy for the danger which was imminent.[3] The enthusiasm of the

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxiv. p. 208.

[2] By 395 votes to 63, *ibid.*, p. 699.

[3] In the Durham letter Russell had said, 'There is a danger, however, which alarms me much more than any aggression of a foreign sovereign —clergymen of our own Church, who have subscribed the thirty-nine articles, and acknowledged in explicit terms the Queen's supremacy, have been the most forward in leading their flocks, step by step, to the very edge of the precipice. The honour paid to saints, the claim of infallibility by the Church, the superstitious use of the sign of the Cross, the muttering of the Liturgy so as to disguise the language in which it is written, the recommendation of auricular confession, and the administration of penance and absolution—all these things are pointed out by clergymen of the Church of England as worthy of adoption. . . . What then is the danger to be apprehended from a foreign prince of no great

people might be on the side of the minister, but men of sense were already either condemning or laughing at his bill.

One thing, however, was at least apparent. Whether the measure were wise or unwise, the minister was in earnest. An appeal was made to him after the second night's debate to postpone the discussion, and he declined to take up any Government business until his motion had been disposed of.[1] His determination did not prevent the interruption of the debate. On the 11th of February, Disraeli drew attention to the severe distress amongst the owners and occupiers of land, and asked the House to declare it to be the duty of ministers to introduce without delay such measures as might be most effectual for their relief.[2] His speech had an importance of its own. It announced his determination, at any rate in the existing Parliament, to abstain from meddling with free trade; it expressed his desire to help the landlords and the farmers by obtaining for them some relief from fixed burdens. But the division was much more significant than the speech. After two nights' debate, Disraeli was only defeated by a narrow majority of 14.[3] The protectionists had not been so near a victory since Peel had adopted the principles of free trade.

Disraeli's motion for the relief of the agriculturists.

Shaken by the effects of this division, uneasy at the protracted strife on the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, the ministry desired to make a vigorous effort to retrieve its position. A good Budget would, it was thought, reunite a party distracted by religious controversy. It was known that the revenue had been unexpectedly large; that considerable savings had been effected in

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power, compared to the danger within the gates from the unworthy sons of the Church of England herself?' *Ann. Reg.*, 1850, Hist., p. 199; cf. for other statements in text, *Hansard*, vol. cxiv. pp. 243, 256.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 362.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 374–414.

[3] By 281 votes to 267, *ibid.*, p. 604.

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the expenditure; and it was assumed that a growing income and a cautious economy would combine to place a considerable surplus at the Chancellor of the Exchequer's disposal.[1] Unfortunately for the ministry, this knowledge quickened expectation; and exaggerated rumours were freely circulated of the surplus which it was supposed that Wood would have at his command. When the Budget was proposed, on the night which succeeded the decision on the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, there was a general disappointment on discovering that the surplus available for distribution did not quite reach 1,900,000*l.* Still this sum, if it were not adequate for effecting the reforms to which Disraeli had pointed, was sufficient to enable the Chancellor of the Exchequer to remedy some of the ills of which the agriculturists complained. But, to their sorrow and disappointment, they found that the Whig Chancellor of the Exchequer, instead of attending to their complaints, was intent on taking some further steps in the direction of free trade. Foreign coffee had hitherto paid a duty of 6*d.*, colonial coffee of 4*d.* a pound. Wood proposed to place an uniform duty of 3*d.* on all kinds of coffee. Sawn timber had hitherto paid a duty of 20*s.*,

[1] The revenue of 1850 had been estimated at 52,285,000*l.*, the expenditure at 50,763,000*l.* *Ante*, vol. iv. p. 374. In 1851 Wood declared that the revenue would probably reach 52,656,000*l.*, that the expenditure would probably only amount to 50,134,000*l.*, and that the surplus would reach 2,521,000*l.* He did not venture, however, for the ensuing year (1851–52) to place the revenue at more than 52,140,000*l.*, the expenditure at less than 50,247,171*l.*, and the surplus at more than 1,892,829*l.* The actual Budget figures were as follows:—

Revenue, 1851–52.		*Expenditure*, 1851–52.	
Customs	£20,400,000	Debt	£28,092,000
Excise	14,000,000	Consol. Fund	2,600,000
Stamps	6,310,000	Army	6,593,945
Taxes	4,348,000	Navy	6,537,055
Income Tax	5,380,000	Ordnance	2,424,171
Post Office	830,000	Miscellaneous	4,000,000
Crown Lands	160,000		50,247,171
Miscellaneous	712,000	Surplus	1,892,829
	£52,140,000		£52,140,000

Hansard, vol. cxiv. p. 703 *et seq*

hewn timber of 15*s*. To the dismay of country gentlemen, who had acres devoted to timber and pheasants, Wood proposed to reduce these duties by one half. Foreign seeds had hitherto paid a duty of 5*s*., colonial seeds of 2*s*. 6*d*. per cwt. Wood proposed to fix the duty on all seeds at 1*s*. These changes respectively absorbed 176,000*l*., 286,000*l*. and 30,000*l*. of the surplus.[1]

The window-tax.

One other change of much more importance was proposed at the same time. For rather more than 150 years a tax had been imposed on windows. In the first instance it had been associated with a house-tax. All houses were required to pay a tax of 2*s*. But an additional tax of 4*s*. and 8*s*. was exacted from houses with ten or twenty windows. These taxes were increased in the reign of Queen Anne, separated in Pelham's ministry, trebled by Pitt, augmented by Addington and Perceval, and afterwards reduced by Robinson.[2] In 1834 Althorp had been induced to repeal the house-tax.[3] It may be doubted whether he would not have acted more wisely if he had maintained the house-tax and repealed the window-duty. The rent of a house is not an accurate test of its occupier's income, but it is a much better test than the number of windows which the house contains.

The inequality of the burden was not the only objection to it. Its existence was deplored by the sanitary reformer. Air and sunshine are among the first requirements of healthy dwellings, and the window-tax induced every builder to shut out the sun and exclude the air. Poor men were unable to afford the luxury of adequate windows for their dwelling-rooms, or of any windows for their closets. Lord Duncan,

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxiv. pp. 728–734.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. xcvi. p. 1255, where a good history of the tax is given. For Robinson's reductions, see *ante*, vol. ii. pp. 80, 117.

[3] *Ante*, vol. iii. p. 225.

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the grandson of the great admiral whose famous victory placed him among the foremost of England's naval heroes, had the merit of drawing attention to the evils of the tax in 1845, in 1848, and in 1850.[1] On each occasion he experienced defeat. But the defeat of 1850 partook of the nature of a drawn battle; and in 1851 Wood decided on abolishing the tax. The surplus, however, did not enable him to sweep it away without providing a substitute. He therefore determined to retrace the steps which Althorp had taken in 1834, to substitute a house-tax for a window-tax, but to exempt from the new tax all houses worth less than 20*l.* a year. The change, he estimated, would involve a loss to the revenue of 701,000*l.* a year.[2]

There was nothing in this Budget which it was easy to criticise, but there was nothing in it to excite enthusiasm. Free traders complained that it did nothing for trade. Country gentlemen declared that it did nothing for agriculture. All that the farmers had secured by the great debate on Disraeli's motion was the remission of 30,000*l.* of taxation on seeds. Before the House had recovered from its disappointment, Locke King, the member for Surrey, the second son of Lord King, asked for leave to introduce a bill to place householders in counties on the same footing in respect to the franchise as householders in towns. It is not usual to oppose preliminary motions of this character. The fate of bills in the House of Commons is usually decided on the debate on the second reading, and their introduction is generally conceded as a matter of cour-

Locke King's motion.

[1] The motion in 1845 was for inquiry, *Hansard*, vol. lxxviii. page 1054. Duncan was beaten by 93 votes to 47, *ibid.*, p. 1092. The motion in 1848 was for repeal, and was rejected by 160 votes to 68, *ibid.*, vol. xcvi. pp. 1254–1297. The motion of 1850 was only rejected by 80 votes to 77, *ibid.*, vol. cx. p. 99.

[2] The window-tax yielded 1,856,000*l.* The new house-tax of 1*s.* in the pound on all dwelling-houses, and of 9*d.* in the pound on all shops &c., was estimated to yield 1,155,000*l.* *Ibid.*, vol. cxiv. p. 726.

tesy. Russell, however, on this occasion deviated from the customary course. He admitted the necessity for the further extension of the franchise; he promised that the Government would introduce a measure for extending it in the course of 1852; and he asked the House, on receiving this assurance, to reject Locke King's motion. His speech split his party into two sections. Advanced Liberals who desired reform supported Locke King, and Russell could only hope for a majority by enlisting support from the Opposition. The Conservatives, almost to a man, were opposed to Locke King, but the defeat of the Government was a much greater object to them than the rejection of a motion which pledged the House to very little. Instead of supporting the ministry they walked away; and Russell, in a thin House, composed almost entirely of his own friends, was defeated by a majority of nearly two to one.[1] His situation had become intolerable. The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill could only be carried by the assistance of his opponents; the division on Disraeli's motion made it doubtful whether the Budget could be carried at all. Locke King's success placed him in a new dilemma. Men who had experienced the humiliations which had been heaped on the Government during the decline and fall of the Melbourne Administration could not desire to cling to office when their power had departed from them. The Cabinet unanimously decided to retire, and on Saturday morning, the 22nd of February, Russell placed his resignation in the Queen's hands.

The ministerial crisis of 1851.

Then ensued a singular crisis. The Queen, taking the ordinary course, sent for Stanley as the recognised leader of the Opposition. But Stanley, hesitating to accept office in a hostile Parliament before every other expedient had been adopted, advised her to strengthen

[1] By 100 votes to 52, *Hansard*, vol. cxiv. p. 869.

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her old ministry by consolidating the Whigs with the small body of distinguished men who had been identified with the fortunes of Peel. The attempt was made and failed. Aberdeen and Graham[1] declined to join the ministry unless the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill were abandoned; and Russell, though he offered to modify the measure, declined to withdraw it. The failure of the proposed coalition forced the Queen to apply again to Aberdeen and Stanley. Each of these statesmen felt that he was too weak to stand alone;[2] and Aberdeen was still more unwilling to join the protectionists than to coalesce with the Whigs. On the exhaustion of every expedient, the Queen, on the advice of Wellington, turned once more to her old advisers, and Russell was persuaded to resume place. It would be misleading to add that he returned to power.[3]

The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill.

The circumstances under which the ministry had quitted office, as well as those under which it resumed it, justified its members in reconsidering the policy on which they had entered. On the 7th of March, Grey, as Secretary of State for the Home Department, explained the alterations which his colleagues had decided on introducing into the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill; while, on the 4th of April, Wood, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated the modifications which it was intended to make in the Budget. The second edition of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill was not more acceptable to Churchmen and Conservatives than the first. In its

[1] Russell had frequently endeavoured to obtain Graham's help, offering him the Admiralty, the Governor-Generalship of India, &c.; see *Greville*, second series, vol. iii. pp. 87, 92, 259, 410.

[2] According to Lord Malmesbury, Stanley's refusal was due to the timid conduct of Herries and Henley. *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, p. 207, cf. *Greville*, second series, vol. iii. p. 387, and *Edinburgh Review*, No. 332, p. 517.

[3] The explanations on this crisis are in *Hansard*, vol. cxiv. pp. 996, 1029. Cf. Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. ii. p. 346 *et seq.*, Stockmar's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 245, *Recollections and Suggestions*, p. 257, and Lord Aberdeen's letter to Princess Lieven in *Edinburgh Review*, No. 324, p. 554.

original shape the measure had prevented Roman Catholic prelates from doing any acts, receiving any gifts, or succeeding to any property, under territorial titles. In its amended shape the bill merely made it illegal for them to assume titles of this character. It was declared by Grey that it would be a 'national protest' against the act of the Pope.[1] It was not, however, clear why, if a national protest only were required, it was necessary to legislate at all. During the negotiations in the preceding crisis, Aberdeen and Graham had suggested to Russell that Parliamentary resolutions, asserting the right of the Crown, would effect all that was necessary. Grey's admission made the suggestion unassailable, and Russell himself lived to admit that Aberdeen and Graham were right.[2] Unfortunately, the author of the Durham letter could not reconcile himself to abandon legislation which was as offensive to Roman Catholics as ever, and which did not satisfy Churchmen. The original bill, said Inglis, was milk and water; by some chemical process the Government had extracted all the milk.[3] A great prelate, who had the good sense to disapprove its provisions, recorded in his correspondence that it was called Lord John's leaping-bar, to afford exercise in jumping over it.[4]

Other exercise, however, the bill afforded in abundance. Its second reading led to a debate which was protracted over seven nights.[5] Four more nights were occupied in the discussion on going into committee. A whole evening was subsequently occupied by a debate on the formal motion for the postponement of the preamble.[6] The continuous discussions did not even end at this point, and the measure, which had originally been

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxiv. p. 1134.
[2] Russell's *Recollections and Suggestions*, p. 257.
[3] *Hansard*, vol. cxiv. p. 1141.
[4] *Life of Whately*, vol. ii. p. 260.
[5] It was carried by 438 votes to 95. *Hansard*, vol. cxv. p. 618.
[6] *Ibid.*, vol. cxvi. pp. 1048-1096.

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introduced on the first available night of the session, did not reach the Lords till the 7th of July, and did not pass the Peers till the end of that month. In its course through the Commons, Churchmen and Conservatives succeeded in enlarging its scope and its application. On the motion of Thesiger, a lawyer who had filled the Solicitor-Generalship under Peel, and who lived to be twice Chancellor in a Conservative ministry, its preamble was extended to all briefs and rescripts of the Pope similar to that of the previous September. Its operation was consequently applied to briefs under which the Pope had, in previous years, without attracting notice or censure, constituted Irish sees.[1] The amendment placed Russell in a fresh difficulty. The Roman Catholics, in the early part of the session, had complained that he had receded from the promise of his youth and 'placed himself at the head of the bigots of the Empire.'[2] They were forced now to rely on his assistance against Thesiger. All the influence of the ministry, however, was unable to secure the defeat of the new amendment. A motion made in the Lords to exclude Ireland from the bill was defeated by a large majority;[3] and the bill, which had occupied the greater portion of the session, and which had kindled so much animosity, at length became law.[4]

The Bill becomes law.

Discussions of this character, protracted throughout the session, occupied the chief part of the time of the legislature. But, in the intervals between these debates, Parliament found leisure for the concurrent consideration of financial subjects. In February, the Chancellor

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxvii. p. 1325 *sq.*
[2] *Ibid.*, vol. cxiv. p. 1339.
[3] *Ibid.*, vol. cxviii. pp. 1486–1513.
[4] Archbishop Whately has already been quoted. It may be worth while adding the opinion of so clear a thinker on the proposal to omit Ireland from the Act. He believed the Act in general to be a great evil, but a still greater evil if confined to England. It was saying to the English Roman Catholics, 'You are weak and loyal, and therefore we trample on you; to the Irish, you are strong and rebellious, therefore we leave you alone.' *Life*, vol. ii. p. 248.

of the Exchequer had estimated the surplus at 1,892,000*l.*, and had proposed to devote 492,000*l.* of this amount to the reduction of the duties on coffee, timber, and seeds, and to incur a loss of 701,000*l.* by the substitution for the window-tax of a duty of 1*s.* in the pound on houses, and 9*d.* in the pound on shops.[1] His proposal was received with a shout of disapproval, and the protectionists, with Herries as their spokesman, gave notice of an alternative proposal for the reduction of the income-tax.[2] Alarmed at the opposition which his scheme had provoked, Wood decided on abandoning that portion of it which dealt with the duty on seeds, and on reducing the rates for the new house-tax from 1*s.* and 9*d.* to 9*d.* and 6*d.*[3] His amended proposal placed a clear issue before House and country, and the alternative which Herries was suggesting was defeated.[4] A few days after his defeat, Disraeli, in an elaborate speech, asked the House to declare that, in any relief to be granted by the remission or reduction of taxation, due regard should be paid to the distressed condition of the owners and occupiers of land in the United Kingdom,[5] and was only beaten by a majority of 13.[6] Three weeks afterwards, Hume proposed to limit the duration of the income-tax to only one year, for the purpose of enabling the House to institute an inquiry into the incidence of the duty. With the aid of the Conservative party he carried his motion,[7] and Russell was constrained to consent to the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the tax.[8] With this concession the ministry was enabled to secure the acceptance of its reconstructed Budget.

The Budget amended.

These discussions, if they had stood alone, would have done much to impair the reputation of the ministry,

[1] *Ante*, p. 81.
[2] *Hansard*, vol. cxv. p. 1133.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1058.
[4] By 278 votes to 230. *Ibid.*, p. 1196.
[5] *Ibid.*, vol. cxvi. p. 48.
[6] By 263 votes to 250. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
[7] By 244 votes to 230. *Ibid.*, p. 496.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 511.

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The spirit duties.

and unfortunately for the Whig Cabinet defeat was not confined to the discussions on the Budget. Lord Naas, the eldest son of Lord Mayo, a politician whose early career afforded only an imperfect promise of his future eminence, had, in the preceding year, drawn attention to an injustice incidentally occasioned by the spirit duties. The customs duty on spirits was calculated on the quantity taken out of bond. The excise duty on spirits was calculated on the quantity placed in bond. But a cask of spirits tends continually to lose volume from evaporation and leakage, and as whisky improves as it matures, and the best whisky is bonded for many years before it is consumed, the home distiller was placed under a disadvantage. Twice in 1850 Naas brought the matter before the House, and on each occasion he succeeded in inflicting defeat on the ministry.[1] In May 1851 he repeated the motion. The ministry, treating it as an attempt to reduce the duty on spirits, tried to defeat it, but, on a division, only succeeded in securing the same number of votes as Naas. The Speaker gave a casting vote with Naas, and the Government was consequently placed in a fresh dilemma. The power of the Executive was obviously falling from its hands into the hands of the House of Commons; and a Whig member, who had some knowledge of the traditions of politics, appealed to Russell to resign.[2]

But Russell did not resign. Beaten by Naas in May; again beaten by him in June; defeated in July on a proposal to relieve attorneys from special duties—he persevered with the task of carrying on the government. He was able to do so, not because either House or country had much confidence in his administration,

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxi. p. 1097, vol. cxii. p. 950.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. cxvi. pp. 627, 631. The Ministry had also been beaten on a motion of Lord Duncan's for paying the moneys of the Woods and Forests into the Exchequer; cf. *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, p. 209.

but because neither House nor country had any confidence in any possible successor. If, moreover, in other matters, the ministry drifted hither and thither on a tide of uncertainty, one department of the Government continually spoke with no feeble sound. Those indeed, who have read the concluding chapter of the preceding volume, may possibly doubt whether the foreign policy of Palmerston was either so wise or so beneficial as the foreign policy of Aberdeen. But no one acquainted with the history of the times can deny that it was much more attractive to ordinary Englishmen. Men are only schoolboys of an older growth. The man, like the boy, is always ready to believe that the fellow who is not ready with his own blow is liable to be forced to submit to the blow of his adversary. The virtues of a smooth answer seem good enough for gospel or pulpit. But nine men out of ten think the maxim out of place in foreign politics.

Palmerston's foreign policy.

Few statesmen who have filled the British Foreign Office have shown a more instinctive aversion from smooth answers than Palmerston. He was a man of action; and his despatches are those of a strong man, the representative of a strong nation, conscious of his own strength and of that of his country. During his first thirty months at the Foreign Office, Palmerston achieved an almost unprecedented success. The independence of Belgium, the settlement of the Greek frontier, and the Quadruple Alliance were the fruits of his administration. Perhaps his success induced him to believe that firm language and a bold front would never fail to accomplish his objects. But they did nothing of the kind. The questions which arose in Europe and the East from 1834 to 1841 were settled not by Palmerston's words but by force; and the policy of the minister brought the country at different

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times to the verge of war with Russia, with France, and with the United States.

Whatever judgment, moreover, may be ultimately pronounced on Palmerston's foreign policy, it is difficult to defend the manner in which he executed it. Grey, indeed, so long as he remained at the head of affairs, exercised an effective control over every department of State. But Melbourne, who rose to the first place in the ministry in 1834, had neither the temperament nor the disposition to impress his own character on the policy of the Administration. He was the Chairman of the Cabinet rather than the Prime Minister. Unwilling to control his other colleagues, he had an additional reason for leaving the Foreign Minister alone. For Palmerston had not only a will of his own which it was not easy to curb, but he became, in the course of 1839, the Prime Minister's brother-in-law. This connection made him almost supreme. In 1840 he proved the strength of his character and the independence of his conduct. Right or wrong, his Eastern policy was disliked by the Prime Minister and by the leader of the House of Commons, and actively opposed by two at least of his other colleagues.[1]

disapproved by his colleagues;

The alarm which Palmerston excited by his policy and independence was so great that it prevented the formation of a Whig ministry in December 1845. But Palmerston was as dexterous as he was bold. His timely visit to Paris at Easter 1846 dissipated the apprehensions which his conduct had occasioned, and he was suffered to return to the Foreign Office. Within three months, France and England were again on the brink of war. Whether Palmerston's despatch of the 19th of July, on the subject of the Queen of Spain's marriage, was or was not responsible for this result, is a point on which a difference of opinion may fairly exist. But

[1] *Ante*, vol. iii. p. 652, and Greville, *Memoirs*, second series, vol. i. p. 298 *sq.*

there seems no doubt that the despatch itself was written by the minister without consulting his colleagues.[1] In the following year he actually took the extreme course of threatening to suspend diplomatic relations with France, without informing either the Prime Minister or any other member of the Cabinet.[2] In 1848 he went a step further. A despatch to Bulwer, the British Minister at Madrid, which led to Bulwer's dismissal from Spain, was written not only without the knowledge, but in defiance of the orders, of the Prime Minister.[3]

These instances, which could be easily multiplied, will perhaps be sufficient to illustrate the contemptuous indifference with which Palmerston treated his colleagues. He was probably encouraged in his conduct by observing that, however greatly they disapproved his procedure, they had not the resolution to control him. There was, however, one other person in the State who was not prepared to submit with equal patience to the Minister's independence. The policy which Palmerston pursued towards Germany, towards Italy, and to-

disliked by the Queen.

[1] See a very curious story on this subject in *Greville*, second series, vol. iii. p. 298.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. iii. p. 62.

[3] On the 16th of March, 1848, Palmerston addressed a despatch to Bulwer at Madrid, recommending the adoption of a legal and constitutional course of government and the enlarging of the basis of the Government. Bulwer communicated the despatch to the Spanish Government, and the latter took the extreme step not merely of protesting against it, but of returning it. Thereupon Palmerston addressed two other despatches to Bulwer, on the 19th and 20th of April —one approving what Bulwer had done, the other strongly commenting on the conduct of Spain. Upon these, the Spanish Government sent Bulwer his passports, and ordered him to leave Spain. For these events, see *Parl. Papers*, Sess. 1848, (1) Correspondence between the British Government and the Government of Spain; (2) Appendix to ditto; (3) Despatch from Sir H. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston, dated London, May 30, 1848, and cf. *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. ii. p. 66. It has lately transpired that Palmerston wrote one of the despatches not merely without the knowledge of his colleagues, but in opposition to the directions of the Prime Minister. Greville, *Memoirs*, part ii. vol. iii. p. 169. For some severe but just strictures on Bulwer's conduct, see *ibid.*, p. 181. Bulwer wanted Palmerston to send a fleet to Cadiz, demanding instant satisfaction; and Palmerston himself proposed prompt and decisive measures. Happily, however, the Cabinet for once was firm and refused to sanction this course. Bulwer's *Life of Palmerston*, vol. iii. ch. vii.

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wards other countries was not always acceptable to the Queen; and her Majesty, like her ministers, not merely disliked the policy of the Foreign Secretary—she resented also, like them, his manner of conducting it.

Many of the questions with which diplomacy was occupied during the Russell administration had a special interest for the British Court. One of the candidates for the hand of the Queen of Spain was nearly related to the Queen's husband; another prince of the House of Saxe-Coburg was husband to the Queen of Portugal; intervention in Cracow raised incidentally various subjects connected with the future of Germany; while the Revolution of 1848 shook Prussia to its centre, and raised issues on which a German prince could not help feeling a warm interest, and could not help desiring to influence foreign policy.

The relations of the Crown with the Foreign Ministers.

Precedent and practice, moreover, seemed to justify the interference of the Court on questions of foreign policy. Less than a century and a half before the reign of Victoria, an English Sovereign had been his own Foreign Minister; and, though no other king had ventured to imitate the example of William III., many subsequent Sovereigns had exercised a control over foreign policy different from that which they had exerted over domestic policy. The practice of the departments seemed to justify their interference. Despatches from abroad were forwarded to the Crown so soon as they were received. Despatches to foreign Courts were submitted to the Crown before they were signed. The Sovereign of the day occasionally altered and frequently criticised these documents. He naturally assumed that a policy thus conducted was his own policy.

This impression was increased by the language of society, of Parliament, and of the Statute Book. The army of Britain is her Majesty's army; the navy, her Majesty's navy; the public men, who owe their place to

the confidence of the House of Commons, are her Majesty's ministers; their subordinates are her Majesty's Civil Service; the representatives of Britain abroad are her Majesty's ambassadors. An able and industrious Sovereign, sincerely anxious to promote the happiness of his subjects and the weal of his country, may easily imagine that he has a right to influence a policy dictated by his own servants at home to his own servants abroad, and enforced by his own troops and his own vessels.

gradually modified after the Reform Act.

The opinion, however, which a well-intentioned Sovereign was likely to entertain, was being gradually affected by the progress of events. In modern England power is passing from the Sovereign to the people. The change, indeed, is being much more slowly effected in foreign than in domestic affairs. The members of the House of Commons, as a body, have no acquaintance with the business of other nations, and have no patience to address themselves to the task of mastering its details. Except in crises of national importance, they are content to leave the negotiations with other Powers in the hands of the Foreign Minister. When crises, however, of national importance occur, the reformed House of Commons shows an increasing disposition to interfere. Before 1832, when questions of foreign policy arose, the House used usually to wait till the negotiations were complete, and then either approve or condemn the course which the ministry had followed. A reformed House of Commons is perpetually insisting on being made acquainted with the progress of events. It requires to have every despatch, every telegram, communicated to it almost as soon as it is received.

Singularly enough these changes, which are tending to deprive the Sovereign of authority, are steadily increasing the power of the ministry. It has been stated in a previous chapter of this work that a Liberal

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ministry in a reformed Parliament ventured on asking for and succeeded in obtaining much stronger measures of repression for Ireland than even Liverpool or Castlereagh would have thought of demanding. There was no objection—so ran the usual apology—to entrust unconstitutional powers to a constitutional ministry. But the same circumstances which thus tended to increase the power of the Executive at home tended to raise the influence of the Foreign Office abroad. The Foreign Minister, who felt that the Cabinet of which he was a member represented the people, was in a very different position from the Sovereign who represented nothing but the principle of primogeniture. He spoke with more power, he acted with more independence, than any Sovereign would have ventured on doing.

Palmerston's impatience of control.

The change which was thus being effected was undoubtedly quickened by the temperament of the Liberal Foreign Minister. Palmerston was one of those men who derive pleasure from work and acquire confidence from responsibility. He was always at his best when he was supreme; and he was much better fitted by nature to devise and carry out a policy of his own, than to aim at a policy of compromise by consulting other people. Master of his own department, he knew that no other person had so much information as himself; confident in his own judgment, he did not care for the advice of others. Counsel, too, was attended with this inconvenience—it involved delay, and Palmerston always preferred the certainty of to-day to the uncertainty of to-morrow. Even the references which it was the custom of his department to make to the Sovereign were attended with the same disadvantage. They occupied time when despatch was essential.[1] The old idea of asking instruc-

[1] Lord Palmerston's biographer declares that 'during the discussion about the Spanish marriages, Lord Palmerston lost three weeks in answering a communication from Guizot by having to send drafts backwards and forwards while the Court was moving about in a cruise

tions from a Sovereign seemed inapplicable to a system in which the Sovereign was bound to act on the advice of a minister.

A close observer might possibly have seen indications of difference between Minister and Court soon after the formation of the Russell Administration. On the first question of importance which arose, Court and Minister held the same views and used the same language. But perhaps Palmerston saw with impatience that even on this subject the Court had established a private communication with the mother of the young Queen of Spain.[1] In the following year the Court showed an increasing disposition to act alone. The Queen's husband and the British Foreign Minister were both agreed in desiring alliance with Germany. But the Queen's husband, with the natural instinct of a German, desired to strengthen Germany by consolidating her commercial interest in a Zollverein or Customs Union. Palmerston, on the contrary, looked on the Zollverein with the prejudices of his countrymen, and regarded its development as injurious to British trade.[2] Slight differences of this kind increased the indisposition of the Minister to consult the Prince, and of the Prince to

The differences between the Foreign Office and the Court.

on the western coast. Guizot, in his subsequent notes and despatches, was always throwing this delay in his face.' Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 195. The despatch in which the delay occurred is evidently that of the 22nd August, 1846. *Correspondence relating to Spanish Marriages*, p. 12, and cf. Guizot's allusion to it as 'plus d'un mois après ma proposition,' &c., *ibid.*, p. 44. The Court had passed much of the preceding month at Osborne, but it did not go on a yacht excursion till the 18th August, four days before the despatch was sent. Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. i. p. 339.

[1] The *Edinburgh Review* stated some years ago, and the statement has never been contradicted, 'If our own information is correct, which we believe it to be (but this is unwritten history), a direct overture was made by the Queen of Spain to the Queen of England, to the effect that she was tired of the French intrigues, and that if England would promise to support her she would marry Prince Leopold out of hand, and send the French Ambassador about his business.' *Edinburgh Review*, vol. cxli, p. 294. I have reason to believe that the communication came not from the Queen of Spain but from the Queen Mother; but that the allegation is otherwise accurate.

[2] Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. i. p. 448.

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consult the Minister.[1] The Prince thought Palmerston's policy in Spain and Portugal quite wrong.[2] He disliked the matter, he disapproved the manner, of many of Palmerston's despatches.[3]

Relations between Court and Minister were thus soon strained. The tension became much greater after the Revolution of 1848. The Foreign Office was abnormally active, and the Foreign Minister, receiving and writing scores of despatches every week, was naturally tempted occasionally to save time and trouble by avoiding a reference to the Court. In June 1849 the Court formally complained of these circumstances to Russell. Palmerston rejoined that when despatches were sent to the Court much time was lost before they were returned, and a compromise was ultimately effected under which Palmerston undertook to submit every despatch to the Queen through the Prime Minister, and the Queen undertook to return them without unnecessary delay.[4] An arrangement of this kind was not likely to endure. Before many months were over the Queen again complained of the conduct of her Minister. Despatches, she declared, were written without her knowledge, and altered without her authority; and Britain, which 'ought to stand highest in the esteem of the world . . . . was detested, mistrusted, and treated with indignity by even the smallest Powers.'[5]

The complaints of the Court in 1849 and 1850.

[1] During the Cracow difficulty the Prince was anxious that the public should be adequately instructed on the subject, and asked a well-known literary man to undertake the task. The gentleman to whose hands the task was entrusted asked leave to consult Palmerston, and the Prince replied that he did not see any necessity for consulting the Foreign Secretary, though he had no objection to his consulting the Prime Minister.

[2] Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. i. p. 426.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. ii. pp. 65, 301.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

[5] Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. ii. p. 303. The letter from which the extract in the text is taken was written by the Prince Consort to the Prime Minister on the 2nd of April, 1850—i.e., during the crisis on the Greek affairs. Six weeks afterwards the French Ambassador was recalled, and the Prince Consort, writing to the Prime Minister in the Queen's name as well as his own, said, 'We are not surprised that Lord Palmerston's mode of doing business should not be borne by the susceptible

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In the beginning of 1850 relations between Court and Minister were strained to the point of snapping. But the events of that year prevented or postponed a rupture. The success of Stanley's attack in the Lords compelled the ministry to rally round Palmerston; its existence was in fact identified with its foreign policy; while after Roebuck's motion the Foreign Minister became the hero of the hour. He was strong in the confidence of the Commons and in the fresh proof which he had given of his own ability. For some months nothing more was heard of the complaints of the Crown. In the last days of the session, however, the Queen again complained of the 'various neglects' to which she had so often drawn attention, and thought fit to embody her complaints in a written memorandum. She insisted that she should have a distinct explanation beforehand

The Queen's memorandum of 1850.

French Government with the same good humour and forbearance as by his colleagues.' *Ibid.*, p. 275. In the second part of the *Greville Memoirs* Queen and Prince are credited with much stronger language. Talking to Clarendon, who was dining with her, the Queen 'exploded, and went with the utmost vehemence and bitterness into the whole of Palmerston's conduct, all the effects produced all over the world and all her own feelings and sentiments about it.' Afterwards Prince Albert 'poured forth without stint and reserve all the pent-up indignation, resentment, and bitterness with which the Queen and himself have been boiling for a long time past. What he enlarged upon with the strongest feeling was the humiliating position in which the Queen was placed in the eyes of the whole world. The consciousness that all the world knew that she utterly disapproved of all that was done in her name, and that she was powerless to prevent it, was inconceivably mortifying and degrading.' *Greville Memoirs*, 2nd part, vol. iii. p. 317. The Prince's reference in the text to Britain being detested, mistrusted, and treated with indignity by even the smallest Power is probably to Naples. Mr. Reeve, in editing the *Greville Memoirs*, says that Lord Palmerston had connived at a supply of arms being furnished to the Sicilian insurgents. The Editor of the *Times* became accidentally acquainted with the circumstance, and charged the Government with it. 'No notice was taken of this first charge. It was therefore repeated in stronger language. Upon this Lord John Russell (who knew nothing of the matter) took it up, said he must inquire into it, and that the charge must be contradicted or the practice stopped. On inquiry he found it was all perfectly true, and then it was that he compelled Lord Palmerston, sorely against his will, to make a formal official apology to the King of Naples,' *Greville Memoirs*, part ii. vol. iii. p. 272 *note*. The apology to which I presume that Mr. Reeve alludes will be found in *Papers relating to Naples and Sicily*, 1848-9, p. 619.

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of her minister's policy; that, after she had sanctioned a measure, it should not be arbitrarily altered; and that she should be fully informed of all that passed between the Foreign Office and foreign countries before decisions of importance were arrived at.[1]

For more than a year after this memorandum had been written, nothing occurred to increase the strain in the relations between Court and Minister. In the autumn of 1851, however, Kossuth, the patriot of Hungary, paid a visit to England; the enthusiasm with which he was everywhere received caused a not unnatural annoyance to Austria; Queen and Prince sympathised to some extent with the feelings of the Austrian Court; and Russell was alarmed at learning that, with an utter disregard of the susceptibilities of Austria and of the sympathies of the Queen, Palmerston intended to receive Kossuth at Broadlands. His private remonstrance produced no effect; and he had actually to summon the Cabinet, and ask it to determine that the Foreign Minister should not be allowed to receive the patriot. Palmerston could not venture to disobey the mandate of his colleagues. But he took an early opportunity of publicly displaying his sympathies. A deputation from Finsbury and Islington waited on him at the Foreign Office. Addresses were presented to him in which the Emperors of Russia and Austria were called despots, tyrants, and odious assassins; and the Foreign Minister, instead of reproving the language, expressed gratification at the demonstration.[2]

Kossuth in England.

Palmerston's conduct on this occasion created alarm both in society and at Court; and, if the Queen had had her way, would probably have led to the Foreign Minister's dismissal. Russell, however, did not venture on quarrelling with his colleague on this ground.

[1] For the document see Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. ii. p. 305.

[2] *Greville Memoirs*, part ii. vol. iii. pp. 413–416. Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. ii. pp. 406 *sq.*, *Edinburgh Review*, No. 324. p. 557.

Whatever society or Court might think, the people were on the side of Kossuth ; and Palmerston, removed from office for supporting a great rebel against autocracy, would have become a hero. For the moment, therefore, Russell submitted to his colleague, and tolerated conduct which he could not approve. He had not, however, to bear with him long. A few days afterwards Palmerston committed a fresh indiscretion which gave his leader a fresh opportunity, and the career of the Foreign Minister was abruptly terminated.

France under the Republic.

It has been already stated in this work that the government of Lamartine had perished in the Revolution of June, and that supreme power had been entrusted to Cavaignac. The government of Cavaignac lasted till December 1848, when the nation, entrusted with the task of choosing a ruler for three years, selected as its President Louis Napoleon, the nephew of the Great Napoleon. For three years the new President filled his position with dignity and discretion. But these qualities alone were not sufficient to give permanence to his government or to ensure his re-election in January 1852. The President consequently determined to secure his own supremacy by an act of vigour. On the first night of December 1851, decrees were posted on the walls of Paris, dissolving the Assembly, proclaiming a state of siege, and convoking the French people, invested with universal suffrage, in electoral colleges. On the same night some of the most conspicuous men in France were arrested by the President's order, and flung into prison.[1]

The *coup d'état*.

These events naturally created a profound impression in England. The Queen and Prince wrote at once to Russell, enjoined a policy of neutrality, and directed that instructions to this effect should be sent to Normanby

[1] I have not thought it necessary in this history to give a detailed account of events which are so familiar to English readers as the previous career of Louis Napoleon and the incidents of the *coup d'état*.

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at Paris.[1] In so doing the Queen undoubtedly treated her ministers as her agents, and not as her advisers. The Cabinet, however, adopted her decision, and thus became responsible for it. Orders were sent to Normanby to make no change whatever in his relations with the French Government, and to do nothing that could 'wear the appearance of interference in the internal affairs of France.' Unluckily, two days before this despatch was written, Palmerston had expressed to Walewski, the French Ambassador in London, a strong opinion 'on the necessity and advantage for France and Europe of the bold and decisive step taken by the President.' This assurance had much more effect than the cold and formal despatch subsequently sent to Normanby. Whatever the British Ambassador at Paris might say or do, the Foreign Minister of France knew that Palmerston approved Napoleon's action. Annoyed at finding that the official language which he was instructed to hold was at variance with the opinions which Palmerston was expressing, Normanby formally complained of the position in which he was placed. His complaint, like every other foreign document, was sent to the Court, and the Queen instantly insisted on knowing whether there was any foundation for the pretensions of the French Government, that Palmerston had expressed approval where Court and Cabinet had enjoined a policy of neutrality. Palmerston, instead of explaining his conduct, entered into a long defence of the President's action; and Russell, knowing that on this question, at any rate, public opinion would not be with Palmerston, dismissed him from his office.[2]

Palmerston is dismissed.

In this affair, as in the many other matters of which

[1] According to Lord Malmesbury, Louis Napoleon believed in 1850 that, although Palmerston was in his favour, Normanby was intriguing against him, and corresponding privately with Prince Albert. *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, p. 192.

[2] Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. pp. 200–211: Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. ii. p. 411 *sq.* Palmerston was succeeded by Lord Granville, and Russell made an ineffectual attempt to strengthen his ministry by offering office to Macaulay.

the Queen had previously complained, Palmerston erred both in matter and manner. His conduct was both treacherous to his colleagues and discourteous to his Queen. Whatever apology may be pleaded for a busy minister who acts on his own responsibility, there can be no excuse for the member of a Government who deliberately defies the decision of the Cabinet. When his colleagues had formally directed that he should not receive Kossuth, it was intolerable that he should allow a deputation to address to him language in the highest sense offensive to Russia and Austria. It was equally indefensible that he should have consented to send instructions to Normanby in glaring contradiction to the language which he had used to Walewski.[1] Nor is it possible to excuse his conduct to the Queen. The fact that the policy of the country is the policy of the Minister and not of the Sovereign, affords no ground for the Minister neglecting to make the Sovereign acquainted with it. There is nothing wrong—there is, on the contrary, much that is the reverse of wrong—in the Sovereign desiring to understand the policy of her Cabinet; and the least that the Minister can do is to give the Sovereign full materials for forming a correct judgment, and to guide her in arriving at it. Common courtesy demands this course, and the claims of courtesy are not lessened when the Sovereign happens to be a woman.

Palmerston, moreover, was not merely guilty of

[1] It is perhaps right to add that Palmerston had communicated his private opinion to Normanby, two days before he sent him the decision of the Queen and Cabinet. But that private letter is not to his credit. 'As to respect for the law and constitution (he wrote) it is scarcely a proper application of these feelings to require them to be directed to the day before yesterday tomfoolery which the scatter-brained heads of Marrast and Tocqueville invented for the torment and perplexity of the French nation, and I must say that that constitution was more honoured by the breach than the observance.' Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 203. To call De Tocqueville, who had, perhaps, the clearest head of all contemporary French statesmen, scatter-brained, is almost as striking a proof of the writer's heedlessness as it is a remarkable instance of the bad taste of many of his private letters.

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disrespect to his Sovereign, he was wanting in respect to himself. A Secretary of State, by virtue of his office, has a right of access to the Crown. A Secretary of State told—as Palmerston was told in 1849—to communicate with the Crown through the Prime Minister should at once have placed his resignation in the Queen's hands. If he had done so he would have been spared the humiliating reproof which he received in 1850. It is difficult to understand how, with that re proof before him, he could have remained in office. The Minister who does not enjoy the confidence of the Crown cannot discharge his duties to the people; and the Minister who does not assert the privileges which his office confers cannot hope to uphold its dignity.

If, however, Palmerston's conduct cannot be justified, he was not the only offender. It is the maxim of the British Constitution that the Crown can do no wrong. Some Minister is responsible for all its actions. The Prime Minister, therefore, and not the Queen, ought to be held answerable for the course which he allowed the Queen to take in 1849, in 1850, and in 1851. It is a blot on Russell's reputation that in each of these years he suffered her Majesty to take a course which she ought not to have taken. The memoranda of 1849 and 1850—if they should have been written at all—should have issued from the Prime Minister and not from the Sovereign. But at least one of these memoranda should never have been issued. Circumstances may necessitate the removal of a Minister from office. But nothing can justify his retention in power, deprived of the privilege of personal communication with the Crown which his office ought to confer.

It is also a matter of regret that the Prime Minister should have allowed the Sovereign to assert a claim which reads as if it had issued from the pen of a Tudor

Sovereign. 'Ministers'—so said Elizabeth on one occasion [1]—'should not presume to do things of their own heads without direction.' The Queen requires the Foreign Minister—so wrote her Majesty—to 'distinctly state what he proposes in a given case, in order that the Queen may know as distinctly to what she has given her royal sanction. Having once given her sanction to a measure, that it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister.' Interpreted by her action in 1851, when she herself directed the policy to be pursued towards France, it is difficult to detect any substantial difference between the claim of Elizabeth and the position of her Majesty.[2] Yet such a claim was not only opposed to the political feelings of the nineteenth century, but is inconsistent with the restraints which her Majesty has habitually placed upon herself. For it is only bare justice to add that no British Sovereign—and perhaps no Sovereign that ever lived—has ever understood the duties of a constitutional ruler so well as the Queen. She rightly claimed, even in this dispute, that, though she had almost invariably differed from Palmerston, she had always supported the policy of her Cabinet.[3] There could have been no difficulty, under such circumstances, in explaining to her the grave objection that attached to her words in 1849, 1850, and 1851.

Palmerston's dismissal undoubtedly led to serious embarrassments. The crisis of the previous spring had proved the difficulty of forming any ministry, and the Whig Government, weak before, was made dangerously

[1] Froude's *History of England*, vol. xii. p. 67.

[2] The Queen's language in 1851, on learning of the *coup d'état* was distinct. She thinks it of great importance that Lord Normanby should be instructed to remain entirely passive, and should take no part whatever in what is passing: and the Prime Minister's answer left no doubt as to his interpretation of her language: 'Your Majesty's directions respecting the state of affairs in Paris shall be followed.' Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. ii. p. 411. Most people will agree that the policy was right; but, right or wrong, it is plain that it was initiated by the Crown and not by the Cabinet.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 308.

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weaker by the loss of its ablest member. The events, moreover, which had directly led to Palmerston's removal, had in themselves intensified the difficulties of the position. For the people, conscious that a Napoleon, by an act of vigour which France had confirmed, had made himself supreme, and concluding that a new Napoleonic despotism would inevitably lead to fresh Napoleonic aggressions, were seized with the old fear of France which the Revolution of 1848 had temporarily allayed. The newspapers[1] teemed with letters and articles proclaiming and deploring the defenceless condition of the country.

Warned by the disastrous consequences which had followed their proposals in 1848, the Whig ministry did not venture on a repetition of the heroic policy which it had then unfolded. Instead of attempting to comply with all the demands of the alarmists, it considered what were the smallest remedies which the public safety required. It was natural under such circumstances that it should renew its project for embodying the militia. Though the word only came into general use in the seventeenth century,[2] and though the force was hardly organised in its modern form till after the Restoration, constitutional historians regarded the militia as the oldest and most legitimate branch of the military forces. The few persons who have read the pamphlets of Trenchard and Moyle and Somers may recollect how many of the Whigs, after the Revolution, had advocated its institution, and opposed the formation of a standing army.[3] The Whigs under Russell revived

[1] Cobden's *Political Writings*, vol. ii. p. 237.

[2] The earliest trace of the word is in the sixteenth century. Its first use in a well-known classic is, I believe, by Bacon: 'Let any Prince or State think soberly of his forces except his militia of natives be of good and valiant soldiers,' Bacon's *Essays*, Essay xxix.

[3] Macaulay deals with this famous paper warfare in his *History*, vol. v. p. 7. This is the unrevised portion of the work, and the text is founded on the arguments of Trenchard on one side and of Somers on the other. There is no reference in the text to Moyle's treatise, but no doubt that would

the policy which their ancestors had propounded one hundred and fifty years before; and while the nation was clamouring for more soldiers, decided on reconstituting the militia.

The militia.

It was an essential characteristic of the militia on its original establishment in the reign of Charles II., that it was local in its constitution and government. It was organised and trained under the Lieutenants of counties. The local character which the force thus assumed endured for nearly a hundred years. In 1757, however, a panic fear of French invasion induced Parliament to place it on a new basis. Till then each parish had been compelled to provide its own quota of men. In that year the liability was transferred from the parish to the individual. Lists of all men liable to serve were sent to the Lieutenants of counties, who selected by ballot a certain number of men from each parish. At the same time the force was placed under the direct control of the Crown. The Crown was empowered to call it out for training, and, under certain circumstances, to embody it for actual service. When so called out or so embodied, it was placed under military law.

The local militia.

For half a century more this force was the only militia. In the crisis of the great war it did not seem sufficient. By a series of Acts passed between 1808 and 1812, the regular militia was consequently supplemented by what was called the local militia. This force, like the regular militia, than which it was six times more numerous, was raised by ballot. But, unlike the regular militia, it could only be called out for the suppression of riots or in case of invasion, the appearance of any enemy on the coasts, or of rebellion. It could not, even in the gravest crisis, be moved out of Great Britain.[1]

have been referred to in the notes if Macaulay had lived to revise the volume for the press.

[1] Anyone who wishes to supplement this slight sketch of the history of the Militia should refer to Clode, *Military Forces of the Crown*, vol. i. p. 31 *et seq.*; *Manual of Military*

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These forces co-existed during the concluding years of the great war. After Waterloo, the necessity for their existence was less apparent. Economy was the order of the day; and the House of Commons, which had refused to continue the income-tax, was not likely to encourage the continuance of the militia. The annual training was suspended in 1816, the ballot was suspended in 1829; and, though the statutory machinery for raising, organising, and training such a force still existed, nothing more was heard of the militia till after the Revolution of 1848.

In deciding, therefore, to reorganise the militia, the Whig ministry had the choice of two separate forces. Anxious to do as little as possible in the crisis, it decided on reconstituting, not the regular, but the local militia. Such a proposal did not satisfy alarmists. Palmerston at once gave expression to their views by suggesting that the House should reverse the project and reconstitute the regular militia. The House cheered his speech and apparently shared his sentiments. Encouraged in this way, he proposed and carried four days afterwards the omission of the word 'local' from Russell's resolution, and the Whig ministers, correctly interpreting their defeat as indicative of their decreased authority, placed their resignations in the Queen's hands.[1]

The Whigs resign.

Russell's resignation marks a distinct epoch in the political history of England. For more than seventeen years he and his great rival, Peel, had led the House of Commons. During twelve out of these seventeen years the lead had been on Russell's shoulders. Except Pitt, no other man who has lived in the present century

The character of Russell.

Law (published by the Parliamentary Counsel's Office), pp. 199–211; Hallam's *Constitutional History*, popular edition, vol. ii. p. 128–134, and vol. iii. p. 262; and Mr. O'Dowd's article on Militia in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

[1] For the debate, *Hansard*, vol. cxix. p. 550; for the division, 136 votes to 125, *ibid.*, 874; for Russell's resignation, *ibid.*, 882. The Government was defeated by 136 votes to 125. *Ibid.*, vol. cxix. pp. 550, 874, 882.

can boast that he has led the House of Commons for a dozen years. Yet Russell's fame is hardly equal to the opportunities which he enjoyed. The historian naturally compares him with Peel, and Russell loses in the comparison. Yet in this contrast there is much in which Russell has the advantage over his rival. In the happier hours of social converse, Russell's conversation had a charm which could hardly be found in Peel. In the sterner business of the State, men were attracted to Russell by his temper; they were repelled by Peel. Whatever verdict the head may pronounce on the two ministers, the heart will decide for Russell between the two men.

In their political careers, moreover, Russell had in one respect an advantage. He was the most consistent of statesmen, while Peel was one of the most inconsistent. Consistency with Russell was almost a defect, just as inconsistency in Peel was, perhaps, a merit. It was Peel's misfortune or his fault that he was compelled throughout his career to fling overboard, one after another, the opinions which he had either inherited or formed. It was Russell's misfortune or fault that he had thought out his opinions in early life with such care that he was never able to enlarge them. He remained at sixty what he was at twenty. Men, however, living in a progressive age cannot afford to stand still when all around them is in motion. Politics are not exempt from the law of evolution by which the physical and moral world are alike governed.

In charm of manner, in consistency of conduct, Russell may be preferred to Peel. In all the higher attributes of statesmanship, Peel was superior to Russell. The reader who studies Peel's parliamentary career is struck with its success; the student who analyses Russell's life in Parliament will be surprised at its failure. Whether he were dealing with financial matters, or

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with constitutional questions, or with social subjects, Peel almost invariably succeeded in carrying his measures in the shape in which he designed them. The measures of Russell, on the contrary, in their final shape rarely bore any close resemblance to their original drafts. It might be said of them, 'There's a divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will.' The Budgets of his administration were altered as no Budgets had ever been recast since the time of Vansittart. The Irish policy of the Whigs was marked by a series of inconsistencies. Melbourne's second ministry was founded on the necessity of an Appropriation clause. Russell's own administration was formed on opposition to Coercion. Before Melbourne resigned, Appropriation was finally abandoned. Before Russell had been eighteen months in office the most stringent of Coercion bills was adopted. But the same inconsistency which marked the policy of the Whigs in these matters runs through nearly all their measures. Hardly any bill which they introduced became law in its original shape. Many measures which they urged forward as of the first importance never became law at all.

In one other respect the career of Russell contrasts unfavourably with that of Peel. The one man lived to extreme old age, the other died in the maturity of his powers. Peel was removed from political warfare when failure, if it had begun at all, was only perceptible to himself. Russell was spared to age and office when his growing infirmities of mind and body were visible to his friends. If he had died in 1832, his would have been recollected as a career of promise. If he had died in 1852, he would have been remembered as a Minister who had served the cause of freedom well. Living till 1878, the weaknesses of his old age obliterated the memory of his achievements, and dimmed the lustre of the name which he deserved to bear.

Even in his long career, nothing is more singular than the fact that he was succeeded by Derby, for Stanley had just inherited his father's title. Twenty-two years before, Stanley and he, in the same ministry and under the same leader, had fought the same cause, and had been promoted to the Cabinet on the same day. Since then, contrary impulses had carried them far apart; and Derby, unwilling even to renew the negotiations with the old followers of Peel which he had commenced the year before, was compelled to form a Cabinet from among his immediate supporters. Four peers, Lonsdale, Salisbury, Northumberland, and Hardwick, became respectively President of the Council, Privy Seal, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Postmaster-General. Sugden, who had been law officer in Peel's first ministry, and Chancellor of Ireland in 1841, was made Lord St. Leonards and Chancellor; the Board of Trade was conferred on Henley; the Board of Control on Herries. Malmesbury, an amiable nobleman, whose father had served in diplomacy, became Foreign Minister. Pakington, a country gentleman of moderate means and fair capacity, was sent to the Colonial Office. The Home Office was entrusted to a barrister who had been half-a-dozen years in Parliament, who, both on his father's and on his mother's side, inherited blood which had produced statesmen, but who in these pages must be free both from censure and from praise.

He is succeeded by Lord Derby.

These, with one exception, were the chief members of the new Government. The lead in the Commons, however, was entrusted to the remarkable man who had organised rebellion against Peel, who had rallied the protectionists against Russell, and who had gradually become the acknowledged leader of the Tory party. With a keen insight, Disraeli secured the Chancellorship of the Exchequer for himself. It might, indeed, have been objected at the time that he had less

Disraeli.

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knowledge of finance than many of his colleagues; and that Derby had at his disposal such men as Henley, who would have commanded the confidence of country gentlemen, and Herries, who was versed in the traditions of the Treasury. Disraeli, however, probably reflected that, while a strong man may make his mark in any great department, a strong man armed with the power of the purse must necessarily be supreme. He increased his own power by placing a personal friend of his own—Lord John Manners—at the Office of Works. Vivian Grey had thus the satisfaction of meeting Eskdale and Henry Sydney in the Cabinet.

The inexperience of the Ministry.

Whatever opinion may be formed of the capacity of the ministry, no Cabinet of the century had contained so little of experience. Of the thirteen gentlemen who composed it, only two, Derby and Herries, had ever sat in a Cabinet Council before. Only one other, the Chancellor, had held high office. So completely had the Tories separated themselves from the leader under whom they had marched to victory only ten years before, that, with the solitary exception of Derby, no member of the Peel Cabinet could be found to take office in the new ministry.

Its policy.

Inexperienced as the members of the Government were, they had special difficulties to contend with. The accidental circumstances which had placed Russell in a minority in the House of Commons had not given Derby a majority in that House. With Whigs and free-traders against him, it was even doubtful whether he could command a majority in the Lords. He was forced to disarm at the outset a portion of his opponents by announcing that, though still in favour of a tax on corn, he should take no steps to alter the legislation of the previous Parliament till the country had received an opportunity of expressing an opinion on its policy. In the meanwhile the ministry would address itself to other

measures—to the organisation of the militia, to social and legal reforms. To a new Parliament would be entrusted the task of deciding between the rival advantages of protection and free trade.[1]

This declaration was undoubtedly discreet. Moderate men were willing enough to give the new ministers a fair trial; and Cobden and his old associates found themselves almost alone in their reluctance to tolerate a ministry which declined to state whether it intended to adhere to free trade. The members of the Corn Law League reassembled to maintain the principles which they had asserted six years before. Their leader, Cobden, desired to stop the supplies,[2] and thus force the Government to appeal to the country. But the Whigs, conscious of their own weakness, and aware that time alone could heal their divisions, were well content to let matters take their course. All parties tacitly understood that a short session would be followed by a dissolution. No object was to be gained by indefinite debates which only postponed the date of the appeal to the people.

The Militia Bill.

The ministry, thus freed from any serious opposition, succeeded in passing some useful measures. One of them alone requires mention in this chapter. The panic which had induced the Whigs to introduce a Militia Bill still prevailed, and the Tories were compelled to take some steps for the sake of allaying the alarm. England, indeed, nominally possessed an army of 160,000 men. But that force only numbered one-fourth of the Russian army, one-third of the French army, one-half of the Prussian army, and barely exceeded the army of Belgium. Moreover, the empire which the force was required to defend comprehended one-sixth of the population and one-eighth of the habitable surface of the globe; and the army was scattered through these vast

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxix. p. 898 *sq.* [2] Morley's *Cobden*, vol. ii. p. 116.

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possessions. It was impossible to concentrate more than 25,000 men at any spot; and even this force could not be assembled without leaving the metropolis and the Sovereign to the protection of pensioners and police.[1]

The new ministry, like the old Government, thus forced to address itself to the task of improving the defences of the country, decided that the most economical and least objectionable course was the reconstitution of the militia. But it avoided the errors which had proved fatal to the Russell Cabinet. Instead of reviving the old local militia, incapable of being moved out of Great Britain and recruited by compulsory ballot, the Home Secretary proposed to form a regular militia, available for service in every part of the United Kingdom, and recruited by voluntary enlistment. He did not, indeed, venture to abolish the machinery for the ballot. But he retained it only as a reserve to which it might possibly be necessary to resort. Voluntary enlistment under the new scheme was to be the rule; compulsory service was only to be enforced when voluntary measures had been tried and failed.

The bill carried.

The measure differed in most of its details from that which had been introduced by Russell, but it was founded on the same basis—the necessity for increased defence; and on the same principle, the reconstitution of the militia. It should consequently have been the business of the Opposition to support its principle and to criticise its details. It was, however, a strange defect in Russell's character, that he could not always see the necessity of maintaining a principle either in office or in opposition. Annoyed at the notion that any other Government should have ventured on imitating his example, he attacked a measure which consistency should have made him support. His conduct in doing so injured his own position. In the Commons, Palmerston, still sore from his past treat-

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxx. p. 270.

ment, supported the bill; and moderate men of all parties, imitating Palmerston's example, gave the Government a great majority.[1] In the Lords, Wellington gave the proposal the support of his high authority. The bill rapidly became law, and the Queen had the satisfaction of assenting to a 'measure . . . wisely adopted for the better organisation of . . . a constitutional force which, limited to purposes of internal defence, can afford no just ground of jealousy to neighbouring Powers, but which, in the event of any sudden and unforeseen disturbance' abroad would essentially contribute to the protection of the country.[2]

Such a measure would have conferred credit on any ministry. Introduced by men new to public life, it added largely to the reputation of the new Government. A ministry chosen only from a minority in Parliament had been supported in its chief measure by large majorities; it had shown that it possessed skill to devise, and capacity to carry, a bill of the first importance. Yet the success of the measure was not the only thing noteworthy about its passage. The debate on its second reading in the Lords was memorable as the last occasion on which Wellington spoke in that House. The Duke had long survived the time which Solon and David agreed in thinking was allotted to the life of man. Born in 1769, he had completed the eighty-third year of his age. Yet when, in the middle of September, it was known that the old man was gone, the news came like a shock of surprise. The foremost figure had been called off the stage, and the curtain had dropped for ever on a mighty past. It was true that the chief work of the Duke's life had been done before most of the men who followed him to his grave had left school, and before the Sovereign

The death of Wellington.

[1] The second reading was carried by 315 votes to 165. *Hansard*, vol. cxx. p. 1185.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. cxxii. p. 1427.

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whom he served so faithfully had been born. But great work survives the doing of it; and Wellington had done such a work as few soldiers have ever done. He had given England thirty-seven years of peace. The blood of Waterloo was hardly too dear a price to pay for such a blessing.

His character and political career.

With Wellington, the soldier, this book has no direct concern; with Wellington, the statesman, it has had frequently to deal. Yet Wellington's political career was the outcome of his military success; he would never have been the First Minister of the Crown if his sword had not made him the first man of the age. He occupies a unique position in political history. It would be untrue to say that he had no political principles; but he had no principles in the sense in which the word is used by ordinary politicians. It was the object of his political career to enable the King's Government to be carried on; and, for this supreme end, he was ready to sacrifice all the questions on which ordinary ministers stand or fall. Thus it came to pass that, while he was Prime Minister, the dissenters were gratified by the repeal of the Test Acts, and the Roman Catholics were appeased by the removal of their disabilities. Thus again, after the Reform Act he set himself the task of inducing the Lords to submit to the decrees of the Commons. In a House where Lyndhurst led the Tory party, and Brougham was ever ready to thwart his old colleagues, he did much to counteract the mischief, and to make the conduct of Government practicable.

His position, his wealth, his reputation, helped him to do this. The greatness of his success had placed him above suspicion; and the man who had obviously nothing to win could afford to do things which, in other men, prompted the suggestion of unworthy motives. He was judged by a standard different from

that applied to other persons; and it was regarded, and rightly, as the extreme of honesty on his part to do that which men were ready enough—unjustly—to charge Peel with dishonesty for doing. Partly from this reason, partly from a recollection of what he had done, he enjoyed a popularity such as perhaps was never reached by any other subject. With the exception of one brief period of his career, when his foolish declaration against Reform drew on him the temporary hostility of the populace, he was the hero of the nation; and no hero ever deserved better the reverence which was paid to him.

His striking characteristic was his judgment. He had no doubt, in addition, capacity and courage. He could not have fought Salamanca without the one, he would not have held Waterloo without the other. But in capacity he was not, possibly, superior to Moore; in courage he was not superior to Gough. He was a great general, not because he had a great intellect, but because he made fewer mistakes than other men. The calm, even judgment, which made him great as a general, made him great as a statesman. He did not suffer himself to be swayed by passion and prejudice. He formed his opinions on the circumstances as they arose, and with rare exceptions his decisions have commended themselves to posterity.

His services were great almost beyond precedent. His rewards were not unprecedentedly but exceptionally great. Some men will probably conclude that they were extravagant, and therefore mischievous. It may be hoped that a day will ultimately come when the highest honours will not be reserved for mere warriors. In that time the Cobdens and the Stephensons may change places in the world's estimation with the select company to whom the Crown has awarded titles or Parliament has granted pensions. But it may be hoped

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that even then posterity will recollect that the soldier who was their ancestors' hero was in every sense a great man; that among a generation of workers he was distinguished for the excellence of his work; that, whether in the field or in the senate, he did with all his might whatever he found for his hand to do; that he was true throughout his life to Crown and country; and that he lived and died the noblest work of God—an honest man.

The dissolution of 1852.

His death, which occurred on the 14th of September, took place during the recess; his funeral, which was celebrated with extraordinary pomp on the 18th of November, was deferred till after the meeting of the new Parliament. For Parliament, prorogued on the 1st of July, had been immediately afterwards dissolved. The electors were thus afforded the opportunity, which Derby had expressed a desire that they should receive, of pronouncing between the free trade which had been adopted by Peel, and the protection to which the new ministry was supposed to desire to return.[1] The result was pronounced with an emphasis which it was impossible to mistake. The new ministers gained some strength—the influence which all Governments possessed made this circumstance certain. A few of the prominent supporters of Peel lost their seats—the dislike which the masses usually feel for politicians who belong to neither of the parties of the State accounted for and explained their defeat. But the slight changes in the composition of the House of Commons made it plain that the country was not prepared for any reversal of policy. The electors had deliberately abandoned protection in 1847, they showed no disposition in 1852 to do away with free trade.

[1] The desire was not shared by Disraeli. He wrote on the 19th of August to Lord Malmesbury, 'We ought now to be for as complete free trade as we can obtain, and let the English farmer, and the English landlord too, buy the best and the cheapest silks for their wives and daughters.' *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, p. 260.

There was no room for surprise at the decision of the country. In the years which had passed since 1846, a greater eloquence than even Cobden's had made the people cling to the victory which they had won. Facts had told decisively in favour of Cobden and Peel, and had falsified the predictions of Disraeli and Bentinck. In the interval nearly 6,000,000*l.* of taxation had been swept away, and the revenue was as large in the end as it had been in the beginning. So far from the manufactures being affected, British exports had increased from 58,000,000*l.* to 78,000,000*l.* The shipping trade, instead of being destroyed by the Navigation Act, was more prosperous than had ever been known before. The poor, instead of suffering from foreign competition, had never been so well off as at the end of 1852. On the 1st January, 1853, there were less than 800,000 paupers in the whole of England and Wales. Such a thing could not probably have been said of any previous New Year's day in this century. Such a thing unhappily could not be said again for another twenty-three years. Even the landowners for whose sake the battle of protection had been fought were not worse off from cheap corn. The assessment under Schedule B is based on the rental of agricultural land, and the assessment in 1852 was higher than it had been in 1845.[1]

The results of free trade.

These facts spoke with so much eloquence that it was impossible for protectionists to ignore them. Instead of doing so, they endeavoured to account for the increasing prosperity of the country by other circumstances. In 1851 gold in vast quantities had been discovered in Australia. It is a common error to con-

The effects of the discovery of gold in Australia.

[1] The revenue of the year ending 5th January 1846 amounted to 57,556,486*l.*; that of the year ending 5th January 1853, to 57,726,900*l.* The taxes repealed in the interval exceeded those imposed by 5,800,000*l.* The British exports in 1846 amounted to 57,786,876*l.*, in 1852 to 78,076,854*l.* There were 3,199,785 tons of British shipping in 1846, 3,759,278 in 1852; 167,491 tons of shipping were built in 1852. The assessment under Schedule B amounted to 46,328,811*l.* in 1845, and to 46,681,488*l.* in 1852.

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found gold with wealth, and a large addition to the stock of gold in the world was supposed to account for an apparent addition to its riches. Few subjects are more difficult to determine than the exact consequences of an increase or a decrease in the supply of gold. But it is certain that, in the long run, the increase or the decrease in the supply of gold must have the same consequences as the increase or decrease in the supply of other articles. If corn increase more rapidly than the demand for it, its price will fall; in the same way if the production of gold be increased more rapidly than the demand for it, its price will fall. Conversely, if either the population grow more rapidly than the wheat supply, or the demand for gold increase more rapidly than its supply, the price of wheat and gold will rise.

The price of all articles is really measured in the same way. The price of wheat is expressed, for instance, by stating the amount of another commodity for which a quarter of wheat may be exchanged. In the earlier ages of mankind, the ox was the ordinary standard of value. Thus when Glaucus and Diomed change their armour in the Iliad, Diomed obtains arms worth a hundred oxen for arms which had only cost nine oxen. But in later ages gold and silver have been universally adopted as the measure of value, and all civilised nations, instead of expressing the value of an article in oxen, express it by stating the amount of gold or silver which it will purchase.

This circumstance makes it a little more difficult to measure the rise and fall in the value of gold than the rise and fall in the value of any other article. A rise in the value of corn is usually expressed with sufficient accuracy by stating the rise in its price in gold. A rise or fall in the value of gold can only be ascertained by comparing its value with all or many of the other articles with which gold is commonly exchanged. In

no other way is it possible to determine whether the variation in the price is due to an alteration in the value of this or that commodity, or to a change in the value of gold itself.

In modern history the discovery of America is the event which had most effect on the price of the precious metals. It threw vast quantities of these on the European markets;[1] and, so high an authority as Adam Smith has declared, reduced the value of these metals to about a third of what it had been before. But it may be doubted whether this conclusion is really accurate. Even Adam Smith admits that the value of gold did not sink as rapidly as the value of silver, and there are some reasons for thinking that the rise of prices which

[1] Gregory King, in a curious pamphlet written in 1688, which will be found printed in Tooke's *Thoughts and Details on the High and Low Prices*, Appendix, No. ii. estimated that when the West Indies were discovered there were only 45,000,000*l.* sterling of the precious metals in Europe and 500,000,000*l.* in the world. He further estimated that in the succeeding 180 years, the produce of gold and silver in the world had amounted to 1,200,000,000*l.* and that 520,000,000*l.* of the amount had been brought to Europe. Half of the whole stock, he considered, had been consumed; and the stock in 1698 was placed by him at 850,000,000*l.* in the world, of which he calculated that 225,000,000*l.* were in Europe. The *Economist*, in a valuable paper published on the 7th June, 1879, said that in the 383 years ending 1875, the silver produced had amounted to 180,830,575 kilogrammes, and the gold to 9,508,505. Sir C. Wood, speaking in 1844, said that in the reign of Henry IV. gold was reckoned to be to silver as 1 to 10, in that of Elizabeth as 1 to 11, in that of James I. as 1 to 12, in that of Charles II. as 1 to 14, and in 1844 as 1 to 15 and a fraction. *Hansard*, vol. lxxiv. p. 1350. Adam Smith says—I believe more accurately—that before the discovery of the mines of America, an ounce of fine gold was supposed to be worth from 10 to 12 ounces of silver, but that about the middle of the 17th century an ounce of fine gold came to be worth between 14 and 15 ounces of silver. *Wealth of Nations*, vol. i. p. 330. Adam Smith's conclusions are supported by the *Economist* in the paper which I have already quoted, where gold is placed as 1 to 10·75 of silver in 1497, as 1 to 15·10 in 1648, and as 1 to 15·46 in 1801. The annual production of gold was estimated by McCulloch in 1844 (*Commerc. Dict. ad verb.* 'Precious Metals') as 9,050,000*l.*, the annual consumption in arts and coinage as 6,440,000*l.*, and the consequent addition of the stock as 2,610,000*l.* It may be worth while adding to this account that in the days of Homer, gold seems to have been only 11 times more valuable than χαλκός, that in the days of Herodotus it was 13 times more valuable than silver, book iii. ch. 95, and that it appears, from an admirable note by Sir J. G. Wilkinson, that its value was reduced to 10 to 1 in the days of Alexander. It long continued at these proportions. *Rawlinson's Herodotus*, vol. ii. p. 403, *note*.

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occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was due rather to the undoubted fall in the value of silver than to the more doubtful fall in the value of gold.

Gold, at any rate before the discovery of America, was only ten times more valuable than silver in Europe. Gold, after the discovery of America, rose in value till it was fifteen times more costly than silver. These proportions endured at the commencement of the present century. In 1819, legislation which, for the first time in English history, based the currency on gold, had probably the effect of further raising the value of that metal; and in 1821 gold was sixteen times (or, more exactly, 15·95 times) more valuable than silver in Europe.

At this time, however, two causes were simultaneously producing a change in the value of the precious metals, and a slighter change in the relative values of gold and silver. The first of these causes was the series of revolutions in Spanish America, which, throwing a continent into disorder, reduced the American supply of gold and silver to about one-third of its former proportions.[1] The second of these was the discovery of gold-fields in the Ural Mountains in 1823, which gradually placed Russia at the head of gold-producing countries.[2] To the former cause was in a great measure due the remarkable fall of prices[3] which was one of the characteristics of the peace, and which an imperfectly in-

[1] From 47,061,000 to 16,036,000 dollars. Mr. Jacob, writing to Tooke, *Thoughts and Details on the High and Low Prices from* 1792 *to* 1822, second edition, p. 380.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 391, and *Encyclopædia Britannica, ad verb.* 'Gold,' p. 743. McCulloch places the annual Russo-Asiatic supply of gold at 2,600,000*l.*, *Commerc. Dict. ad verb.* 'Precious Metals.'

[3] Only in a measure, however. The peace had probably the effect of liberating much hoarded bullion, and this bullion, brought into circulation, had the effect of increasing the supply. This circumstance and other matters, such as the increased consumption of gold in arts &c., must be weighed by anyone who exhaustively deals with the whole question. I have endeavoured in the text, however, rather to suggest than to settle the point, which has only an incidental connection with this history.

structed writer referred to the resumption of cash payments. To the latter cause may more directly be attributed the circumstance that silver, compared with gold, became a little more valuable than it was in 1821.

What the discovery of gold in the Urals had done in 1823, the discovery of gold in Australia did more effectually in 1851.[1] The annual supply of gold was at once trebled, or perhaps quadrupled. Undoubtedly some effect was consequently made on prices. But the effect was probably only slowly and gradually felt. Gold was absorbed in vast and unprecedented quantities in the arts, and the supply which was actually available for barter was not immediately augmented to the same degree. Of the increased production, however, there was no doubt; and superficial thinkers pleaded it as the cause of various matters which they found it difficult to explain. In Alison's judgment, it at last redressed the inconvenience which had resulted from the suspension of cash payments. In the opinion of baffled protectionists it accounted for the prosperity which, falsifying all their predictions, had followed in the steps of free trade. But the country generally paid no heed to these explanations. Enough for it that Bentinck had proved wrong and that Cobden had proved right. No arguments, however specious, could induce it to abandon free trade.

The abandonment of Protection.

This circumstance was plain enough to Disraeli. Ever since 1847, he had been suggesting that agriculture might be compensated by a readjustment of taxation for the losses which he still contended had been inflicted on it by free trade. If it were impracticable to restore protection, it was possible to repeal

[1] According to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (*ad verb.* 'Gold') the average annual supply increased from 1,760,500 ounces in the decade 1841–50 to 6,350,180 ounces in the lustrum 1851–55. But of course, if McCulloch is right in placing the production of gold in 1842 at 9,050,000*l.*, the writer in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* has underestimated the supply at that time.

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the taxes which pressed heavily on the land. His attitude convinced many persons that he was preparing to surrender in office the principles which he had uniformly avowed in opposition. The preliminary Budget, which he produced in April 1852, confirmed this suspicion. To the amusement and delight of the free-traders, amidst the 'sullen silence'[1] of his own friends, he dilated on the prosperity of the country and on the success of free trade. Derby himself, astounded at the language of his lieutenant, attempted to resuscitate protection in an after-dinner speech at the Mansion House.[2] Disraeli cared not for his leader's opinions. In an address to his constituents, he had the effrontery to declare that the time was gone by for recurring to protection. The spirit of the age tended to free intercourse, and the producer had nothing to expect but fair treatment. All that the legislature could do for him was to diminish the cost of production.[3]

When Parliament met in November, moreover, it was evident that Disraeli, and not Derby, was shaping the policy of the Cabinet. The Speech from the throne re-echoed his language,[4] and the recommendations of the Speech were repeated by ministers. In the Lords, Derby emphatically declared that, in regard to free trade, he was prepared to submit to the decision of the country. In the Commons, Disraeli announced that the Budget would at once be brought forward, and that Parliament would then receive practical proof that the ministry was loyally intent on carrying out its new

[1] Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 231.

[2] Hickman's *Beaconsfield*, p. 182.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 183; cf. *Life of Lord Beaconsfield* by O'Connor, p. 441.

[4] 'If you should be of opinion that recent legislation, in contributing with other causes to this happy result, has at the same time inflicted unavoidable injury on certain important interests, I recommend you to dispassionately consider how far it may be practicable equitably to mitigate that injury, and to enable the industry of the country to meet successfully that unrestricted competition to which Parliament in its wisdom has decided that it should be subjected.' *Hansard*, vol. cxxiii. p. 20.

principles. Never had convert been more eager to prove the sincerity of his conversion, than Derby and Disraeli to show that the Administration was founded on a policy of free trade.

Mr. Villiers' resolutions.

In heaven there is more joy over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety-nine just men who need no repentance. Such a joy, however, was not felt in 1852 by free-traders in the House of Commons. They could not tolerate protectionist ministers pursuing a policy of free trade. They would not even patiently wait for the development of the measure which the ministry had promised to produce. On the first available night of the session, Mr. Villiers, whose long and consistent advocacy of free trade in corn had given him an ascendency which no other free-trader, except Cobden, enjoyed, brought forward some resolutions affirming the advantages which had ensued from the adoption of free trade, declaring that the Act of 1846 was a wise, just, and beneficial measure, asserting the necessity of maintaining and extending the same policy, and pledging the House to consider any measures consistent with these principles.[1]

Disraeli's amendment.

Mr. Villiers' notice placed Disraeli in some difficulty. Ready, for the sake of power, to adopt the legislation of 1846 as the basis of his policy, he was not yet prepared to pronounce it 'wise, just, and beneficial.' These odious epithets, as he called them, implied that his own conduct in opposing Peel had been unwise, unjust, and injurious. Instead, therefore, of accepting Mr. Villiers' resolutions, he endeavoured to substitute for them a colourless declaration of the duty of adhering to a policy of free trade.[2] In substance there was no difference between the policy to which Mr. Villiers asked the House to adhere, and the policy which

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxxiii. p. 351.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 411.

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Disraeli professed his readiness to adopt. The ministry, however, not unnaturally declared that, while it was ready to accept a resolution of its own framing, it should treat the adoption of Mr. Villiers' proposal as a proof that the House had no confidence in its professions and its measures.

The Whigs, however, were hardly yet prepared to accept office; the old differences between the free-traders and themselves were not composed; the recent rupture between Palmerston[1] and Russell was not healed. Moderate men, moreover, thought that it was not desirable that the ministry should be defeated on an abstract proposition; they preferred that it should be afforded an opportunity of proving its sincerity and its capacity. Under these circumstances Palmerston came forward with alternative resolutions attributing the prosperity of the country to free trade, and declaring that this policy should be 'firmly maintained and prudently extended.'[2] If there had been little difference in substance between the resolutions of Mr. Villiers and the amendment of Disraeli, there was equally little difference between the alternative of Palmerston and either of the proposals for which he substituted it. The Government, however, thought itself able to accept from Palmerston a proposition which it could not accept from Mr. Villiers; and the omission of the 'odious epithets' gave it an excuse for doing so. The followers of Peel were equally ready to accept from Palmerston a declaration which they did not choose to accept from Disraeli. Thus everything tended to the settlement of an artificial controversy by the adoption of Palmerston's expedient. Mr. Villiers' resolutions were

Palmerston's alternative resolutions,

which are adopted.

[1] I have not thought it necessary to refer to the original negotiations in February to induce Palmerston to join the Tory ministry. See for the offers to him, Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 230; or again for the renewed offer made to him in the summer, *ibid.*, p. 248; and cf. as to these and other negotiations, *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, pp. 281, 282.

[2] *Hansard*, vol. cxxiii. p. 458.

rejected, and Palmerston's alternative adopted by a large majority.[1]

With Palmerston's help, Disraeli had gotten a victory; but it was a victory which would have ruined the career of any other politician. The man who had won his reputation by his persistent attacks on Peel, and who had risen to ascendency by his uncompromising defence of protection, had flung aside his old opinions and betrayed his old friends for the sake of securing a few more days of office. It was the striking circumstance of Disraeli's career, however, that the public accepted at his hands with a laugh changes which it would have met in any other statesman with a reproof. For the moment the defeat of Mr. Villiers strengthened the position of the Government. It is possible that, if it had discharged any necessary business, and adjourned Parliament, it might have secured some more months of office. But, with a fatal confidence in his own powers, Disraeli had undertaken at once to produce his Budget; and accordingly, a week after the victory, he rose to explain the manner in which he proposed to conciliate his old supporters without deceiving his new friends. It has passed into a tradition to say that the speech in which he explained his plan was one remarkable for its ability. Men of genius—and Disraeli ranks in genius above all his political contemporaries—can always make able and effective speeches; and the dullest of all subjects in the hands of a pedant can be invested with the interest of a romance when it is entrusted to a man of parts. For more than five hours Disraeli interested the House, and almost succeeded in persuading his audience that his scheme was as wise as it was specious. But the eloquence of

The Budget of December 1852.

[1] Mr. Villiers' resolutions were rejected by 336 votes to 256. *Hansard*, vol. cxxiii. p. 696. Palmerston's were adopted by 468 votes to 53, *ibid.*, p. 701. The minority consisted of Conservatives who were still true to the cause which their leader had thrown over.

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genius, when it is divorced from knowledge, has this disadvantage. Its effects are less permanent than those of the solid arguments of its commonplace opponents. Splendour and effect have their triumph on the day, while sober reason succeeds on the morrow.

According to Disraeli, the era of unrestricted competition had begun. Protection was an obsolete doctrine which it was hardly worth while discussing. Free trade, in the manner in which it had hitherto been devised, was an imperfect system, which it was necessary to complete. The legislation of 1846, 1848, and 1849 had dealt with corn, sugar, and ships. Yet the farmers who grew corn, the colonists who grew sugar, the merchants who owned ships, were fettered with restrictions. These restrictions the great prophet of protection, who had now become the prophet of unrestricted competition, undertook to remove. The shipping interest was harassed by various regulations respecting pilotage, insurance, and other matters. It was burdened with heavy taxation for lighting the coasts. Disraeli offered to transfer 100,000*l.* of this taxation to the Consolidated Fund, and to relieve the shipping interest to the same extent. So far for ships: next as to sugar. It was impossible to inaugurate the new era of unrestricted competition without dealing with the grievances of the West Indies. Unfortunately, however, for Disraeli, facts, which had falsified all his predictions respecting corn, had simultaneously destroyed all his arguments respecting sugar. The admission of foreign sugar to the markets, instead of destroying the West Indian trade, had been followed by a large increase in the trade in colonial sugar. The colonies, which sent only 4,094,000 cwt. of sugar to England in the first ten months of 1851, consigned 5,373,000 cwt. of sugar to England in the first ten months of 1852, while the supplies of foreign refined sugar fell from 268,000 cwt. in

November 1851, to 243,000. cwt. in November 1852, and the supplies of foreign unrefined sugar decreased in a still greater proportion. The writer who had declared that the colonies 'were already overwhelmed' by slave-grown sugar,[1] who had preserved the famous boast of Bentinck, that he had 'saved the colonies' and rung 'the knell of free trade' by carrying in a Select Committee a differential duty of 10*s.* in favour of colonial sugar,[2] had to protest that, call him traitor, call him renegade, he could not recommend 'a differential duty to prop up a prostrate industry which is actually commanding the metropolitan market.'[3]

Tardily convinced, therefore, of the folly of his old methods, but forced to do something in redemption of his old pledges, Disraeli proposed to conciliate the colonists by allowing them to refine sugar in bond for the home markets. It was supposed that foreign sugar contained a larger proportion of saccharine matter than colonial sugar. It was asserted, therefore, that the payment of duty on the raw commodity favoured the foreign producer; and it was urged that equality would be established if the sugar were refined in bond and the duty paid on the raw commodity. Such an arrangement had already been effected in the case of sugar intended for exportation.[4] Its extension to sugar intended for home consumption had been recommended by Bentinck, and Bentinck's proposal had occupied just three lines in the political biography.[5] Something, however, had to be done for the colonists; protection was impossible; and, instead of it, Disraeli offered the smallest of concessions—to allow them to refine sugar in bond.

[1] *Lord G. Bentinck*, p. 316.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 388.
[3] *Hansard*, vol. cxxiii. p. 850.
[4] By the 3 and 4 William IV., c. 61.
[5] *Life of Lord G. Bentinck*, eighth edition, p. 395. It is characteristic of Disraeli, that he had paid so little attention to a proposal which was to become the basis of his policy, that these three lines are hopelessly inaccurate.

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There was nothing in these proposals calculated to excite enthusiasm. The relief to merchants and colonists was too small to attract support. There was still, however, the great landed interest to deal with, and Disraeli had fought the battle of the landowner as no man had ever fought it before. In 1846 and 1847 he had resisted free trade; in 1849, 1850, and 1851, he had advocated the remission of local burdens. 'Reciprocity being impossible,' as the editor of his speeches afterwards put it, 'the next best thing was to obtain compensation for the landed interest.'[1] He had the opportunity in December 1852 of carrying out his own proposals. Though protection was already abandoned, there was no obvious reason to prevent his redeeming the pledges which he had given to the agriculturist. But facts again had acted unkindly towards Disraeli. The prosperity which had followed free trade had reduced the burden of the poor rate, and the arguments which had been based on a high expenditure had been weakened or destroyed by a low one.[2] To the consternation of his own friends, to the amusement and delight of his opponents, Disraeli withdrew all his former recommendations, with the solitary excuse that he had 'greater subjects to consider than the triumph of obsolete opinions.'[3] But, just as he had been forced to do something for shipowner and colonist, so he felt constrained to extend some boon to the farmers whom he had betrayed. Instead of repeating his old remedy, which was open to the fatal objection that it relieved the landowner alone, he offered to reduce the malt-tax by one half, and to repeal the old war duty on hops. He threw out, at the same time, a bait for the rest of

[1] *Lord Beaconsfield's Speeches*, vol. i. p. 208.

[2] The expenditure on the poor fell from 6,180,000*l.* in 1848 to 4,962,000*l.* in 1851. *Hansard*, vol. cxxiii. p. 858.

[3] *Ibid.*, Mr. Kebbel has had the wisdom to omit the first and damaging half of the December speech from Lord Beaconsfield's collected speeches.

the community to swallow, by proposing gradually to reduce the duty on tea from 2*s.* 2¼*d.* to 1*s.* a pound.

The proposals which were thus made involved an immediate loss of revenue of 3,700,000*l.*[1] But, in addition to these changes, Disraeli suggested another alteration. The income-tax, which had been temporarily renewed for a year in 1851, and which had been continued in 1852, expired in 1853, and Disraeli determined, on again renewing it, to alter its application. It had hitherto been assumed that the profits of the farmer were equivalent to one-half the rental of the farm. Disraeli decided that the farmer should in future pay a tax on one-third instead of on one-half of his rent. But this was not the only boon which he offered to him. Permanent incomes and life incomes had hitherto been charged on the same basis. Disraeli proposed that incomes derived from the rent of land and from funded property should continue to pay at the full rate of 7*d.* on each pound, while the incomes derived from farming, from trade, and from salaries should pay at the mitigated rate of 5¼*d.* In compensation for the loss caused by these exemptions, he extended the tax to funded property and salaries in Ireland; to all industrial incomes of 100*l.*; and to all incomes arising from property of 50*l.* a year.

The income-tax in the form thus proposed would—Disraeli imagined—produce about the same sum as the tax in its previous shape had yielded. But it was still incumbent on him to provide for the serious loss occasioned by the remission of one-half of the malt-tax, the war-duty on hops, and the gradual reduction of the tea-duties. Half of the necessary amount he

[1] Malt Duty (one half) £2,500,000
Tea (first instalment of 4¼*d.*) . . . 900,000
Hops 300,000
£3,700,000

It was intended to reduce the duty on tea at once to 1*s.* 10*d.* per lb., and subsequently by 2*d.* annually till the amount was 1*s.* *Hansard*, vol. cxxiii. pp. 873, 879.

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proposed to obtain from the surplus with which the prosperity of the country provided him; the other half he sought to procure by applying to income the repayment of the advances to local authorities which had previously been used for the redemption of debt; and by extending the house-tax to 10*l.* householders, and by raising its rate from 9*d.* to 1*s.* 6*d.*

The Budget which was thus proposed does not deserve much attention as a measure of finance. Its arrangements, which were in the first instance commended as plausible, were shown to be both unjust and unwise by the criticisms of financiers. Either intentionally or inadvertently, Disraeli had thrown the whole cost of the relief which he gave to the consumers and the farmers on the 10*l.* householders. People dwelling in houses whose rent ranged from 10*l.* to 20*l.* were precisely those whose incomes amounted to from 50*l.* to 150*l.* a year; and these persons, who were perhaps the least fitting objects for taxation, were to be simultaneously subjected to the burdens of income-tax and house-tax. This cardinal blot was exposed by Mr. Gladstone,[1] and its demonstration confirmed the House in its determination to have nothing to do with the Budget. But, though the Budget of 1852 does not deserve much attention as a fiscal scheme, it requires careful consideration as the last expedient of protection. The protectionists, under Disraeli's guidance, had begun by resisting free trade, and they had been beaten; they had endeavoured to procure compensation for the landed classes, and they had been beaten; and their leader had finally produced a compromise, and had again been beaten. From that time forth the principles of free trade were not seriously questioned, and protection ceased to be a watchword among responsible statesmen.

The final abandonment of Protection.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxxiii. p. 1671.

It was a serious misfortune to the country gentlemen throughout the struggle, that their cause was a selfish cause, and their leader an unscrupulous leader. The country gentlemen of England fought the battle of protection on the very worst position which they could have chosen. Many of them, perhaps most of them, honestly believed in the necessity for protecting British industry; but, by selecting corn as their battle-ground, they created an impression that they were only eager to protect their own rent-rolls. If, however, the protectionists seemed to be engaged in the defence of their own incomes, their leader seemed only intent on satisfying his own ambition. He subordinated his principles to his career, and flung away position after position for the sake of achieving a personal success.

That the game was played with courage and dexterity, Disraeli's enemies will admit. That it was played scrupulously, his friends will hardly contend. Even in the very last hour of the struggle, he clung to a chance straw floating near him for support, and actually condescended to appeal to the free-traders for help against the Whigs.[1] Such an appeal could not have been made by any person who had been earnest in the cause of protection, though it was natural enough in a politician who preferred power to consistency. But the expedient failed to allure. Nothing but the shame of resorting to it clung to its proposer; and the ministry, defeated on the Budget by a sufficient majority, had no alternative but to resign.[2]

The fall of the Derby Ministry.

Under ordinary circumstances, the fall of the Derby Cabinet would have been followed by the return of the Whigs and Russell to office. In the circumstances of December 1852, such a result was unattainable. The Whigs had been unable to stand in the preceding Par-

[1] Morley's *Cobden*, vol. ii. p. 126.

[2] The majority was 305 votes to 286. *Hansard*, vol. cxxiii. p. 1693. For the resignation, *ibid.*, p. 1709.

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liament; they were numerically weaker in the new House of Commons, and they were divided by the estrangement of Palmerston from Russell. But there was another circumstance in 1852 which no neutral politician could avoid noticing. The followers of Peel still held aloof from both the great parties of the State, and among them were the ablest and most experienced of living statesmen. Acquainted with these facts, and anxious to terminate 'the unsatisfactory epoch of government upon sufferance which had resulted from the disorganisation of parties since 1846,'[1] the Queen, on receiving Derby's resignation, sent for Aberdeen, Peel's most trusted lieutenant, and Lansdowne, the oldest member of the Whig party. She obtained from Lansdowne a promise of support, and she then entrusted Aberdeen with the formation of her Government.

Aberdeen forms a Ministry.

It was the joking remark of Derby—made both to the Queen and a private friend—that Aberdeen could not satisfy all the claims upon him without including at least thirty-two persons in the Cabinet.[2] As a matter of fact, however, the new Cabinet contained only thirteen members. Aberdeen himself took the Treasury. Four others of Peel's colleagues—Mr. Gladstone, Newcastle, Graham, and Sidney Herbert—became respectively Chancellor of the Exchequer, Colonial Minister, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Secretary at War. Rolfe, who had been Solicitor-General in Melbourne's ministry, and who had been made Vice-Chancellor and Lord Cranworth in 1850, was raised to the woolsack. Russell and Palmerston, the leading members of the Whig party, received the seals of the Foreign Office[3] and

[1] Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. ii. p. 482.

[2] *Ibid.*, and *Life of Campbell*, vol. ii. p. 311.

[3] Russell volunteered in the first instance to accept the Foreign Office with the lead of the Commons. Subsequently, on reflection, he declared such a course inconsistent with his honour; and he was ultimately prevailed upon (partly by Macaulay) to accept the Foreign Office for a few weeks, when he surrendered the seals to Lord Clarendon. *Edinburgh Re-*

of the Home Office. Lord Granville became President of the Council; the Duke of Argyll, a peer of high rank and great promise, Privy Seal. Molesworth became First Commissioner of Works; Wood, President of the Board of Control; and Lansdowne consented to serve the Cabinet without office.

England, so Disraeli had said in the great debate which had been followed by the defeat of the Derby ministry—'England does not love coalitions.'[1] The phrase has been often quoted; and the Aberdeen Administration has frequently been regarded as a coalition ministry. And in one sense no doubt the popular verdict is accurate. Aberdeen succeeded in combining in one Government the men who had seven years before fought against each other under Peel and Russell. The ministry thus represented a coalition of parties, but it did not comprise a conflict of opinion. It was composed almost exclusively of men in favour of moderate progress and free trade. Molesworth was the only member of the Cabinet who could possibly have been called a Radical; and Molesworth was only a wealthy country gentleman of advanced Whig views. Mr. Gladstone was the only member of the Cabinet who was eventually destined to adopt much of the Radical programme; and Mr. Gladstone, in 1852, was still a Conservative in name and sympathy. Such men as Cobden and Mr. Bright, who were earnest in their Liberalism, found no admission to the new ministry. Even Milner

Its character.

view, No. 324, p. 568; cf. Trevelyan's *Macaulay*, vol. ii. ch. xiii. It may perhaps be worth while adding that four Prime Ministers of the present century, Sidmouth, Goderich, Wellington, and Russell, have subsequently accepted lower office. Wellington is an exception to every rule. Goderich and Sidmouth ranked so low as Prime Ministers, that they had no reputations to destroy. Russell's example indicates that a man who has once served in the highest place had better refuse all subordinate offices.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxxiii. p. 1666. Communications had been carried on between Whigs and Peelites from the previous July. An account of them will be found in *Edinburgh Review*, No. 324, pp. 559–563.

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Gibson, who had held a subordinate place in the Russell ministry, was excluded from office. Mr. Charles Villiers was the only prominent member of the Corn Law League admitted to it, and Mr. Villiers was relegated to an obscure and unimportant office.

The capacity of its members.

Yet, though the new Cabinet had no room for such men as Cobden or Mr. Bright, it included probably a larger share of ability and experience than any other Administration of the century. It is a well-known remark of Macaulay that the line which divides the two great parties of the State is a very narrow one, and that the best men on both sides are to be found nearest to the dividing line. The members of the Aberdeen Cabinet were taken from the immediate neighbourhood of the dividing line. The Cabinet, besides the Prime Minister, contained Russell, an ex-Prime Minister; Palmerston, a future Prime Minister; and Mr. Gladstone, who was destined as Prime Minister to rival the achievements of the greatest Prime Minister of the century, his former chieftain Peel.

But there was another circumstance about the Cabinet which was even more remarkable. It included three men—Aberdeen, Palmerston, and Granville—who, with a brief interval of a hundred days, had regulated the foreign policy of England from 1828 to 1852. A Cabinet which included Aberdeen and Palmerston seemed to comprise every system of foreign policy. Yet, in foreign policy, as in other matters, the Cabinet was only a Cabinet of transition. Its composition pointed to the termination of one epoch of history, a period which had been marked by the rivalry of Peel and Russell, of Whigs and Conservatives. But its composition also showed that, though the period was concluded, a new period had hardly commenced. A long interval of compromise and inaction at home, disfigured by war abroad and mutiny in India, was to succeed before a

new conflict was again to be waged, under Mr. Gladstone and Disraeli, between the rival forces of progress and reaction.

Symptoms of the future struggle were indeed visible. The most successful critic of Disraeli's Budget speech was Mr. Gladstone. His speech at once made him the recognised exponent of Peel's financial principles, and he was included thenceforward among that tiny company of great men who may be counted literally on the fingers of one hand, who in England have displayed conspicuous financial ability during the last two centuries.[1] Such a fact ought not to have created surprise among his contemporaries. In all the great financial debates of the preceding decade, Mr. Gladstone had towered above all his contemporaries except Peel. In the session of 1853 he had the opportunity of showing that he had constructive ability of the highest order by producing the greatest Budget which had been brought forward since that of 1842.

Mr. Gladstone's Budget.

Circumstances undoubtedly favoured the minister. Disraeli, in April 1852, had estimated the revenue at 51,625,000*l.*; Mr. Gladstone, in April 1853, was in a position to state that it had actually yielded 53,089,000*l.* The expenditure in the Budget of 1852 had been reckoned at 51,164,000*l.*, and it had only amounted to 50,782,000*l.* The surplus which Disraeli had computed at 461,000*l.*[2] had reached 2,460,000*l.* Seldom had the revenue proved more elastic; unhappily, however, the panic dread of France which had arisen in 1851, and which had not yet been allayed, forced the

[1] For the other four great financiers, see *ante*, vol. i. p. 41. Burton, in his *Reign of Anne*, vol. i. pp. 27 and 35, calls Godolphin 'the greatest financial minister that ever ruled Britain.' But this only proves that, however competent Burton may have been to write the *Book Hunter* and *the History of Scotland*, he had no knowledge of English financial history.

[2] Disraeli's first Budget is in *Hansard*, vol. cxxi. p. 11. I have not thought it necessary to give any minute detail of it. The estimated expenditure is in *ibid.*, p. 27, the estimated revenue and surplus in *ibid.*, p. 34.

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ministry to propose fresh expenditure for both army, navy, ordnance, and militia, and reduced the estimated surplus of 1853–4 to about one-third of the actual surplus of 1852-3, or to 807,000*l.*[1]

A surplus of this character was not large; and it was also affected by one consideration. Technically, the income-tax expired in 1853; and Mr. Gladstone, like Disraeli, was obliged to attend to the remonstrances of the critics who objected to the tax itself or to its inequalities. Unlike Disraeli, however, Mr. Gladstone shrank from the almost impracticable task of distinguishing between permanent and industrial incomes; and, instead of attempting to remedy a possible inequality by a readjustment of the income-tax itself, decided to redress the balance by imposing a fresh tax on property. Realty in England was originally subject to the payment of a heavy succession duty on each heir succeeding to the estate; for—as has been well said—'the casualties incident to feudal tenure were practically taxes on succession.'[2] But the country gentlemen of England in the seventeenth century succeeded in liberating their persons and their property from the old feudal obligations which they had inherited; and a Parliament of landlords in the eighteenth century refrained from resuming the burdens

[1] The figures in the Budget were as follows:—

Revenue.		*Expenditure.*	
Customs	£20,680,000	Debt	£27,804,000
Excise	14,640,000	Consolidated Fund	2,503,000
Stamps	6,700,000	Army	6,025,000
Taxes	3,250,000	Navy	6,235,000
Income Tax	5,550,000	Ordnance	3,053,000
Post Office	900,000	Miscellaneous	4,476,000
Crown Lands	390,000	Commissariat	557,000
Miscellaneous and Old Stores	780,000	Militia	530,000
		Kaffir War	200,000
		Packet Service	800,000
	£52,890,000		£52,183,000

—*Hansard*, vol. cxxv. p. 1355, and cf. p. 1423.

[2] Mr. Trevor, quoted in *Report of Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, 1870, vol. i. p. 94.

from which their ancestors had relieved themselves. In the seventeenth century a probate duty was first imposed; in the eighteenth century a legacy duty was first introduced. But the probate duty pressed with unequal severity on the smaller estates, and a proposition to extend the legacy duty to real property was rejected by an unreformed House of Commons.[1]

Hence a tax was already in existence, applicable to all personal property which passed by will, and which had never been extended to real property and to personal property passing by settlement. Mr. Gladstone decided in 1853 on terminating these exemptions. He anticipated that, as the new tax gradually came into force, it would add some 2,000,000*l.* a year to the resources of the State.[2] With this sum at his disposal, he was able to make an elaborate proposal for the reduction of the income-tax. That impost he proposed to continue for two years at 7*d.* in the pound, to reduce it after two years to 6*d.*, and after three years to 5*d.* Thus he desired to provide for the ultimate abolition of two-sevenths of the income-tax, and to supply, or rather more than supply, the deficiency by a succession duty.

The introduction of a succession duty constituted the main feature of the Budget of 1853. In addition, Mr. Gladstone applied the income-tax to incomes exceeding 100*l.* a year, charging them, however, at a lower rate than that at which larger incomes were taxed; he extended the tax to Ireland, remitting at the same time the debts recently created due from Ireland to the

[1] The scheme for extending the legacy duty to real property was withdrawn after it had been carried through one of its stages by the Speaker's casting vote in 1796. *Report of Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, 1870, vol. i. p. 97.

[2] The succession duty was expected to produce 500,000*l.* in 1853–54, 1,200,000*l.* in 1854–55, 1,600,000*l.* in 1855–56, and 2,000,000*l.* in 1856–57, *Hansard*, vol. cxxv. p. 1399. The usual criticism at the time was that these estimates were much too low; they proved to be much too high. *Report of Commissioners of Inland Revenue* 1870, vol. i. p. 97.

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Treasury; and he increased the duties on Scotch spirits from 3*s.* 5*d.* to 4*s.* 8*d.*, on Irish spirits from 2*s.* 8*d.* to 3*s.* 4*d.* a gallon, assenting to the proposal which Naas had made, and which the Whig ministry had hitherto resisted, that allowance should in future be made for the waste of spirits in bond.

These various changes raised the surplus of 807,000*l.*, with which Mr. Gladstone set out, to one of 2,151,000*l.* With this surplus he proposed to repeal the duty on soap;[1] to reduce the duties on tea, advertisements, carriages, dogs, men-servants, apples, cheese, cocoa, butter, raisins, and on 133 other articles; to abolish the duties on 123 other articles,[2] to reduce the rates of postage to the Colonies, and to trust largely to the recovery, which all experience proved invariably took place in the revenue after remissions of taxation, to replace the loss which these changes would in the first instance involve.

A Budget of this comprehensive character had rarely been brought forward by any financier. It emphasised in a striking manner the superiority of Mr. Gladstone to Disraeli. But Mr. Gladstone was not

[1] The repeal of the tax on soap marks an epoch in financial history which is worth observing. Adam Smith had condemned taxation on the necessaries of life, especially mentioning salt, leather, soap, and candles. *Wealth of Nations*, vol. iii. p. 337. The tax on salt was largely reduced in 1822 (*ante*, vol. ii. p. 50) and expired in 1825; the tax on leather in 1830, *ibid.*, p. 545; the tax on candles in 1831, *ibid.*, p. 634. The repeal of the tax on soap, therefore, completed the work which Adam Smith had advocated nearly a century before. Cf. Dowell's *History of Taxation*, vol. ii. p. 322.

[2] These changes involved the following loss:—

Soap Duty	£1,126,000
Life Insurance	29,000
Receipt Stamps	155,000
Stamp Duties	50,000
Advertisements	160,000
Carriages, Men-servants, Dogs, Horses, Post Horses	370,000
Tea	3,000,000
Postage, Colonial	40,000
Apples, Cheese, Cocoa, Nuts, Eggs, Oranges, Lemons, Butter, Raisins	262,000
Reduction of Duties on 133 minor articles of food	70,000
Abolition of duties on 123 ditto	53,000
	£5,315,000

—*Hansard*, vol. cxxv. p. 1423.

satisfied with this great scheme. Consols which could be paid off at a year's notice stood at a little over par. The New 3 per cents., which could not be paid off for another twenty years, stood at about 103. The difference between the price of these two stocks represented the value of the guarantee of the Government to pay 3 per cent. on the 'new threes' for a further twenty-one years. Mr. Gladstone assumed that, by guaranteeing some of the stock which had no guarantee, he could appropriate for the public benefit the increased value which would thus be imparted to it. He therefore decided to offer the holders of the old 3 per cent. stock the right of exchanging it either for Exchequer Bonds, or for $3\frac{1}{2}$ or $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. stock. Not more than 30,000,000*l.* either of Exchequer Bonds or of the New $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. stock was to be issued, but no limit was to be placed on the issue of the New $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. stock.[1]

Such, briefly stated, were the great financial proposals of 1853. From one point of view they were singularly unfortunate. The new succession duty did not realise one-fourth of the sum which its author was advised that he might rely on obtaining from it. Long before two years were over, circumstances occurred which made it necessary indefinitely to postpone the proposal for progressively reducing the income-tax, and which, by depressing the price of stock, made

[1] Exchequer Bonds were practically a new security. They were to bear interest at the rate of 2*l.* 15*s.* per cent. up to 1864, and at the rate of 2*l.* 10*s.* per cent. up to 1894. *Hansard*, vol. cxxv. p. 818. Mr. Gladstone felt himself able to float them from the circumstance that the outstanding Exchequer Bills only bore, at the time, 1*l.* 10*s.* per cent. interest. Holders of Consols and Reduced Threes were to be at liberty to exchange 100*l.* of either of them for Exchequer Bonds, or for 82*l.* 10*s.* New $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. stock, producing 2*l.* 17*s.* 9*d.* a year and irredeemable for forty years (*ibid.*, p. 829), or for 110*l.* of irredeemable $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. stock, *ibid.*, p. 833. In addition to these proposals, Mr. Gladstone simultaneously arranged for the consolidation of the old South Sea stocks, *ibid.*, p. 814. But this portion of his scheme was not of sufficient importance to make it necessary to dwell upon it.

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any large voluntary conversion of debt impracticable. The financial arrangements of 1853, therefore, compare unfavourably with those of 1842 and 1845. Peel's great Budgets can be judged from their results. Mr. Gladstone's first Budget can only be judged from its intention. Yet in breadth, in comprehension, in boldness, in knowledge, and in originality, it may be compared with Peel's greatest efforts. Search English history from the days of Halifax to the present time, and it is impossible to try it by a severer test.

The defect of the Budget.

Yet there was one defect in the Budget which was indeed characteristic of its author, but which ought to have hindered its proposal. It was marked by the over-confidence of a good man who believed in the regeneration of the world. Youth naturally looks forward, and, though Mr. Gladstone had passed his forty-third birthday, he retained in middle age the physical vigour and the mental freshness of youth. With a supreme faith in the ultimate improvement of mankind, he could not bring himself to believe that progress would be interrupted in his own time by the calamity of a great war. Instead of dealing with a known present, he was thus induced to rely on an unknown future, and to speculate on the growing revenue of coming years.

From the standpoint of a prudent financier, such confidence was unwise. The sad experience of accumulated centuries has proved that man is among the most cruel and combative of animals; and, till either his nature be altered, or the deeper causes which lie at the root of modern wars be extirpated, fighting will not cease in the world. There is reason for fearing, indeed, that the order which emanates from civilisation in itself leads to war. For order produces the growth of population; and peoples overtaking their means of subsistence struggle to conquer the opportuni-

ties which they find it more difficult to obtain at home in the possessions of their weaker neighbours. The same great laws which threw uncivilised hordes of Celts and Goths on early and mediæval Europe are throwing equally great hordes of civilised Europeans on savage countries. Some great nations already encamped on the margin of the ocean are straining across the sea to new continents, are driving the Maori or the Indian into a narrower and narrower interior, and are seizing the lands on which these primitive men have hitherto roamed and fought at will. Other nations, still remote from the ocean, are pressing forwards with the accumulating force of a growing flood to the seas. But both the Russian as well as the German and Englishman, ever sending their swarms of colonists from the parent hives, are only obeying the eternal law of nature. They are great, they are growing, nations; and the law of evolution which requires that the fittest should survive has determined that weaker peoples should give way before them.

These circumstances, however, were not apparent to everyone in 1853. The memory of the Great Exhibition of 1851 was still green; the reign of peace had just been proclaimed. The few doubters who pointed to the tramp of armies abroad, and to the defenceless condition of England at home, seemed like the old pagans clinging to the ideas in which they had been reared, while a new and brighter faith was regenerating humanity. What if, only seven years before, France and England had suffered estrangement on the petty question of the marriage of a Queen of Spain? What if, only five years before, half Europe had stood in arms against autocracy, and kings had been arrayed against peoples, and peoples against kings? What if, only three years before, England had herself extorted satisfaction from a minor Power by force of arms?

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What if, in defiance of the treaties of 1815, a Napoleon was again supreme in France, and Britain was again resorting to the old military machinery which had been discarded since the great war? The reign of peace had been proclaimed from pulpit and from platform; it had been inaugurated in Hyde Park; and the wisest statesmen failed to see that commerce and progress, instead of terminating warfare, were inventing new reasons for bloodshedding.

CHAPTER XXIV.

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THE vast power which frowns over Eastern Europe, and which for centuries has been extending its possessions and accumulating its resources, has only a difficult and imperfect access to the ocean, the common highway of mankind. Her northern shores are fringed with a frozen sea, her southern limits are lost in the hot and arid wastes of Central Asia. On the north-west and south-west, indeed, two inland seas give her an intermittent or doubtful access to the Western world. The navigation of the Baltic is, however, annually interrupted by the ice of winter. The navigation of the Bosphorus is at the mercy of the Power which holds the city of Constantine. Every educated Russian consequently sighs for predominance at the Porte, which is the gate of the Russian Empire. Russia.

The forces which would under any circumstances impel the Russians to gravitate towards the Bosphorus are augmented by the condition of European Turkey. A warlike race, of a religion strange to Europe, governed by an autocracy which is at once brutal and feeble, has been encamped for centuries on the soil of the rich provinces which stretch from the Danube on the north to the Greek frontier on the south. The descendants of the former inhabitants of this country, degraded and exhausted as they are by a long course of bad government, sigh for independence and relief. They turn in their distress to Europe for the help which their own right hands seem powerless to afford them. Indepen- Turkey.

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dence they would gladly receive from any Power, but two influences, the strongest among those by which nations are affected, induce them to look especially towards Russia. One large portion of the inhabitants of European Turkey is allied to Russia by ties of race. Another large portion is connected with it by ties of faith. The Slave naturally looks to the great Slave power of northern Europe for the redress of his grievances, while the Greek regards the Czar of all the Russias as the head of his Church.

Turkey is rarely free from questions of race and religion. As the second half of the nineteenth century commenced, two obscure subjects—one involving race, the other religion—forced themselves into prominence.

Monte-negro.

The inhabitants of the little principality—the Black Mountain—have for centuries maintained a desultory warfare against the Turk. In 1852 they resumed their aggressions. The Turk decided on repressing disorder by the occupation of their territory, and entrusted the task to Omar Pacha, a general of repute. In taking this step, the Porte hardly foresaw all the consequences of its decision. Austria, just recovering from the crisis of 1848, was alarmed at the prospect of fresh disorder near her own frontiers. Determined to stop war at any cost, in January 1853 she sent General Count Leiningen to Constantinople, to demand the withdrawal of Omar Pacha. The Porte, alarmed at language which, coming from Austria, was as unaccustomed as it was peremptory, gave way. Omar Pacha was recalled, and the Montenegrin difficulty terminated.[1]

The Holy Places.

Events were in fact taking place in Constantinople which made it impossible for the Porte to risk the enmity of Austria. Another question, growing in intensity, was agitating the counsels of the Sultan. The

[1] *Russian Diplomatic Study of the Crimean War*, vol. i. pp. 115–117; cf. Kinglake's *History of the Crimean War*, vol. i. p. 76 *sq.*

Porte has for centuries possessed the fortunate or unfortunate country which every Christian knows as the Holy Land. In the middle ages torrents of blood had been poured out, hoards of treasure had been exhausted, in a vain endeavour to reconquer for Christendom the places which are indelibly associated with the life of the Divine Man who founded Christianity. In modern Europe devout Christians adopted the easier course of making pilgrimages to the spots which are hallowed by the memory of Christ. Members of the Latin as well as of the Greek Church composed these pilgrimages. Members of the Latin as well as of the Greek Church guarded the sanctuaries and officiated at the shrines.

More than a century before the Crimean war, France, in a treaty with the Porte, had obtained for the Latin Church possession of all the places which it owned in 1740.[1] The most important of these were the great Church of Bethlehem, the Sanctuary of the Nativity, the Tomb of the Virgin, the Stone of Anointing, and the Seven Arches of the Virgin in the tomb of the Holy Sepulchre; but the Latins also claimed the right of repairing the Cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.[2] The atmosphere of the eighteenth century, however, was opposed to any zealous retention of these privileges, and the Latin races, reading Rousseau and Voltaire, had not much thought for holy shrines in Palestine. But the Greek branch of the Christian Church was not affected by the influences which ultimately enshrined Reason in the capital of France. Its members still repaired in their hundreds and in their thousands to the Holy Shrines of Palestine. They occupied the places

[1] Les religieux Latins, qui résident présentement, comme de tout temps, en dedans et en dehors de Jérusalem. . . . resteront en possession des lieux de pélerinage qu'ils ont dans la manière qu'ils les ont possédés par le passé. Art. 33 of Treaty of 1740. *Eastern Papers*, part i. p. 5.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 4; but cf. p. 22, where a more extended list is given.

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which the Latins neglected, they even repaired the edifices which the Latins suffered to fall into decay, and they obtained special permits from the Porte authorising them to execute these works. If, therefore, the Latins had originally a treaty right, the Greeks in the course of time acquired by usage a right to occupy these sacred places.

The religious revival of the nineteenth century, however, affecting other countries besides England and Scotland, again directed the attention of religious people to the scenes which were permanently associated with the life and labours of Jesus Christ. England, in conjunction with Prussia, resolved on the strange expedient of appointing a Protestant Bishop of Jerusalem. Roman Catholics in France again cast their thoughts to the Holy Places which their ancestors had neglected. Louis Napoleon, after his accession to the Presidency of the Republic, anxious to induce the Conservatives of France to range themselves behind his chair, grasped at a question which was obviously interesting to every religious man. The same causes, which induced him to restore the Pope to Rome with the assistance of French bayonets, induced him in May 1850 to assert the right of France to place the Latin monks in possession of the Holy Places.

The French demand.

The paper in which the French formulated their demand was subsequently described by a Russian official authority as an ardent polemic.[1] Other Roman Catholic Powers, however, supported the demand; and the Porte, reluctant to refuse France, and equally unwilling to offend Russia, offered to refer the French demand, the treaty of 1740, and the firmans which had been granted by the Porte both before and after that year on the

[1] The paper is in *Eastern Papers*, part i. p. 4. The Russian description of it is in the *Diplomatic Study of the Crimean War from Russian Official Sources*, vol. i. p. 127. This work will in future be referred to as the *Diplomatic Study*.

subject, to a mixed commission. The French, in the first instance, objected to referring to a commission firmans issued subsequent to 1740 without the cognisance of France. But the inquiry ultimately took place first before a mixed commission, and afterwards before a Turkish commission of inquiry. In January 1852 the Porte arrived at a decision on the points in dispute which was embodied in a letter to the French Chargé d'Affaires on the 9th of February, and in a firman addressed to the Greek patriarch at Jerusalem; and diplomatists, believing that the whole question was finally though not formally settled, breathed in peace. But the dispute was not settled. The Porte, in fact, in its desire to please both parties employed different language in its letter to France and in its firman to the Greeks.[1] In the letter the Porte laid stress on what it yielded to France; in the firman it dwelt on the claims which it

The attempted compromise.

[1] It may perhaps be well to bring out distinctly the difference between the letter and the firman:—

The Letter.

The Grotto of the Holy Manger is at present a place visited by the various Christian nations, and it has been ordained from a very early period that a key of the North Gate of the Great Church at Bethlehem, a key of the South Gate of that Church, and a key of the gate of the Grotto above mentioned, should be in the custody of the Latin Priests also. In case, then, the keys are not in the possession of the Latins, a key of each of these gates must be given them, in order that they may have them as of old. *Parl. Papers*, pp. 37, 38.

The Firman.

In former times a key of the two gates of the Great Church of Bethlehem and of the Holy Manger was given to each of the Greek, Latin, and Armenian nations,—a measure which was also confirmed by the firman delivered to the Greek nation in the year of the Hejira 1170, and that arrangement shall still continue But as it does not follow from this that it is permitted to alter the existing state of things in that Church, or to prevent the Latins officiating there, or, in short, to make any new arrangement calculated to incommode other sects, either in the passage from the Church to the Holy Manger, or in other respects, the smallest pretension in regard to this shall not be allowed or entertained on the part of anyone whatsoever. No change shall be made in the present state of the gates of the Church of Bethlehem. *Parl. Papers*, p. 41.

There was equal difference in the wording of letter and firman in other points.

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disallowed. In the letter it directed that the Latins should have keys of the north and south gates of the great Church of Bethlehem and of the Grotto of the Holy Manger. In the firman it stated that the arrangement under which Greeks, Armenians, and Latins held keys to the gates should continue, but that no change should be made in their state. It went on to declare that the Latins had 'no right' to exclusive possession of the Holy Places, and that they are not right in the pretension that the tomb of the Blessed Mary belongs exclusively to them. The language of the letter was drawn up to satisfy France, the language of the firman was strengthened to conciliate Russia.[1]

The beginning of the disputes.

When the discrepancy between the firman and the letter became known fresh irritation was of course excited. The French declared that they had consented for the sake of peace to waive the undoubted right which the treaty of 1740 gave them, and that those rights were decided against them in the firman.[2] The Russians, on the contrary, declared that they only accepted the compromise because the firman practically decided many points in the dispute in their favour.[3] The Russians consequently, relying on the firman, insisted on its being publicly read at Jerusalem. The French, protesting against it, obtained a promise from the Porte that it should not be read in that city.

A quarrel, therefore, temporarily allayed in the spring, was ready to burst into a fresh flame in the summer. And it so happened that another circumstance was producing estrangement between France and Russia. The Russian Court had seen without regret the election of Louis Napoleon to the Presidency of the French Republic. The President was identified with the cause of order, and in the Conservative atmosphere

Russia and the French Republic.

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part i. pp. 41, 42.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 42.
[3] *Diplomatic Study*, vol. i. p. 134.

of St. Petersburg order was of paramount importance. For the same reason it had seen with actual pleasure the conduct of the President in December 1851. 'The *coup d'état*' was 'a genuine service rendered to order and peace, and a title to gratitude earned by Napoleon from the various Governments.'[1] Behind the President's chair, however, there soon loomed a vision of another Empire. Wherever the President went he was invited to assume the imperial crown; and invitations of this character, when sedulously repeated, are not likely to be continually refused. It is true, indeed, that Napoleon at first endeavoured to explain away the cheers of 'Vive l'Empereur!' which everywhere greeted him. The cry was, he declared, a souvenir which touched his heart rather than a hope which flattered his pride. It is true also that he afterwards endeavoured to reassure a startled continent. 'L'Empire c'est la paix'—so ran the assurance which he gave—'L'Empire c'est la paix.' For France desires peace, and when France is satisfied the world is tranquil.[2]

Russia and the Second Empire

As the autumn wore on, moreover, worse things than the restoration of the Empire occurred. To the horror of Nicholas, the French Senate not merely pronounced Napoleon Emperor, they hailed him as Napoleon the Third;[3] to his still greater horror, the act of the Senate was ratified by the people, and Napoleon owed his throne to the vote of more than seven millions of Frenchmen. There was an eloquence in both these circumstances which Nicholas could not ignore. The mention of 'the Third' expressed, what the English Parliament had intended to express, nearly two centuries before, when it placed at the head of the

[1] *Diplomatic Study*, vol. i. p. 73.

[2] *Ann. Reg.*, Hist, 1852, pp. 256, 259; cf. Malmesbury's *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, p. 268.

[3] The origin of the III. is well known. 'The Prefect of Bourges had given instructions that the people were to shout "Vive Napoleon." but he wrote "Vive Napoleon ! ! !" The people took the three notes of interjection as a numeral. *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, p. 290.

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Statutes of 1660 the assertion that they were made in the twelfth year of the reign of our Most Gracious Sovereign Lord, Charles the Second. The disagreeable parenthesis of the reigns of Bourbon kings and of the Man of July was ignored as completely as the disagreeable parenthesis of the English Commonwealth had been ignored before. Other Powers besides Russia were alarmed at the adoption of a number which avenged Waterloo without the interchange of a blow. Other Powers, however, were pacified by the assurance that the number had only an insignificant meaning. The new Emperor, whatever title he might assume, boasted that he owed his throne to the suffrages of the people. But this second circumstance, however much it might appease other statesmen, only increased the apprehensions of Nicholas. The Czar had been ready enough to applaud a President who had 'placed aside constitutional institutions;' he could not forgive a ruler who had appealed to universal suffrage.

But Nicholas stood alone. The logic of facts was too strong for other Powers; and men prepared to recognise Napoleon were ready to advance one step further, and acknowledge Napoleon the Third. Nicholas, however, had one other resource. Monarchs when they address one another are accustomed to style themselves, in the quaint language which has descended from mediæval times, brother and sister. To the surprise and sorrow of Nicholas, even the Conservative Courts of Austria and Prussia consented in recognising the third Napoleon to call him 'Mon frère.' Nicholas alone declined to submit to this fresh indignity; and, instead of addressing the new Emperor as 'Monsieur mon frère,' adopted the puerile alternative of styling him 'Mon cher ami.'[1]

Thus it happened that, while a miserable dispute was occupying the attention of diplomatists at Con-

[1] For the Russian view, see *Diplomatic Study*, vol. i. pp. 73–95.

stantinople, one party to the quarrel was annoyed at the accession of Napoleon to the throne, and the other party to it was angry at the slight which Nicholas had cast on him. Such feelings did not tend to smooth matters at the Porte. There the Russian agent was still demanding that the firman should be read in public, and the French agent was still insisting that it should not be so read. The Porte, placed between two millstones, vainly strove to avoid being crushed by either of them. It sent Afif Bey on a special mission to Jerusalem, and instructed him to carry out the compromise which it had decided on. The mission only ended in fresh disturbances. The Russian Consul-General, unable to procure the reading of the firman, left the city in anger. The Latins, on hearing the decision of the Porte that they should be allowed to celebrate mass once a year in the Church of the Virgin, near Gethsemane, but that they should not be permitted to disturb the altar and its ornaments,[1] declared that it was impossible to celebrate mass on a schismatic slab of marble, and before a crucifix whose feet were separated. The agent of France at Constantinople talked 'of sending for the French fleet;'[2] and, to pacify France, the Porte surrendered to it the key of the great Church of Bethlehem, and suffered the Latins to place a star over the altar of the Nativity.[3] But this concession to the Latins only inflamed the Greeks. The Russian Government placed a corps d'armée on active service, and sent one of Nicholas' aides-de-camp, Prince Menschikoff, on an extraordinary embassy to Constantinople.[4] Thus, as the year 1853 commenced, the Turkish Government found itself simultaneously threatened by three great European Powers. Austria was demanding the withdrawal of Omar Pacha from Montenegro, and France

Afif Bey's mission.

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part i. p. 45; cf. *Diplomatic Study*, vol. i. p. 144.
[2] *Eastern Papers*, part i. p. 47.
[3] *Ibid.*, part i. p. 55; *Russian Diplomatic Study*, vol i. p. 143.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 146 *sq.*; *Eastern Papers*, part i. pp. 56, 76.

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and Russia were each threatening war if their contrary and irreconcilable demands were not complied with.

When this grave diplomatic quarrel had reached its crisis, the short-lived Derby ministry fell, and Aberdeen succeeded to power. Such a change, at such a time, could not otherwise than influence Russian policy. Nearly nine years before, while Peel was minister, and Aberdeen Foreign Secretary, the Russian Emperor had paid a memorable visit to England. He had charmed both the Court and its advisers by his presence, his manner, his evident honesty, and his sensible views. With Aberdeen, in particular, he had formed an acquaintance which almost amounted to friendship. In the course of his visit, Emperor and Foreign Minister had found opportunities of conversing on the state of Europe and of the East. Turkey—such was the gist of Nicholas' words to Aberdeen and Peel—is a dying man; he must die; we cannot now determine what shall be done on his death. But we may, at least, keep the eventual case of his collapse honestly before our eyes. Russia does not claim one inch of Turkish soil, but she will not suffer any other Power to have an inch of it; and the true method to prevent France from seizing territory either in Africa, or the Mediterranean, or the East, is for Russia and England to be agreed. The Emperor had gone on to say that, if the catastrophe which he foresaw occurred, the danger attendant on it would be much diminished if Russia and England had previously arrived at a common understanding. Austria would necessarily adopt any policy which commended itself equally at St. Petersburg and London; and when Austria, Russia, and England were at one, peace was assured.[1]

Aberdeen and Nicholas.

[1] For their conversation, see *Stockmar*, vol. ii. p. 106 *sq.*; Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. i. p. 215 *sq.*; and Nesselrode's 'Memorandum on the Communication,' *Eastern Papers*, 1854, part vi.

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Thus the ministerial crisis of December 1852 had placed a Prime Minister in office who had talked over the whole Eastern question with Nicholas, and arrived at a virtual understanding with him upon it. It is not surprising, therefore, that immediately after the crisis Nicholas should have endeavoured to resume the communications which he had enjoyed in 1844. On the 9th of January, 1853, the Czar spoke to Sir Hamilton Seymour, the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, using much the same language he had employed nine years before. The Turk, so he said, is very sick; the country is falling to pieces; and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding on the subject. Five days afterwards he renewed the conversation. Turkey, he said, may suddenly die upon our hands; we cannot resuscitate what is dead; if the Turkish Empire falls, it falls to rise no more. It is far better to provide beforehand for the contingency than to risk the consequences which would ensue if the catastrophe came upon us unprepared.[1]

Nicholas conversations with Sir H. Seymour.

This conversation, duly reported to the ministry, naturally created some sensation in Downing Street; and the Government, in its reply, frankly avowed the fundamental difference between its own views and those of Nicholas. The Czar insisted on regarding the Turk as a dying man; the British, on the contrary, believed him likely to recover. While, therefore, Nicholas desired to provide for a contingency which he considered unavoidable, the British ministry declined to make provision for an eventuality which, it assumed, need not arise. It was in vain that Nicholas urged that, if England would not settle what should be done in the contingency of the Turk's death, she might at least determine what should not be done; or that he suggested

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part v. pp. 2, 4.

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that the European possessions of the Porte might be formed into independent States in the position of the Principalities; and that England might assure her own road to the East by the occupation of Egypt,[1] and, if she wished it, of Candia. The British Government, on the one hand, declared that the predetermination of what should not be tolerated did little towards the solution of real difficulties; it avowed, on the other hand, that it had no desire for territorial aggrandisement, and could be no party to any arrangement from which she was to derive any such benefit.[2]

The British attempt to arrange the dispute.

In one sense the conversations between Nicholas and Seymour had no result; in another sense they had much influence. The British ministry, pleased with the frankness of the Emperor, took steps to arrange the dispute between Russia and France. It directed its agent at Constantinople to suggest that the Porte might extricate itself from an embarrassing position by offering to sanction any arrangement respecting the Holy Places which France and Russia conjointly adopted.[3] It told its Ambassador at Paris that the spectacle of rival Churches contending for mastery, in the very place where Christ died for mankind, was melancholy indeed; and that it could not avoid perceiving that France had been the first to disturb the *status quo*, and that France, if report were true, had been the first to speak of a resort to force.[4]

Such, at the close of January 1853, was the opinion of the British Government. It had hitherto observed a strict neutrality, and it had now had the courage to declare that France was in the wrong. The declaration

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11. So much abuse was afterwards showered on Nicholas for this offer, that it is right to point out that Peel, in 1844, in talking to Nicholas had dwelt strongly on the importance of Egypt being open to England. See *Stockmar*, vol. ii. p. 108.

[2] *Eastern Papers*, part v. p. 19.

[3] *Ibid.*, part i. p. 67.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

had some effect in moderating the attitude of Napoleon. Lavalette, who had represented France at the Porte during the dispute, and whose language had frequently imported heat into the discussion, was recalled, and De la Cour, the French Minister at Berlin, was appointed to succeed him. Russia, appeased by the conciliatory attitude of the French, and assured that the Porte had yielded to the Austrian demand for the evacuation of Montenegro, relaxed the preparations which she had made for the occupation of the Principalities, and Britain, pleased at the better prospect of an arrangement, decided on sending a man of influence as ambassador to Constantinople, and entrusted Stratford de Redcliffe, the great diplomatist who had won his reputation at Constantinople, with the mission.[1]

Stratford de Redcliffe sent to Constantinople.

Thus, at the end of February 1853, the crisis seemed a little less acute. The agents who were on their way to represent the Great Powers at Constantinople had hitherto taken no part in the fray, and might be expected to be cool. Vain expectation! In sending Menschikoff to Constantinople, Nicholas had made compromise difficult; in despatching Stratford to the Porte the British ministry had drawn England into a quarrel with which she had no concern.[2]

Menschikoff reached Constantinople on the 28th of February. He paid at once a formal visit to Sultan and Grand Vizier, but he declined to call on Fuad Effendi, the Foreign Minister. Fuad, so the Russians thought, had acted with bad faith, and Menschikoff, as Russian ambassador, declined to have anything to do

Menschikoff at Constantinople.

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part v. p. 89.

[2] According to Lord Malmesbury, who writes on the authority of the late Lord Bath, Stratford afterwards openly boasted that he had 'got his personal revenge against the Czar (for refusing to receive him as ambassador) by fomenting the war. He told Lord Bath so.' Malmesbury's *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, p. 326. For this refusal see *ante*, vol. iii., p. 165, *note*.

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with him. Menschikoff's refusal had the effect of inducing Fuad to resign, and Rifaat Pacha was appointed to succeed him. But the incident created a flutter of excitement at the Porte which was both ridiculous and irrational. The slight shown to Fuad was declared to be a slight to the Sultan. The Grand Vizier hurried to Colonel Rose, the British *chargé d'affaires* at the Porte, declared that Turkey was on the eve of destruction by Russia, and actually induced him to send to the Admiral in command in the Mediterranean, and urge him to bring his fleet to Vourla. Fortunately, the Admiral at Malta and the British ministry in London were free from the influences which temporarily shook Rose's judgment. The Admiral declined to move without orders from London. The Cabinet commended his decision, and disapproved the course taken by Rose. Napoleon, however, saw in Menschikoff's action and Rose's fears a fresh excuse for embroiling France. Though acquainted with the views of the British ministry, he at once ordered his own fleet to Salamis. The chances of peace were not improved by a movement which was gradually bringing French and Russian armaments within striking distance of one another.[1]

The temporary excitement caused by Fuad's dismissal, however, wore off, and the Russian ambassador was able to address himself to the objects of his mission. One of these had been accomplished before he set foot in Constantinople. The Porte had accepted the ultimatum of Austria, and Omar Pacha had withdrawn from Montenegro. Ostensibly nothing remained to determine, except the question of the Holy Places. From the language which Menschikoff held at the Porte, from the assurances which Nesselrode conveyed to Seymour at St. Petersburg, and which Brunnow repeated to

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part i. pp. 85, 91, 93, 95.

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Clarendon in London, the British ministry had a right to infer that no other issue of importance was reserved for settlement.[1] Almost immediately, however, after Menschikoff's arrival, rumours were circulated at Constantinople that he was the bearer of a larger demand which he was insisting should be kept secret from the British authorities;[2] and on Stratford's arrival he found that the demand was for a formal treaty acknowledging the right of Russia to protect the Greek Church and its members in Turkey. By Stratford's advice the Porte insisted on separating the two questions;[3] and with Stratford's assistance all the disputes affecting the Holy Places were settled before the end of April.[4] But, on the day succeeding that on which the original dispute was settled, Menschikoff laid an ultimatum before the Porte, requiring it within five days to accept a treaty guaranteeing the Greco-Russian religion against all molestation for the future.[5] The Sultan's minister, and the British Ambassador, who was rapidly becoming the Sultan's supreme minister, considered that such a treaty, if it were signed, would place the Greek subjects under the direct protection of the Czar of Russia. By Stratford's advice[6] the Porte consequently decided on the courteous but firm rejection of the ultimatum; and Menschikoff, with his whole suite, withdrew from Constantinople.

Menschikoff's ultimatum.

He leaves Constantinople.

From a Russian point of view,[7] Russia was only claiming, in the case of members of the Greek Church,

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part i. p. 203.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 109.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 160.
[5] The orthodox Greek religion, its clergy and its possessions, shall enjoy, without any prejudice, under the protection of his Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities which are assured to them *ab antiquo*, and upon a principle of perfect equity, shall participate in the advantages accorded to the other Christian sects (*ibid.*, p. 166, and cf. p. 168). Menschikoff first asked for a treaty; he offered subsequently to be satisfied with a *sened*, and he finally offered to be contented with a note. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 176 *sq.*
[7] *Russian Diplomatic Study*, p. 188.

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the same kind of protection which France had always exercised in the case of Roman Catholics, and England in the case of Protestants, in Turkey. From an English point of view, there was a radical difference between these cases, since the Roman Catholics and Protestants in Turkey were only numbered by thousands, while the Eastern Church reckoned its members by millions. Russia, indeed, might urge that this very circumstance made interference more necessary, since the privileges of the many were of more importance than those of the few; but England could reply that the same circumstance made interference more dangerous, since it was one thing to place a small minority, and another thing to place a majority, of a Sovereign's subjects under the protection of a foreign Power.

The conduct of the ministry.

Reasonable men will agree in admitting that there was truth and force in both of these contrary contentions, but they will not agree in attaching the same amount of importance to them. Some will probably think that the demands of Russia were natural and legitimate; others, that they were natural but dangerous; others again, that they were natural but inadmissible. Much could easily be advanced for all these views. Each of them could probably have found capable exponents in the Aberdeen Cabinet. But there is no evidence that the Cabinet ever set itself seriously to consider which of these views was right till it had been irrevocably committed by its Ambassador to his own policy. No doubt, if it had addressed itself to this consideration, it might have resolved on the line of action which Stratford pursued. In this case it would, at least, have guided the ship of state into the unsettled waters into which she was being carried. But it did nothing of the kind. It left it to its Ambassador to shape its policy; it committed the honour of its country to his hands. It is not true to say, as was said at the

time, that it glided or drifted into war. The ship was steered into the whirlpool; but the hand which held the tiller was the hand of Stratford, and not the hand of Aberdeen.

The fleet sent to the Dardanelles.

Momentous issues at once followed Menschikoff's departure. The Czar, impelled to war by a temper which had grown irritable with age, and hardly dissuaded from it by the sober counsels of his Chancellor, Nesselrode,[1] resolved on the occupation of the Principalities. The British ministry thereupon ordered the Mediterranean fleet to the Dardanelles, and placed its further movements at the disposition of Stratford.[2] It thus admitted that a quarrel which hitherto had been regarded as involving Russia and France alone, and in which Britain had no concern, had been converted into a dispute between Russia and England. By a movement which was hardly perceptible, and which was not generally understood, the mere onlooker had become a principal in the dispute.

Unfortunately, moreover, there were no restraining influences to check the decision of the ministry. England has rarely been engaged in a war into which her people did not enter with alacrity; and in 1853 the English were more than usually disposed to war, and to war with Russia. On the one hand a whole generation had grown up ignorant of what a European war meant. On the other hand the memory of disaster in Afghanistan was still green; and Russia was regarded as the Power which had forced the Afghan policy on Auckland. In

[1] I have studiously endeavoured in these pages to refrain from a single word which could give pain to any reasonable Russian, and so increase the unfortunate estrangement between two great nations whom I would fain see allied. And I think it right, therefore, to point out that the passage in the text is founded, not on Mr. Kinglake's eloquent invective, but on the *Russian Diplomatic Study*. 'This half-measure was the result of a compromise between the calm moderation of Count Nesselrode and the extreme irritation of the Emperor Nicholas,' vol. i. p. 190.

[2] *Eastern Papers*, part i. p. 210.

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addition, those who sympathised with the Liberal movement of 1848 saw in Russia the chief champion of autocracy; while men of Conservative opinions were annoyed at the new ideas of foreign policy which Cobden and a few other men were proclaiming. Thus both Liberals and Conservatives were ready to fight, and to fight with Russia; and the ministry, which should have steered the ship of state into calmer waters, entrusted its control to their representative at the Porte.

Yet, at that supreme moment, there was one man who desired peace with all his soul. Peace was the sum and substance of Aberdeen's policy. No Englishman then alive had done so much for peace. But the exertions which he had made in that sacred cause in the past, had now actually become inducements for war. Nicholas could not believe that war was possible while Aberdeen, the minister with whom he had conversed in 1844, presided over the British ministry. He failed to observe the change which had occurred. The policy of England no longer depended on the Cabinet in London; it was practically moulded by Stratford at the Porte.[1]

The new phase into which the quarrel had entered had been followed by new circumstances. England had become a principal in the dispute, and in consequence had been drawn into closer union with France. But the action of Russia in occupying the Principalities was attended with even more important results. The Danube is to Austria what the Bosphorus is to Russia; and Austria saw accordingly, with undisguised alarm, her powerful neighbour approaching a river which is both the artery and the outlet of her dominions. Prussia in 1853 usually followed the lead of Austria; and thus, while

[1] Nothing has brought out more clearly the confidence which Nicholas reposed in Aberdeen's policy than the *Diplomatic Study*, see *e.g.*, vol. i. pp. 292, 300.

Menschikoff's ultimatum and Stratford's action had made Britain a party to the dispute, the occupation of the Principalities had brought Austria and Prussia into the quarrel.

This circumstance, however, was not unfavourable to the cause of peace. Every addition made to the party of resistance naturally increased the desire of moderate men in Russia to avoid the risks of war. Austria and Prussia, moreover, had little inclination to engage in hostilities with a Power which had much in common with themselves. France, on her part, or the autocrat who represented France, had gained by the quarrel all that he could ever hope to obtain. The man at whose conduct France had first laughed and then trembled had posed before Europe as the ally of England, and had acquired the status of which he felt in need from the alliance. In England itself the strange craving for war in the multitude was tempered by the moderation of her Prime Minister. It seemed certain that Aberdeen would do all that honourable men could honourably do for the sake of avoiding war.

Thus, though the combatants were nearing the arena, though the Russian army under Gortschakoff[1] was occupying the Principalities, though the French and English fleets were casting anchor outside the Dardanelles in Besika Bay, diplomatists still hoped for a peaceful solution of the question. There was one way by which everyone felt that peace might be assured. Though the Porte had declined to sign either the

[1] It is one of the curious facts connected with the Crimean War that Gortschakoff, the commander of the Russian army, was a warm admirer of England. In what Lord Malmesbury calls a 'racy military speech' in London in 1852 he said, after a panegyric on Wellington, 'Vive cette armée qui a combattu avec lui! Vive cette belle marine qui a nettoyé son chemin et aidé ses efforts! Mais, avant tout, vive la vieille et glorieuse Angleterre!' Malmesbury's *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, p. 282.

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sened or the note on which Menschikoff had insisted, there was no reason why a note should not be drawn up which should be palatable both to Turk and Czar.

The Vienna note

France, at the close of June, drew up a draft note which French statesmen thought might effect this purpose.[1] England at the beginning of July drew up a draft treaty with the same object.[2] Austria, to whom both note and treaty were referred, expressed her preference for the note; Prussia followed, as usual, the lead of Austria; and the four Powers agreed on transmitting the note (the Vienna note as it was then called), slightly amended,[3] to Constantinople and St. Petersburg.

accepted by Russia,

Nicholas, at St. Petersburg, at once accepted the note which was thus agreed upon.[4] Stratford, at Constantinople, at once decided that it should be refused. The messenger who brought it from Vienna crossed another from himself to the Austrian capital, with an alternative note, which he had drawn up, and to which the representatives of the four Powers at the Porte had agreed.[5] Stratford had the assurance to assume that the definite acceptance of his own arrangement by the Porte would supersede the note agreed upon by the four Powers. Corrected on this point by Clarendon, he endeavoured as Ambassador to prevail upon the Porte to accept the Vienna note. He did not attempt to conceal his objections to it as a man.[6] The Porte, attaching more importance to his own opinions than to the advice which he was instructed to give, declined to accept the note unmodified;[7] and the peace

rejected by the Porte.

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part i. p. 307.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 350.
[3] For the Vienna note in its amended shape, *Eastern Papers*, part ii. p. 25. For the amendments, *ibid.*, pp. 2 and 4. The copy of the note in the *Russian Diplomatic Study*, vol. i. p. 205 *note*, is not accurate, but its inaccuracies are not material.
[4] *Eastern Papers*, part ii. p. 43.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 30.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 69, and cf. *Russian Diplomatic Study*, vol. i. p. 210.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 75–80.

which had been virtually made was thus again endangered.

As war eventually broke out on these rival projects; as the war which thus occurred probably consumed 200,000,000*l.* of treasure and sacrificed 500,000 lives; and as ordinary historians usually omit to compare Menschikoff's treaty with the Vienna note, or the Vienna note with the amendments introduced into it by the Porte, it may be as well to make this comparison here. Menschikoff proposed that the Czar and Sultan, being 'mutually desirous of maintaining the stability of the orthodox Greco-Russian religion professed by the majority of their Christian subjects, and of guaranteeing that religion against all molestation for the future, have agreed,' &c. (1) 'No change shall be made as regards the rights, privileges, and immunities which have been enjoyed by, or are possessed *ab antiquo* by, the Orthodox Churches, pious institutions, and clergy, in the dominions of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, which is pleased to secure the same to them in perpetuity, on the strict basis of the *status quo* now existing. (2) The rights and advantages conceded by the Ottoman Government, or which shall hereafter be conceded, to the other Christian rites by treaties, conventions, or special arrangements, shall be considered as belonging also to the Orthodox Church.'[1]

The points at issue.

The Vienna note and the note as amended by the Porte may perhaps be conveniently placed side by side.[2]

'If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part i. p. 169. I have omitted the four other articles, as nothing turned on them.

[2] In the text the words occupying the whole page are common to the note both in its original and amended form. The words in the left column are in the original note; the words in the right column are the Porte's amendment.

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maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused again to confirm them

Orthodox Greek religion and Church,[1] the Sultans have never ceased to provide for the maintenance of the privileges and immunities which at different times they have spontaneously granted to that religion and to that Church in the Ottoman Empire, and to confirm them

by solemn acts testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects.

'His Majesty the Sultan Abdul Medjid, now reigning, inspired with the same dispositions, and being desirous of giving to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia a personal proof of his most sincere friendship, has been solely influenced in his unbounded confidence in the eminent qualities of his august friend and ally, and has been pleased to take into serious consideration the representations which his Highness Prince Menschikoff conveyed to the Sublime Porte.

'The undersigned has in consequence received orders to declare by the present note that the Government of his Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to

the letter and to the spirit of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion, and

the stipulations of the treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the protection by the Sublime Porte of the Christian religion, and he is moreover charged to make known

[1] I have ventured to transpose these words in the translation. The official translation, 'Religion and Orthodox Greek Church' does not accurately render the original, 'le culte et l'église orthodoxe Grecque.'

that his Majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by his Majesty's august ancestors to the Orthodox Eastern Church, which are maintained and confirmed by him; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted

to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement.'

or which might be granted to the other Christian communities, Ottoman subjects.'[1]

A microscopic examination can hardly detect any essential difference between the terms which were demanded by Menschikoff, and those which were embodied in the Vienna note. More distinction may undoubtedly be drawn between the conditions of the Vienna note and the amendments which Stratford and the Porte desired to introduce in it. The first amendment proposed by the Porte related indeed to questions of fact, and on these facts persons who have any knowledge of Oriental history will think that the language of the note was more accurate than the language of the amendment. The other two suggested alterations were of much more importance. The first actually limited the stipulations of Kainardji and Adrianople which the note proposed to extend. There was no question that these treaties gave Russia a limited right of interference in respect to one particular Church and its ministers, and to members of the Greek Church in certain specified provinces.[2] Menschikoff's demand and the Vienna note would equally have extended this right to the whole Ottoman Empire; the Porte's amendments, by defining the protection thus accorded to the Greek

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part ii. p. 81.

[2] See Stratford's own account in *ibid.*, part i. p. 128.

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Church as protection of the Sublime Porte, would have by implication destroyed the limited right already existing. The same thing could be said of the last amendment. The treaties of Carlowitz, Belgrade, and Sistova gave Austria the right of protecting all persons of the Roman Catholic persuasion in Turkey, whether they were Ottoman subjects or not.[1] It was the object of Menschikoff—which would have been obtained by the Vienna note—to confer on Russia a similar right of protection for members of the Greek Church. It was the determination of Stratford, enforced by the Porte's amendments, to limit this right to any privileges specially conceded to the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

If at that moment the British ministry had calmly reviewed the position, it would probably have directed Stratford to tell the Porte that, should it persevere in declining to adopt the Vienna note, it would be left to deal with Russia alone. Unhappily, instead of taking this course, it followed the example of Austria and France[2] in asking Russia to accept the Porte's amendments. The Czar naturally declined to make any further concessions to the Sultan; his minister drew up, for the private information of his master, a statement of the reasons which made it impossible for him to do so. This statement, communicated in confidence to the Russian Minister at Vienna, found its way—it is not known how—into a Prussian paper.[3] Europe was suddenly startled at finding that the Czar placed an interpretation on the Vienna note different from that which the Power which had drawn it up, and the Powers which

[1] See again, Stratford's explanation, *ibid.*, part ii. p. 69.

[2] For the action of Austria, see Lord Westmoreland's despatch of 28th of August; for that of France, Lord Cowley's despatch of 30th of August; for that of England, Lord Clarendon's despatch of the 1st of September, in *Eastern Papers*, part ii. pp. 85, 86.

[3] *Diplomatic Study*, vol. i. p. 217.

had adopted it, intended it to bear. The nations, indeed, which had been parties to the conference, attached a different significance to the circumstance. Austria redoubled her efforts to induce the Porte to accept the note; England formally declined to recommend it any further.[1] By this course the solid cohesion of the four Powers was dissolved. Prussia followed Austria in leaning towards the Russian side, while France readily supported the British ministry in its novel determination to uphold the Porte.

England refuses to support the Vienna note.

Years afterwards,[2] a member of the British Cabinet declared in his 'Recollections' that, if he had been Prime Minister in 1853, he would have insisted on the acceptance of the Vienna note. It is unfortunately certain that the man who penned this sentence in his old age gave very different advice to his colleagues in 1853.[3] But on both occasions he seems strangely to have overlooked the circumstance that there was a question of much more importance for the consideration of the ministry than the acceptance of the Vienna note. The chief chance of peace lay in maintaining the cohesion of the four Powers; and any ministry which had understood its duty, instead of determining the question for itself, would have endeavoured to decide it in concert with its allies. While the four Powers were agreed, war was almost impossible; it was their separation which made it certain.

The dissension in the Cabinet.

Unhappily, moreover, at this juncture the members of the Cabinet with whom the decision rested were divided among themselves. Russell had with difficulty been persuaded to join the ministry. He had been prevailed upon to do so by the suggestion that, after a due interval, Aberdeen might retire in his favour, and

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part ii. pp. 111, 114.
[2] *Recollections and Suggestions*, p. 273.
[3] Kinglake's *History of Crimean War*, vol. i. p. 393.

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he might again become Prime Minister. The interval had passed, but the arrangement was still unfulfilled. Aberdeen naturally considered that, while peace or war was the high issue at stake, he could not honourably retire from his post. But, though unfortunately for his reputation, he was thus forced to remain in office, he still more unfortunately could not afford to dispense with Russell's services. For the sake of retaining Russell's help he forbore, and persuaded his colleagues to forbear, from insisting on the unconditional acceptance of the Vienna note by the Porte. In so doing he had the vigorous support of Palmerston. But, as the autumn wore on, these two men, who had led the war party in the Cabinet, were separated from one another on a question of internal policy. Russell was pledged to introduce a new Reform Bill, and Palmerston, who agreed with Russell on the Eastern question, but who disliked a further extension of the franchise, resigned. Eventually, indeed, he was persuaded to withdraw his resignation,[1] just as Russell had withdrawn his resignation in the previous August. But differences of this kind, even when they are healed, leave a permanent impression on public policy. Practically the ministry had decided that it could not afford to lose either Palmerston or Russell, and the men whom it could not spare were insisting on the unconditional support of the Turk.

Russell and Palmerston.

Moreover, while the Cabinet was thus divided, and the leaders of the old Whig section were throwing their influence into the scale which pronounced for war, there was one man, a mere agent and not a member of the ministry, who knew his own mind, and resolved on carrying out his own policy. Stratford—to quote the accurate description which was given of his conduct—ful-

Stratford Canning's warlike policy

[1] Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 270. Kinglake's *Crimea*, vol. ii. p. 26 *et seq.* and prefatory note to vol. vi.

filled his instructions to the letter, but he so contrived that his employers were constantly getting deeper into a war policy.[1] In September, on the application of the Sultan, who feared for the peace of Constantinople, he called up some ships of war from Besika Bay to the Bosphorus.[2] The ministry not merely approved his policy, but, influenced by the advice which Palmerston had frequently given,[3] authorised the Ambassador to summon the whole fleet.[4] This policy led, as it could only lead, directly to war. The treaty of 1841 had strictly forbidden the Porte to admit, or other Powers to send, ships of war to the Bosphorus while Turkey was at peace. The new policy, therefore, could only be justified by the assumption that Turkey was at war, and, in reply to the animated remonstrance of Russia,[5] Clarendon boldly answered that, while the Principalities were occupied, Turkey could not be considered at peace.[6] Such a declaration formed a new departure. Up to that time the ministry had declined to consider that the occupation of the Principalities involved war,[7] and the Russians were certainly justified in contending that if, after the battle of Navarino, Britain did not choose to consider herself at war with Turkey, there were no grounds for asserting that the Russian occupation of the Principalities involved an act of war.[8] But the new policy soon underwent a rapid development. Urged on by France, the ministry in October sent full instructions to Stratford,[9] authorising him, if necessary, to desire the fleet to pass through the Bosphorus, and engage in defensive operations in any part of the Euxine. Four days before this momentous decision was

[1] Prince Consort to Stockmar, in *Martin's Prince Consort*, vol. ii. p. 532.
[2] *Eastern Papers*, part ii. p. 121.
[3] Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 276, 277.
[4] *Eastern Papers*, part ii. p. 116.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 119.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[7] Ashley's *Palmerston*, part ii. p. 279.
[8] *Eastern Papers*, part ii. p. 139.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 142.

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taken, the Porte had authorised Omar Pasha to summon Gortschakoff to evacuate the Principalities within fifteen days, and, in the event of the summons being disobeyed, to commence operations.[1]

For the moment, indeed, the moderation of the Russian Government afforded a fresh opportunity for averting war. Russia declared that she would probably meet the Turkish declaration of war by neither counter-declaration nor attack, but await, with peaceful aims, fresh overtures from the Porte.[2] But a passive attitude is difficult in war. While the Russian troops were awaiting fresh overtures, the Turkish troops crossed the Danube and inflicted on them sharp defeats. Forced into activity, the Czar loosed his squadron from Sebastopol, and authorised it to cruise in Turkish waters. On November 30, 1853, it attacked and destroyed the Turkish fleet at Sinope.[3]

The Turkish fleet at Sinope destroyed.

The battle, or massacre, of Sinope, as it was called, was regarded in England as 'a humiliation and defiance,'[4] and created a passionate anger against the Czar, and an almost irresistible desire for war with Russia. Yet it is certain that this anger was wholly unreasonable. Englishmen might, indeed, feel natural annoyance that the allied fleets, which had been ordered to the Bosphorus and which had been authorised to engage in offensive operations in any part of the Euxine, had not prevented the catastrophe. But no Englishman had a right to complain that the Czar, after war had been declared against him, should have committed an act of war. If Englishmen, in fact, had enjoyed even a superficial acquaintance with their own history, they would

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part ii. p. 161.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 181.

[3] The Russians believed that the Sinope fleet, under the pretext of victualling Batoum, was intended to stir up insurrection in the Caucasus.

[4] *Diplomatic Study*, vol. i. p. 334. Aberdeen was completely overwhelmed by the public exasperation. . . . 'I am accused,' he said, 'of cowardice, of betraying my country to Russia. I dare not show myself in the streets, I am done for.' *Ibid.*, p. 339.

have known that, forty-seven years before, their own ancestors had committed an act of much more doubtful propriety, which English historians always defend. Yet if the battle of Sinope were indefensible, the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 was an outrage.

Though, however, the attack on Sinope may be justified, its imprudence cannot be excused. The British ministry, on hearing of the disaster, declared that it did not doubt that the British and French Ambassadors would have at once directed the combined fleets of France and England to enter the Black Sea.[1] The French Government, going a step further, proposed that the fleets should not merely enter the Black Sea, but that every Russian vessel found at sea should be 'invited' to return to Sebastopol,[2] and the British Government adopted the Emperor's suggestion.[3]

This decision, which brought the Western Powers still nearer towards the war to which their policy was continually driving them, was taken at a singularly unfortunate period. Ever since the rejection of the Vienna note, and the practical separation of the Western from the German States, the representatives of the four Powers had been constantly striving to discover some ground on which they could take common action. Within the week in which the slaughter at Sinope occurred, they succeeded in agreeing to a note which they had reason

[1] Mr. Kinglake has been so anxious to show that our Government was forced by the Emperor into a policy of war, that he has wholly misconstrued this decision. He writes (vol. ii. p. 36, *note*) that the Government determined that no special instructions to the Admirals were necessitated by the disaster of Sinope. But the full passage is, 'Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that . . . your Excellency, acting in concert with General Baraguay d'Hilliers, will have directed that the combined fleets should enter the Black Sea. Special instructions *as to the manner in which they should act* do not appear to be necessary. *We have undertaken to defend the territory of the Sultan from aggression, and that engagement must be fulfilled.*' *Eastern Papers*, part ii. pp. 304, 305. By overlooking the words which I have italicised, Mr. Kinglake has given a contrary appearance to the decision of the Cabinet.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 310.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 321.

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to hope might prove acceptable to Czar and Sultan.[1] Stratford was directed to press this note on the Porte's acceptance.[2] In the closing days of 1853 the Porte adopted this note,[3] and one obstacle to peace was at last removed. On the 13th of January, 1854, the representatives of the four Powers at Vienna decided on communicating these terms to St. Petersburg for the Czar's acceptance.[4] By another unfortunate coincidence, on the very day on which the four Powers in conference at Vienna adopted this resolution, the British Minister at St. Petersburg communicated to Nesselrode the decision of the Western Powers to require every Russian ship in the Euxine to re-enter a Russian port.[5] The Russian Government, unable to obtain explanations satisfactory to itself of this policy, withdrew its missions from Paris and London,[6] and, on the 6th of February, 1854,[7] instructions were sent to the British and French Ministers to leave St. Petersburg.

The second Note of 1853.

Diplomatic relations suspended.

The withdrawal of the Russian Ministers from London and Paris, and of the British and French Ministers from St. Petersburg, in 1854, did not immediately lead to war. By a policy, which most people will regard as unfortunate, those who were responsible for the government of Britain and France had separated themselves from the German Powers; but by a circumstance which was as fortunate as it might have proved beneficial, the Western Powers obtained a new opportunity of recovering the position which they had lost, by rejoining the German Powers. The original dispute between France and Russia, it must be recollected, had been settled; the quarrel had passed into a controversy between Russia and Turkey on the right of Russia to protect the

Fresh negotiations between the Western and the German Powers.

[1] The note was signed on the 5th of December. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 303.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 361.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 369.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 374.
[6] *Russian Diplomatic Study*, vol. i. pp. 236–245.
[7] *Eastern Papers*, part iii. p. 7, part vii. pp. 26, 27.

Christian subjects of the Porte. Irritated at the refusal of the Sultan to concede his claim, the Czar had occupied the Principalities. France and England had no particular interest in these provinces, but the German Powers, or at any rate, Austria—which regulated the policy of Prussia as well as her own—had a vital interest in their occupation. Austria could not afford to see a great military Power astride the Danube, or Russian armies encamped on its banks. On the 22nd of February Buol, the Austrian minister, told Bourqueney, the French Ambassador at Vienna, that if England and France would fix a delay[1] for the evacuation of the Principalities, the expiration of which should be the signal for hostilities, the Cabinet of Vienna would support the summons. The language implied that Austria was at any rate prepared for war. But the ministry, instead of acting on an assurance which had filtered to them through three or four persons, telegraphed to Vienna and Berlin for a distinct statement of the part which Austria and Prussia would take in the event of Russia refusing the summons.[2] These despatches were sent on the 23rd and 24th of February, 1854. The answers to them were received on the 28th of February. Austria, instead of replying to the question of Clarendon, approved the proposal of a summons, and promised to support it. The Prussian minister more cautiously declared that he did not think that Prussia would 'perhaps' object to join in a summons, but he did not think that she would take a part in active hostility in the event of a refusal.[3] Neither Austria nor Prussia had answered the question which had been addressed to them. If it were, however, necessary to make the inquiry on the 23rd or 24th, it was equally

The ultimatum of February 1854.

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part vii. p. 53. Mr. Kinglake prints the word 'day,' vol. ii. p. 112. But in this, as in all cases, I have endeavoured to retain the exact language of the despatch.

[2] *Eastern Papers*, part vii. p. 57.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

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requisite to have a distinct reply to it on the 28th. But ministers, with singular imprudence, thought otherwise. They were in such a hurry that they actually despatched the ultimatum through Vienna and Berlin to St. Petersburg the day before[1] they received the replies of the Austrian and Prussian Governments. The summons thus addressed by the Western Powers was, however, urgently supported by the German States. The Czar, by this time almost mad from rage, declined to notice the ultimatum. The Western Powers, almost equally insane, undertook alone to enforce by arms a summons which the German States had joined them in urging on Russia. With their own blood, with their own treasure, they decided on upholding a policy in which they had no greater interest than the rest of Europe, and in which one Power—Austria—had a much greater interest than themselves.[2]

Unanswered by Russia.

It is a miserable reflection that in this imprudent haste England was even a greater offender than France. Her people, her Parliament, her press, were all eagerly demanding war. The utmost anxiety was felt not merely that war should be declared, but that war should be declared at once. And the hurry was the haste of the man who feels that he is ready to start, and who fears to miss his chance. For a great fleet, such as England had not seen for more than a generation, was assembled at Portsmouth. Its command had been entrusted to Napier, the hero of Acre, and neither England nor Napier could afford to wait, for the ice in the Baltic was beginning to break up.[3] From prince to

The Baltic fleet.

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part vii. p. 61. Mr. Kinglake has much weakened his argument by overlooking this singular circumstance, vol. ii. p. 112.

[2] People have argued — Mr. McCarthy among others—that Austria and Prussia had not the same interest as the Western Powers in the causes of the war. But these writers overlook the fact, that the only cause of war stated in the summons was the evacuation of the Principalities, and in this it is admitted that Austria had a capital interest.

[3] Prince Consort to Stockmar, in *Martin*, vol. iii. p. 36.

peasant, every man was eager for the fleet to sail. The Liberal party thought proper to entertain the Admiral at their political club in London before he set out on his command. The war was spoken of at the dinner with a levity which may have accorded with the feelings of the hour, but which must shock every person who reads the proceedings now. The great fleet, moreover, which was despatched amid light words and lighter expectancy, did nothing quite worthy of its promise or its commander. The Russian fleet in the Baltic was not captured; the great Russian arsenal, Cronstadt, was not even attacked; and a generation which had not known war, and which conveniently recollected the story of its forefathers' victories and forgot the history of their failures, blamed everyone except itself for its disappointment.

The campaign on the Danube.

The war, however, was not to be decided by a mere episode in the Baltic. It was the South at which Russia was striking, and the struggle had to be fought out in the South. Omar Pacha was defending the line of the Danube; and the French and English armies, which were in the first instance taken to Gallipoli, on the shores of the Dardanelles, were moved to Varna, the great Turkish port north of the Balkans. The command of the French army was entrusted to St. Arnaud; the command of the English army was given to Lord Raglan, who as Fitzroy Somerset in his youth had ridden by the side of Wellington in the Peninsula, and who in his mature years had served under him in the Horse Guards. But it did not require the presence of French and English troops to secure victory for the Ottoman on the Danube. The Russian armies, under Paskievitsch, the hero of 1829, moved against Silistria in May. But the garrison, sustained by the courage of a few English officers, resisted the attack and maintained the struggle. On the 22nd of June the great Russian

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general was forced to confess his failure, and to raise the siege. A fortnight afterwards, a chance reconnaissance, which brought the Turks across the Danube at Giurgevo, induced Gortschakoff to move with another Russian army on that place. But the Turkish troops, reinforced by British gunboats, presented a bold front, and Gortschakoff withdrew from the attack. The skill of Omar Pacha, the courage of the Turks, the sustaining presence of the Western armies, the attitude of Austria, and the difficulties of the country, had made—so it was no longer doubtful—Russian successes impracticable.

Russia evacuates the Principalities.

The evacuation of the Principalities, to which Russia was thus forced, accomplished every object which the Conference of Vienna or the Western allies had proposed. Russia had claimed the right of protecting the members of the Greek Church in Turkey. She had seized the Principalities as a guarantee for the concession of her claim. The guarantee was surrendered when Gortschakoff's men recrossed the Pruth. It was true that Russia had not withdrawn her claim, but she had proved—what was practically the same thing—that she was powerless to enforce it. The battalions of Omar Pacha forbade her further access to European Turkey, the fleets of France and England condemned her ships to inactivity; and the mere continuance of an armed force in the Baltic and the Euxine would have paralysed her trade, reduced her to impotence, and compelled her sooner or later to sue for peace.

Common sense, therefore, plainly indicated that the time had come for abstaining from active operations, and for exerting only a passive pressure on the Russian Empire. Unhappily, however, when nations engage in war, they are not usually contented with passive operations. They like to hear of the achievements of their arms and of the courage of their soldiers, and this

unwholesome appetite for military success has been indirectly stimulated by the machinery of modern civilisation. The rapid transmission of news, and its extended circulation, have created in the multitude a craving for fresh intelligence, which, in 1854, had not been satisfied. The people had expected much from the armaments which had left the shores of Britain, and their expectations had resulted in disappointment. The Turkish vessels at Sinope had been destroyed almost in the presence of the British fleet, the Russian vessels in the Baltic reposed in safety under the guns of Cronstadt. Even the allied armies lay in camp at Varna, while Omar Pacha and his raw Turkish levies were bearing the brunt of the contest. The war was the nation's war; the nation could not bear the thought of its termination without one great national achievement; it could not believe in a peace secured without disaster to its adversary.

The expedition to the Crimea decided on.

There was one way, so the people thought, in which a heavy blow could be struck at the rising power of Russia in Southern Europe. The Russians had formed a great naval arsenal at Sebastopol, a harbour on the western shores of the Crimea. Thence the fleet had sailed which had dealt the blow of Sinope. Thither the Czar's navy had repaired after the passage of the Bosphorus by the allied squadrons. The naval strength of Russia might be destroyed for years if Sebastopol were taken and the Russian fleet sunk. The people, anxious to prove that the sword which they had drawn had not been blunted by disuse, began to talk of an expedition to Sebastopol. On the 15th of June, 1854, the *Times*, giving expression to the general desire, declared that 'the grand political and military objects of the war could not be attained as long as Sebastopol and the Russian fleet were in existence.' On the 22nd of June it repeated the advice, and

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insisted that 'a successful enterprise against the place was the essential condition of permanent peace.'[1] In the Ministry there were men, besides their chief, anxious for milder measures. But pacific counsels could not be heard in the stormy atmosphere charged with passion and war. On the 28th of June the Cabinet sent instructions to Raglan, recommending, or rather urging, an immediate expedition to the Crimea.[2] Against his own opinion, against the judgment of St. Arnaud, Raglan was constrained by the urgency of these despatches to attempt the invasion of Russian territory,[3] and, after a delay of two months, caused partly by sickness in the camp and partly by the necessity for preparation, the allied forces sailed.

The expedition sails.

Yet the expedition would not have sailed if a man of low rank and with little interest, whose services were unrewarded in life, and forgotten in death, had not devised means for embarking and disembarking the cavalry and artillery—Roberts, a master in the navy, bought up the long narrow caïques of the country and made them the floating power of the rafts which he built upon them. At the time the men on the spot recognised the service. Later on the men at home ignored and neglected the doer of it; and, while rewards were freely given to other and lesser men, Roberts was suffered to live without promotion till he died from the effects of exposure during the war, and disappointment at the ingratitude of his employers.[4]

The expedition reached the Crimea on the 13th of

[1] Kinglake's *Crimea*, vol. ii. pp. 241, 243. Lyndhurst had urged the same course in the Lords on the 20th June. *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 75, and cf. *ibid.*, p. 76.

[2] Kinglake's *Crimea*, vol. ii. p. 261.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 277; cf. Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 81.

[4] See *The Service and its Reward*, p. 9, and cf. Kinglake's *Crimea*, vol. ii. p. 288, *note*. So strongly were Roberts' services felt by those who saw them, that Raglan told Admiral Lyons that 'Roberts did more for us than anybody;' and Lyons himself declared that 'without Roberts' pontoons we could not have gone to the Crimea at all that season.' *Ibid.*, p. 19.

September. The five following days were occupied in landing troops and stores; and on the 19th the allies moved southwards from the spot on which they had disembarked towards Sebastopol. They found the Russian army strongly posted on the banks of the Alma, a little river which rises in the highlands in the east, and flows, after a westerly course, into the Euxine. The Russians, who were under the command of Menschikoff, the Ambassador of the previous year, and who numbered some 40,000 men, occupied a strong position which had been fortified with much care. St. Arnaud, who commanded the right of the allied army, proposed to turn the Russian left by crossing the Alma at a point which the enemy had neglected to occupy, while the English by a similar movement attacked their right wing. The idea which was thus formed was only partially carried out. The flanking movement of the French occupied time, and the troops who undertook it found themselves too far removed from the Russian columns to engage in any very serious fighting. The brunt of the battle fell on the left wing of the allies, or the English army. Fighting in line against the Russians massed in column, the English enveloped their enemies with their fire, and forced them, after obstinate resistance, to withdraw. Their retreat was quickened into a disordered flight by the presence of the French on their left flank, and the allied armies found themselves undisputed masters of the field.

The battle of the Alma.

The battle reflected little credit on any of the commanders. Menschikoff, indeed, chose his position with prudence and strengthened it with judgment. But he displayed no tactical skill during the battle. He reduced the front of an army, too small for the ground which it held, by massing his men in needlessly heavy columns; and, like Napoleon on the day of Quatre Bras and Ligny, he wasted whole regiments by marching and counter-

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marching them to points which he had either neglected to occupy or which were exposed to an unusually heavy assault. His subordinates made no effort to repair the errors of their chief. Superior in cavalry, they omitted to employ it; and they never once attempted to deploy the regiments which were decimated by the English fire. To St. Arnaud, a slightly higher praise may be given. His original conception of the battle was bold and skilful, but its execution was weak and tardy, and the French troops, brought too slowly into action, did not exert that influence which ought to have resulted from their numbers and their gallantry. The English attack, on the contrary, displayed no tactical skill, but it was carried out with extraordinary vigour. Raglan, indeed, thrust himself into the heart of the enemy's lines, and by doing so lost control over his own men. But his divisional commanders, left to themselves, did not shirk the responsibilities of their position, and though one of them, by neglecting to bring up the reserves, placed the result in jeopardy, the others, by the valour with which they took positions and by the tenacity with which they clung to them, secured a brilliant victory.

Raglan proposed, but St. Arnaud refused, to follow up this success. If the allies had done so, they might have entered Sebastopol unopposed. Instead, however, of at once seizing the present opportunity, they remained three days on the battlefield, burying the slain and tending the wounded.[1] At last, on the morning of the fourth day, the march was resumed. But the interval had allowed the Russians time to strengthen their fortresses and to construct a new outwork. Alarmed at these preparations, St. Arnaud declined to risk the

[1] At the end of three days, the Russian wounded remained 'a grey mass on the plain.' Russell, *The War*, p. 187, and cf. the account in Kinglake's *Crimea*, vol. iii. p. 329 *et seq.* People who talk lightly of war should read such accounts as these, and try to realise what they mean.

consequences of an assault, and Raglan, unable to act alone, and unwilling to refrain from action, suggested that the allied armies should move round Sebastopol from the north to the south, and attack the arsenal from the side where they were not expected. The flank march.

It is due to the memory of a gallant soldier to add that St. Arnaud, when he declined to follow up the victory of the 20th, and when he refused to risk the chances of an assault on the 25th, was suffering painfully from a disease which clouded his intellect, and only four days later caused his death. He was succeeded in the command of the French army by Canrobert, during the crisis of the great flank march. To that march Raglan may have been forced by the refusal of the French to risk the chances of an assault. Its dangers may not have been greater than the risk of doing nothing. On no other principle is it possible to defend a movement which for twenty-four hours placed the allied armies at the mercy of their opponents. Had Menschikoff been a man of genius, had he even been a man of vigour, the allies would probably have been destroyed on the 25th of September.

On that day, however, the Russian general, instead of watching the movements of his enemy, was absorbed in carrying out a movement of his own. Convinced that Sebastopol could not be defended against a resolute assault, aware that defeat in such a position would cut off his communications with Russia and annihilate his army, he decided to defend the port against a possible attack from sea by sinking ships of war in the mouth of the harbour, to abandon the defence of the town to the crews of the ships and to his irregular soldiery, and, moving out of Sebastopol himself with his main army, to gain the main road which passed through Simpheropol to Russia. Thence, with his communications secure, he fancied that he might be able to strike Menschikoff evacuates Sebastopol.

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at the flank and rear of the allies and paralyse their attack. Thus, by a singular coincidence, while the allied army was moving round Sebastopol from the north to the south, the Russian army was moving out of Sebastopol on the south and seeking the north. The two lines of march intersected one another, and Raglan, moving at the head of his own reconnoitring columns, actually came upon the Russian rearguard. Yet, though the two armies were thus executing movements which brought them within striking distance, though portions of them actually met, neither Menschikoff nor Raglan had any notion of the designs of their opponents. With Raglan ignorance did little harm. His only chance of safety lay in secrecy. With Menschikoff ignorance was fatal. He lost an opportunity such as falls to the lot of few commanders of destroying his opponents.

While Menschikoff was doing nothing, the men whom he had left behind in Sebastopol were doing much. On the afternoon of the 25th, whilst awaiting an attack, they observed from a high fort in the town the movements of the allies. Thenceforward they knew that the blow which they had awaited from the north was to be delivered from the south, and they had to reckon on the means which were left to them of meeting it. The circumstances might well have disheartened the bravest of mankind. If, on the north, the fortresses were indefensible, on the south the protecting works were much more slender. By a grave error Menschikoff, in evacuating the town, had placed the north and south banks of the harbour under independent commands, and he had naturally assigned the best troops and the best men to the side where the danger seemed greatest. Nachimoff, who commanded on the south, had only 3,000 troops under him, and concluded that he had no alternative but to sink his

Nachimoff, Korniloff, and Todleben.

remaining ships and sell his life, and the lives of his men, as dearly as possible. Fortunately for the Russians, Korniloff, who commanded on the north side, at once left his own post and hurried to the spot where the danger was greatest. Still more fortunately for them, he had by his side an engineer officer, Colonel de Todleben, who had been despatched from the Principalities on a warning mission to Menschikoff, and who had remained as a volunteer to superintend the defence. At Nachimoff's request Korniloff assumed the command. At Korniloff's wish Todleben set himself to strengthen the position.

The history of the Crimean war is a history of blunders. The allies failed to produce a man of genius; the Russians were never under the supreme command of a man of vigour. But, in the dreary story of mistakes and sufferings, the names of two men shine in undimmed lustre. One of them, Korniloff, once the admiral of the fleet, part of which lay sunken at the mouth of the harbour, was an enthusiast with an unfaltering faith in his country, his cause, and his God. He had all the strength which, in an age of doubt, is given to those few men who can believe from the depth of their souls. The other, Todleben, was a practical engineer of consummate power and unlimited resource. It was his mission to teach the world the value of earthworks. These two men, one confident in his God and his cause, the other relying on pickaxe and spade worked by strong hands and guided by a clear brain, were drawn together in close friendship. Korniloff was struck down at the very opening of the siege by a shot from the proud armies he had thwarted. Todleben survived to a good old age, and lived to see all the results of the cruel war in which he had borne so great a part obliterated.

Heroes even like Korniloff and Todleben—'the soul

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and the mind'[1] of the defence, as they have been finely called—could not have stood the onslaught of the allies if it had been delivered on the 28th of September. Sir George Cathcart, who commanded one of the divisions of the British army, declared that he could walk into the place with scarcely the loss of a man.[2] The opinion thus formed by Cathcart was shared by the Russians. But the allies did not attack. Canrobert was opposed to the risks of doing so. Sir John Burgoyne, who commanded the Engineers in the British army, supported his opinion, and, instead of instant assault, the allies sent for their siege train. A delay of this kind was exactly what Todleben desired. He had all the resources of a great arsenal at his disposal; he had troops of dockyard labourers whom he could employ in making earthworks; he had far more engineering skill than any of his adversaries. The twenty days, which were occupied by the allies in getting up their siege train and in preparing preliminary trenches, were devoted by Todleben to strengthening and arming his outworks. Stung by Korniloff's remonstrance, Menschikoff threw 25,000 men into the town; and thus, on the 17th of October, when the attack at last began, the allies had before them works well-designed, heavily armed, and strongly held, instead of the poor fortifications, slightly armed and weakly manned, over which they might have forced their way twenty days before.

The attack postponed.

The bombardment of the 17th of October.

On the morning of the 17th of October, when the bombardment at last began, the allies hoped to destroy the enemy's fire, and to march into the town over his silenced batteries. As the day dawned the fire was opened, a little later the allied fleets joined in the attack, and for long hours a duel was maintained such as

[1] Kinglake's *Crimea*, vol. iv. p. 326. I need hardly add that, in this short summary of the operations in the Crimea, I have, in the main, depended on Mr. Kinglake's diffuse, but brilliant, narrative.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

had never previously been witnessed in the history of the world. But the allies found that the task which they had set themselves to perform was tougher than they had expected. The ships, posted too far from the forts, sustained some injury themselves, but inflicted little loss on their adversaries. The French, on the left of the allied line, found themselves enveloped by a fire superior to their own, till at last the explosion of a magazine in their lines disheartened their troops and silenced their batteries. The English, opposed to less heavy metal, succeeded in dominating the Russian fire. But their success was not sufficient to counteract the other failures. The allies had flung away their opportunity twenty days before; and in war, as in life, the opportunity which is once lost does not recur.

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Had, indeed, the allies known what had occurred in Sebastopol, they might perhaps have thought that the bombardment had not been in vain. The storm of shot and shell had not opened a way into the Russian lines, but one chance shot had struck to the death the man who was the soul of the defence. The spirit of Korniloff, however, survived his fall. The breaches which had been made by the allied fire in the daytime were repaired in the night; and every day the gunners of the allies looked on works stronger and more formidable than those which they had assailed the day before.

The death of Korniloff.

He who desires to understand the stirring military events of the next few weeks must endeavour to acquire some general acquaintance with the ground on which the allies were encamped, and of the positions which they held. The roadstead of Sebastopol is a deep inlet of the sea, running west and east. On the extreme east it receives the waters of the Tchernaya, a little river which flows from south to north, and which is crossed by two bridges, one near its outlet, the other five miles nearer its source, and by a ford between the two. Due

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south of the eastern end of the roadstead lies the little sheltered port of Balaklava, occupied by the British shipping. The Chersonese, on which the allies were encamped, may thus be roughly described as a piece of high rugged land in the shape of an isosceles triangle, the base of the triangle being an imaginary line drawn from the eastern end of the Sebastopol roadstead to Balaklava. The base could be threatened along its whole line by an enemy with its communications open to Simpheropol and Russia; but it was specially exposed to attack at its north-eastern angle, which is usually, though not quite accurately, called Mount Inkerman, and at its southern limit near Balaklava.

By their own choice, the English occupied the right of the line of siege and drew their supplies from Balaklava; the French occupied the left of the line and were supplied from Kamiesch and Kazatch Bay. The left flank of the French army, therefore, rested on the sea; the right flank of the English army, its communications and its supplies, were open to attack. Unfortunately, moreover, while the more difficult task was thus thrown on the English army, the English numerically were much weaker than the French. Including sailors landed from the fleet, the English army, at the end of October, numbered some 25,000, the French army some 40,000, combatants.

The strength of the allied armies.

The strength of the allied armies would hardly have been sufficient to justify their undertaking the siege of Sebastopol, if the garrison had been confined to the men whom Menschikoff had originally under his orders. But, during the six weeks which followed the battle of the Alma, Menschikoff was largely reinforced from Russia. The march of the allies round Sebastopol left all the roads to Russia free, and the evacuation of the Principalities placed an army at the Czar's disposal which was rapidly transferred to the Crimea.

The strength of the Russian army.

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Thus at the end of October the Russian army was gradually raised to 120,000 combatants, and the unusual spectacle was offered of a siege in which the besieged were to the besiegers as 2 is to 1.

Under these circumstances the time had obviously come when it rested with Menschikoff to take the initiative. He directed one of his lieutenants, Liprandi, to strike, and strike hard, at the little port of Balaklava. This port, it has already been stated, was in the rear of the English position. Unlike Sebastopol—for the coast line at this point runs almost east and west—it was an inlet running nearly due north and south into the land. To the north of the inlet was a large plain or valley, surrounded on all sides by rocky eminences and intersected in the centre by a ridge of high land connecting the heights on the east with the allied camp on the west: and on this ridge the Russians in former times had constructed a causeway known as the Woronzoff road.

The battle of Balaklava.

It did not require any large military knowledge to see that a position of this character was exposed to attack. An active enemy, with its communications open to Russia, operating on the east or right bank of the Tchernaya, could easily throw a large force on the heights which commanded the valley both on the north and on the east. If they established their batteries on the heights, they could, under protection of them, push on a force through the northern half of the valley to the causeway. Once masters of the causeway, they might be able to annoy or possibly even to destroy the crowded shipping in the little port from which the English drew their supplies.

To guard against such an eventuality, the English constructed a line of redoubts along the causeway, and fortified at the same time a high hill on its south-eastern corner, which the soldiers, after the new com-

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mander of the French army, named Canrobert's Hill. Redoubts and forts were armed with heavy guns, and manned with Turkish troops.

Very early on the morning of the 25th of October, Liprandi, moving with a large force from the north, attacked the east of the position. Canrobert's Hill, its guns silenced by superior fire, was taken. The redoubts on the causeway itself were next attacked; and the Turks, surprised and outnumbered, after a short resistance fled in disorder. Three strong redoubts, and the guns which protected them, fell into the hands of the enemy.

This disaster placed the northern half of the valley of Balaklava at the mercy of the Russians. Liprandi moved some batteries to the high range of hills which overlooked it from the north, he occupied the redoubts which he had wrested from the Turks on the south, he held the heights on the east, and he moved a large cavalry force up the northern valley between the protecting batteries. But the disaster did more than this. The English cavalry was encamped in the southern half of the valley. It was now withdrawn due west behind some of the redoubts on the western end of the causeway which the Russians had not occupied. Its withdrawal laid open the southern valley to the Russians; and only one British regiment, the 93rd, and a horde of flying Turks stood between the vast force of Russian cavalry and the rich prize of English shipping and stores at Balaklava.

Happily for the cause of England, the 93rd comprised stout soldiers, and the command at Balaklava had been entrusted to a capable general—Colin Campbell. Campbell saw that the slender regiment which alone stood between the Russians and the port would be attacked by cavalry in force; he resolved to attempt the bold manœuvre of receiving a cavalry attack in

line. The commander of the Russian horse, at once appreciating Campbell's object and the true method of defeating it, led his men round the right flank of the British line. But Campbell, wheeling his flank company forward, again presented a firm front to his foes. The British fire discomfited the Russian horse, and the enemy's squadrons withdrew.

The charge of the Heavy Brigade.

The attack on the 93rd was, however, only an episode in a battle. The baffled squadrons withdrew to the vast columns of horse which were moving up the northern valley and preparing to cross the causeway to the south. Raglan, some time before, had desired that eight squadrons should be moved to support the flying Turks; and Lord Lucan, who commanded the cavalry in the Crimea, desired Scarlett, the commander of the heavy brigade, to execute the order. Scarlett, moving through broken and undulating ground, was ignorant of the circumstance that he was marching with a slender force of a few squadrons across the face of a huge column of Russian cavalry. The configuration of the ground suddenly revealed to him the danger he was incurring. He at once wheeled his little force into line and prepared to attack. Had the Russians at that moment advanced, their weight must have swept before them the slight brigade which had the hardihood to confront them. By a singular error, they received Scarlett's onslaught remaining at the halt. The small English cavalry force gained, in consequence, the advantage which attaches to momentum. It threw itself upon or into the Russian column, and ultimately cut its way through it. Assailed in this manner, the Russian column gained no assistance from its size and weight. Those only who were nearest the onslaught could raise an arm in their defence, those who reeled before the attack imparted their own unsteadiness to the body. In eight minutes the huge

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column was broken, and retreated to the eastern end of the valley.

The retreat of the Russian horse altered the conditions of the battle. Russian artillery still occupied the heights which overlooked the valley on the north. Russian troops still held the guns which they had seized from the Turkish troops on the southern heights, and a Russian army still stood at the eastern end of the valley. But the valley itself was swept of the enemy. Under these circumstances it was natural that the English should desire to regain the redoubts on the south of the valley which the Russians had captured, and whose possession seemed essential to the safety of Balaklava. Raglan accordingly directed Cathcart to recapture them. The order was only imperfectly obeyed; and Raglan, chafing at the slow movement of an infantry division, decided on employing cavalry for the purpose. The order was understood by Lucan as a command to attack the Russian guns at the eastern end of the valley, and, though he foresaw the fatal nature of the task, he ordered his brother-in-law, Lord Cardigan, who commanded the light cavalry, to undertake it. The fated force thus despatched on a hopeless mission, charged down a valley swept by the guns from the northern heights, from the captured redoubts on the south, and from the enemy's batteries on the east. Suffering cruel losses, it rode with heart never failing, with speed never checked, at the thick Russian columns before it. The remnant of the bold men who arrived at the goal even asserted their mastery over the thousands whom they charged. But, for all practical purposes of warfare, their valour was useless. The charge reduced to one-third of its former strength a brigade already too weak for the heavy duties cast upon it; it prevented any effort being made for the recovery of the captured redoubts; and it left,

The charge of the Light Brigade.

therefore, the Russians masters of the position which seemed essential for the safety of the little port of Balaklava.

No one need feel surprise that a brilliant feat of arms should be cherished in the memory of the British race, and that the 600 who rode in the light cavalry brigade should be immortal. The courage, the glory of the deed, was theirs, the blunder was not theirs; and on them should be the fame of having achieved it, on another[1] the disgrace of having ordered it. But it is a matter of surprise that, while the charge of the light brigade promises to be recollected for ever, the charge of the heavy brigade is already well-nigh forgotten.[2] Yet the one charge was executed with as much gallantry as the other; and, while Scarlett and his men were the heroes of a gallant, successful, and advantageous feat of arms, the men whom Cardigan led were the victims of a miserable error.

The attack of the 26th of October on Inkerman.

At Balaklava the allies were the victors in every contest, but the Russians held the prize of war, the mastery of the battlefield. On the day which followed the action, they delivered another attack on another part of the allied lines. They threw a heavy force on Mount Inkerman. They were easily repulsed by De Lacy Evans, who was in command of the British troops opposed to them, and who gradually withdrew his pickets and dispersed his assailants with artillery. But few men who shared in this battle could have imagined

[1] A history of this kind, which does not deal with military details at length, cannot discuss the responsibility attaching to Lord Raglan, Sir R. Airey, Lord Lucan, and Lord Cardigan respecting this charge, nor even the personal questions connected with Cardigan's conduct. I have omitted with more reluctance reference to the brilli nt charge of the French cavalry which temporarily silenced the Russian guns on the northern heights, and to some extent diminished the dangers of the retreat of the light brigade.

[2] I do not forget that Lord Tennyson has endeavoured to repair his previous omission by describing the charge of the heavy brigade. But for one man, who is acquainted with his later poem, probably ninety-nine men are familiar with his earlier stanzas.

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that the Russian effort was to be repeated ten days later on a larger scale, and that the ground on which Evans stood was destined to gain immortal memory in British story.

The battle of Inkerman.

Of the deeds wrought at Inkerman little can be said here. Are they not written in the book of Kinglake? The tactics of armies have no right to occupy much space in general history, and the tactics of Inkerman were little better than the fights of the Iliad or the Æneid. It was Menschikoff's purpose, on the 5th of November, to drive the allies from the Crimea by an attack along their line. Largely reinforced, he felt himself strong enough to threaten all points and to strike at many. But he proposed dealing his main blow at the rocky eminence which stood on the right flank of the British army. There Pennefather—for Evans was disabled by illness and a fall—a hot-headed Irishman, held command over a small force of a few thousands. On a raw, foggy morning, which favoured the surprise, the position was strongly assailed by vast columns of Russian troops, numbering in the aggregate 60,000 men. Pennefather, instead of imitating Evans' example —withdrawing his pickets and relying on his artillery to crush the attack—hurried forward such men as he could collect in support, and maintained a combat at his outposts. There, shrouded in mist, with only such temporary guidance as individual officers could give them, a few British soldiers, fighting like heroes, maintained for hours an unequal combat. Time after time they drove back the enemy, till at last, reinforced by the French, a remnant of them stood undisputed masters of the ground which they had made historic by their prowess.

The Briton who can read the story of the Alma, of Balaklava, and of Inkerman, without feeling his blood stirred by the brave deeds of his countrymen must be

strange to some of the noblest influences which affect mankind. But the Briton who can read the story without recollecting that the vanquished showed in some respects valour as great as the victors, must be dead to that sense of justice which all fair men retain. There may, indeed, be some who imagine that, in contests in which hundreds defeated thousands, the prize of valour must be allotted to the few. But this conclusion will not be shared by the most competent judges. As surely as the light cavalry brigade was sacrificed at Balaklava to a mistake, so surely were the Russian columns at the Alma, at Balaklava, and at Inkerman, the victims of a blunder.

The Russians imagined that by massing their troops in columns they could impose on their enemies by their size, and overwhelm them by their weight. They failed to see that the fighting strength of the column was reduced to the strength of its front; and that two weak companies, deployed in line, could present a longer front, and therefore greater fighting power, than eight strong companies massed in column. The Alma taught them that lesson, but they listened not to the teachings of the Alma. At Balaklava they not merely repeated, they emphasised the error. The weight of a column depends on its motion, and they allowed their heavy columns to remain motionless while they were charged by detached squadrons of horse. But the lesson of Balaklava fell, like the lesson of the Alma, unheeded, and the old error of fighting small detached bodies with heavy columns was repeated at Inkerman. There the mere weight of the column was a disadvantage to the few men who were face to face with their enemies. It encumbered their action; and when, later on in the day, English guns played on Russian columns, the inherent fault of the formation was more plainly visible. The column was an easy mark for the gunners, and

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every shot cleft a bloody lane through its closely-packed files.

Once in that day, while the Russians were disheartened by defeat and encumbered in their retreat, a band of brave British soldiers, who had learned from experience that no deed was too difficult, had the hardihood to make a dash at the rich prize of guns which their enemies were endeavouring to withdraw. The engineer who had saved Sebastopol by his skill, but who had no authority over the armies which assailed Balaklava and Inkerman, happened to be near the spot, and immediately threw out, not a column, but a line of skirmishers to resist the attack. The simple contrivance at once succeeded: and it suggests the reflection that, if Todleben had been in supreme command in the Crimea, the story of the Crimean war might have ended with the day of Inkerman.

Though, however, the allies had won a fresh victory, the battle very nearly necessitated the raising of the siege and the evacuation of the Crimea. On the eve of Inkerman 120,000 Russians were gathered under Menschikoff in defence of Sebastopol. The French, English, and Turkish armies did not number more than 76,000 combatants.[1] The Russians lost 12,000, the British 2,600, the French 1,800 men in the battle; and at the close of the engagement, the Russians must have had some 108,000, the French 39,300, the British 22,250 combatants. The allied forces had always been too weak for the prosecution of the siege, and their weakness had become more apparent from the casualties of combat. Though, too, the allies decided on adhering resolutely to their purpose, they could not conceal from themselves that the revelations of the battle had

The new conditions of the campaign.

[1] *Kinglake*, vol. vi. pp. 2-4. The French numbered rather more than 40,000, the British rather less than 25,000, and the Turks 11,000 combatants.

altered the conditions of the campaign. Until the very eve of Inkerman, they had pushed forward their approaches in preparation for an immediate assault. They could no longer, after the battle, venture on assaulting a position held by troops largely outnumbering their own. It at once became evident that the enterprise on which they were engaged had changed its character. The objects of the expedition were no longer attainable in the autumn. The allies were engaged on a campaign which, at the least, would last throughout the winter.

Up to that time fine autumn weather had lightened the task of the commissariat. The army was fed with punctuality; and, except through his own neglect, no man was ever 'without his pound of good biscuit, his pound and a half or pound of good beef or mutton, his quota of coffee, tea, rice, and sugar, or his gill of excellent rum, for any one day.'[1] Thus things on the whole fared well with the soldiers during the early days of November. On the 14th day of that month, however, very early in the morning, the camp was struck with a fearful hurricane. In one squall nearly every tent was levelled with the ground. Soldiers and sick were almost in a moment deprived of shelter. Men and horses were rolled over by the blast, and perished in many cases from exposure. The hurricane was accompanied in the early hours by driving rain, and as the day wore on by driving snow. Sick and wounded, as well as strong and healthy, had no shelter from the weather. Nor was their exposure the only evil. Twenty-one vessels were wrecked during the storm. Clothing for men, hay for horses, ammunition for rifles, were thus destroyed by the tempest. A second Inkerman would have been more tolerable than the consequences of this storm.

The storm of the 14th of November.

[1] Mr. Russell, writing on 8th of November, *The War*, p. 263.

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And there was one other consequence, still to be told, more fatal than all the foregoing. The English camp was situated some eight or nine miles from Balaklava. At the commencement of the siege two roads connected the port and the army. One, a metalled causeway, passed through the redoubts which the Russians had seized on the 25th, and was consequently no longer available. The other, a cart track, wound its way over the plain. While the weather remained fine, stores were easily transported over this road. The storm of the 14th of November converted it into an impassable morass. At first, indeed, strong teams were able with difficulty to draw waggons from the port to the camp. Soon no teams, however strong, could effect the purpose, and the beasts were taken out of the waggons and their loads placed on their backs. A horse can only carry on its back one-third of the load which it can draw in a waggon. The capacity of the transport was therefore at once reduced by two-thirds. Sorely overtaxed beasts dropped down and died; they died the more rapidly because the hay, their food, had been destroyed in the storm. The commander of the British army did not venture to ask for more horses, because there was no more hay.

The difficulties of transport.

Thus, when the winter was beginning, and more food, more clothing, more fuel were requisite, communication between port and camp was broken, and men were forced to submit to less food, less clothing, and less fuel. Sickness, under such circumstances, naturally attacked the camp. Cholera, in the previous summer, had broken out in Varna, and delayed the sailing of the expedition. Sporadic cases of the disease had occurred throughout the campaign, and the men who had been free from it had rarely enjoyed their usual health. Cholera again attacked the camp after the storm of November, and it was accompanied by

Disease in camp.

scurvy, dysentery, and fever. Between the beginning of November and the end of February, 8,898 British soldiers perished in hospital. At the last of these dates, 13,608 men were still in hospital.[1] In other words, the sick during the four months outnumbered the whole strength of the British army after Inkerman, and, except for the reinforcements constantly received from home, the army would have ceased to exist.

It may, perhaps, be thought that in hospital, at any rate, the men obtained relief from their sufferings. But unhappily the reverse was the case. In the camp hospitals, men were laid and died on the cold ground, with only one blanket to cover them. The British, however, had established hospitals at Scutari, the beautiful town which looks upon Constantinople from the Asian shore of the Bosphorus. But there were no ambulances to carry the wounded or invalided soldier from camp to port; there were no proper arrangements on board ship for his comfort; and, when he reached Scutari, he found a hospital in which dirt and confusion prevailed, and in which the plainest sanitary laws were ignored. It is not, under these circumstances, surprising that men died in hospital even more rapidly than they died in camp. In one great hospital, during February 1855, more than one-half of all the patients died.[2]

The condition of the hospitals.

If these things had happened in the commencement of the nineteenth century, months, perhaps years, would have passed without their attracting attention in England. In the autumn of 1854 the sufferings of the army were almost immediately known in London. The English newspapers had correspondents in the Crimea; and one of these men, Mr. Russell, who represented the *Times*, became widely famous for the extent of his information and for the vigour of his graphic

[1] *Kinglake*, vol. vii. p. 177. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

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narratives. The *Times* naturally enforced in its articles the lessons which its correspondent was teaching in his letters. Men meeting in street and office, club and drawing-room, repeated one to another the verdict of the *Times*; and a whole people, awestruck and angry at the story of suffering and mismanagement, called loudly for the punishment of those who were to blame.

Indignation in London.

The meeting of Parliament.

When Parliament, indeed, met on the 12th of December, 1854, the whole story was not known. The Queen, instead of speaking of the sufferings of her army, was able to dwell on the bright pages which its victories had added to history; and Lords and Commons, after giving the Crown the power which it sought of enlisting a foreign legion,[1] separated for the Christmas holidays. But it had hardly separated before the truth became known, and a storm of indignation arose. When Parliament re-assembled on the 23rd of January, Roebuck gave notice that he would move for a Committee to inquire into the condition of the army and into the conduct of the department whose duty it had been to administer to its wants. Russell, who had threatened to resign in 1853, who had wished to resign in the summer of 1854,[2] and who in the autumn had urged the supersession of Newcastle and the reorganisation of the War Office[3] under a strong minister like Palmerston,[4] at once declared it impos-

[1] Cf. Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 146. This measure, as well as one empowering the militia to serve abroad, were suggested by the Prince Consort. For the debate on this bill, see *Hansard*, vol. cxxxvi. pp. 253, 507.

[2] The particulars will be found in Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 91.

[3] Up to the summer of 1854 the Colonial Secretary was Secretary of State for War, and this office, under Aberdeen, had been entrusted to Newcastle. In the July of 1854 the War Office was separated from the Colonial Office, and Newcastle was given his choice of the two offices. He chose the War Office. But the War Office, into which he entered, had not the entire control of the military departments. The Ordnance was still a distinct office. Army finance was under Sidney Herbert as Secretary at War, and the commissariat was a branch of the Treasury. Cf. on these points, Kinglake's *Crimea*, vol. vii.

[4] *Hansard*, vol. cxxxvi. p. 965; Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 301.

sible for him to resist Roebuck's motion, and resigned his office. His desertion naturally made the position of the ministry indefensible. After two nights' debate, Roebuck's motion was carried by a large majority,[1] and, on the last day of January 1855, Aberdeen placed his resignation in the Queen's hands.[2]

The fall of Aberdeen's Administration.

The fall of the great coalition ministry was, in one sense, both desirable and inevitable. Whatever influence its individual members owed to their ability, they failed to exhibit the agreement one with another which can alone give consistency and strength to national policy. The public, too, believed, and with reason, that one section of its members disliked the war, and was anxious to obtain some reasonable pretext for terminating it. The authority of the Cabinet was thus impaired by the opinions of some of its members, and the distrust which it consequently incurred was not removed by any confidence in its chief. The famous apothegm of Tacitus was applicable to Aberdeen, and the best Foreign Secretary of the century might have been regarded as worthy of rule if he had not, in an evil hour for his reputation, become Prime Minister. Forced by the strong men under him into a policy which he disapproved, he was never able to throw his heart into the war in which he had reluctantly engaged. Yet a fair critic, instead of condemning the minister, will perhaps applaud the man. The faults which Aberdeen committed as a statesman were not far removed from the virtues of private life. In other times he might have done his country good service. The troublous period in which he stood at the helm without guiding the vessel required a sterner and more resolute pilot.

[1] By 305 votes to 148. *Hansard*, vol. cxxxvi. p. 1230.

[2] Malmesbury's *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, pp. 345–348; Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. iii. pp. 195–208.

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Palmerston forms a ministry.

And such a pilot England found. After a vain appeal to Derby, to Lansdowne, and Russell, the Queen applied to the man for whom the nation had already pronounced, and asked Palmerston to become Prime Minister. In the first instance the remaining members of the ministry agreed to serve under their new chief, and hardly any alteration became necessary in the composition of the Cabinet. But when, a few days afterwards, Roebuck announced his intention to persevere with the appointment of his Committee, and Palmerston saw the impossibility of resisting his motion, the three statesmen who agreed most closely with Aberdeen retired from office, and radical changes were consequently effected in the composition of the Cabinet.[1]

The improvement of affairs in the Crimea and at Scutari.

Much had been done, before the Aberdeen ministry was overthrown, to repair the errors which had caused so much suffering in the Crimea. The road which ought to have been made in October was made at last. Materials for a railway, and navvies for making it, were sent out; and so well did the men work, that the same correspondent who, on the 6th of February, sneered at the undertaking, on the 19th of February chronicled its approaching completion.[2] Fresh men and fresh stores were hurriedly despatched, and despondency vanished as health returned. Nor was it in the Crimea alone that the measures of the defeated Government were restoring affairs. At Sidney Herbert's solicitation, Miss Nightingale undertook to bring such

[1] Palmerston, of course, succeeded Aberdeen at the Treasury; Lord Granville, Russell at the Colonial Office; and Lord Panmure was appointed to the offices of Secretary for War and Secretary at War, which were now amalgamated. Sir George Grey, who had been Colonial Secretary, was transferred to the Home Office in succession to Palmerston, and was replaced at the Colonial Office by Russell, who re entered the Cabinet. Sir G. C. Lewis succeeded Mr. Gladstone at the Exchequer; Sir C. Wood Sir J. Graham at the Admiralty. Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 309; Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 212.

[2] Cf. Mr. Russell's letters in *The War*, pp. 334, 349.

help as woman alone can give to the sick and wounded at Scutari. By her efforts and those of a noble band of ladies, cleanliness and order were restored to the hospitals. Skilled engineers remedied the sanitary defects of the buildings. These reforms had their immediate effect; the death-rate rapidly decreased, till, at the close of the war, the same places in which in February two men out of every five who entered them were doomed to die, became as healthy as well-managed hospitals at home. CHAP XXIV. 1855.

Thus the path of Palmerston had been already smoothed by the measures of his predecessor, and the new ministry had little more to do than to follow up the steps which the old ministry had taken. If war were to be continued there was, at any rate, some consolation in reflecting that measures were in progress calculated to prevent the waste of life from avoidable disease. It so happened, however, that, at the moment when the ministry was changed, some prospect was afforded of a return to peace. A new minister, the vigorous advocate of the war, had more chance of concluding it than the old minister, to whom the war had always been distasteful. Prospects of peace.

When war had been declared in the previous April, the representatives of the Western as well as of the German Powers had agreed on a protocol declaring that they remained united in the double object of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and of consolidating, by every means compatible with the Sultan's sovereignty and independence, the civil and religious rights of his Christian subjects; they had further declared that they would endeavour in common to discover the guarantees most likely to attach the existence of that Empire to the general equilibrium of Europe.[1] But the four Powers which

[1] *Eastern Papers*, part viii. p. 1. The language of the text is taken almost verbatim from the protocol.

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signed this vague protocol on the 9th of April, 1854, were animated by very different views. Two of them, France and England, had practically taken upon themselves the burden of carrying out the programme. The other two, Austria and Prussia, followed up the protocol by concluding a defensive alliance one with the other.

Russia and the German Powers

Russian statesmen, naturally thought that, if Austria and Prussia drifted from neutrality into activity, the task of their country would be hopeless. They endeavoured, therefore, to yield as far as possible to the views of the German Powers. To conciliate Austria, Nicholas offered to evacuate the Principalities and to accept the protocol of April as the basis of peace. This overture, however, led to only a cold reception. The Western Powers, instead of proceeding to negotiate, at once defined the meaning which they attached to the protocol. (1) The protectorate which Russia had hitherto exercised over the Principalities was to be replaced by a collective guarantee; (2) the navigation of the mouths of the Danube was to be freed from all impediments; (3) the treaty of 1841 was to be revised in the interests of the European equilibrium; and (4) Russia was to renounce all official protectorate over the Sultan's subjects, of whatever religion they might be. These new conditions, which became subsequently famous as the four points, were to some extent vague. The *Moniteur* gave shape to the more important of them by declaring that the revision of the treaty of 1841 must involve the limitation of Russia's naval power in the Black Sea; and the Czar could not bring himself, while his fleets and armies were still undefeated, to agree to a proposal which seemed equivalent to a defeat.[1]

The four points.

The war consequently went on. But towards the close of 1854 Prussian statesmen discovered that their

[1] *Diplomatic Study*, vol. ii. pp. 18–44, 132 *sq.*

policy was almost everywhere producing distrust and isolation. Under these circumstances, they used the influence, which neutrality had naturally secured for them at St. Petersburg, to urge the Czar frankly to accept the four points as the basis of peace. Nicholas thought such a course, though it had seemed dishonourable in the spring, compatible with his honour in the autumn; the 'Baltic campaign had produced no result; the bombardment of Sebastopol had failed; there were as yet neither victors nor vanquished.' An overture from himself, moreover, would be likely to detach Austria from the alliance, or at any rate would prevent her from joining in the war.[1] Animated by these considerations, he authorised Gortschakoff, his Minister at Vienna, to express his readiness to conclude peace on the basis of the four points; and Gortschakoff fulfilled this duty on the 16th of November.[2]

The Czar offers to accept them.

The Czar's new move was not entirely successful It did not prevent Austria from concluding a close arrangement with the Western Powers,[3] and it induced her, in concert with France and England, to define more strictly the precise meaning attached to the four points. With some disappointment, Russia was doomed to find that every successive explanation of these points involved some fresh sacrifice on her own part. The freedom of the lower Danube, she was now told, could not be secured unless she surrendered the territory between that river and the Pruth which she had acquired at the treaty of Adrianople; the revision of the treaty of 1841, she was assured, must put an end to her preponderance in the Black Sea.[4] These new exactions, however, did not deter the Czar from his desire to treat. By no other means was it possible to

[1] *Diplomatic Study*, vol. ii. pp. 52, 53, and 167 *sq.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[3] This was the treaty of the 2nd of December. *Ibid.*, and Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 166.

[4] *Eastern Papers*, part xiii. p. 1.

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prevent Austria from taking part against him; and a conference, even if it ultimately proved abortive, would in the interim confine her to neutrality. Under these circumstances, Nicholas consented to negotiate. Unhappily, however, for mankind, while men of war delight in rapid movements, the diplomatists who arrange the terms of peace seem ignorant of the vexation of delay. The conference which it was decided to hold in December did not assemble till the following March. The negotiation which had been agreed to by Aberdeen, was carried out under Palmerston; and, with the double object of temporarily ridding himself of an inconvenient colleague, and of assuring the presence of a statesman of adequate rank at the conference, Palmerston entrusted its conduct to Russell.

The conference of Vienna.

While Russell was on his way to Vienna, an event occurred of momentous importance. Sore troubled at the events of the war, alarmed at the growing strength of his enemies, the Emperor of Russia had neither heart nor strength to struggle against a slight illness. His sudden death naturally made a profound impression on the mind of Europe. For nearly thirty years he had filled a larger position and exercised a wider influence than any other living man. His ideas were, indeed, opposed to the general conclusions of the wisest and most successful statesmen of the age. Imbued with a reverence for the 'ills we have,' he was profoundly distrustful of the others that 'we know not of;' and he thus lived an ideal Conservative at a time when Conservatism was everywhere assailed by new and powerful forces. The novel ideas which were influencing Europe were probably unintelligible to the Czar. He had no more doubt of the divine right of autocracy than of the existence of God; he was as certain that it was the duty of people to obey as of himself to com-

The death and character of Nicholas.

mand. To assert that he occasionally blundered, and that he sometimes sinned, is only to say, what perhaps he would have reluctantly admitted, that he was of the same dust as other men. Yet, when his life is fairly written, it will perhaps be found that he did not make more blunders or commit more sins than other persons. His treatment of Poland—the darkest blot on his career—was not in any sense worse than the conduct of Cromwell to Ireland; and are there not Englishmen, whose lives are as pure as their pens are dexterous, who have a good word even now to offer for the Irish policy of Cromwell? The Czar's policy in 1853–4, which throws a deep shadow on his capacity, was no doubt adopted through an erroneous conception of the character of Aberdeen and of the feelings of England, and persisted in from an almost insane irritation at the influence of Stratford at the Porte. Perhaps, however, fair critics will some day see that the mistake which Nicholas made in 1853 was similar in kind to that which England made in 1854 and 1855. Nicholas was not content with obtaining a solution of the existing difficulty, he went on to seize the Principalities as a guarantee for fresh concessions. In precisely the same way, England was not content with obtaining the evacuation of the Principalities and the virtual surrender of all that she demanded. She went on to seize Sebastopol in order to obtain fresh concessions from the Czar. And the policy of England produced a catastrophe as great as the policy of the Czar. The one cost the autocrat Sebastopol; the other, attended by a slower vengeance, resulted in the humiliating treaty of 1870.

Fair critics will also remember that, while Nicholas inspired the Englishman who knew him not, with nothing but distrust, every prominent Englishman who was thrown into his company left him with confidence in

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his integrity. Wellington had set out in 1826, sharing the conviction of his colleagues that Russia was in the wrong and the Porte in the right on the question then at issue between them. He had not been long at St. Petersburg before he 'was under the necessity of admitting that the Emperor was in the right and the Porte in the wrong.'[1] 'Years ago,' the Czar said of himself to Peel, 'Lord Durham was sent to me—a man full of prejudices against me. By merely coming to close quarters with me, all his prejudices were driven out of him.'[2] No British minister was ever more opposed to the Emperor's policy than Aberdeen in 1828. The sincere confidence which Aberdeen reposed in the Emperor after he had once known him was one of the many causes of the war of 1853. But, perhaps, one of the most striking proofs of the sense which everyone who came near him entertained of the Emperor's integrity may be drawn from the concluding passage of Lord Heytesbury's unpublished diary. 'Lord Heytesbury,' so it runs, 'then took leave of a Sovereign who had honoured him with unceasing marks of confidence and favour—a Sovereign the ablest ~~and best~~ probably, who ever sat on the Russian throne, whose ~~virtues~~ great qualities all sprang from his own noble and chivalrous nature, whose faults (~~if faults they were~~ in great measure) from the necessities of his position. The ruler of so vast, and still ~~so~~ but half civilised an Empire, cannot fairly be judged by an English standard.'[3]

[1] Wellington's *Supplemental Despatches*, vol. vii. p. 340.

[2] Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. i. p. 416.

[3] The interlineations were added after the Crimean War, and this note was added by Lord Heytesbury: 'This, it must be recollected, was written in 1840. Subsequent events would assuredly have induced the writer to modify the high character here given of the Emperor's ability and conduct.' Lord Heytesbury does not seem to have observed that in 1840 he spoke with the authority of a witness. In 1856 his opinion was of no greater value than that of any other equally intelligent Englishman. Witnesses are not allowed to correct their evidence on a defendant's character by the gossip which they may have collected after their intercourse with the prisoner at the bar has terminated.

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Alexander, his successor, a monarch whose reign commenced with disaster and ended with outrage, at once announced his adherence to the policy of his father. His accession, therefore, did not interrupt the proceedings of the Conference; and, in the first instance, the diplomatists, who assembled at Vienna succeeded in arriving at a welcome agreement. On the first two of the four points all the Powers admitted to the Conference were substantially in accord. On the third point no such agreement was possible. The Western Powers were determined that an effectual limitation should be placed on the naval strength of Russia in the Black Sea; and they defined this limit by a stipulation that she should not add to the six ships of war which they had ascertained she had still afloat.[1] Russia, on the contrary, regarded any such condition as injurious to her dignity and her rights,[2] and refused to assent to it. Russia, however, did not venture on absolutely rejecting the proposal of the allies. Instead of doing so, she offered either to consent to the opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the ships of war of all nations, or to allow the Sultan a discretion in determining whether he would open them to the vessels either of the Western Powers or of Russia.[3] The Western Powers, however, were firm in their determination to prevent the fleets of Russia from passing into the Mediterranean, and refused the alternative. With its rejection the Conference practically terminated. After its members separated, however, Buol, the Austrian Minister, endeavoured to evolve from the Russian offer a possible compromise. If, he argued, Russia would not consent to any limitation of her force in the Euxine; and if the Western Powers would not pay for their own

The accession of Alexander.

The new proposal of Austria.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxxxix. p. 566; cf. *Diplomatic Study*, vol. ii. p. 315.
[2] *Ibid.*, 306.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 308, and cf. *Eastern Papers*, part viii. pp. 79, 89.

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admission to that sea by the possible passage of the Dardanelles by a Russian fleet, Russia might consent to a principle of counterpoise; under which, any addition to her own fleet might be followed by the admission of a corresponding number of war vessels of the allies into the Euxine. The integrity of Turkey might be guaranteed both by Austria and the Western Powers. These arrangements, Buol thought, would effectually prevent a Russian attack on the possessions of the Porte either by sea or by land, and consequently effect the object of the Western Powers.[1]

Favoured by Drouyn de Lhuys and Russell.

Drouyn de Lhuys, who personally conducted the negotiation on the part of France, and Russell, who represented England, both declared that Buol's alternative was outside their instructions, and that they were consequently unable to accept it; but both of them privately expressed to Buol their readiness to support it; and both undertook to go home and recommend its adoption to their respective Governments. The Emperor of France and the Cabinet of England concurred, however, in disagreeing with their plenipotentiaries, and the alternative was consequently rejected. Upon its rejection, Drouyn de Lhuys at once resigned the office which he held in the Emperor's ministry. On the other hand, Russell remained in the ministry, and, without disclosing the opinion which he had formed at Vienna, made a violent speech in favour of the prosecution of the war.[2] Such a course naturally provoked the Austrian minister to disclose the language which Russell had held at Vienna. Charged with it,

[1] See, for this proposal, Russell's account, *Hansard*, vol. xxxix. p. 506. Sir T. Martin, in his *Life of the Prince Consort*, inserts a memorandum of the Prince arguing that the alternative might be extended and accepted. But, oddly enough, he goes on to say that this memorandum was the cause of its rejection, vol. iii. p. 273. I am not writing a Life of the Prince Consort, and so I have abstained from criticising the part which he played throughout the negotiations and the war. His influence was so great that he almost succeeded in re-establishing personal government.

[2] *Hansard*, vol. cxxxviii. 1075.

Russell had no excuse to offer except the inconvenience which he thought would be involved by his own resignation. But the excuse was not suffered to remain in force. The press denounced his conduct; Bulwer Lytton, giving expression to the public verdict, gave notice of a motion censuring his position as well as his policy; and Russell, bending before the storm, retired from the Ministry.[1]

The resignation of Russell.

The rejection of the Austrian alternative necessitated the continuance of the war. But the struggle was resumed under conditions very different from those on which it had previously been conducted. Austria, indeed, considered that the rejection of her proposal released her from the necessity of actively joining the Western Powers, and, instead of taking part in the war, reduced her armaments.[2] But the Western Powers obtained other aid. The little State of Sardinia sent a contingent to the Crimea; later on in the year Sweden joined the alliance. Fresh contingents of troops rapidly augmented the strength of the French and English armies, and finer weather as well as better management banished disease from the camp. Under these circumstances the bombardment was renewed in April. In May a successful attack on Kertch and Yenikale, at the extreme east of the Crimea, proved the means of intercepting communication between Sebastopol and the Caucasian provinces, and of destroying vast stores intended for the sustenance of the garrison. In June the French, to whose command Pelissier, a Marshal of more robust fibre than Canrobert, had succeeded, made a successful attack on the Mamelon, while the English concurrently seized another vantage-ground. Men at

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cxxxix. p. 889. He was succeeded as Colonial Secretary by Sir W. Molesworth.

[2] It was the fashion in this country to describe Austria's conduct at that time by very hard epithets. But it is interesting to observe that Russia was equally angry with her. *Diplomatic Study*, vol. ii. p. 294 *sq.* No one, perhaps, is so unpopular as the neutral.

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home, cheered by the news of these successes, fancied that they were witnessing the beginning of the end.

Yet the end was not to come immediately. A great assault, delivered on the 18th of June, by the French on the Malakhoff, by the English on the Redan, failed; and its failure, among other consequences, broke the heart of the old soldier who for nine months had commanded the English army. The Crimean War did not make any great military reputation. In his conduct of the campaign, Raglan displayed none of those qualities which make men fit to command their fellow-men. As a general he did many things which he should not have done; he left undone other things which he should have done. Yet he displayed qualifications which were of essential service. He did much by his courtesy and conduct to perpetuate the French alliance; he displayed in the field a gallantry which was, perhaps, in his position excessive; he endured the privations and faced the dangers of the winter with a courage which merits high praise; he bore an unjust attack of public and private critics with a patient dignity which disarms criticism; and he sank at last, enfeebled by the difficulties and anxieties of a trust which he had no longer strength to fulfil. Those who criticise his career now should remember all these circumstances. They should also recollect that even his capacity as a general does not suffer from any comparison with that of his successor, General Simpson. That officer had been sent out to the Crimea in the preceding winter; he had served under Raglan as chief of the staff; and he was now selected for the command. He had, at least, the credit which attaches to any military man who holds a responsible post in the crisis of an operation. For the crisis of the campaign had now come. On both sides supreme efforts were made to terminate the struggle. On the 16th of August the Russian army in force

The death of Raglan.

General Simpson succeeds him.

crossed the Tchernaya, attacked the French lines, but experienced a sharp repulse. On the 8th of September the assault of June was repeated; and though the British were again driven back from the Redan, the French succeeded in carrying the Malakhoff. The Russians, recognising the significance of the defeat, set Sebastopol and their remaining ships on fire, and retreated to the northern bank of the harbour. After operations, which had lasted for nearly a year, the allies were masters of the south side of the city.

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to prolong any further the narrative of operations which had little influence on history. The story of the defence of Kars and of the bombardment of Sweaborg have an interest of their own. But they had no effect on the events which followed or on the peace which ensued. Soon after, the Vienna Conference was dissolved, indeed, it became evident that the war was approaching its close. The cost and the sacrifices which it involved were making the French people weary of the struggle, and the accidental circumstances, which gave them in August and September the chief share in the glory, disposed them to make peace. The reasons which made the French, however, eager for peace did not apply to the English. They, on the contrary, were mortified at their failures. Their expectations had been raised by the valour of their army at Alma, at Balaklava, and at Inkerman. But, since the day of Inkerman, their own share in the contest had added no new page of splendour to the English story. The English troops had taken no part in the battle of the Tchernaya; their assaulting columns had been driven back on the 18th of June; they had been repulsed in the final attack on the Redan; and the heroic conduct of their own countrymen at Kars had not prevented the fall of that fortress. Men at home, anxious to account for the failure of their expec-

Unpopularity of the war in France.

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tations, were beginning to say that England is like the runner, never really ripe for the struggle till he has gained his second wind. They were reluctant that she should retire from the contest at the moment when, having repaired her defective administration and reinforced her shattered army, she was in a position to command a victory.

Whatever wishes, however, individual Englishmen might entertain, responsible statesmen, as the autumn wore on, could not conceal from themselves the necessity of finding some honourable means for terminating the war. In October the British Cabinet learned with dismay that the French Emperor had decided on withdrawing 100,000 men from the Crimea.[1] About the same time the members of the Government learned with equal alarm that, if war were to be continued at all, the French public were demanding that France should secure some advantage in Poland,[2] in Italy, and on the left bank of the Rhine. In November the French ministry took a much more extreme course, and concerted with Austria terms of peace without the knowledge of England.[3] It is true that Palmerston addressed a vigorous remonstrance to the French Ambassador in London, and declared that England would rather continue the war alone than accept unsatisfactory conditions of peace.[4] It is true, too, that the French Emperor wrote personally to the Queen to explain his desire to act in accord with the British.[5] Neither remonstrance nor assurance could conceal the facts that it was impossible any longer to depend on the co-operation of France, and that it was folly to continue the struggle without her assistance. The protocol which Austria had drawn up, and to which France had

France and Austria concert terms of peace,

[1] Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 383.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 385.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 392.
[4] Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 322.
[5] Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 393.

assented, was, with some modifications, adopted by Britain and presented, as an ultimatum, to Russia by Austria.[1] In the middle of January, 1856, the ultimatum was accepted by Russia; a Congress at which Clarendon, as Foreign Minister, personally represented his country, was assembled at Paris. The plenipotentiaries, meeting on the 25th of February, at once agreed on a suspension of hostilities.[2] Universally disposed towards peace, they found no difficulty in accommodating differences which had proved irreconcilable in the previous year, and on the 30th of March, 1856, peace was signed.[3]

which are accepted by England.

The peace which was thus concluded admitted the right of the Porte to participate in the advantages of the public law of Europe; it pledged all the contracting parties, in the case of any fresh misunderstanding with the Turk, to resort to mediation before using force. It required the Sultan to issue and to communicate to the Powers a firman ameliorating the condition of his Christian subjects; it declared that the communication of the firman gave the Powers no right, either collectively or separately, to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects; it neutralised the Black Sea, opening its waters to the mercantile marine of every nation, but, with the exception of a few vessels of light draught necessary for the service of the coast, closing them to every vessel of war; it forbade the establishment or maintenance of arsenals on the shores of the Euxine; it established the free navigation of the Danube; it set back the frontier of Russia from the Danube; it guaranteed the privileges and immunities of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia; it similarly guaranteed the privileges of Servia, though it gave the Sultan the right of garrison in that province; and it

The terms of peace.

[1] Martin's *Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 407.

[2] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1856, 'Protocols of Conference,' &c., p. 4.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

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undertook that Russia and Turkey should restore the conquests which they had made in Asia one from another during the war.[1]

Such were the terms on which the war was terminated. Before the plenipotentiaries separated they were invited by Walewski, the Foreign Minister and first representative of France, to discuss the condition of Greece, of the Roman States, and of the two Sicilies; to condemn the licence to which a free press was lending itself in Belgium; and to concert measures for the mitigation of some of the worst evils of maritime war. On this invitation the plenipotentiaries adopted the following solemn declaration:—

The Declaration of Paris.

'1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.

'2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.

'3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flags.

'4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.'[2]

This famous declaration is still in force among all the Powers which took part in the Congress, and among those who subsequently adopted it. It is the only monument which remains of all the blood spilt in the Crimea, and of all the ink wasted at Paris. The neutrality of the Black Sea, for the sake of which war was renewed in 1855, was abruptly terminated in 1870. The frontier of the Danube, from which Russia was forced back in 1856, was restored to her in 1878.

The results of the war.

The stipulation that mediation should replace arms proved an empty artifice; and the promise that the lot of Christians should be ameliorated did not stop the

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1856, General Treaty, &c.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, 'Protocols of Conference,' &c. p. 110. I have traced shortly the history of this question in a little book on *Foreign Relations*, p. 146.

Bulgarian massacres. The sick man of 1853 still, indeed, lives; he has shown his capacity for living by surviving injuries which might have destroyed stronger frames. But he is still very sick, very weak, very like to die.

If Turkey still survives, her powerful opponent has recovered from his losses and resumed his threatening posture. He has regained his old frontier in Europe. He has added large acquisitions to his Asian territory. He is master of Kars; he is encamped on Ararat; he frowns on the sources of the great river which some men have thought might supply a link between the Eastern and Western Worlds. Like the glacier which through long centuries advances foot by foot through the Alpine valley, with a patience that never tires, with an impetus that never fails, he is slowly but gradually advancing the frontiers of his vast dominions. He will advance them till he reaches the outlet for which all nations strive, the sea.

What, then, did the Crimean War do? It did not galvanise the dying body of the Turkish Empire into fresh vitality; it did not permanently arrest the irresistible advance of Russia; it merely set back the clock for some fourteen years. That was the solitary result of the Crimean war. To secure that result, whole rivers of blood were shed, whole mountains of treasure were expended. In blood this country paid the smallest portion of the bill. She buried some 28,000 brave men, and her statisticians say that Russia lost twenty times as many lives. In treasure, she added only some 30,000,000*l.* to her debt. But the increase of debt represents imperfectly the financial sacrifice of the war. Before the war her expenditure had not for thirty years and upwards reached 56,000,000*l.* Since the war it has never fallen below 64,000,000*l.*

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Was the result worth the bill? It was perhaps worth some sacrifice to prove that England was still ready to strike a blow for a weak neighbour whom she believed to be oppressed, and to withstand, with blood and treasure, the Power whom she believed to be the oppressor. On any other reasoning it is difficult to show that substantial grounds existed for the war. Let it be recollected that English statesmen considered Russia right in the original quarrel with France; that the sole ground for war in 1854 was the claim of Russia to protect the Christian subjects of the Porte; and that the arrangement, which neutral Europe proposed for settling this claim, was accepted by Russia and rejected by Turkey; that the only pretext for continuing the war in 1855 was the determination of English statesmen to refuse Russia a privilege which some of the same statesmen restored to her fifteen years afterwards; and it seems difficult to determine whether the motives for the war or the duration of the results which ensued from it, be the less commensurate with the greatness of the struggle.

But perhaps it may be thought that Nicholas outraged public feeling in Europe by his cold-blooded proposition for the partition of the Turkish spoils. England, so her Foreign Minister declared in 1853, 'desires no territorial aggrandisement;' and the British people applauded the sentiment and contrasted it with the proposal of the Czar. Yet, if Nicholas could return to the scene of his former labours, and see on the one hand the frontier of Russia in Europe still bounded by the Pruth, and learn, on the other hand, that Britain had made Cyprus a *place d'armes*; that she was adopting his own policy of converting the European provinces of the Porte into autonomous principalities; that British armies were moving up the valley of the Nile, and that British politicians were advocating

the permanent occupation of Egypt, he might possibly think that time and events had vindicated his character, and that the bloodshed and sorrows of the great war were hardly justified by its solitary result—it had set back the clock.

Yet, while the moralist would find it difficult to encounter this reasoning, the patriot would still find an excuse for the struggle in the page which it added to England's story. Never before in history had British soldiers suffered more cruelly or endured more patiently, or fought more gallantly. Never before had the blunders of statesmen and the errors of commanders been redressed more nobly by the courage of officers and men; and the true Englishman who reads these things, and feels his pulse stirred by the reading of them, will perhaps find himself unconsciously repeating the old toast of 1816:

'Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong.'

CHAPTER XXV.

CHAP. XXV.

1757–1784.

If some future Gibbon should ever write the history of the British Empire, he will probably point to the rise and development of the British colonies as the most striking and lasting monument of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. Yet their progress will not form the subject of his most eloquent passages. Man takes more pleasure in occupying himself with the feats of arms than with the pursuits of industry, and the brilliant conquests of the English in India will prove a more attractive theme for the historian's eloquence than the periodical censuses of men, oxen, and sheep in Canada or Australia. The few sentences in which Gibbon has described the agriculture of the Roman Empire have a far more lasting value than the famous passage in which he has related the march of Julian from the Rhine to the Danube. Yet the details of the march of the Emperor are recollected by thousands of readers who could not probably recall the conclusions of the historian on the rural economy of the Romans.

The Indian Empire of Britain

No romance ever contained a more stirring story than the record of the East India Company's achievements. The heroes of antiquity did not obtain more success than that which was won by the strong heads and stout hearts of the men who founded the Indian Empire. Yet, by a singular circumstance, the most thrilling story in British history has never been told by a competent writer. Macaulay, indeed, in two of his best essays, has related the deeds of Clive and the

Its history still unwritten.

policy of Hastings. His admirable descriptions only excite the wonder that a history which contains two such chapters should not have found some writer to tell it as a whole. The dreary pages, in which Mill and Wilson, Thornton and Marshman, have related the doings of the English in India, find few readers because these authors have contrived to make an account which should have sparkled like a rivulet in the sunshine as dull as a shady pool; and the Englishman who delights in reading in his own language the achievements of a Pizarro or a Cortez in another hemisphere ignores the greater feats which men of his own race and own language accomplished in the Deccan and Hindostan.

In a history which only professes to commence in 1815, it would be impossible to attempt to supply a notable want, and the present writer is forced to content himself with referring, in the merest outline, to the circumstances under which the Indian Empire was founded. The story of the English in India in the nineteenth century, however, cannot be understood unless their peculiar position in the eighteenth century be recollected, and stress must therefore be laid on this fact by any writer who hopes to make his account either useful or intelligible.

Trade, not conquest, the first object of the English in India.

Everyone who desires to understand the history of the English in India should remember that trade and not conquest was the original object of the earliest adventurers. India was supposed to teem with wealth, and the merchants who ventured on the perilous Indian seas went in pursuit of wealth. Perhaps everyone who arrives first at a gold-mine thinks that he has an exclusive right to its treasure. The men who first embarked their capital in Indian trade desired a monopoly of its advantages. Just as the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, and the English would have liked to have shut out all nations except themselves from the Indian seas,

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so the East India Company succeeded in excluding all British vessels except their own from Indian commerce.

This desire, which appears both selfish and absurd to a modern mind, seemed consistent and reasonable enough in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The wisest statesmen at that time endeavoured to encourage trade by the promise of monopolies, and to ensure the wealth of their own country by excluding other nations from all share of their commerce. It was easier, however, to stipulate that no Englishmen, except those armed with a charter from the Crown, should embark on the Indian trade, than to confine the whole trade to the English nation. The British were not even the first people who had landed in India; they had no more capacity for trade than other adventurers; and he would have been a bold man who, in the middle of the eighteenth century, had predicted that the French and Portuguese settlements at Pondicherry and Goa were destined to torpor or decay, and that the English settlements were the first foundations of a mighty empire.

Rival European races in India.

It is instructive, moreover, to observe that of the three Powers the Portuguese enjoyed advantages which might have pointed to their ultimate supremacy. Their navigators had been the first to arrive in the Indian seas; their kindred had displayed in Brazil their competence to found an empire; and the peace which usually reigned between Portugal and England prevented any serious disturbance between Portuguese and English on the coasts of India. On the other hand, neither the French nor the British had at that time displayed much capacity for trans-oceanic conquest, and the constant warfare in which they were engaged in Europe made it almost certain that they would transfer their quarrels to the East. Yet these circumstances, which seemed to point to the superiority of the Portuguese, ultimately

ensured the formation of a British Empire, and the British may undoubtedly trace the series of events which led to their predominance in India, to their ancient rivalry with the French in Europe.

The struggle between French and English extended to India.

It would be impossible in this volume to attempt any narrative of the events which this rivalry occasioned. It is sufficient to observe that during the war which ended with the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, and the war which was concluded by the Peace of Paris in 1763, the struggle was extended to India. But in the two periods it was conducted on different systems and with contrary results. In the former war the struggle—at any rate, under Labourdonnais—was virtually confined to the French and English themselves, and the advantages were not with the English. But before this war was concluded the English, smarting under the capture of Madras, sought to strengthen themselves by alliances with Native Powers. From thenceforward, French and English, engaged in a perpetual rivalry, successively sought support from, and lent aid to, native chieftains; and the servants of a Company, formed for purposes of trade, found themselves occupied with the business of war and the intrigues of foreign policy.

French and English both seek Native help.

There is a general opinion among the worshippers of heroes, that the man makes the opportunity. It is probably much more true to say that the opportunity makes the man. This conclusion is, at any rate, supported by the events on the Coromandel coast in the eighteenth century. Where before had so small a handful of Europeans produced such a galaxy of great names as Labourdonnais, Dupleix, Bussy, and Lally on the one side, or Coote, Lawrence, and Clive on the other? Any generous Englishman will admit that, if the victory finally lay with his own countrymen, the glories of the campaign were shared equally by both

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nations. The French indeed sent their beaten general to a gibbet, while the English rewarded the victor with a coronet. But the fame of the man who died on the scaffold will live almost as long as that of the great founder of the Indian Empire. If, indeed, Lally had received more support from France, if Chatham had displayed less energy, the history of the world might have been altered, and the French and not the English might have held the first place in the East Indies.

The death struggle between France and England led to a closer connection between the British adventurers and the Native Powers. Thenceforward, the English in India found their own interests blended with those of Native princes, and were consequently drawn into the troubled sea of Indian politics.

The condition of the Native States.

The conquerors, to whom India had in previous ages been a prey, had swept away the governments which they had found, but had built up no new systems of their own: and this assertion was true of Alexander and Timur, as well as of Baber, Akbar, and Aurungzebe. Systems sustained only by their personal energy were shattered by their death, and whole provinces passed under the sway of the first adventurer who had the ambition to desire and the capacity to secure the government. Thus the English who were drawn by a European contest into Indian struggles found the confusion in which diplomacy delights already made. They would, perhaps, have been more than human if, under such circumstances, they had stood apart. For, in all ages and among all men, the desire for rule is a stronger force than the craving for wealth. Power seems the one object worth pursuit, and mankind intensifies the feeling by giving its highest honours to the men of action. It seems so much better to be a statesman or a soldier than a merchant or a man of letters, that nine men out of ten are ready to ex-

change the counting-house and the study for the sword and the tribune. They omit to reflect that commerce survives while treaties are broken, and that the poet is read when the soldier is forgotten.

The servants of the Company in India.

Men sent to India in the interests of trade were thus suddenly turned into warriors and diplomatists. There can be no room for surprise that they paid afterwards more attention to affairs than to trade. But the circumstances which influenced the Company's servants in India had no weight with its Directors at home. They were intent on gaining riches, while their servants were busily founding an empire. Plassey, which brought Clive a title, brought them debt; and conquests which, from a statesman's stand-point, were of priceless value, measured by a merchant's scales were hardly worth the cost.

The Directors at home.

It may, moreover, have possibly occurred to some of these sober citizens that the extension of their dominion was not favourable to the continuance either of their monopoly or of their authority. So long as they only occupied a few factories on the coast, the bulk of their fellow-countrymen were content to leave them in solitary possession of their trade. But, as soon as they annexed whole states as large as England, other merchants thought that they should be allowed some share of the commerce of these territories. Again, so long as they were a commercial undertaking, Parliament was willing to leave them alone. But, as soon as they acquired a vast territory, it naturally insisted on exercising some control over their action. The India Bill of Pitt was, indeed, less offensive to them than the India Bill of Fox. But, when the Act of 1784 was explained by the declaratory Act of 1788, the Directors found to their surprise that the supreme authority had been virtually transferred from themselves to the Crown. Their monopoly crumbled away almost as

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rapidly as their power. On the renewal of their charter in 1793, a portion of the Indian trade was for the first time given to British subjects who were not members of the East India Company; in 1813 the whole of the Indian trade was thrown open, and the trade with China alone reserved for the old Company.

The monopoly of the Indian trade destroyed.

In truth, if the fashion of quoting Virgil had extended from St. Stephen's to Leadenhall Street, the Directors might have plaintively repeated the 'tulit alter honorem' of the poet. They had won an empire for the Crown, and they were conducting their own business at a loss.[1] Even the splendour of foreign empire was a poor compensation for a want of dividends, and the extension of dominion seemed to be inseparably connected with a failure of returns. It was under these circumstances perhaps natural that the Directors should have deliberately forbidden all further annexations of territory, and that the decision at which they arrived should have been supported by the Government. Aggressive politicians sometimes imagine that the reluctance with which modern Liberals assent to any additions to the empire are the first symptoms of the decay of English rule. If they be symptoms of decay, they were visible enough a century ago, when every prominent statesman disliked or forbade further additions to the Company's territories in the Deccan and Hindostan.

Further extensions of territory forbidden both by the Directors and Parliament.

Lord Cornwallis.

Lord Cornwallis, who succeeded Warren Hastings in 1786,[2] was in one sense the founder, in another sense the exponent, of the policy which aimed at the contraction

[1] 'The company had lost four crores of rupees (4,000,000*l.*) by their trade to India in nineteen years, notwithstanding their monopoly, and they had traded with profit only to China, where they had neither sovereignty nor monopoly.' Marshman's *History of India*, vol. ii. p. 279. The nineteen years to which Mr. Marshman refers, are the nineteen years preceding 1813.

[2] Warren Hastings was succeeded provisionally by Sir John Macpherson, who acted in the interval between Hastings' retirement and Cornwallis' arrival.

of the Company's interests. He was admirably adapted for giving effect to it. With no previous acquaintance with India, he was free from the friendships, the traditions, and the prejudices by which men trained in the Company's service were hampered. It may be doubted whether a more honest man was ever chosen for the high office allotted to him. Those who knew him regarded his capacity with almost as much respect as his honesty. His conduct in America, in India, and in Ireland, proved that he had abilities of a high order. Yet it may, perhaps, be doubted whether he was not wanting in the quality which even in inferior men commands success. His capitulation at Yorktown was almost the final scene in the drama, which resulted in the loss of America to England; his Indian policy was laid on one side; one half of his Irish policy was accomplished by devices which he must have loathed, the other half was abandoned through a breach of faith which he must have abhorred.

Two years before Cornwallis reached India, the Act of 1784 had forbidden the Governor-General to declare war, to commence hostilities, or to enter into any treaty either for making war, or for guaranteeing the possessions of any native prince or State, without sanction from home.[1] Cornwallis went to India with the full intention of carrying out this policy. He left India with a firm belief in its possibility. Yet he thought himself compelled to depart from the spirit of the Act and to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Nizam at Hyderabad against Tippoo Sultan. The war which in consequence ensued added to the territories and responsibilities of the Company. Malabar, Salem, and Dindigul were taken from Tippoo and

[1] 24 Geo. III. c. 25, sec. 34. Having regard to later history, it is worth while citing the preamble of the section: 'Whereas to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of the nation.'

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permanently annexed to its dominions. But, though Cornwallis had been forced to disregard the Act of 1784, and to depart from his own principles, he fancied that he had paved the way for a future policy of non-intervention. He thought that by weakening Tippoo he had secured a balance of power in the Deccan; and in the eighteenth century a balance of power was the fashionable expedient for preserving peace. But the supposed balance never preserved peace in Europe for twenty years at a time; it did not preserve peace in India for half that period.[1] Events were too strong for the Government, the Company, and Cornwallis; and in half a dozen years a policy of non-intervention was again replaced by a policy of interference.

Sir John Shore.

In fact, the policy of non-intervention which Cornwallis inaugurated barely survived the official existence

[1] When Cornwallis reached India, the Company possessed a large tract of territory in Bengal (Bengal, Behar, Chittagong and Benares); the Circars on the Coromandel coast; a small tract round Madras; the town of Bombay and the adjacent island of Salsette. Central and Southern India was occupied rather than governed by the Mahrattas, the Nizam at Hyderabad, and Tippoo Sultan in Mysore. On Cornwallis reaching India he found that his predecessor (Macpherson) had got into 'a very awkward, foolish scrape by offering assistance to the Mahrattas' against Tippoo. *Cornwallis Correspondence*, vol. i. p. 226. With some difficulty he extricated himself from this engagement, which he thought involved war with Tippoo and an infraction of the 24th Geo. III. Yet within two years he concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Nizam against Tippoo. His reasons for doing so were plain enough. Tippoo was angry at the cession of the Guntore Circar, a territory on the Coromandel Coast, to the Company by the Nizam, and openly made warlike preparations and intrigued with the French. *Ibid.*, pp. 281, 297. Cornwallis was afraid that Madras might be assailed by the most powerful soldier in Southern India, and that the assault might receive the covert or open aid of France. Under these circumstances, while still approving the restrictions of the Act of 1784, he admitted that the system which that Act instituted was 'more calculated to prevent our making enemies than to promote the acquisition of friends' (*ibid.*, p. 282), and he accordingly entered into an alliance with the Nizam. This note is purposely confined to the facts of Cornwallis' policy. The moral questions which that policy raised will be found briefly described in Marshman's *History of India*, vol. ii. p. 9, and Thornton's *History of British India*, vol. ii. p. 393 *seq.* Whatever opinion may be formed on it, it is difficult to believe that Cornwallis was right, if he was justified in condemning Macpherson's 'scrape' as 'awkward and foolish.'

of his successor, Sir John Shore. During his rule the Nizam was attacked by the Mahrattas on the north and by Tippoo on the south. The unfortunate Nizam, finding that the British had nothing to offer him but good advice and good wishes, appealed, in his extremity, to the French for assistance. Hence arose a new dilemma. The balance which Cornwallis thought that he had secured was only obtained by the weight of France being thrown into the scale, and the neutrality of the British, in the opinion of old Indians, involved the decay of British influence. It was in the midst of the embarrassments which were thus occasioned, that Lord Mornington, better known under his later title of Lord Wellesley, reached India. The friend of Pitt, he shared Pitt's views; he had watched the course of events in France with the alarm which was felt by most of his contemporaries; he was impressed with the duty of combating revolution; and revolution, among those with whom he had lived, was a mere synonym for France. Even before he reached India, he made up his mind to destroy French influence at the Nizam's court; and he despatched from the Cape of Good Hope the famous State paper in which he proposed to the Home Government the reversal of the policy of his predecessors, by giving the Nizam a British guarantee and a British force in the place of his French contingent. The policy which he thus proposed was carried out soon after his arrival in India. A British force was moved into the Nizam's territory, the French were disarmed, and the Nizam again became the close ally of the British in India.[1]

Lord Wellesley.

This bold stroke, which, for good or for evil, re-

[1] For the despatch, see, *inter alia*, Pearce's *Wellesley*, vol. i. pp. 141–156. For the disarmament, *ibid.*, p. 208; *Marshman*, vol. ii. pp. 71, 77; *Thornton*, vol. iii. pp. 28–44; cf. Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. i., p. 200 *seq.* Extracts from the despatch are also given in Mr. Torrens' uncompleted life of Lord Wellesley, p. 137 *seq.*

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versed the policy which Cornwallis had instituted and which Shore had pursued, was accompanied or followed by another. Tippoo, the most formidable power in Southern India, was the hereditary enemy of the British race; and Tippoo, in 1798, openly proclaiming his alliance with France, sent ambassadors to the Mauritius, while the governor of this colony thereupon issued a proclamation inviting its inhabitants to enter Tippoo's service for the sake of war with England. A man full of the ideas which influenced English thought in the closing years of the eighteenth century could hardly ignore such a challenge. Mornington made up his mind that Southern India was not large enough for both Tippoo and the Company, and that there was no alternative between war and ruin. He chose war, and ordered the Madras Government to prepare for war. Whatever judgment may be formed of the policy which provoked it, no two opinions can exist on the capacity with which the war was conducted. Seringapatam was taken, Tippoo was slain, and the territory of Mysore, reduced to half its area, was allotted to a Hindoo lad, the lineal descendant of the ancient Rajas whom Tippoo's father had dethroned; and the boy was placed under British protection.[1]

The war with Tippoo.

These great events won for the author a Marquis's coronet; and Mornington became Lord Wellesley. But the reward only stimulated him to fresh contests. The Nabob of the Carnatic, a State which embraced the south-eastern littoral of Southern India, had bound himself by treaty with Cornwallis to place the resources of his State at the disposal of the British authorities in the event of war arising in contiguous territory.[2] On the eve of the war with Tippoo, Wellesley required the

The Nabob of the Carnatic.

[1] Pearce's *Wellesley*, vol. i. pp. 178, 187, 202, 303, 319; Marshman's *India*, vol. ii. pp. 83–99; Thornton's *India*, vol. iii. pp. 34–96; Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. i. pp. 212–241.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 96.

Nabob to contribute a sum of money towards the expenses of the campaign. The Nabob was insolvent, his government was a wretched despotism, and he either would not or could not fulfil the demand. To this refusal was soon added the evidence of another offence. Papers found at Seringapatam proved that the Nabob, and his father before him, had corresponded in cipher with Tippoo. Such a discovery was quite enough for Wellesley. The interests of the Company, he thought, pointed to the annexation of the Nabob's dominions. His misgovernment made annexation desirable, his intrigues made it justifiable. By an act of despotism Wellesley annexed the Carnatic, and by a stroke of his pen added the whole southern coast of India to the territories of the Company.[1]

These proceedings reconstructed the map of Southern India. When Wellesley reached Hindostan, the Company owned a small strip of territory round Madras, the Malabar coast, and the isolated provinces of Salem and Dindigul. In 1801 it occupied the whole western coast line from Goa to Travancore and the whole eastern coast from Travancore to Cuttack. The territory of Mysore, shrunk to a moiety of Tippoo's dominions, was under British protection, and practically an integral portion of the Company's empire. The Nizam, who on Wellesley's arrival was leaning on a French force, was sustained on his throne by British bayonets. The whole scheme of Cornwallis for a balance of power was destroyed, and Britain, and Britain alone, was predominant in Southern India.

But Wellesley was not yet satisfied with his achievements. All the conquerors of India, from Alexander to Nadir Shah, have burst into Hindostan through its north-western frontier. All aggressive statesmen, from

[1] For these events, see *Thornton*, vol. iii. p. 125 *sq.*, and *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 103 *sq.*; cf. Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. i. pp. 284-308.

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Wellesley to Beaconsfield, have looked with alarm at a possible invasion of India from the remote states beyond the Indus. In the closing months of the eighteenth century an enterprising prince, Zemaun Shah, who controlled the destinies of the Afghans, crossed the Indus and marched on Lahore. In 1800, a bird from Lahore, following the straightest course, would have had to wing its weary way for more than 600 miles, before alighting on the nearest British territory in Benares. It was not, therefore, very obvious that even the permanent occupation of Lahore foreboded any danger to the East India Company. But there was not even much likelihood of the permanent occupation of Lahore. A native envoy,[1] despatched to Persia, easily succeeded in stirring up revolution in Afghanistan, and in thus paralysing the advance of Zemaun Shah. Like the king of the north, whose predicted procedure has been applied to so many potentates, the Afghan heard a report, and hastily retired to his own land. A more timid man than Wellesley might, under these circumstances, have slept quietly in his bed at Calcutta. Wellesley, however, saw, or affected to see, in the advance of Zemaun Shah, a pretext for a new act of vigour. The kingdom of Oudh immediately adjoined the Company's territory at Benares. Its reigning Vizier owed his seat on its throne to the direct intervention of Shore, and he had stipulated to pay a subsidy of 760,000*l.* a year for the maintenance of a

Zemaun Shah.

Oudh.

[1] For this embassy, Watson's *History of Persia*, p. 123. It must be recollected that the native envoy was followed by Malcolm, who was then despatched on his first mission to Persia, and who succeeded in forming a treaty with the Persian Court, which is alluded to *infra* p. 176. The terms of the treaty will be found in Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. i. p. 9. It pledged Persia, in the event of an Afghan invasion of India, 'to lay waste, with a great army, the country of the Afghans.' It also pledged her to refuse any individuals of the French nation leave to reside in Persia; the king actually directing his provincial governors 'to disgrace and slay the intruders.' In the event of a French invasion it pledged both contracting parties to act conjointly 'for their expulsion and extirpation.'

British force in his dominions, on condition that, if the force fell below 8,000 men, a proportionate reduction should be effected in his payment, while, if it were increased to more than 13,000 men, an addition should be made to his contribution.[1] Oudh being an Indian kingdom, it is hardly necessary to add, was misgoverned, and the stipulated payment to the Company was irregularly made.

These conditions were easily converted into a pretext for interference. The Vizier was told that the attitude of Zemaun Shah required an addition to the British force in Oudh. The cost of the additional troops would be half a million a year, and the Vizier could most easily provide for the payment of this sum by disbanding his own disorderly and useless battalions. Even an Indian prince did not easily submit to such a demand. The Vizier told Wellesley that his assent to it would annihilate his authority and expose him to the contempt of his subjects. Wellesley cared very little for such consequences as these, and insisted on a compliance with his requirements. The Vizier yielded, but he found that concession only exposed him to a fresh exaction. The disorganised condition of his province made it almost hopeless for him to pay with punctuality the stipulated contribution to the British Government. Wellesley proposed that the payment should be secured by a surrender of territory. The wretched Vizier opposed every obstacle in his power to the spoiling of his possessions. All that he could do was to secure, by a policy of delay, two years of grace. Throughout the two years, however, Wellesley clung to his purpose. Before they closed,

Its treatment.

[1] *Thornton*, vol. ii. p. 576; Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. i. p. 169–178; cf. *Dacoitee in Excelsis, or the Spoliation of Oudh*, p. 44. The student who desires a short sketch of the treatment of Oudh from an Oudh standpoint cannot do better than consult this remarkable pamphlet.

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more than half Oudh was annexed to the Company's dominions, and the Company's outposts were advanced some 300 miles nearer the camp of Zemaun Shah.[1]

If these occurrences had taken place in Europe; if some Napoleon, for instance, had treated Spain as Wellesley treated Oudh, history would have condemned his conduct. But historians apply one code of morality to India and another to Europe, and they excuse in the one acts which they would not condescend to defend in the other. Wellesley himself felt that the policy of annexation which he had consistently pursued was opposed to the instructions which he had brought with him, and to the wishes of his employers. He was annoyed at the tone of the despatches which reached him from Leadenhall Street, and he offered to retire. He was persuaded to serve Company and Crown a little longer, and he consequently obtained an opportunity for entering on a more formidable war than any which he had previously undertaken.

The Mahrattas.

It had been the policy of Cornwallis to establish a balance of power in the Deccan. Tippoo, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas had been weighed one against the other, and the balance, as Cornwallis thought, had been secured. But Wellesley had destroyed Tippoo, he had made the Nizam a dependent on the Company, and he had left Britain and the Mahrattas face to face. It was possible to doubt whether the Company had derived much advantage from this reduction in the number of the combatants. The Mahrattas were the

[1] For these events see *Thornton*, vol. iii. p. 181 *sq.*; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 115 *sq.*; Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. i. pp. 273–283. The author of *Dacoitee in Excelsis* says that the district which Wellesley so annexed yielded a revenue of 1,350,000*l.*, the subsidy for which it was exchanged was only 760,000*l.* Wellesley, therefore, appropriated a territory yielding 590,000*l.* more than the required subsidy. *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 48. But the author has apparently omitted from his calculation the additional 500,000*l.* required by Wellesley for the extra force.

most formidable of the Powers against which the British had as yet been arrayed in India. Their rise had been almost as rapid as that of the Company. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, Sevajee, a bold adventurer whose career recalls Byron's famous description of Marmion, succeeded in carving a territory for himself out of some of the fragments of the Mogul empire. His successors, owing their origin to plunder, carried out the traditions of their race. Mahratta horse forced their way into many parts of the Deccan; they invaded Hindostan;[1] and levied tribute[2] from every chieftain.

Turbulent races living on plunder do not usually present a compact organisation. Any leader who displayed bravery or capacity commanded the allegiance of some portion of the Mahrattas. Sevajee's descendants became Rajas of Sattara. But early in the eighteenth century one of them, destitute of the courage and capacity of his ancestors, gave his minister, or Peishwa —the word Peishwa literally means first man—full administrative power. Subsequent Rajas continued these powers to succeeding Peishwas, and the authority which originally resided with the Raja at Sattara gradually devolved on the hereditary Peishwa enthroned at Poona. The same causes, however, which had in the first instance interfered with the Raja's power, gradually undermined the Peishwa's authority. The commander in-chief set up a second independent kingdom as Raja of Berar, another leading officer ruled as Guicwar at Baroda, while the great Mahratta families of Holkar and Scindia placed themselves under their

[1] The Deccan is the country south of the Nerbudda, Hindostan is the country north of that river. In this chapter the term Hindostan is always used in its true sense.

[2] Chout is the word ordinarily used by Indian historians, who fall into the bad habit of employing Indian words in books intended for English readers. Chout is one-fourth of the revenue. Malcolm's *Central India*, vol. i. p. 66, *note*.

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chieftains, who exercised authority in Malwa [1] and Gwalior.

While, however, the Mahratta empire was thus disintegrated by the divisions of its chieftains, the power of the Mahrattas was largely extended by the turbulent armies which followed the banners of Scindia and Holkar. Their power extended from Gujerat on the western shores of India to Cuttack on the east, and from Agra in the north to the Carnatic on the south. Both in Hindostan and in the Deccan, their famous horse exacted tribute from the tribes which surrounded the Company's territory, and held the whole country in awe.

Successive Governor-Generals had naturally hesitated to recognise the authority of turbulent and irresponsible chieftains, and the negotiations which had been conducted with the Mahrattas had been carried on with the Peishwa alone. Such had been the course of Cornwallis in 1790, such had been the policy of Wellesley after the death of Tippoo. But Scindia, the most powerful chieftain of the Empire, had not on either occasion tolerated this disregard of his own importance with patience. His battalions not merely overawed the Peishwa at Poona, his troops held practically captive the Mogul Emperor at Delhi. Virtually supreme both at Delhi and Poona, he naturally thought that Wellesley should court his assistance rather than that either of emperor or raja; and that, in arrangements affecting the Mahrattas, his own voice—the voice of the most powerful native in India—should not be wholly ignored.[2]

Scindia,

[1] For the previous history of Malwa, see Malcolm's *Central India*, vol. i. p. 22 *sq.*

[2] Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas* is the standard authority on these subjects. But Lord Wellesley himself wrote a history of the war of 1803 which contains a great deal of information. It seems hardly known to historians. The rise of Sevajee is in Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. i. pp. 119–300; cf. the account of the Mahrattas in Malcolm's *Central India*, vol. i. p. 59 *sq.*

There was, however, one reason which made Wellesley dislike any alliance with Scindia. This officer had availed himself of French assistance for the organisation of his army, and had also helped to place French officers over the forces of the Mogul Emperor. The French, therefore, had a voice both in Scindia's camp and in the councils at Delhi; and the same considerations which had previously urged Wellesley to destroy Tippoo, drove him into a fresh struggle with Scindia.

From Wellesley's standpoint, the best means of reducing Scindia's influence was to strengthen the Peishwa's authority, and the easiest method of assisting the Peishwa was to place a British force at his disposal. Even the Peishwa, however, showed little inclination to admit troops organised and officered by the Company into the heart of his dominions, and the negotiation wore on without producing any results. Suddenly, however, an unexpected turn was given to the matter. The Governor-General had been so jealously scrutinising Scindia's power, that he had omitted to pay equal attention to Holkar's battalions. In October 1802, however, Holkar. Holkar suddenly made his influence felt. He marched upon Poona, defeated the combined armies of the Peishwa and Scindia, and forced the Peishwa to take shelter in British territory.[1]

Defeat naturally affected the Peishwa's policy. He asked Wellesley to send him six battalions of sepoys, and offered to cede territory to the Company in payment for the force. A treaty embodying this arrangement was signed at Bassein on the last day of 1802, and Scindia was subsequently invited to become a party to it. But Scindia, though he had nothing to urge against the arrangement, hesitated to adopt it.[2] He watched with evident dislike the steps which Wellesley took to

[1] *Thornton*, vol. iii. p. 277.

[2] For the treaty of Bassein, see *Grant Duff*, vol. iii. pp. 225, 229.

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The first Mahratta war.

carry out his policy. While the Governor-General's brother—Arthur—entered the Peishwa's dominions with an army and replaced the Peishwa on his throne, Scindia, in the immediate neighbourhood, accompanied by the Raja of Berar, held his forces ready for any eventuality. An armed peace is distasteful to every Government. Wellesley was the last man who would have tolerated it. He directed his brother to arrange for Scindia's withdrawal; and General Wellesley, in obedience to these orders, proposed that Scindia should withdraw into Hindostan, that the Raja should retire to Berar, and that he himself should return into the Company's territory. Scindia, after a long negotiation, refused the offer, and the first Mahratta war immediately began.[1]

A reader who has not an intimate acquaintance with the geography of India must refer to the map if he desire to gain an idea of the operations which then ensued. One force was at once despatched from Bengal to take possession of Cuttack; another force seized Scindia's territory in Gujerat; the Governor-General's brother advanced from Poona, crossed the Godavery, and defeated Scindia in the great battle of Assaye; while Lake, marching at the same time from Cawnpore, defeated M. Perron, the Emperor's French general, at Allyghur, took Delhi and Agra, and stamped out all further resistance in the battle of Laswaree. A war which commenced on the 8th of August was practically over on the 1st of November. In that short period the British had won the great battles of Assaye and Laswaree; they had taken Cuttack, Gujerat, and the valuable territories of Scindia between the Jumna and the Ganges, they had captured the cities of Delhi and Agra, they had

[1] Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. iii. p. 234, and *Wellesley*, History of Events and Transactions during the late War, p. 65 *et seq.*; Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. i. p. 249 *sq.* For the rise of the family of Scindia, see Malcolm's *Central India*, vol. i. p. 116 *sq.*

seized the forts Ahmednugger, Allyghur, and Baroach. 268 pieces of ordnance, 57 stands of colours, were among the minor prizes of their victory.

These achievements naturally led to fresh annexations. Cuttack had hitherto broken the British communication on the east coast of India. It was added to the Company's possessions, and the whole of the east coast of India from Travancore to Chittagong remained thenceforward under the sway of the Company. The territory of Delhi, and the Upper Dooab, between the Jumna and the Ganges,[1] was annexed at the same time, and the seat of the Mogul Empire was accordingly transferred to the East India Company.

The war of 1804 with Holkar.

But war occasionally begets war, and the triumphs of 1803 involved a fresh struggle in 1804. The defeat of Scindia left Holkar more powerful than before. During the negotiations with Scindia in 1803, Holkar had been suspected of combining with the rest of the Mahrattas against the British. He was not, however, prepared for the rupture which Scindia eventually precipitated, and he thought that the Mahratta policy should have been based rather on delay than on warfare. He had not, moreover, foreseen the easy defeat of Scindia, and he saw with concern the rapid victories of the British armies. The arrangements to which Scindia submitted seemed subversive of his own authority. Rival chieftains, members of the same State, Scindia and he had not nicely defined the boundaries of their own dominions, and Holkar claimed a portion of the territory between the Jumna and the Ganges which Scindia had ceded to the East India Company.[2]

His claim made any permanent understanding between Holkar and the Company unlikely. Wellesley

[1] The Dooab, literally two waters, is the country between the Jumna and the Ganges. Malcolm, *Political History of India*, vol. i. p. 389, *note*.

[2] Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. iii. p. 273; cf. *Thornton*, vol. iii. p. 422.

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met it by requiring him to withdraw from the menacing position which he occupied in the neighbourhood of British territory, and on his refusal at once commenced war. But the war which thus began, in April 1804, was attended with very different consequences from those of the campaign of the previous autumn. Holkar understood much better than Scindia the conditions of the contest. Instead of precipitating actions, he hurriedly retreated; and Lake, fancying that the contest was over, and seeing that his men were suffering and his cattle dying from the heat, withdrew into quarters, and left only a small detachment under Colonel Monson to watch the movements of Holkar.

The retreat of Monson.

North of the Nerbudda, a little more than half-way from its source to the sea, two rivers rise in a high range of mountains. One of these, the Mhye, or Mahie, flows first in a northerly direction, till suddenly meeting with higher land its waters are turned, and hold a south-westerly course till they lose themselves in the Gulf of Cambay. The other river, the Chumbul, rising to the east of the Mahie, flows from the first in a north and north-easterly direction, till it finally falls into the Jumna. Holkar's retreat practically abandoned all his territory to the north-west of the Chumbul, and Monson followed him along the right bank of that stream towards its source. Another officer, Colonel Murray, was instructed to march through the Mahie valley from the west, and effect a junction with Monson near the sources of the Chumbul.

Up to the beginning of July all went well with the two forces. In July Murray, alarmed at reports of forces gathering around him, fell back across the Mahie. His retreat made Monson's position full of danger. He was in an enemy's country, short of supplies, with an active foe before him and a difficult mountain pass in his rear. He decided to retire; but his decision was at

once followed by an attack on his rearguard, which was cut to pieces. Monson fell back in order on the Mokundra pass, where he made a stand, and defeated his enemy. But Holkar's horse collected after their defeat and harassed his retreat. At Rampoora succour reached Monson which had been sent him from Agra. Strengthened as he was, he was still forced to retire. The rivers were swollen with the rains; the guns, sticking in the soft soil, were spiked and abandoned, and the wearied troops were harassed night and day by the active force which surrounded them. Discipline under these circumstances was lost; order ceased; and, at the end of August, the detachments which survived the disaster straggled, a mere rabble, into Agra.[1]

This reverse, the greatest which the British had yet sustained in India, imposed the necessity of vigorous action upon the authorities. Holkar, flushed with success, actually laid siege to Delhi, and the Raja of Bhurtpore threw in his lot with the Mahratta chieftain. But the British proved their spirit in the midst of these trials. A small British force under the command of Colonel Burn successfully defended Delhi and forced Holkar to withdraw. General Fraser, who commanded one division of Lake's army, decisively defeated Holkar at Deeg; and General Jones, who had superseded Murray in Gujerat, avenged the disaster of the preceding summer by marching through the Mahratta territory and joining hands with Lake in the valley of the Jumna. The authority of the Company was restored, and the power of Holkar was broken by these successes, and the British had leisure to punish the chieftains who had deserted them in their need. Foremost among them was the Raja of Bhurtpore, and Lake in January 1805 attacked that town. But the

The siege of Bhurtpore.

[1] Grant Duff's *Mahrattas*, vol. iii. p. 280 *sq.*

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siege, undertaken in haste, was conducted without judgment, and the British experienced a new failure.

Throughout the operations with Holkar, Scindia had been the nominal ally of the British. But he had carefully evaded their demands for armed assistance, and had held himself prepared to embark on any policy which the fortunes of the war might commend to his judgment. Unfortunately, the policy of Wellesley had given this chieftain not merely an opportunity but an excuse for war. The Governor-General maintained, and Scindia denied, that, under the arrangements of 1803, Gwalior and Gohud belonged to the Company. It would be tedious to detail the arguments which were urged in support of and against this claim. It is sufficient for an English writer to observe that the Governor-General's brother, who had negotiated the treaty, sided with Scindia;[1] and that Malcolm, the British envoy at Scindia's court, was of the same opinion as Colonel Wellesley.[2] The disasters of Monson's detachment predisposed Scindia to a new quarrel with the Company; the subsequent successes of Lake, however, made him shrink from entering upon hostilities; but the evident failure of the siege of Bhurtpore again roused him to action, and induced him to march upon the town and propose to mediate between Holkar and the Company. A year before, such conduct would have extorted only one answer from Wellesley. In 1805 he had not the power, if he had retained the will, to embark on a new war. His employers in London had seen with dismay the progress of his policy; they were bent on pursuing peace, and they saw themselves committed to war; they had forbidden fresh annexations, and the Governor-General was annexing province after province. Wars for which they had to pay, and

Scindia marches to Bhurtpore.

Wellesley's operations disapproved in England.

[1] *Wellington Despatches*, vol. iii. pp. 486, 532.
[2] *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 175.

for which they were responsible, were commenced without their knowledge and concluded without their authority, and their opinions were treated with contempt by their own officers.[1]

Unfortunately for Wellesley, moreover, the Court of Directors was not alone in distrusting his policy. Wellesley was mortified to find that, while he was urging in his despatches the conquest of Holkar's possessions in the Deccan and in Malwa, Castlereagh was doubting the justice, necessity, and policy of the first Mahratta war. Finding that his proceedings were disapproved by the Court and distrusted by the Government, he naturally desired to withdraw from his high office.[2] His continuance in it was, in fact, impossible. Government and Directors saw plainly that they must either supersede the Governor-General or abdicate their own functions of control. They naturally adopted the former alternative. Cornwallis, who had formulated a policy of non-intervention, and who was known to disapprove the proceedings of Wellesley, was persuaded to return to his old post and resume the duties of Governor-General.

Wellesley superseded by Cornwallis.

A knowledge that his successor was already on the seas naturally modified Wellesley's policy. Active measures were suspended; the reinforcements which had been ordered were countermanded; and the Governor-General expressed a readiness to make concessions to his opponents.[3] Before, however, these arrangements were concluded, his own authority was terminated by Cornwallis's arrival, and the career of the statesman who, against the orders of his employers and in defiance

[1] Wellesley wrote to Castlereagh as President of the Board of Control in March 1804, 'It is unnecessary to repeat to your Lordship my utter contempt of any opinion which may be entertained by Mr. —— and the Court of Directors.' Pearce's *Wellesley*, vol. ii. p. 361.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 373, 374.

[3] *Thornton*, vol. iii. p. 550; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 178.

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of their wishes, had conquered an empire was terminated.

The thirteen years which had passed since Cornwallis had left India had exhausted the frame of a statesman who had seen active service in many climates and in both hemispheres. He came out to Calcutta, but he came only to die. During the few months, however, of his remaining life, he laboured to reverse the policy of his predecessor. He was ready to conciliate Scindia by ceding Gwalior and Gohud,[1] and he was anxious to make the cession the occasion for a general statement of his policy, 'with a view to restore to the Native States that confidence in the justice and moderation of the British Government which past events have considerably impaired.'[2] Cornwallis, however, did not even live to receive the vigorous remonstrance which his policy elicited from Lake. He died on the 5th of October, sixteen days after his views had been reduced to writing, and the government fell on the shoulders of the first member of his Council, Sir George Barlow. This change, however, made no alteration in the policy of the Government. Barlow, though he had held high office under Wellesley, loyally carried out the orders which Cornwallis had brought with him from England. Gohud and Gwalior were given up to Scindia; Holkar was assured in his dominions south of the Chumbul; the Company declined to interfere in the

The death of Cornwallis.

Sir John Barlow concludes peace.

[1] *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 178. The lavish abuse which has been bestowed on Cornwallis by Wellesley's admirers (e.g., *Thornton*, vol. iv. pp. 2–35) makes it necessary to point out that in this his chief decision he had been anticipated by his predecessor. Those who are led away by Thornton's angry remarks would do well to compare them with Wilson's temperate examination of this policy in vol. i. p. 100. The Duke of Wellington's defence of it will be found in a note to the passage. Cf. Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. i. pp. 334–355.

[2] *Cornwallis*, vol. iii. p. 552; *Thornton*, vol. iv. p. 30. However much the reader may agree with Cornwallis's principles, it is impossible to avoid a regret that he should have so frequently indulged in unnecessary reflections on his predecessor's policy.

affairs of any Native states west of the Jumna, and peace on these terms was secured to British India.[1]

News of Cornwallis's death and of Barlow's accession to office reached England in the troubled period which immediately succeeded the death of Pitt. The Coalition Ministry, before it was fully formed, adopted a recommendation of the Company and confirmed Barlow in his high office. But the Cabinet, when fully constituted, decided on reversing this decision. Some of its members resented the appointment of an officer who was understood to be opposed to Wellesley's policy; others of them disliked the promotion of one of the Company's servants; others again desired to secure the appointment for one of their own friends. These various reasons determined them to cancel Barlow's appointment and to confer the office on the Earl of Lauderdale. This nomination, however, aroused the heated opposition of the Directors. Lauderdale's opinions were calculated to excite the alarm of sober merchants. He was a reformer, and reform in 1806 was synonymous with rebellion; he was a free trader, and free trade in 1806 was the most pestilent heresy. He had, moreover, in the past, dared to support Fox's India Bill and to oppose the Company's privileges. Leadenhall Street could hardly have been expected to submit unmoved to such a nomination. It angrily resisted the right of the Crown to dispose at pleasure of the highest offices of the Company. To some extent its opposition was successful. The ministry clung to its own power of cancelling Barlow's appointment, but it consented to withdraw an obnoxious nomination. Lauderdale was persuaded to resign; and Lord Minto, whom the Coalition Ministers had already made President of the Board of Control, accepted the office and set out for India.[2]

Lord Minto is made Governor-General.

[1] *Marshman*, vol. ii. pp. 191–197; *Thornton*, vol. iv. pp. 35–55.

[2] *Thornton*, vol. iv. p. 86 *et seq*; *Wilson*, vol. i. p. 149.

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Minto came to India intent on carrying out the policy of non-interference which Cornwallis had initiated, and which both Leadenhall Street and Downing Street approved. And in one sense he was successful. Throughout the period of his rule, he was engaged in no extensive military operations, and his troops were employed chiefly in establishing order in the Company's territory, and not in curbing the pretensions of foreign princes.[1] Yet if he were not, like We'lesley, notorious for his wars, he was at any rate famous for his embassies. If he did not attempt to make his country supreme by force of arms, he tried to stop the advance of its enemies by negotiation. He did not, like Napoleon, crush rival potentates into submission; he occupied himself, like William III., in projecting alliances.

His policy.

Indian politics had hitherto been chiefly concerned with Hindostan and the Deccan. But the victories of Wellesley had practically terminated for a time both war and diplomacy in these regions. In both of them the Company enjoyed a preponderating influence. The Mahrattas—the only people capable of disputing its empire—were prostrated by the defeats which they had experienced and the increasing incapacity of their own leaders. Even Holkar, whose cavalry was still formidable, was earning, by drink and indulgence, insanity and death. But in the far North-West, where no British army had yet appeared, other chieftains were gradually consolidating their power. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, indeed, it was not easy to see that any of the disorganised tribes who occupied Central Asia could venture on an enterprise which would bring them ultimately into collision with the armed strength of Britain. But there was one Power,

The North-Western frontier.

[1] This statement is made of India itself. It perhaps requires some modification in connection with Minto's expeditions to Java and Mauritius.

bent apparently on subduing the whole world, whose ambition no British statesman could ignore. The period of Minto's rule was precisely that in which Napoleon attained the summit of his renown; and an English statesman who had seen the greatest empires in Europe struck down, and who was as ignorant of the geography of Central Asia as modern statesmen are of the physical conditions of Central Africa, might be pardoned for imagining that the soldier who had begun his career by marching from Africa upon Asia, and who had just dictated terms to a continent at Tilsit, could have no difficulty in following the footsteps of Alexander, and in deciding the long struggle between French and English by a decisive battle on the banks of the Ganges.

A statesman occupied with such apprehensions as these naturally turned with interest to the North-Western frontier of India. In the country which is watered by the five great rivers which join their waters in the Indus, and which owes its name of Punjab to these streams, a few people, under a remarkable leader, had established a new religion. Recognising much that was pure both in the Hindoo and Mahomedan creeds, their founder Nanuk had succeeded in attracting both Hindoos and Mahomedans to his faith, and in thus collecting many 'Sikhs,' or disciples. Toleration is as rare in the East as in the West. The new sect, proscribed and persecuted, was forced to arm in self-defence. Organised for defensive purposes, 'the puritans of India'[1] soon found themselves strong enough to pursue a policy of aggression, and, obtaining a capable leader in Runjeet Singh, overran the Punjab, and threatened the independence of adjacent principalities. Up to 1806 Runjeet had confined his operations to the right bank of the Sutlej. In 1806 he crossed that river and

Runjeet Singh.

[1] The expression is Mr. Arnold's, in *History of Dalhousie Administration*, vol. i. p. 344; cf. for the Sikhs, *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 51.

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threatened to overrun the territory between the Sutlej and the Jumna. Professing friendship to the English, he linked his professions to claims which threw Calcutta into alarm. 'The country on this side the Jumna,' he wrote, 'excepting the stations occupied by the English, is subject to my authority. Let it remain so.'[1]

The position of Runjeet Singh induced Minto to reconsider his policy of non-interference. He did not, indeed, rush into immediate war, but he decided on sending a mission of importance to the Sikh camp. The embassy was entrusted to Charles Metcalfe, a young civil servant, just commencing a career which made his name famous.[2] Probably even Metcalfe would have failed if he had been left to his own unaided resources. Troops, however, were moved up towards the North-West to support the ambassador; and Metcalfe, thus enabled to assume a tone of authority, succeeded in confining the Sikh leader to the right bank of the Sutlej and in establishing 'perpetual amity between the British Government and Runjeet Singh.' The treaty which was thus concluded was memorable as the first concluded by the British in India which was never broken. Throughout the whole of Runjeet Singh's life the perpetual amity remained inviolate, and it was only after his death that the alliance between Sikhs and English was interrupted.[3]

The mission to Runjeet Singh.

If Minto's diplomatic efforts had been confined to this memorable mission, he would have been remembered as the most successful of Indian diplomatists. His rule, however, is famous for two other embassies, less successful in their immediate results, and attended

[1] *Wilson*, vol. i. pp. 101, 197; *Marshman*, vol. i. p. 184; vol. ii. p. 221.

[2] For this mission, see Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, edition 1858, vol. i. pp. 166–225; Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs*, 2nd edition, pp. 138–141; *Quarterly Review*, vol. lxxviii. p. 175, an article which contains an admirable account of the Sikhs.

[3] *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 225; *Wilson*, vol. i. p. 200; Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. i. p. 411.

The mission to Afghanistan.

with disastrous consequences in the remote future. The fear of French invasion, which might have been dispelled by a superficial study of geography, induced the British to seek allies on the other side of the Indus. Two nations commanded the approaches to India. Persia controlled the mouth of the Euphrates and the waters of the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan was mistress of the Hindoo Koosh and of the difficult passes which debouched on the valley of the Indus. To both Persia and Afghanistan costly embassies were despatched. Mountstuart Elphinstone was sent to Shah Sooja, the ruler of Afghanistan. He found his task beset with difficulties. The Afghans naturally demanded what advantages the British had to offer if the French were excluded from their country. This preliminary question, indeed, which it was not easy to answer, might have been followed by another—what means had Shah Sooja of resisting French invasion? While Elphinstone was in Afghanistan, Shah Sooja's armies were beaten in Cashmere, and his brother, Mahmoud, seized Cabul and Candahar.[1] Shah Sooja, who had been invited by the British to aid them in an improbable contingency against the French, naturally asked the British to aid him in a certain danger against his brother. Minto and his advisers, however, had too much good sense to meddle with a civil war in a remote country. They contented themselves with ratifying a treaty which Elphinstone succeeded in obtaining from Shah Sooja, and which gave the British the right of resisting, at their own cost, a French invasion of Afghanistan. Before the treaty had been returned to Afghanistan, however, Shah Sooja was a fugitive from his throne. But the cost of an expensive mission might not have been entirely wasted if the British had learned—as they unfortunately failed to learn—the

[1] Elphinstone's *Cabul*, Introduction, p. 74.

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folly of interference in the concerns of distant countries far removed from their frontiers.[1]

The missions to Persia.

There was perhaps a little more justification for the mission to Persia. Years before, when Zemaun Shah, Shah Sooja's brother, was marching through the Punjaub, Wellesley had despatched first a native envoy, and then a young Englishman, Malcolm, to Teheran, with orders to check the invader's advance.[2] The object of the mission was accomplished by the native, who easily succeeded in stirring up civil war in Afghanistan, and in thus compelling Zemaun Shah to retrace his steps. Malcolm, furnished with Oriental magnificence, and ordered to indulge in an Oriental expenditure, found that he had been anticipated by the humble agent who had preceded him.[3] The magnificence of the mission, however, and the dexterity and tact of the ambassador, made a profound impression on the Persian Court, and Persia was persuaded to agree to a treaty, which, in the words of an eloquent Englishman,[4] 'French writers freely condemn and English writers are ashamed to vindicate,' and which pledged Britain to aid Persia in every contingency against France. In 1813 Persia had need of help. Russia, extending her frontiers, occupied vast tracts of Persian territory in Armenia. Persia, recollecting its negotiations with Wellesley, appealed to Calcutta for assistance. But, though the British had promised to help Persia in the possible contingency of a struggle with France in Asia, they were not ready to render British help in the campaign which Persia was undertaking against Russia. The refusal of assistance at once threw Persia into the arms of France. Napoleon, locked in a death struggle with

[1] *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 226; cf. Wilson's *India*, vol. i. p. 208 *et seq.*

[2] *Ante*, p. 158 and note. Watson's *Persia*, pp. 124–128. No English diplomatist had until this time been employed in Persia since the reign of Charles II. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[3] *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 110.

[4] Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. i. p. 35.

Britain, was not likely to overlook a chance of embarrassing his antagonist, and sent an ambassador, General Gardanne, to Teheran.[1] The despatch of a French embassy to the Persian Court created a flutter of excitement among statesmen both in London and in Calcutta. The British ministry decided on sending Sir Harford Jones as Ambassador to the Persian Court, while Minto, thinking that such a mission should emanate from the Indian Government, desired Malcolm to return to Teheran. This conflict of authority threatened at one time to produce grave inconvenience. Ultimately, however, the Company gave way, and the Foreign Office retained the negotiations in its own hands. Jones succeeded in concluding an arrangement by which Britain on the one hand undertook to defend Persia in certain contingencies, and Persia, on the other, engaged in certain eventualities to assist Britain.[2]

Thus, during the previous twenty-five years, three Governors-General had pursued three different descriptions of policy. Cornwallis had devised, though he had not always pursued, a policy of strict non-intervention; Wellesley, representing the opposite pole of thought, had actively interfered in every part of India; while Minto, endeavouring to effect by negotiation what Wellesley had attempted by force, had sent mis-

[1] *Wilson*, vol. i. pp. 204, 222.

[2] The important article of the treaty which is reprinted in *ibid.*, vol. iii. p. 217, is as follows: 'In case of any European nation invading Persia, should the Persian Government require the assistance of the English Government, the Governor-General of India, on the part of Great Britain, shall comply with the wish of the Persian Government, by sending from India the force required with officers, ammunition and warlike stores; or, in lieu thereof, the English Government shall pay an annual subsidy of' (two hundred thousand tomans). 'It is further agreed that the said subsidy shall not be paid in case the war with such European nation shall have been produced by an aggression on the part of Persia.' Cf. vol. i. p. 231; Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. i. pp. 71, 141, 147; Watson's *Persia*, p. 182. The technical reader may care for Malcolm's comments on the mission being entrusted to the Foreign Office, and on Lord Minto's remonstrance, *Political History of India*, vol. i. p. 415 *sq.*

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sions to distant nations and had sought allies amidst the snows of the Himalayas or in the basin of the Euphrates. During the same period something had been done to fulfil the higher functions of government. The Company, indeed, angry with its officers for increasing its territory and neglecting its trade, rarely condescended to issue any instructions for the better government of its dominions. India was popularly regarded as a place out of which money was to be extracted; and, with rare exceptions, Englishmen both in England and in India were indifferent to the conditions under which the natives of the country passed their lives. The bad government of a native ruler afforded a convenient excuse for interference or aggression, but the bad government of the Company itself attracted little or no attention.

The internal administration of India.

Cornwallis, who had the merit of endeavouring to establish a system of non-intervention, deserves to be remembered in connection with the reform of abuses. In this as in other respects, indeed, it is permissible to doubt whether his head was equal to his heart, his ability to his will. He made grave mistakes, from some of the consequences of which India still suffers. But he instituted many reforms which place his name in a different category from that of all the Governors-General who preceded Lord W. Bentinck.

Cornwallis as a reformer.

The reform, for which Cornwallis is perhaps chiefly remembered, was forced on him by the financial difficulties to which he succeeded. All Eastern Governments derive much of their revenue from the land, and all Indian Governments had reserved for their own use a portion of the produce of the soil. The ryot, or the cultivator, in Bengal held directly under the State, and the Government appointed a zemindar,[1] or col-

The land system of Bengal.

[1] Some of the zemindars had jurisdiction over vast tracts of territory. The zemindaree of Burdwan, for instance, contained nearly 4,000 square miles. *Cornwallis*, vol. ii. p. 192.

lector, to receive the rent. Such was the system which the Company inherited from its Mahomedan predecessors, and which, it is needless to add, led to endless abuses. The Company, in the first instance, selected for the office of zemindar the man who promised it the best terms; and the man who bid the highest for the place was usually a native prepared to exercise towards the ryot the maximum of cruelty, and to extend to him the minimum of sympathy. Abuse, however, usually brings with it retribution. The unfortunate ryot, treated like an Irish cottier, acted as an Irish cottier acted under the same circumstances. When he saw that the profits of improvement were swept into the pockets of the zemindar, he ceased to improve his land. Whole districts consequently fell out of cultivation, whole peoples lapsed into miserable poverty, and progress became impossible.

A change of system was plainly necessary. A modern legislator would have had little hesitation in deciding on the shape which reform should assume. The ryot would have been left in occupation of his land; the Government would have appointed competent officers to determine the rent which he should pay from time to time; and the zemindars would have become the agents employed for this purpose, or would have been required to give place to competent successors. Unfortunately, an English nobleman could hardly understand a cottier proprietary. The existence of large proprietors seemed indispensable; and, as no landowners were in existence, Cornwallis proceeded to make them. By a stroke of the pen, the zemindars in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa were converted into proprietors, or, as they would be styled in England, copyholders, while the ryots were turned into the tenants of the zemindar. Steps were, indeed, taken to protect the ryot against

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extortion. Some ryots, such as the talookdars,[1] were given a perpetual holding under the zemindar on conditions similar to those under which the zemindar held the land under the Company. Others of them received leases at a specified rent, which the zemindar was, in theory, unable to raise. But the poor man, neither in the East nor in the West, stands on the same level as the rich one. The leases in many cases lapsed, rents were arbitrarily raised, and the securities on which the ryot had relied proved valueless. Cornwallis's settlement was thus attended with two inconveniences. It confined the Company to an inelastic revenue, fixed at a period when the produce of the land had been reduced by abuses to a minimum; it ignored the interests of the teeming millions of India, and left them at the mercy of the zemindars.[2]

The settlement.

In England, however, statesmen unacquainted with foreign systems, whose idea of property was founded on the customs of their own country, were convinced of the necessity of landowners,[3] and of the wisdom of Cornwallis's policy. Charmed with the system introduced into Bengal, the authorities sent out urgent orders for its extension to Madras. If zemindars could not be found, zemindars, they insisted, should be created, and a responsible landowner should be provided for every acre of soil.[4] And this policy, thus urgently recommended, might have been universally adopted, if Wellesley, in the course of his career of ambition, had not conquered Mysore. It was not possible, in the ceded territory, to place all the land in the hands of the zemindars, without ascertaining whether zemindars were

Munro founds the ryotwaree system.

[1] The talookdar is the holder of a village or a dependency—a talook. *Wilson*, vol. i. p. 437, *note*.

[2] *Marshman*, vol. ii. pp. 32, 262; *Thornton*, vol. ii. p. 522 *seq.*; cf. Mill's *Political Economy*, Book ii. ch. ix. sec. 4.

[3] Pitt 'shut himself up' ten days with Dundas at Wimbledon to consider Cornwallis's proposal, which he ultimately approved. *Cornwallis*, vol. ii. p. 215.

[4] *Wilson*, vol. i. p. 442.

in existence, and what sums they could properly pay. Some officers, among whom was a young lieutenant, Munro, were instructed to make a survey of the province for the purpose. Munro satisfied himself that the ryots in many cases enjoyed proprietary rights which it would be unjust to destroy; and Lord W. Bentinck, the Governor of Madras, agreeing with Munro, urged the authorities to conclude a settlement direct with the ryots, or, as it was called in India, a ryotwar settlement, and not to extend the zemindar system which Cornwallis had applied to Bengal.[1]

In England most administrators were opposed to Munro's doctrine. They doubted the possibility, or at any rate the economy, of making minute arrangements with millions of cultivators, and they concluded that it was necessary to place some middle-man between the Government and the ryot. But, though Munro's proposals did not find acceptance in London, his inquiries led to the reconsideration of Cornwallis's policy. It was seen that, both in justice to the ryots and in the interest of the Company, a mistake had been made in giving permanence to the zemindar settlement; and, instead of insisting on its extension to every part of India, the authorities consequently forbade its further application in perpetuity to any district.[2]

Cornwallis's judicial reforms.

Thus the chief reform for which the Indian administration of Cornwallis is recollected hardly retained its popularity for twenty years. His second great reform was in some respects more fortunate. When he reached India, he found it without any adequate judicial machinery, and with a criminal code revolting from its brutality. He set himself to provide competent civil courts, and to divest the criminal law of its most ob-

[1] *Wilson*, vol. i. p. 445 *et seq.*

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 410, 448. The whole chapter in Wilson is well worth studying, both by students of Indian history and by those who may wish to draw a parallel between the land customs of Ireland and India. Cf. *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 260.

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jectionable features. The first object he tried to accomplish by removing judicial duties from the revenue officers who had previously discharged them; the second object he endeavoured to effect by substituting imprisonment for mutilation as the punishment of crime.[1] It is, however, no easy matter to provide an adequate judicial staff for millions of people, and Cornwallis's reforms broke down from the inefficiency of his machinery. The new courts proved unable to get through the business which was at once attracted to them, and in consequence justice was denied from the sheer inability of the judges to find time to administer it.[2]

The Civil Service of India.

In one other respect, Cornwallis endeavoured to improve the administrative machinery of the Company. Though he refused to use the cheap and abundant labour of the native races, he did his best to reform the conduct of the English officials. Up to the time of his rule, the Indian civil servant had been paid a low salary, and had been left to accumulate a fortune

[1] It is horrible to reflect that 'for twenty-five years after the establishment of the Company's authority in Bengal, the barbarous practice which had previously prevailed of punishing prisoners by mutilation was perpetuated in the courts over which European and Christian gentlemen presided, and it was distinctly authorised by the Regulations of 1787. It was not till 1791 that Lord Cornwallis suppressed this revolting custom, and enacted that the offender should be subjected to fourteen years' imprisonment where he had formerly been deprived of two limbs, and to seven years with hard labour where the loss of a single limb had been usually inflicted.' *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 98.

[2] Under the old system, which Cornwallis superseded, the collector in each collectorate presided over the civil court, while a native magistrate, in the presence of the collector, presided over the criminal court. Cornwallis thought it objectionable for a revenue officer to be concerned with the administration of justice, and established a graduated civil jurisdiction. In the lowest courts native judges had jurisdiction up to fifty rupees; above these were the Zillah courts, in which a European presided, assisted by a European registrar, and by a Hindoo and Mahomedan assessor, with power to try all civil causes of a local nature; from these an appeal lay to the Provincial courts, in which three covenanted civil servants sat, with a further appeal to the Sudder court in Calcutta, and, in cases where more than 50,000 rupees were involved, to the Sovereign in Council. *Cornwallis Memoirs*, vol. ii. pp. 201, 202; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 36.

by rapacity. Cornwallis saw that no reform was possible so long as the officers of the Company were encouraged or permitted to supplement their regular emoluments by unauthorised accumulations. He insisted on revising the salaries of officials. He was resisted by the nabobs who had extorted fortunes from the natives, and by the Company which had not the wisdom to see that servants engaged in trade were more likely to study their own profits than their masters' interests.[1] His success prepared the way for most of the other reforms which have been accomplished in India. The Company's servants, adequately paid and excluded from commercial pursuits, addressed themselves to the business of government; and its officers, from being identified with rapine, became the patterns of administrators. But it must not be supposed that the beneficial reforms which Cornwallis thus instituted were easily completed. Abuses have always died a lingering death, and the statement is as true in India as in the rest of the world. The Director of the Company still regarded his patronage as the most valuable incident of his position. His pay was 300*l.* a year, but he could realise 25,000*l.* annually by the sale of appointments.[2] The law, indeed, compelled each member of the Court to swear that he would neither directly nor indirectly accept any pecuniary consideration whatever on account of the appointment of any person to any place in the service of the Company.[3] Oaths of this kind do not seem to trouble the easy consciences of those who take them. The history of purchase in the army is the record of the manner in which an oath may be systematically evaded, and it was perhaps too much to expect that oaths which were disregarded as a matter of course by every military man, should have been

The sale of offices.

[1] *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 7.
[2] The statement is Marshman's, vol. ii. p. 367.
[3] 33 Geo. III. c. 52, sec. 160.

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scrupulously observed by the Directors of the Company. Appointments were notoriously sold, and cadetships and writerships had a regular price.[1] 'The command of the Company's vessels was always reckoned worth' 10,000*l.* 'a voyage. . . . The China trade, of which the Company still enjoyed a monopoly, was managed by officers denominated supercargoes, who lived like princes in Canton, and amassed ambitious fortunes in a few years.'[2]

The institution of a police force.

A less satisfactory result ensued from another reform which Cornwallis initiated. For the purposes of extorting his share of the produce, the zemindar had been compelled to maintain a police. The change in his position led to the dismissal of this force, the only body of men capable of preserving order. Cornwallis endeavoured to supply the want by appointing a police superintendent—a *daroga*, to use his Indian title—in every district. But no means were available for the payment or employment of an adequate body of men. The darogas, entrusted with districts which were too large for any one man to superintend, inadequately paid, and placed under no proper control, became the tyrants of Indian life; and, instead of busying themselves with repressing crime, wrung a provision for themselves from the people.[3]

Thus, at the close of the eighteenth century, society in India wore a lamentable aspect. The ryot, the hereditary tiller of the soil, lay at the mercy of the zemindar. The new law courts were hopelessly hampered by the business thrown upon them. The suitors in civil causes were unable to secure a hearing. The prisoners in criminal suits were rotting in prison, and there was no one to try them. The new police, instead of being the

[1] The price of a writership was about 3,500*l.*, that of a cadetship varied from 150*l.* to 500*l.* *Wilson*, vol. i. p. 496 *note*.

[2] *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 366.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 270.

saviours, were the oppressors of society. In such circumstances crime rapidly extended; men, who pursued their ordinary avocations in the daytime, formed themselves into bands of robbers, or dacoits, who in the middle of the night attacked and plundered houses, forcing their inmates to reveal and surrender their property. The dacoits became the terror of Bengal, and all improvement seemed impossible so long as they were allowed to continue their outrages.[1]

Dacoits.

Minto had the merit of suppressing to a great extent the evils of dacoitee. He appointed special magistrates for the purpose, and the vigour with which these men acted, though it added a new terror to Indian life, limited the prevalence of wrongdoing.[2] But Minto, like Cornwallis before him, imperfectly appreciated one condition of the problem. He did not observe that most of his predecessor's failures were due to his reluctance to employ native agents. It was his attempt to govern India on English ideas, and with English machinery, that subjected his best devised schemes to disaster. In the first place the machinery at the disposal of the Government was inadequate for the task, and in the next place the most intelligent and the best disposed natives were deprived of all hope of a suitable career. This consideration, indeed, brought no disquietude to men who regarded India as a possession held for the good of England, and who were not disturbed by so minor a consideration as the views of its inhabitants. The good of England required that the Indian people should be governed by English officers on English principles, and the people themselves had no more right to object to their decisions than the elephants or the tigers who ranged in the jungle.

Thus, up to the period at which this History opens,

[1] For dacoitee, see *Wilson*, vol. i. p. 398; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 270.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 272; and cf. *Wilson*, vol. i. p. 403.

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some few and imperfect reforms had been introduced into Indian administration, while three Governors-General—Cornwallis, Wellesley, and Minto—had identified themselves with three different systems of policy. The success which Minto had achieved, and the moderation which he had displayed, ought to have won for him consideration. But the necessities of politicians at home give them little disposition to attend to the claims of statesmen abroad. In the political negotiations which followed the death of Perceval, Lord Moira bore a distinguished part. Moira was one of those fortunate individuals who concentrate in their own person more than an ordinary share of the titles which the Crown bestows on its favourites. He inherited from his father the earldom of Moira; he inherited from his mother the ancient barony of Hastings; he married Lady Loudoun, one of the few ladies who enjoyed the distinction of a peerage. He was summoned to the House of Lords during his parents' lifetime as Baron Rawdon. Much, however, as Moira owed to the accidents of birth and marriage, he was indebted still more to the favour of the Regent. Basking in the sunshine of Court, and breathing the vicious atmosphere of Carlton House, he was at once one of the most trusted as well as one of the most respectable of the Regent's friends. The Regent and his brother thought him adapted for every emergency. He was the Duke of York's second in his duel with Colonel Lennox; he conducted the negotiation for the education of Princess Charlotte;[1] he was authorised in 1812 to form a ministry;[2] he was made Governor-General of India in 1813. The public transactions of his Indian administration have been related by a dull though competent writer. A summary of his administration

Lord Moira made Governor-General.

[1] Twiss's *Life of Eldon*, vol. i. p. 461.

[2] Yonge's *Liverpool*, vol. i. p. 394.

from his own pen was published soon after the termination of his rule. His private diary, containing little of public interest, was edited by his daughter, Lady Bute; and the reverence with which his family regarded him received an amusing illustration in the preface which she prefixed to it. Wherever Lady Bute thinks it necessary to speak of her father's government, his office, or the principles that guided him, she commences the pronoun with the capital H, which a few authors employ when they are referring either to their Sovereign or their God, but which ordinary writers reserve for their God alone.

Moira, on his arrival in India, found that the Company's dominions were threatened by a double danger. The operations of Wellesley had left Central India, between the Company's territories in Hindostan and the Nizam's protected territory, at the mercy of freebooters; while in Northern India the Ghoorkas[1] had founded an empire on the slopes of the Himalayas. The Ghoorkas had acquired their power by much the same expedients as those which the British had used in Hindostan and the Deccan. They had availed themselves of the dissensions of the weak tribes who occupied Nepaul and the adjoining districts to conquer a territory which extended for 700 miles from the banks of the Sutlej to the banks of the Teesta.[2] Formidable from their martial proclivities, they were still more formidable from the character of the country. On the north of Nepaul the Himalayas raise their snowy peaks to the highest elevation at which land is anywhere found on the surface of the world. The southern slopes of these mountains are fringed by a vast and almost impregnable forest.

The Ghoorkas.

[1] The word Ghoorka literally means goatherd. The Ghoorkas, when their chief seized Nepaul, gave the name to its inhabitants. *Wilson*, vol. ii. pp. 5 and 6 *note*.

[2] Prinsep's *Transactions*, vol. i. p. 55; cf. *Wilson*, vol. ii. p. 4. The Teesta waters the small principality of Sikkim, between Nepaul and Bhotan.

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A plain which is a jungle and a pasture-ground known as the Terai extends southwards from this forest, abundantly watered by the streams which roll their tributary waters through British territory to the Ganges.

The Terai is the pasture-ground of the Ghoorkas. Every spring they drive their flocks into the plains from the hills, returning to the high mountain land when the summer heats make the plains unhealthy. As the pasturage marched on British territory, and as each side of the border line was equally suitable for their flocks, they frequently trespassed on the Company's dominions. The zemindars who were the subjects of the Company found themselves unable to resist these encroachments; they appealed continually to Calcutta. The authorities of Bengal, however, usually shut their ears to complaints which could not be removed without risking a difficult war, and the Ghoorkas continued to pillage the British territory without encountering any formidable opposition.[1]

A border dispute of this character is the almost universal heritage of a country with a large extent of wild frontier. The dispute with Nepaul was rendered more acute by the additions which Wellesley made to the Company's dominions in 1801. Annexing half Oudh, he obtained possession of Goruckpore. The man who buys a lawsuit is not usually regarded as the wisest of landowners, but the Governor-General who acquires a war is apparently judged from a different standpoint. There is no question that, in obtaining Goruckpore, Wellesley made war with Nepaul ultimately certain. The territory which he had acquired nominally included the district of Bootwul, which had been overrun, however, and practically conquered a few years before by the Ghoorkas. The British thus succeeded to the *de jure* rights of the Oudh emperor; the

[1] See Prinsep's *Transactions*, vol. i. p. 54 *sq.*

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Ghoorkas could allege the *de facto* rights which had their origin in their swords.

In the short government of Sir G. Barlow an effort was made to compromise the quarrel. The Governor-General offered to cede the adjoining district of Sheoraj, to which the title was also in dispute, as a consideration for the evacuation of Bootwul. The Ghoorkas refused this offer; the Governor-General's attention was directed to other matters; and for half a dozen years nothing further was done in the matter. In 1811 fresh disturbances, in which blood was shed, occurred on the frontier. Minto never acted hastily, and he sent an officer from Lucknow with instructions to arrange the dispute. Major Bradshaw, the commissioner who was chosen for the purpose, ascertained that Sheoraj had been seized by the Ghoorkas sixteen years before Goruckpore had become British territory.[1] His report would have justified Minto in renewing Barlow's proposal. Notwithstanding the report, however, Minto, instead of offering to exchange Sheoraj and Bootwul, insisted on the cession of both districts. The Ghoorkas naturally refused terms which were far more unfavourable than those on which Barlow had previously offered to compromise the dispute. Moira, succeeding Minto at the moment of the refusal, turned his predecessor's demand into an ultimatum The Ghoorkas met, and resolved to maintain their position by force;[2] the British seized the disputed territory; the Ghoorkas attacked the British stations, and in October 1814 the Nepaulese war began.[3]

The Nepaulese war.

The war which was thus undertaken did not prove the bloodless parade which perhaps some of its origi-

[1] Prinsep's *Transactions*, vol. i. p. 73.

[2] *Ibid.*, Appendix, vol. i. p. 457, where the written opinions of the Ghoorka chiefs on the subject of peace and war are given.

[3] In this account of the origin of the war, the narrative has been purposely confined to the chief dispute, For this and the simultaneous complications on the Sarun frontier, see *Prinsep*, vol. i. pp. 54–80; and cf. *Thornton*, vol. iv. pp. 251 270; *Wilson*, vol. ii. pp. 4 20.

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nators contemplated. For its conduct as well as its inception, Moira was responsible. He had persuaded the Government at home to entrust him with the command-in-chief in India as well as with the Governor-Generalship. He determined to throw four armies on Nepaul; one, under General Marley, was instructed to march upon Katmandoo, the capital; another, under General Wood, was ordered to clear the Terai; a third, under Colonel Ochterlony, was directed to enter Nepaul on the extreme north-west; while a fourth, under General Gillespie, was told to enter Nepaul on the west, near the head waters of the Jumna and the Ganges. Gillespie's division was the first engaged, and suffered a rare disaster. The Ghoorkas, he found, had occupied a small fortress, called Kalunga, a short distance from the frontier. On the 31st of October Gillespie determined to carry this fort by assault. The men, received with an unexpectedly heavy fire, wavered. Gillespie placed himself at their head, and was shot dead as he was urging them forward.[1] His death discouraged the troops, who hastily retired; and Colonel Mawbey, who succeeded to the command, declined to renew the attack till he was reinforced by heavy artillery from Delhi. A whole month was thus lost; and unfortunately the second attack proved in the first instance no more successful than the first. The battery which arrived from Delhi brought down a part of the wall, but the breach proved impracticable, and the men were again repulsed with loss. Then, and then only, the place was shelled; a searching shell fire made it untenable, and it was evacuated. But the paltry fortress had delayed an army for more than a month, and the losses of the troops exceeded the numerical strength of the enemy's garrison.

The repulse at Kalunga,

[1] *Prinsep*, vol. i. p. 89. Cf. for the narrative in the text, *Thornton*, vol. iv. 271; *Wilson*, vol. ii. p. 24; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 292. For Lord Moira's private reflections on this event, see his *Diary*, vol. i. p. 222.

This unfortunate commencement of a little war convinced the Governor-General that more vigorous measures than he had hitherto contemplated were necessary to ensure success. Mawbey's division was reinforced, its command was entrusted to General Martindell, and it was moved on Jyetuck, a mountain fortress. At Jyetuck, however, the division experienced a similar disaster to that which it had already encountered at Kalunga. Attempting to carry the place by assault, it was driven back by the enemy's fire, and its retreat was soon converted into flight.[1]

and at Jyetuck.

Unfortunately, moreover, the failure which had been experienced by this division was accompanied by other reverses. Wood, in December, entering the Terai, found himself in front of a stockade held by a party of the enemy. He was repulsed with loss in an effort to take it, and remained for the next three months unable, or fancying that he was unable, to move.[2] Shortly after Wood's disaster the outposts of Marley's army were attacked by the Ghoorkas, and defeated, with a serious loss of men, stores, and guns; and Marley, like Wood, felt himself forced by the defeat to suspend offensive operations. He was superseded, and General George Wood was appointed to the command of the division. Marley had been made inactive by a repulse; George Wood thought it necessary to remain inactive on account of the weather, and the early months of 1815 wore away without any attempt to repair the disasters of 1814.

Other reverses.

These events made a profound impression throughout India. The English had chosen their own ground, they had made their own arrangements, and they had been worsted all along the line. Native princes, jealous

[1] *Prinsep*, vol. i. pp. 97–104.

[2] Wood, according to Prinsep, would have had no difficulty in carrying the stockade if he had boldly continued the attack which his subordinates had begun; vol. i. p. 116.

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of their power, hoped that the sun of the Company was setting in the horizon, and that the time was coming for driving the British out of India. One of the ablest of the younger servants of the Company shared these views, and thought that the 'beginning of the end had arrived,' and that 'the Indian Empire would soon be shaken to the base.'[1] Moira himself was dismayed by the news of disaster after disaster. The war was his war, undertaken on his own responsibility, against the advice of his ordinary counsellors. The success would have been his success; the failure was his failure; and, when three out of four British armies were foiled by mere handfuls of mountaineers, the failure seemed very great, the responsibility very grave.

Retrieved by Ochterlony.

Happily for Britain and for Moira, Ochterlony, on the extreme north-west, had avoided the errors of his brother commanders. He disapproved the war, he disapproved still more strongly the instructions which he received from Moira to stir up insurrection against the Ghoorka Government,[2] but his opinions as a statesman did not prevent his doing his duty as a soldier. He moved with caution; he made roads through the Terai as he advanced; he carried the fort of Nalagurh, where the Ghoorkas had established an outpost, in the autumn; he turned and stormed the position of Ramgurh in February; he fought a successful action with the enemy at Deothul in April; and forced Ummer Sing, the Ghoorka chieftain, to capitulate in May.[3]

These successes partly retrieved the disasters which had been sustained by the other armies, and they were the more significant because an irregular force of Rohillas, under the command of Colonel Gardner, subsequently reinforced by a regular contingent under Colonel Nicolls, concurrently obtained great advantages

[1] Kaye's *Metcalfe*, vol. i. p. 282.
[2] *Ibid., note.*
[3] *Prinsep*, vol. i. pp. 105, 113, 163, 171.

in Kumaon.[1] Gardner and Nicolls forced the Ghoorkas to cede the province. Ochterlony's operations compelled them to surrender the whole of their territory to the west of it, and these concessions naturally induced them to desire a termination of the war.

The nation, however, which once appeals to arms cannot always lay them down on conditions which it is willing to accept. The Ghoorkas, in the hour of their defeat, found to their dismay that the British not only required them to cede the country which had been conquered from them, but the whole of the Terai which British armies had failed to penetrate. Months passed before they consented to agree to conditions which drove them from the pasture lands on which their existence almost depended. At last a treaty containing the humiliating terms was signed at Segoulee. But after its signature the war party at the Ghoorka Court again obtained the upper hand, and refused to ratify it. Moira at once gave orders for the renewal of the war. In February 1816 Ochterlony defeated the enemy at Mukwanpore; almost at the same time Colonel Kelly won a second victory at Hurrehurpore; and the Ghoorka chieftain, alarmed at these disasters, and perceiving that further resistance was hopeless, agreed to the terms of the treaty.[2]

Throughout these transactions Moira gained little credit. His critics thought that he had displayed a reckless anxiety to embark on the war, and a nervous desire to conclude peace when difficulties arose.[3] Yet,

[1] *Prinsep*, vol. i. pp. 143–157.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. i. pp. 188 206, 473. I have followed Prinsep throughout the narrative. But his account may be usefully compared with *Thornton*, vol. iv. pp. 271–345; *Wilson*, vol. ii. pp. 1–83; *Marshman*, vol. ii. pp. 286–300. The frontier was subsequently modified with Moira's consent, and so much of the Terai, as was not required to make the frontier line even, was surrendered to the Ghoorkas. *Prinsep*, vol. i. p. 206.

[3] After the signature of the treaty, Moira actually desired to cede to the Nepaulese some of the surrendered lands on account of which the war had been continued. See *Thornton*, vol. iv. p. 337. It is a striking proof

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if the war could be justified at all, there was no reason for dissatisfaction with the results which had been secured by it. An irritating dispute had been terminated, the quiet of the frontier had been secured, the Ghoorkas had received a lesson which ensured their future submission. In addition to these great advantages the Government of India had obtained a station in the hills, where it was ultimately to find a healthy retreat from the pestilential summer heats of Calcutta; while the thick jungles of the Terai—which had baffled the columns of the British army—were to become the favourite hunting-grounds of British sportsmen. These various results had, moreover, been achieved at a trifling expense. In the beginning of the war Moira succeeded in obtaining, in two sums, a loan of 2,000,000*l.* from the Nawab of Oudh. At the end of the war, the Nawab was induced to accept a portion of the land conquered from the Ghoorkas as a full discharge for one half the money which he had thus advanced. This arrangement enabled Moira to declare that the war which he had successfully waged had not cost the Company a shilling.[1] Statesmen of ambition who enter the service of companies of merchants are perhaps wise in satisfying their employers that the wars on which they embark involve no expense. Moira had good reason for doing so. Before he had concluded the Nepaul campaign he was already meditating fresh

of Moira's self-sufficiency, that on the 1st Feb. 1814—a little more than four months after he had arrived in Calcutta—he declared that he had 'amicably settled' the dispute with Nepaul; and that, in June, when he thought war inevitable, he wrote, 'When the cold season arrives, the Nepaulese will be brought to account.' *Diary*, vol. i. pp. 44, 72. In the *Summary* Lord Hastings glibly passes over the disasters of the war in a single sentence: 'Particular details of the war in Nepaul would be superfluous.' See the reprint in the *Pamphleteer*, vol. xxiv. p. 293.

[1] *Prinsep*, vol. i. pp. 225-228; *Private Journal*, vol. ii. p. 121; cf. *Wilson*, vol. ii. pp. 111-118; and Lord Hastings' own account in *Pamphleteer*, vol. xxiv. p. 293; *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 64.

wars and fresh conquests, which were destined almost to double the territory and the responsibilities of the British in India.

When Moira reached India, the Company occupied in Hindostan the whole basin of the Ganges from the head waters of the Jumna to Chittagong, except the principality of Oudh; it occupied in the Deccan the whole coast of Southern India from Goa to the Kistna, except the principalities of Mysore and Travancore. In addition to these great possessions, it held the whole coast of Eastern India; while the Nizam at Hyderabad, the nominal ruler of a vast territory, was in strict dependence on the British. But in Central India the country which Wellesley had left under the sway of the Mahrattas was governed by a great many semi-independent Powers. The Raja of Sattara was still overshadowed by the Peishwa whom the treaty of Bassein had restored to Poona; the Guicwar of Baroda was still the ruler of Gujerat; the Raja of Berar was still seated at Ghazpore; while Scindia in Gwalior and Holkar in Malwa were still independent and powerful sovereigns. In addition to these, other smaller states at Bhurtpore, Jyepore, Bhopal, and elsewhere occupied tracts of Central India. War, indeed, had reduced the actual strength of Scindia, Holkar, and the other Mahratta princes, but it had left a new chain of difficulties behind it. The irregular cavalry, which these princes had employed, released from their allegiance, retained their organisation. Living on plunder, these men—Pindarees and Patans as they were called—swept over the plains of Central India, wasted the territories of Native princes, and insulted the Company's dominions. The petty states were too weak to stop their inroads; the larger states tolerated their encroachments because they regarded them as possible auxiliaries in time of need. The servants of the Company declared that neither peace

Central India.

The Patans and Pindarees.

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nor prosperity could exist so long as these outrages were suffered to continue.

Yet even Moira, or Hastings as he had now become, for a Marquis's coronet had rewarded the conqueror of the Terai, hesitated to draw the sword. Both in London and in Calcutta his employers and his counsellors favoured a policy of peace, and war might not have occurred if, in the course of a tour up the Ganges, the Governor-General had not been thrown into contact with a young man who, a few years before, had been appointed Resident at Delhi, and who was already exercising a great influence on Indian affairs. Charles Metcalfe, the son of one of the Company's Directors, was removed from Eton, before his education was complete, to make his fortune in a writership. He reached India on the first day of the nineteenth century, before he had completed his sixteenth year; he remained in India for thirty-seven years. His character was thus formed and the best years of his mature life were passed in an Indian atmosphere, and he naturally regarded Indian politics from what an English statesman would be inclined to call an Indian standpoint.

Charles Metcalfe.

A lad of sixteen would probably under any circumstances have admired the policy which was fashionable in India when Metcalfe reached it. The Governor-General was conquering kingdoms and dictating terms to emperors. But Metcalfe had additional reasons for being fascinated by Wellesley's system. He received personal kindness from the Governor-General, and his first distinction was due to opportunities which Wellesley created for him. It was natural for him to count himself among Wellesley's admirers, and to disapprove the languid policy of Wellesley's successors. He saw in Hastings a statesman cast in a different mould from that of Cornwallis and Minto. Hastings listened with evident approval to the bold advice of the

Delhi Resident, and Metcalfe, thus encouraged, embodied in an important paper a system of policy for Central India. CHAP XXV. 1817.

Metcalfe knew that neither order nor improvement was possible so long as Pindarees and Patans were at liberty to swoop down at their will on defenceless populations. He saw that these bands of plunderers would be powerless if they were deprived of the active support or passive connivance of the larger Mahratta Powers, and he consequently concluded that the true way of restoring order was to annihilate the great military States of Central India.[1] Even Wellesley had never conceived a more imperial policy. If, indeed, Scindia, Holkar, and Berar would boldly range themselves on the side of the Company, and use all their strength in aiding it to crush the Pindarees, Metcalfe thought that they might still be left a little longer in their independence. If they were either hostile or neutral in the contest which Metcalfe desired, they should be treated like the barren figtree, and cut down as mere cumberers of the ground. His policy.

Such was the policy which Metcalfe openly advocated and which Hastings secretly approved. A Governor-General of India exercises, even now, a power which is enjoyed by few men. In the earlier years of the nineteenth century, he was free from the curbing influence which the telegraph has since supplied. Yet even Hastings found himself powerless to carry out the policy which Metcalfe had persuaded him to adopt. Two members of his Council declined to embark on a new war. The Company sent out 'positive instructions against interference,' the Board of Control supported the Company, and Canning, who rejoined the ministry in 1816, and acceded to that War forbidden from England.

[1] Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, vol. i. p. 313 *et seq.*

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office, refused 'to incur the risk of a general war for the uncertain purpose of extirpating the Pindarees.'[1]

Hastings did not venture on acting in opposition to the orders which he received from home and the decision of his own Council. But the increasing boldness of the Pindarees at length modified the views of his employers. Early in 1816, a band of these bold plunderers, under their chief leader, Cheetoo, crossed the Nerbudda, swept through the Nizam's territories, carried blood and fire into the Company's dominions on the Coromandel Coast, and brought away booty which was estimated to be worth 100,000*l.*[2] A few days after he had enjoined a policy of peace, Canning received an account of the particulars of this raid. Anxious as he was to prevent war, he could not take upon himself the responsibility of forbidding the punishment of marauders. He sent a supplementary despatch to Hastings, authorising him to take measures for the protection of British territory. He even sanctioned, in certain contingencies, hostilities with Scindia and Holkar, if these Powers, openly or secretly, supported the Pindarees.[3]

The Pindarees' raid of 1816.

Canning's despatch removed the prohibition which had hitherto restrained the Governor-General. He commenced the war. But war with the Pindarees alone was only one part of the policy which Metcalfe had framed and which Hastings had approved. It had been the essence of Metcalfe's proposal that the Company should be the centre of a defensive league, and that any State which was not a member of the league should be regarded as an enemy. An opportunity occurred in 1816—before Canning's despatch arrived—for giving part effect to this policy. Raghojee Bhonsla, the Raja of Berar, died,

The third Mahratta war

[1] *Metcalfe*, vol. i. p. 325; and *Wilson*, vol. ii. p. 203.

[2] See the account of the raid in Hastings' *Private Journal*, vol. ii. p. 113; and cf. *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 312; *Prinsep*, vol. i. pp. 328–334.

[3] *Wilson*, vol. ii. p. 205; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 318.

and was succeeded by a son, Persajee Bhonsla, who was both physically and mentally weak. The real power of the State fell into the hands of Raghojee's nephew, Appa Sahib, and the latter thought an alliance with the Company the best means of securing his own position. Hastings readily made an arrangement with a chieftain who commanded the fords of the Nerbudda, and imagined that the treaty which he thus signed would clip the wings of the Pindaree horse.[1] An arrangement was at the same time made with the Raja of Bhopal, whose territory abutted on the right bank of the Nerbudda, while Scindia, in strict accordance with Metcalfe's policy, was required to join the league.[2]

Thus, almost in defiance of the orders of authority at home, or at any rate without its express sanction, the great Mahratta Powers of Central India had, in accordance with Metcalfe's proposal, been ranged in a defensive alliance under the guidance of the Governor-General.[3] Hastings' admirers have usually regarded the league which was thus formed as the crowning achievement of his career. Yet the league, such as it was, hardly survived the interval of preparation for the war. In October 1817 Hastings was ready to take the field, and he then found that he had to count with his allies as open enemies. Appa Sahib, murdering his weak nephew, Persajee, threw himself into the cause of the Pindarees, and attacked the British Resident at his Court, and the small force at the Resident's disposal.[4] Scindia was detected in carrying on a secret correspondence with Nepaul, in which he urged the Ghoorkas to seize the opportunity of rising against the British,[5] and nothing

[1] *Wilson*, vol. ii. p. 167; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 314.

[2] *Wilson*, vol. ii. p. 208; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 307.

[3] *Wilson*, vol. ii. p. 209; cf. Hastings' *Private Journal*, vol. ii. p. 162; *Thornton*, vol. iv. p. 380.

[4] *Marshman*, vol. ii. p 397.

[5] Hastings' *Private Journal*, vol. ii. p. 216.

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but the rapid success of the British arms prevented the Pindaree war from becoming a universal Mahratta rising.

And at one moment the rising seemed likely to try the capacity of the British to the uttermost. The Mahrattas still recognised that they owed a shadowy allegiance to the Raja of Sattara. But in the time of Hastings, as in the time of Wellesley, the power of the Sattara Raja was overshadowed by the authority of the Peishwa whom British bayonets had restored to Poona. Bajee Rao, the Peishwa, was one of those weak, cunning, cruel men of whom Indian history furnishes so many examples. He was under the influence of Trimbuk or Trimbukjee, a servant who had ministered to his pleasures and who enjoyed his confidence. The Peishwa had inherited a dispute with the Guicwar of Baroda. The Guicwar sent an agent to Poona to arrange its settlement, and the agent, before he set out on his mission, required and received a guarantee from the British of his personal safety. But the assassin's knife has no respect for guarantees. The envoy was murdered, and the British Government, which had guaranteed his safety, and which traced his death to Trimbukjee's influence, demanded the minister's arrest.

The war with the Peishwa.

Bajee Rao was forced to comply with the British demand, and Trimbukjee was confined in a fort near Bombay and guarded by Europeans. He had the dexterity, however, to effect his escape and to maintain himself in concealment near his master. His influence was thenceforward naturally directed against the Power which had demanded his imprisonment; he busied himself to effect a confederacy of the Mahratta states, and he surrounded himself in the meanwhile with a body of insurgents who were nominally in arms against the Peishwa, but who were suspected of leaning in the Peishwa's interests against British influence. The insur-

rection was quelled by a mixed British and Native force in April 1817; and the Resident at Poona, holding the Peishwa responsible for the revolt, insisted that its suppression should be followed by a surrender of fortresses and a revision of the treaty of Bassein. The Peishwa was required to recognise the dissolution of the Mahratta Confederacy; to renounce, in return for a fixed payment, all claims on the Guicwar of Baroda; to cede to the Company territory sufficient for the maintenance of the subsidiary force which the treaty of Bassein had stipulated should be provided at the Peishwa's cost; to cede in addition other territories both in the Deccan and in Hindostan, and to pledge himself to hold no communication with foreign Powers except through the British Resident.[1]

These terms virtually reduced the Peishwa to dependence on the Company. As such they were only accepted on compulsion; and, on the earliest opportunity, the Peishwa ventured on again risking an appeal to arms. Towards the end of October 1817, the threatening aspect of Bajee Rao's battalions forced the Resident to leave the Residency, and to retire to a small fort in a village named Kirkee, in its immediate neighbourhood. His withdrawal led to the immediate plunder and burning of his house. But Bajee Rao's battalions, though they surged round the little company of British at Kirkee, did not venture on assailing the position. In the beginning of October, a large British force arriving at Poona, attacked and carried the Mahratta position. Poona itself was taken, and Bajee Rao forced to fly for his life from his capital.[2]

The battle which was thus fought destroyed the power of the Peishwa. But the Peishwa was not merely

[1] *Wilson*, vol. ii. pp. 212–226; cf. Malcolm, *Political History of India*, vol. i. p. 480.

[2] *Prinsep*, vol. ii. p. 47 *sq.* *Wilson*, vol. ii. pp. 234–243; *Thornton*, vol. iv. pp. 427–441.

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sovereign of Poona. He enjoyed the reputation which attached to him as the head of the Mahratta Powers. Defeat at Poona made itself felt in Berar. Throughout October, Appa Sahib had been collecting troops and preparing for hostilities. At the end of the month he ventured an attack on the British Residency. The small force at the Resident's disposal was withdrawn to Seetabuldee, a hill which overlooks Nagpore. On this position 1,400 of the Company's troops were exposed to the attack of 20,000 men. Never, perhaps, had British soldiers fought at such tremendous odds. But never did British courage and discipline achieve a more decisive victory. Appa Sahib, foiled in his purpose, was forced to negotiate. Nagpore itself was subsequently carried by the British army, and the Raja of Berar lay at the mercy of his conquerors.[1]

Appa Sahib defeated.

There was, however, one other Power which was still formidable. It has been already stated in this chapter that the Holkar who had inflicted defeat on Monson and who had braved the battalions of Lake had sunk into insanity and the grave from the intemperance in which he had indulged. The reins of government at his death fell into the hands of a woman who occupies in the life of Holkar the position which Bathsheba filled in the life of David.[2] This woman, Toolsye Bhye, was endowed by nature with both beauty and brains. As she had no child of her own, she adopted a son of Holkar's by another woman, and carried on the government in the name of this boy. She had no easy task to perform. On the one hand her people, recollecting the successes which they had achieved in 1804, were clamorous for war; on the other hand she had the wisdom to perceive that war with the Company

Toolsye Bhye.

[1] *Thornton*, vol. iv. pp. 467-480.

[2] To Holkar's credit, however, it ought to be added that his Uriah was only thrown into prison, and released on the entreaty of his Bathsheba.

must eventually end in the victory of the British. As her views inclined to peace, Malcolm, who was, at that time, in command of a division of the army operating against the Mahrattas, was instructed to conduct a negotiation with her. But the conference ended in one of those acts of violence which occur so frequently in the history of the East. The war party seized Toolsye Bhye and put her to death. Her murder was the almost immediate signal for hostilities. The British and Mahratta forces were encamped near Mahidpore on opposite banks of the river Seepra. On the 20th of December Sir Thomas Hislop, the British commander, crossed the river and inflicted a decisive defeat on the enemy. The power of Holkar was shattered by the battle; the Mahrattas were forced to sue for peace, and to consent to terms which placed them in strict dependence on the Company; while the British possessions were largely increased by the cession of Holkar's territory in the Deccan.[1]

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Toolsye Bhye murdered, and Holkar defeated.

Thus the policy which Metcalfe had advised had been adopted. The strength of Berar, of Poona, and Malwa had been shattered. The example which had been thus given was not lost on other states. Scindia, wavering between hope and fear, refrained from risking a fresh war with the Company, whose strength he had already tested, and whose sword evidently retained its old sharpness. Minor principalities hastily ranged themselves on the side of the British, and Hastings found himself free to deal with the Patans and Pindarees who still swarmed in Central India.

The task which remained for accomplishment was not difficult. The strength of the Pindarees was dependent on the support of Native states. From the Deccan and from Hindostan the British arms converged on all sides on these irregular troops. Battalion after battalion

The Pindarees broken up.

[1] *Thornton*, vol. iv. pp. 483–494.

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was broken up, put to flight or routed, and peace was restored to Central India.

The wars which were thus undertaken undoubtedly consolidated the power of the British in India. The Peishwa was ultimately deposed and made a pensioner on the Company, while his vast territory was annexed to the Company's dominions. Appa Sahib was thrust from the throne of Berar; half his principality was placed under the nominal sovereignty of a boy who was kept in strict dependence on a British Resident. Malwa in the same way was brought under practical subjection, and Scindia was left as the solitary independent Power of any strength in Central India. These vast changes could never have been effected if the progress of events had not assisted the Governor-General's policy. For sixty years everything had tended to ensure British supremacy in India, and Hastings drifted to conquest on a tide which greater forces than his own will had set in motion.

The results of the war.

Great, however, as were the changes which the campaigns of 1817 and 1818 effected, the third Mahratta war is rather associated with misfortune than with victory. While the armies which Hastings collected were preparing for hostilities, the cholera broke out among one of them which was encamped in Gwalior. The disease was no new scourge in India. Forty years before it had appeared in Madras, and it had subsequently reappeared at intervals in different parts of the Deccan. But in 1817 it burst forth among the soldiers with a virulence which had never previously been known, and since that time it has been permanently endemic in the valley of the Ganges. Hastings' army gradually escaped from its ravages by shifting its quarters, but the angel of death only left the army to strike down natives and Europeans in other parts of Hindostan and the Deccan. Nor was the mysterious

The cholera.

disorder confined to India. It crossed the Himalayas, and found in China a field fertile with victims; it crossed the Indus and desolated Persia; it was carried slowly by travellers to the Russian Empire; it was wafted rapidly on the wings of commerce to Western Europe; and it left memories behind it, which, after an interval of more than fifty years, are not obliterated.[1] Such was one of the indirect consequences of the third Mahratta war. The historian of the war cannot avoid the influence of a success which secured the supremacy of the British, and gave peace to the populations of Central India. The philanthropist cannot avoid the reflection that, in the wars of Hastings as in the wars of Wellesley, the sword of the British was on the side of the people and only turned against their governors. If it be possible to assume, with some Indian statesmen, that the true mission of the English in the East is to break the rod of oppression and to relieve the oppressed, and to believe that, for the sake of remedying the wrongs of millions, it is lawful to exterminate Governments; if, in short, a war of conquest may be justified on grounds of humanity, if evil may be done that good may ensue, then Wellesley does not require a defence and Hastings is in no need of an apology. No reasonable man can doubt that the regular rule which the Company gave to Central India was a welcome substitute for the irregular exactions of Patan and Pindaree, and the brutal outrages of Appa Sahib or Bajee Rao.

The policy of the war.

More difficulty will perhaps be experienced in defending the Governor-General than in approving his policy. However desirable the third Mahratta war may have been, no one can assert that Hastings was within his rights in undertaking it. He had received a reluctant permission to crush irregular bands of plunderers, and

The conduct of the Governor-General.

[1] For the outbreak in India, see Hastings' *Private Journal*, vol. ii. p. 238; cf. *Marshman*, vol. i. p. 375, and vol. ii. p. 330.

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he framed a system of alliances and embarked on a war of conquest which were opposed to the statutes of the British Parliament and to the instructions of his employers. A splendid disregard of orders has won for many a hero immortality. But the position of the statesman is not comparable with that of the commander, and it may be doubted whether any statesman can be justified in plunging into a war which is not merely unauthorised, but which is expressly forbidden. His success may condone his insubordination; it ought not to blind us to his fault.

It is remarkable, moreover, that the man who ventured to undertake a war of conquest on his own responsibility, and to reverse the policy of his immediate predecessors, had been previously distinguished for the strong language in which he had denounced the policy of Wellesley. The atmosphere of India changed his opinion, and converted him to a system which he had uniformly opposed in the House of Lords.[1] A change of this kind was no novel spectacle in history; the man who is weighted with the responsibilities of office frequently adopts a policy which is inconsistent with the views which he had previously formed in opposition; and the strongest statesmen have often pursued in power a course which it is difficult to reconcile with their previous doctrines. It would indeed be absurd to include Hastings in the limited category which includes the names of only the strongest statesmen. In many respects he was inferior to Minto who preceded him; in almost every respect he was inferior to Canning who nominally controlled his action. But, at the same time, he had a capacity for rule which is possessed by

Opposed to the opinions which he had expressed before reaching India.

[1] This is clearly shown in *Thornton*, vol. iv. p. 497 *note*. Speaking as Lord Rawdon in 1791, Hastings 'had denounced in the most unmeasured terms the establishment of a British government in India. "That government," his Lordship said, "was founded on injustice, and had originally been established by force."'

only few men. His inordinate vanity, which even his admirers admit, gave him a self-reliance which proved eminently useful to him in his Indian career. Persuaded of the soundness of his own judgment, he could not believe that any policy except that which he himself pursued was right; or that either his colleagues or his employers could, in the long run, resist his arguments.

Such was the man who completed the work of Wellesley, and proclaimed the supremacy of the British in India.[1] He remained in India from 1814 to 1823. He thus enjoyed the Governor-Generalship for an unusually long period. By one of those strange metamorphoses, which occasionally occur in public life, he descended, on leaving his higher office, into a lower field of action. The man who had been thought of for the post of First Minister, who had displayed in his government of India a splendour which none of his predecessors except Wellesley had shown, was selected to govern one of the smallest possessions which England has acquired, the island of Malta. In this tiny colony—where, like Napoleon at St. Helena, he must have frequently meditated on his exploits—he died from the effects of a fall; and, so little is Indian history read, that probably eleven people out of every twelve at any English dinner table would be unable to give an intelligible account of the career of the man who made England supreme in India, and would be astonished to learn that Lord Hastings added as large a territory to the Company's dominions as that over which Warren Hastings ruled.

His death in Malta.

On Hastings' retirement in 1823, the choice of the ministry fell upon Canning. It is not difficult to detect the causes which prompted the choice, or which induced Canning to accept the office. In 1823 a singular series of circumstances had apparently extinguished his poli-

Canning accepts the Governor-Generalship.

[1] Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. ii. p. 60.

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tical career. His refusal to take the second place in the ministry in 1809 cost him, in all probability, the first place in 1812. His refusal to persecute a queen for the sake of gratifying a king, cost him even his subordinate office in 1820. His chances of political success in England were apparently destroyed by the offence which he had given to a Sovereign who could occasionally forgive his own enemies, but who rarely tolerated his wife's friends. He turned, therefore, to India for the opening which he could not find at home. Fortunately for his country, the death of Castlereagh prepared the way for fresh combinations. The necessities of the Conservatives compelled the King to accept Canning as leader of the House of Commons. India thus lost the services of the most brilliant statesman who had ever been nominated to her government, and England retained a minister who was destined to work a revolution in foreign policy, and modify by so doing the course of European history.

Lord Amherst made Governor-General.

On Canning ultimately resigning the Governor-Generalship, the choice of the authorities fell upon Lord Amherst.[1] The new Governor-General reached India at a time when the authorities in London had a right to expect a long period of peace. In fact, both in Hindostan and in the Deccan, the victories of Hastings had left the Company no more enemies to conquer. Unfortunately, however, for the prospects of peace, nature, which had given India an impenetrable boundary on the north, had left her with an undefined and open

[1] Charles Wynn, the Duke of Buckingham, and Lord W. Bentinck all wanted the appointment, while the ministry thought of Melville and of Manners Sutton, the Speaker, for it. *Liverpool*, vol. iii. p. 203; *Greville*, vol. i. p. 59. Amherst's selection was thus due to a process of exhaustion. He had some years previously been sent on a special mission to China, which had proved abortive from his refusal to do obeisance to the Emperor; and he had been shipwrecked on his return home. Years afterwards he was selected for a special mission to Canada, on which, however, he did not proceed. See *ante*, vol. iii. p. 415.

frontier on the east. On the shores of the Bay of Bengal, opposite Calcutta, a struggle had raged during the eighteenth century between the inhabitants of Ava and Pegu. The former, known as Burmans or Burmese, had the good fortune to find a capable leader, who rapidly ensured their own victory and founded a Burmese Empire. The successful competitors were not satisfied with their own predominance in Pegu—they conquered Aracan, they overran Assam, and they wrested from Siam a considerable territory on the Tenasserim coast.[1]

The Burmese Empire.

The conquest of Aracan brought the Burmese to the confines of the Company's dominions in Chittagong. The conquered people, disliking the severe rule of the conquerors, crossed the frontier and settled in British territory. Many of them used their new home as a secure basis for hostile raids on the Burmese; and at last one of them actually crossed from Chittagong to Aracan and defeated the ruling race. His triumph was of short duration. After a few months he was driven from the scene of his conquests and compelled again to seek refuge in Chittagong. But, though defeated, he did not cease from using every opportunity to harass the Burmese. He conducted a series of raids into Burmese territory, and habitually used the dominions of the Company as the base for his predatory incursions.

The frontier raids and their consequences.

These events were occurring on the Burmese frontier at the time at which the depredations of the Ghoorkas on the north of Hindostan were producing the complications which resulted in the war with Nepaul. The case of the Burmese against the Company was similar to that of the Company against the Ghoorkas, and the barbaric monarch of Ava used language which a civilised ruler might have employed. He insisted on the Com-

[1] *Thornton*, vol. v. p. 1 *et seq.*

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pany's duty of maintaining the peace of its frontiers, and he asked for the extradition of those of his subjects who were using British territory as a base for their warfare. The first request the Company could not comply with; it had no forces at its disposal which could enforce order on a frontier line hundreds of miles long. The second it would not grant; it was not prepared to surrender persons who had sought refuge in its dominions from the merciless treatment of the King of Ava.

A dispute of this character tends naturally to grow. Semi-independent Burmese chiefs crossed the frontier, and carried the sword into British territory. The Burmese governor of Aracan, with or without the authority of his monarch, boldly asserted his right to the whole of Chittagong, and even demanded the cession of Eastern Bengal. At the time when this demand was made Hastings was occupied with the Pindaree war, and could not venture on embarking on a new campaign. He found it consequently convenient to treat the claim as a forgery.[1] But the barbaric people with whom he had to deal were naturally encouraged by this conduct. They saw that the outrages on their own territory were not stopped, and that their own raids on the Company's lands were not punished. They continued to meet raid with raid, and to heap disorder upon disorder.

The island in the Naf.

The river Naf ran for a portion of its course between the possessions of the British in Chittagong and those of the Burmese in Aracan. With the object of preventing the repetition of outrages, which had occurred on the river, a small British guard was stationed on a little island, called Shaporee, near its mouth. The Burmese, claiming the island as their own, attacked the guard and drove it from the post. It was impossible to ignore such a challenge. The island

[1] Summary in the *Pamphleteer*, vol. xxiv. p. 304.

was reoccupied; but the Governor-General, still anxious for peace, offered to treat its occupation by the Burmese as an action unauthorised by the Burmese Government. The Burmese Court, however, instead of accepting this offer, sent an army to reoccupy the island; collisions almost simultaneously occurred between the British and the Burmese on other parts of the frontier, and in February 1824 the first Burmese war began.[1]

War had long been inevitable. The Burmese, ignorant of the strength of the Power which they were attacking, were anxious for an opportunity of measuring their swords with the weapons of the Company; and the British could not tolerate the continuance of disorder on their frontiers, and were forced to fight. Yet, if the war of 1824 may be excused as inevitable, its conduct must be condemned as careless. No pains were taken to ascertain the nature of the country which it was requisite to invade, or the strength of the enemy whom it was decided to encounter. The experiences of the Nepaulese war might have taught the military advisers of the Governor-General that a rude race, acting in a difficult country, might inflict defeat on British troops. But the lesson was forgotten in 1824, or, at any rate, not applied.

The first Burmese war.

Burma is watered by two great rivers, the Irawaddy and the Salwen, both flowing in parallel courses from north to south, and both enclosed by mountain ranges which separate them one from the other and from the adjacent country. In its upper waters the Irawaddy is a rapid stream; in its lower waters it flows through alluvial plains, and finds its way through a delta with nine mouths into the Bay of Bengal. On one of its western mouths is the town of Bassein, on one of its eastern mouths the great commercial port of Rangoon. The

[1] *Wilson*, vol. iii. pp. 1-34; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 385; *Thornton*, vol. v. p. 6.

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banks of the river are clothed with jungle and with forest; and malaria, the curse of all low-lying tropical lands, always lingers in the marshes. The authorities decided on invading Burma through the Rangoon branch of the river. They gave Sir Archibald Campbell, an officer who had won distinction in the Peninsula, the command of the expedition, and, as a preliminary measure, they determined to seize Rangoon. Its capture was accomplished with ease, and the Burmese retired from the town. But the victory was the precursor of difficulty. The troops dared not advance in an unhealthy season; the supplies which they had brought with them proved insufficient for their support; and the men perished by scores during their period of forced inaction.

Rangoon is taken.

The summer of 1824 was not, indeed, entirely lost. In August a small expedition, sent from Rangoon to the Tenasserim Coast, seized the principal towns of that district, and laid the foundation of a new possession in the Malay peninsula. But victory in this distant region made little impression on the counsels of the barbaric Court of Ava, and any effect which it might have had was destroyed by the defeat of a small British force by a large Burmese army in Aracan. This disaster—which for the moment was believed to have opened the road to Calcutta—and the condition of the army at Rangoon, wasting away with dysentery and disease, almost justified the confidence with which the Burmese had provoked the war.

The Burmese war, however, was not the first—as it was not the last—occasion on which Englishmen plunged into hostilities without adequate preparation, and triumphed over fortune herself by steady perseverance. When more favourable weather returned with the autumn, Campbell was again able to advance. Burma was then attacked from three separate bases

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A force under Colonel Richards, moving along the valley of the Bramaputra, conquered Assam; an expedition under General Morrison, marching from Chittagong, occupied Aracan; while Campbell himself, dividing his army into two divisions, one moving by water, the other by land, passed up the Irawaddy and captured Donabue and Prome. The climate improved as the troops ascended the river, and the hot weather of 1825 proved less injurious than the summer of 1824. The Burmese, moreover, alarmed at the advance of the troops, and disconcerted at their own losses, made overtures for a reconciliation. They, indeed, imagined that the victors, as a preliminary step towards peace, would strip themselves of the advantages which they had gained; and, when they found that the British refused to withdraw from territory where their arms had once stood, they professed their astonishment and renewed the war. But the operations in 1825-6 drove home the lesson which the campaign of 1824-5 had already taught. The Burmese realised their impotence to resist, and consented to accept the terms which the British were still ready to offer them. Assam, Aracan, and the Tenasserim Coast were ceded to the Company; the King of Burma consented to receive a Resident at his capital, and to pay a very large sum of money—1,000,000*l.*—towards the expenses of the war.[1]

The war concluded.

The slow and doubtful success which had attended the British arms created unusual excitement throughout India. The natives imagined that the tide of conquest had at length reached its height, and that it was at last beginning to recede. The necessities of the campaign, moreover, compelled the authorities to reduce the garrisons of the newly acquired districts;

Disturbances in India.

[1] *Wilson*, vol. iii. pp. 35-161; *Thornton*, vol. v. pp. 1-103; *Marshman*, vol. ii. pp. 382-398. The first Burmese war had an interest of its own from the future eminence of some of the men engaged in it—*e.g.*, Pollock, Havelock, and Marryat, the novelist.

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and the Mahrattas and Pindarees, who had been crushed into subordination, thus found an opportunity for fresh disturbances. Local insurrections broke out in various places, and nothing but the gradual restoration of affairs in Burma prevented a general uprising. One little war, indeed, arose out of these troubles which deserves a passing notice from the historian. Ever since Lake's failure to reduce its fortress twenty years before,[1] the little State of Bhurtpore had been a rallying place for the disaffected, and its citadel had been at once the symbol and the hope of the native cause. The authorities at Calcutta, anxious to avoid or postpone a rupture, treated its Raja with a consideration which was not always shown to more submissive rulers; and Bhurtpore, in the opinion of native critics who had rejoiced in its victory, and of British officers who deplored its arrogance, reaped the reward of its own successes. So matters continued till 1824, when the Raja died. The Company acknowledged as his successor his little boy, a child of five. Before many days were over the child's cousin seized the lad and assumed the direction of affairs. The Residency at Delhi was at that time held by Sir David Ochterlony, the stout soldier who had retrieved his country's cause nine years before in Nepaul. Ochterlony believing, like many Indian officers, that the divine right of kings was dependent on the choice of the Company, called on the Jauts to disown the usurper, and promised to uphold them in their disobedience by British bayonets. His action, however, was embarrassing to a Government whose resources were already strained to a dangerous extent by the Burmese war. It overruled his decision, and ordered him to pursue a policy of peace. This order broke the heart of the brave old officer. He resigned his trust, laid himself down and died.

Bhurtpore.

The death of Sir D. Ochterlony.

[1] *Ante*, p. 167.

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In Ochterlony's place the Governor-General selected the distinguished civil servant whose advice had prompted the Pindaree war. Metcalfe, since his previous occupation of the Delhi Residency, had seen service both at Calcutta and at Hyderabad. In returning to his old post, he was compelled to pass through Calcutta; he used the opportunity to urge on the Council the expediency of the policy which the Governor-General had censured Ochterlony for pursuing; and he was authorised to secure the usurper's removal either by negotiation or by force. Negotiation failed, and the troops were accordingly ordered to carry out the decision of the Council. The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Combermere, had the good sense to profit from the failure of his predecessors. The water which had been used to flood the ditches of the fortress at the former siege was at once cut off by the labours of a column pushed forward in advance of the army. The mud walls which it was impossible to breach were shattered by mines; and the storming column, advancing through the ruins which were thus made, drove the garrison from its guns, and slaughtered the men with the sword.

The capture of Bhurtpore.

The policy of intervention is always open to question, and the siege of Bhurtpore forms no exception to the general rule. Whatever judgment, however, may be pronounced on the policy of the siege, no two opinions can be expressed as to its effect in India. Natives gazing on the star of the Company were ever ready to persuade themselves that its light was becoming dim. They had been dazzled for the moment by Hastings' successes in Central India, but they forgot the lesson of their defeat when the Company's fortunes were again clouded in Burma. The successful termination of the Burmese war and the almost simultaneous fall of the virgin fortress of Bhurtpore dispelled the

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mist which had temporarily obscured their vision. The star of the Company again shone with an increasing brightness, and the power of the Company seemed stronger than at any previous period of its history.

The recall of Amherst.

But the increasing credit which the Company thus acquired did not add to the reputation of the Governor-General. Authorities at home were ready to admit that he was a good man, but they declined to admit that he was a capable one. The Company complained of the vast additions which his rule had made to expenditure, and they doubted the expediency of acquiring new and unnecessary territory beyond the confines of India itself. The ministry thought that these acquisitions were opposed to the policy which Parliament had laid down, and to the true interests of the empire. It decided on his recall. Amherst himself was probably weary of a post for which he must have felt himself unsuited. The formal thanks which the Company voted to him, and the earldom to which his Sovereign promoted him, gilded and facilitated his compulsory retirement.[1]

Lord W. Bentinck made Governor-General.

At the time of Amherst's recall Canning was Prime Minister of England, and marriage had brought him into intimate relations with the Bentinck family. This family, during the two centuries in which it has occupied a commanding position in England, has not produced any personage whose figure strikes the imagination; but for three successive generations it has

[1] Historians do not usually notice that Amherst was forced to retire, but the circumstance is clear from *Wellington Despatches*, vol. ii. pp. 513–520; and cf. p. 565, where the Duke says, 'Lord Amherst, instead of being dismissed, is to have the option whether he will retire or be dismissed by the Court of Directors.' Cf. *Thornton*, vol. v. pp. 101, 175. Wilson, who gives a flattering account of Lord Amherst's government—'which could not be charged with a spirit of ambition or martial enterprise; but which had nevertheless effectually checked the aggressions of the Burmese, had widely extended the confines of British territory, and by the capture of Bhurtpore, effaced the only stain that tarnished the brilliant military reputation of British India'—says that his departure 'was accelerated by the illness of a member of his family,' vol. iii. p. 237.

contributed a man of mark to English politics. Few people, perhaps, recollect that the third Duke of Portland was twice Prime Minister of England. His son William, the Governor-General of India, will be remembered for a longer period. Macaulay wrote the inscription for his monument; and, while the prophet is read, the subject of his prophecy will not be forgotten. His grandson, George, obtained an even greater distinction. Carried by the force of his own convictions and the dread of free trade from obscurity to eminence, he led, for a little interval, the protectionist party. Happy in his life, he was happier in his biographer. Macaulay recorded the virtues of the uncle in an inscription, Disraeli devoted a volume to the nephew's eulogy.

William Bentinck, whom Canning selected as Amherst's successor, was no stranger to Indian soil. More than twenty years before he had served as Governor of Madras, and had been recalled from his government under circumstances of peculiar notoriety.[1] The career of most men would have been destroyed by such an occurrence. The Governor who is recalled from his government is not likely to receive a second chance. The sons of Prime Ministers, however, in the beginning of the present century, had opportunities for distinction which were enjoyed by few other men. In the troublous period of foreign politics, during which the French conquered Naples and attempted to subdue Sicily, Bentinck was employed in that island as half-ambassador and half-monarch. But, beneath the blue skies of Sicily and amidst the political excitement of London, he brooded over the circumstances of his recall and longed to return to India in the highest capacity. The death of Londonderry, and the promotion of Canning to the Foreign Office in the autumn of 1822, held

[1] For the Vellore Mutiny, which led to Bentinck's recall, *vide infra*, ch. xxvii. and *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 413.

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out to him expectations of gratifying his ambition. He strove to obtain the succession to Hastings' office, relying on his individual popularity with the Directors of the Company, and on his connection with Canning. The ministry, however, declined to go out of its way to bestow a splendid prize on a political opponent; George IV. had no love for a politician who was half a radical; and Bentinck was consequently compelled to wait another six years for the position which he had set his heart on obtaining.[1]

The propriety of Warren Hastings' impeachment forms a favourite subject for the deliberations of debating societies. Schoolboys and undergraduates are able to obtain all the information necessary for their speeches by reading a few brilliant pages of a sparkling essayist. But, if men enjoyed an equal acquaintance with Indian history in the present century, youthful disputants would probably find in Bentinck's career another appropriate theme for their debates. The Whigs would regard his rule as a pattern of what is good. The Tories would denounce it as an example of what is bad.[2]

Bentinck arrived in Calcutta in difficult times. Amherst's war had saddled the Government with a debt, and his successor with a deficit. In 1822–3 the revenues of India amounted to 23,120,934*l.*, and exceeded the expenditure by 1,528,853*l.* In 1827–8 the estimated revenues amounted to 22,819,229*l.*, and the estimated expenditure was 2,554,671*l.* in excess of this sum.[3] Shallow writers who hastily condemn Bentinck's 'unstatesmanlike retrenchments' should, as a preliminary duty, address themselves to the examination

The necessity for retrenchment.

[1] *Liverpool*, vol. iii. p. 203; *Greville*, vol. i. p. 59.

[2] Cf. Macaulay's panegyric with Mr. Yonge's criticism in *Liverpool*, vol. iii. p. 203.

[3] These figures are taken from a Paper presented to Parliament in 1830, No. 22, pp. 14–17. The Paper, however, requires a good deal of analysis before it is intelligible.

of these figures. Retrenchment, in the opinion of every one qualified to judge, was absolutely indispensable,[1] and Bentinck, as a matter of fact, brought out specific instructions to retrench. The responsibility was with those who drew his orders. His own merit or demerit was confined to the manner in which he carried them out.

In theory, no character is so popular as that of the economical reformer. In practice, retrenchment is the most unpopular policy which a statesman can adopt. The prodigal minister is like the protectionist, he is constantly obliging some friend; the economist is like the free trader, he is continually offending some interest. Bentinck soon experienced the truth of this assertion. For many years the officers of the Indian army, when employed on active service, had received an extra allowance known in India as batta. When their employment was outside the Company's dominions this allowance was doubled, and they received double batta. When they were stationed in cantonments, where quarters were provided for them, the allowance was reduced to one half. The Company from a very early date had objected to the issue of double batta, and in 1796 it was abolished in every place except Oudh, where living was supposed to be exceptionally expensive.

Batta.

The arrangement which was thus made continued for five years. But the additional allowance granted in Oudh had a prejudicial effect on the service, since it made everyone desirous of employment in that province. In consequence, in 1801 Oudh was placed on the same footing as the rest of India. But, at the same time, the officers both in Oudh and throughout Bengal, who had hitherto been provided with quarters, were required to

[1] Cf. *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 1; *Thornton*, vol. v. p. 216; and *Wilson*, vol. iii. p. 246.

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provide their own homes, and were allowed full batta to cover the expenses of doing so. The Company, however, thought this new settlement extravagant. It was willing to allow full batta to officers on active service in the field. It declined to do more than issue half-batta with free quarters, or half-batta with an allowance for quarters, to officers in cantonments; and in 1814 it issued orders to this effect. Hastings, however, instead of obeying these instructions, sent home a formal statement of objections to them. The Directors adhered to their own views and repeated their orders. But Amherst, who in the meanwhile had succeeded Hastings, refused as steadily as his predecessor to execute their directions; and from 1814 to 1828 the Directors found themselves thwarted in their desire to enforce the reduction. In 1828 they reiterated to Bentinck their positive injunctions to reduce the allowance at all stations within 400 miles of Calcutta. Bentinck could hardly have refused to obey instructions which had been deliberately given to three Governors-General in succession. He contented himself with forwarding to England the formal remonstrance in which Combermere, as Commander-in-Chief, supported the memorials of the army against the decision, and set an example of obedience by giving way. But the decision nearly provoked a mutiny. The officers indulged in language which was unjustifiable among soldiers. They assailed the Governor-General with abuse, they talked of electing delegates to carry their remonstrances to England. But reflection gradually produced wiser counsels, the excitement slowly wore off, the decision was quietly carried out, and the reduction made.[1]

[1] *Wilson*, vol. iii. pp. 242–247; *Thornton*, vol. v. pp. 218–226; *Marshman*, vol. iii. pp. 2, 4. Wilson, whom Marshman follows, declares that the order was enforced with the concurrence of her Majesty's ministers, including the Duke of Wellington. For Wellington's real opinion, see Ellenborough's *Political Diary*, vol. ii. pp. 116, 132, 182.

The saving which was effected by this reduction was so small that it was possible to doubt its wisdom; and the discontent which it provoked was increased by a general apprehension that it would be accompanied by other economies. On his first arrival in India, Bentinck appointed two committees for the purpose of reducing the public charges to the scale at which they had stood at the commencement of Amherst's government. The inquiries thus instituted led to gradual reductions which ultimately effected a saving of 1,500,000*l.* a year.[1] However reasonable or desirable such a saving may have been, the servants of the Company, with whose prospects it interfered, could hardly be expected to regard it with satisfaction. Their apprehensions were increased by another circumstance. India had previously been governed in the interests of the English; Bentinck displayed an evident desire to govern it in the interests of the Indians. The separate judicial machinery which Cornwallis had instituted in 1793 had proved from the first incapable of dealing with the mass of work thrown upon it. Bentinck retraced the steps which his predecessor had taken, and decided on reuniting the revenue and judicial departments.[2] This reform, however, if it had stood alone, would not have made the judicial machinery efficient. So long as India was governed without native aid, it was impossible, without incurring a ruinous expense, to employ a staff adequate for the work. Bentinck had the courage to entrust 'the primary jurisdiction of all suits, of whatever character or amount, not excluding those instituted against Government, to native agency.'[3] Large as the reform proved in a judicial sense, it was attended with still greater national advantages. It removed one cause of native hatred to the British rule by holding out to the

Other economies.

The employment of native agency.

[1] *Wilson*, vol. iii. p. 248.

[2] *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 45; *Wilson*, vol. iii. p. 261.

[3] *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 51; *Wilson*, vol. iii. p. 263.

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educated native the prospect of obtaining honourable employment. It has been gradually extended to other departments of the Government; and, though much remains to be accomplished in this direction, native officers are now largely employed in the administration of India.

These changes were not sufficient to terminate the deficiency which Amherst's ill-conducted wars and lax administration had created. They were supplemented, however, by two measures which largely increased the resources of Government. The State in India relies chiefly on two kinds of revenue—one derived from land, the other from opium. The revenue which it drew from land it owned as the supreme landlord, and, in theory, every zemindar paid it a fixed rent for the soil which he held. In practice, however, during the corrupt period of Mahomedan government, many zemindars in the North-Western Provinces had been exempted by these rulers on various pretexts from this rent. The British, in the first instance, recognised these exemptions. But their doing so encouraged forgery and fraud, since every zemindar strove to produce some documentary proof that his own land enjoyed an exemption from the assessment. It was consequently determined to authorise the collectors of revenue to hold a judicial inquiry into the titles of rent-free lands, giving, however, an appeal from the collectors to special commissioners appointed for the purpose.

The assessment in the North-Western Provinces.

This decision had been formed before Bentinck reached India. His responsibility in the matter was confined to its execution. In this, however, as in other matters, he infused his own energy into his subordinates, and succeeded in completing a revision of the settlement which under other circumstances might have been protracted over years. The Company's resources received a large addition from the resumptions which

were thus effected.[1] At the same time a fiscal reform of more importance was adopted by Bentinck. Since the time of Warren Hastings the sale of opium to the Chinese has proved a source of profit to the Indian Government. The cultivation of the poppy was confined in the first instance to Behar and Benares, and the cultivator was compelled to sell the crop at a fixed price to the Government. The poppy, however, grows with great luxuriance in Malwa, and the restoration of tranquillity by the conquests of Hastings encouraged its cultivation in that province. The Company, anxious to protect its monopoly, refused to allow Malwa opium to pass through Bombay. But this prohibition, instead of stopping the trade, merely diverted it to the Scinde port of Kurrachee and to the Portuguese ports of Diu in Kattiwar and Daman on the shores of the Gulf of Cambay. Instead of continuing to drive the trade into a circuitous channel, Bentinck decided on exacting a licence from the trader for permission to pass direct through Bombay. The change ultimately produced a welcome addition to the resources of India, and stimulated the cultivation of opium in Malwa.[2]

Reforms of this character do not appeal to the imagination, and they are consequently easily forgotten by the student who recollects without difficulty the more brilliant achievements of other statesmen. Yet such

[1] *Wilson*, vol. iii. pp. 255–259; *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 8; *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. i. pp. 95 *sq.* Kaye says of this settlement that it was 'a war of extermination . . . . waged against the nobility and gentry of the country.' He goes on, however, 'It was adopted in pure good faith, and with the most benevolent objects . . . . it was sanctioned by the genius of John Lawrence and of the Gamaliel at whose feet he had sat, the virtuous, pure-minded James Thomason.' Kaye's *Sepoy War*, i. 153.

[2] In 1816–17, 2,670 chests of opium were sent to China from Patna (Behar) and Benares, and only 600 from Malwa. In 1826–7, 3,661 chests were sent from Patna and Benares, and 6,308 from Malwa. In 1836–7, 8,078 chests were sent from Patna and Benares, and 13,430 from Malwa. McCulloch's *Commercial Dictionary*, *ad verb.* 'Opium.' The charge for passing opium through Bombay was fixed at 175 rupees a chest. *Wilson*, vol. iii. p. 255, *note*. There are about fifteen chests of opium to the ton.

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reforms confer a more solid benefit on humanity than the conquests of most warriors or the legislation of most ministers. In two other matters, however, Bentinck effected a change which deserves to be recollected with gratitude. He had the courage to abolish flogging in the native Indian army; he had the still higher courage to abolish suttee.

Flogging in the Indian Army.

The first of these two reforms has been already mentioned in this history. The most humane man may venture to doubt its wisdom. It was not in Bentinck's power to abolish flogging in English regiments quartered in India; and the anomaly consequently existed that an English soldier could be flogged, while a native soldier could not be flogged, for the same offence. Struck, perhaps, with this injustice, another Governor-General years afterwards repealed the order.[1] But it is not possible to restore a punishment which has been once abolished, and the new order became consequently a dead letter. The abolition of suttee was destined to become more enduring. In Bengal the suttee, or 'the pure and virtuous woman,'[2] who became a widow, was required to show her devotion to her husband by sacrificing herself on his funeral pile. The practice was said to be founded on certain texts in the sacred books of the Hindoos, and ordinary historians have been content to give this reason for its prevalence. A more philosophic author has traced it to a coarser motive. 'In Bengal,' writes Sir H. Maine, the Hindoo laws gave 'the childless widow the enjoyment of her husband's property, under certain restrictive conditions, for her life. . . . . Marriages among the upper classes of Hindoos being very commonly infertile, a considerable portion of the soil of the wealthiest Indian pro-

The abolition of suttee.

[1] *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 273; *Thornton*, vol. v. p. 233.

[2] For the explanation of the term, see *Wilson*, vol. iii. p. 265, *note*, and Arnold's *Dalhousie*, vol. ii. p. 316.

vince is in the hands of childless widows as tenants for life. But it was exactly in Bengal proper that the English, on entering India, found the suttee, or widow-burning, not merely an occasional, but a constant and an almost universal practice with the wealthier classes, and, as a rule, it was only the childless widow . . . . who burnt herself on her husband's funeral pyre. . . . . The anxiety of her family that the rite should be performed . . . . was, in fact, explained by the coarsest motives.'[1]

Successive Governors-General, whose attention had been directed to this barbarous practice, had feared to incur the unpopularity of abolishing it. Cornwallis issued some minute regulations to ensure that the widow was of a certain age and a consenting party to the sacrifice; Wellesley actually asked the judges whether the ceremony could be forbidden. But Conservatism was very strong in Bengal in the days of Cornwallis and Wellesley. The regulations of the one were frequently broken; the judges assured the other that the abolition of suttee was highly inexpedient. Yet these timid legislators might have gained courage if they had studied Indian history. Centuries before, a great Portuguese administrator, Albuquerque, had set them an example by abolishing suttee in the Portuguese settlements.[2] In 1808 Metcalfe had prohibited suttee in Delhi.[3] What Albuquerque had done at Goa in the beginning of the sixteenth century, what Metcalfe had done in Oudh in the beginning of the nineteenth century, an English gentleman might have ventured on doing in Bengal. Yet Cornwallis and Wellesley, Hastings and Amherst, were all afraid to prohibit murder which was identified with religion, and it was accordingly reserved to Bentinck to remove the reproach of its existence. With

[1] *Early History of Institutions*, pp. 334, 335.

[2] *Wilson*, vol. i. p. 552.

[3] *Life of Metcalfe*, vol. i. p. 338.

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the consent of his Council, suttee was declared illegal. The danger which others had apprehended from its prohibition proved a mere phantom. The Hindoos complied with the order without attempting to resist it, and the horrible rite which had disgraced the soil of India for centuries became entirely unknown.[1]

For these humane regulations Bentinck deserves to be remembered with gratitude. Yet it should not be forgotten that these reforms were as much the work of his age as of himself. The wave of thought which in England had led to the prohibition of cruel sports, and to the mitigation of a cruel code, had reached the shores of India, and was sensibly affecting the views of the Company's officers.[2] Few men, however, enjoy so enviable a lot as those whose fortune or whose capacity enables them to alleviate permanently the sorrows of humanity; and the right judging critic will regard such persons as Howard, Wilberforce, Buxton, Pinel, and

[1] *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 53; *Wilson*, vol. iii. p. 265; *Thornton*, vol. v. p. 235. How great the danger of abolishing suttee was supposed to be may be inferred from a passage in Sir J. Malcolm's *Political History of India*. After urging that the barbarous rite would ultimately be eradicated by the improvement of manners, Sir J. Malcolm declares it to be 'unwise to attempt to suppress by the strong arm of power this or any other of the superstitious customs of our native subjects.' Vol. ii. p. 287.

[2] A young Bengal civilian—Augustus Cleveland—is recollected as one of the first persons who endeavoured to civilise the more barbarous tribes of India. He devoted his life to reclaiming the savage robbers of the Rajmahal district. He died in 1784 at the early age of twenty-nine. Some years afterwards Outram pursued similar means in dealing with the Bheels, a robber tribe of Western India, and his labours were crowned with similar success. During the half-century which commenced in 1790 a succession of the Company's officers laboured to prevent the horrible practice of female infanticide which was prevalent among the Rajpoots; while in 1835 the horrid system of human sacrifice which was found among the Khonds, an aboriginal hill tribe of Orissa, was checked. (For these sacrifices, cf. *Dalhousie's Administration*, by Arnold, vol. ii. pp. 304 *sq.*) It is important to observe, in connection with the assertion in the text, that all these reforms were commenced, and most of them completed, in the same half-century. It is a fair presumption that they were due less to the individuals by whose agency they were effected than to the kindlier feelings of the age in which they lived. For the facts in this note, see *Marshman*, vol. iii. pp. 99–111. There is a pleasant notice of Lord W. Bentinck's kindness to a young Frenchman of genius, Victor Jacquemont, in Guizot's *Mémoires*, vol. iii. p. 132.

Shaftesbury as among the happiest members of the human family in modern times. Bentinck will hereafter be included in the same category, and, like Abou-ben-Adhem, will be recollected as one of those who proved by their example that they 'loved their fellow-men.'

One other great abuse was terminated under Bentinck. In Central India life was made unsafe and travelling dangerous by the establishment of a secret band of robbers known as Thugs. The Thugs mingled with any travellers whom they met, disarmed them by their conversation and courtesy, and availed themselves of the first convenient spot in their journey to strangle them with a rope and to rob them of their money. The burial of the victim usually concealed all traces of the crime; the secrecy of the confederates made its revelation unlikely; and, to make treachery more improbable, the Thugs usually consecrated their murders with religious rites, and claimed their god as the patron of their misdoings. Bentinck selected an active officer, Major Sleeman, whom he charged to put down Thuggee.[1] Sleeman's exertions were rewarded by a gratifying success. The Thugs, like all secret societies, were assailable in one way. The first discovery of crime always produces an approver. The timid conspirator, conscious of his guilt, is glad to purchase his own safety by sacrificing his associates, and when one man turns traitor every member of the band is anxious to secure the rewards and immunity of treachery. Hence the first clue towards the practices of the Thugs led to the unveiling of the whole organisation; and the same statesman, who had the merit of forbidding suttee, succeeded in extirpating Thuggee from the dominions over which he ruled.

The suppression of Thuggee.

Social reforms of this character occupy the greater

[1] *Marshman*, vol. iii. pp. 58-60; *Wilson*, vol. iii. pp. 297-304.

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portion of the history of Bentinck's government. In politics he almost always pursued a policy of non-intervention. The British during his rule made few additions to their possessions; they rarely interfered in the affairs of Native states. The little district of Cachar, on the borders of Assam, was indeed brought under subjection to the Company, and the Raja of Coorg was driven from his throne and his dominions were annexed to the Company's territories.[1] In Mysore itself an insurrection provoked by the follies and cruelties of its rulers compelled the interference of the Resident, and the Governor-General ultimately determined to enforce a stipulation in Wellesley's treaty of 1799, and to terminate anarchy by placing its administration under a British officer.[2] These, however, were almost the only instances in which Bentinck departed from his usual principle of non-interference. In the long period during which he remained in India, he proved that the supremacy of the British could be maintained without either meddling unnecessarily in affairs with which they had no concern, or embarking on wars of aggression or ambition.

The Government at home.

At the commencement of Bentinck's government, he received only a hesitating and doubtful support from the authorities at home. Political parties in England were in a transitional state; and the death of Canning, the disintegration of the Goderich administration, the secession of Huskisson and his friends from the Wellington ministry, had lessened the confidence of the public in the stability of the Tory Government. While, however, the Tory party was weakened by these changes, its control over the government of India was simultaneously strengthened. From the retirement of Canning in 1820 to the formation of the Wellington

[1] *Marshman*, vol. iii. pp. 11–13; *Wilson*, vol. iii. pp. 324, 349; *Thornton*, vol. v. p. 204.

[2] *Wilson*, vol. iii. p. 349.

ministry in 1828, the Presidency of the Board of Control was held by Charles Wynn, a politician who owed his promotion to his connection with the Duke of Buckingham. No real control was exercised over Hastings or Amherst during his tenure of office. But, on the formation of the Wellington administration, Charles Wynn was unceremoniously dismissed and Lord Melville was placed at the India Board;[1] while, in the following September, Melville was promoted to the Admiralty, and the Board of Control was given to Lord Ellenborough.[2] The new President, in an age of oratory, was a remarkable orator. He wrote, as he spoke, for effect; and both his despatches, his papers, and his speeches contain sparkling phrases which a more judicious person would probably have suppressed. The training of the new minister was, perhaps, opposed to the formation of a judicial temperament. The son of the great judge who had proved his capacity both in Parliament and at the bar, but who too frequently carried into Westminster Hall the opinions which he should have left in the House of Lords; the brother-in-law of the statesman who was the last uncompromising defender of Tory opinions in this country; in enjoyment of an office which yielded him an income of 7,000*l.* a year for doing nothing—his birth, his associations, and his position all marked him out rather as the apologist for abuses than the advocate of reform.

Lord Ellenborough made President of the Board of Control.

A great poet once declared that the people regarded the orator as a god, and a philosophic historian has insisted that the use and reputation of oratory among a rude people is the clearest evidence of public freedom.[3] It may, however, be doubted whether a capacity for words in man, like action in a horse, does not occasionally divert attention from more solid qualities. The

[1] *Ante*, vol. ii. p. 468.
[2] *Ellenborough*, vol. i. p. 207.
[3] *Gibbon*, vol. ix. p. 235; cf. *Odyssey* viii. 173.

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best speaker is not usually the best administrator, and the man of words is not always the man of knowledge. Few statesmen have ever surpassed the second Ellenborough in eloquence; few ministers have ever failed more signally in administration.

With an ambition which knew no bounds, Ellenborough regarded England as too narrow a field for his energies. He longed to throw his weight into the politics of a continent, and sighed for the Foreign Office as the proper field for his exertions. Among the many debts which this country owes to Wellington, few are greater than the obligation to him which arises from the fact that he declined to gratify the young peer's ambition. No reasonable man can read Ellenborough's diary without perceiving that his accession to the Foreign Office in 1828 would almost inevitably have produced a Russian war. Instead of attaining the distinction which he sought, he was placed in what he called the incognito office of the Board of Control. But in that place he aped the manners of a Foreign Minister. Every victory, which Russia gained in 1829 in Asia, he regarded as a victory over himself. He declared that he could have stopped the advance of Paskievitsch with a mere trifle of 200,000*l*. Asia, in the arrogant language of his diary, was 'his.' He dreamt of meeting Russia on the Indus, and of winning a great battle on the banks of that river.[1]

His views.

To a man of Ellenborough's views, a Governor-General like Bentinck was unsatisfactory. And during 1829 the Governor-General's recall was on many occasions probable.[2] The change of ministry in 1830 strengthened Bentinck's position. He received, moreover, cordial support from the Whigs, and from Charles Grant, the new President of the Board of Control. He

[1] *Diary*, vol. i. p. 273; vol. ii. pp. 88, 93.

[2] See *ibid.*, vol. ii. pp. 52, 57, 59, 141, 143, 146.

had the satisfaction, thenceforward, of knowing that the authorities at home, instead of doubting his policy, approved his principles.

And there had rarely been a period when a complete accord between the Governor-General in India and the Board of Control in London was more desirable. The privileges which the East India Company enjoyed had from time to time been renewed by the British Parliament. The charter of the Company had been extended for a period of twenty years in 1773, in 1793, and in 1813. But the conditions on which it was continued in 1813 were very different from those on which it had been originally granted. Instead of maintaining its exclusive right of trade, Parliament decided on throwing open the trade with India to all British subjects. It left the Company a monopoly of the China trade alone.

The Company's charter.

The Act of 1813 of course excited the strenuous opposition of the Company. The highest authorities were brought forward to prove that the trade with India would not be increased by a termination of the monopoly. Their views, however, were proved false by the result, and the stern logic of facts consequently pointed in 1833 to the further extension of the policy of 1813. Ever since the passage of the six Acts, moreover, monopoly had been slowly going out of fashion. Monopoly in politics, in religion, in social privileges, and in trade, had been attacked and struck down. It was impossible to suppose that monopoly would be allowed to continue in Leadenhall Street.

The inclination towards free trade was, in fact, so prevalent, that it is doubtful whether, even if the Tories had remained in office, they would have consented to preserve the monopoly. Peel and the wiser members of the Cabinet were opposed to its continuance, and even Ellenborough slowly gravitated to the

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opinion that it was inexpedient and, indeed, impossible to maintain it.[1] It is probable, therefore, that in any case the monopoly would not have been preserved. The fall of the Wellington administration made its termination a certainty.[2] Thenceforward the question for discussion was not its end, but the manner of ending it. In this the Whig Government enjoyed the advantage that their predecessors had appointed a Select Committee [3] on the subject, whose functions were renewed at the instigation of the new ministry by the Parliament of 1830 and the Parliament of 1831.[4] Guided by its researches, the Government consented to compensate the Company for the loss of its monopoly by an annuity of 630,000*l.* charged on the territorial revenues of India.[5]

It is a remarkable circumstance that the change of ministry which deprived the Company of its trade possibly preserved its political power for nearly a quarter of a century. Ellenborough was willing to leave the Company its trade, but he was desirous of depriving it of its power.[6] Grant was in favour of leaving it its power and of stripping it of its monopoly. The Directors of the Company had always regarded their political power as an encumbrance, and they would possibly have accepted without regret the compromise which Ellenborough would have favoured. But the Whig ministry shrank from proposing an alteration for which the country was not prepared, and which might have aroused the opposition by which the Coalition of 1783 had been destroyed. Though, however, it left the rule

[1] Ellenborough's *Diary*, vol. i. p. 184; vol. ii. pp. 37, 64, 219.

[2] Brougham, in the course of his Yorkshire election campaign, denounced the monopoly as one of the main causes of the existing distress. *Ann. Reg.*, 1830, Chron., p. 125.

[3] *Ibid.*, Hist., p. 64.

[4] *Wilson*, vol. iii. pp. 479, 480.

[5] The profits of the exclusive trade were stated by Grant to have decreased in the last three quinquennial periods from an average of 1,500,000*l.* a year to an average of only 830,000*l.*, and 730,000*l.* *Ann. Reg.*, 1833, Hist., p. 180.

[6] Ellenborough's *Diary*, vol. ii. pp. 131, 410.

with Leadenhall Street, it altered the machinery of government. The Governor-General of Bengal was made Governor-General of India. A fourth member—an English jurist—was added to his Council, and the Governor-General in Council was authorised to legislate for the whole of India. At the same time the disabilities which still clung to the natives were in theory swept away, and Europeans were for the first time allowed to hold land in India. These important proposals were carried at the close of the first session of the first reformed Parliament. But Parliament listened with little patience to Indian debates, and ministers found it necessary to apologise to small and languid audiences for occupying time with a discussion on Indian government.

The Act of 1833.

Yet the Act of 1833 marks an epoch in English politics as well as in Indian history. It was the first public recognition which Parliament deliberately gave of the new policy which was gradually being introduced into the Board of Control. With Bentinck at Calcutta and Grant in London, men might hope for a period of peace in India, as men were already enjoying a period of peace at home. Wars of aggression had apparently ceased; the deficits which wars had occasioned had been terminated by economy; and India, free from open robbers like the Pindarees and secret robbers like the Thugs, had entered on an epoch of settled government. The last monopoly of the Indian Company had been struck down, the law which had prevented English capitalists from purchasing land in India had been repealed, and the natives, freed from their disabilities, had the prospect of acquiring distinction in the service of the Company. A politician, without being an optimist, might hope that a better day was dawning both in India and England. A better day! In history, as in the world around us, the night

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always succeeds the day, and the most that statesmen can do is to make the day of peace a little longer, the night of gloom a little less dark. The eternal law of action and reaction was to prove true both at home and in Hindostan. Progress in England was again to be arrested by the existence of a feeble ministry. The peace of India was again to be broken by the most unnecessary and most ruinous war which the English had ever waged.

CHAPTER XXVI.

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THE Governor-General was at Ootacamund when the Act of 1833 reached India. 'In a climate equable as Madeira and invigorating as Braemar,'[1] he was seeking to regain the health which the heats of Calcutta had impaired. There 'the first Council under the new Act was held, and the new Government constituted.'[2] Unfortunately, however, the cool breezes of the Neilgherries did not restore strength to Bentinck, and he felt compelled to resign his office. His resignation led to important consequences both in India and in England. In India, Metcalfe was hastily summoned to Calcutta to fill the Governor-Generalship till the pleasure of the Government at home could be ascertained. In England the choice of a Governor-General became the subject of controversy and ill-feeling, and the selection which was ultimately made was determined on considerations and attended with consequences of supreme importance to the history not only of India but of the world.

Lord W. Bentinck resigns.

The rule of Metcalfe, Bentinck's immediate successor, is directly associated with one great reform and indirectly connected with two other measures. Under all autocratic Governments a disposition to check the free expression of opinion is invariably visible; and even in this country, where free criticism was tolerated with more equanimity than in any other State of Europe, the authorities long disliked the growing freedom of the press.

Metcalfe temporarily succeeds him.

[1] The expression is Mr. Trevelyan's, in *Life of Macaulay*, ch. vi.

[2] *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 81.

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During the first forty years of the reign of George III. the ministers of the Crown were constantly taking steps to curb the increasing licence of the newspapers. The measures which they brought forward with this object culminated in the legislation of 1795–1799. While Pitt, unhappily for his reputation, was pressing forward these laws, his friend Wellesley was assuming the government of India. It was natural that Wellesley should desire to transplant to the autocratic soil of the East the institutions which he had seen his friend and leader engrafting on the free constitution of England. He consequently determined on placing the press of India under considerable restrictions, and of imposing a strict censorship on Indian newspapers.[1]

The press in India under Wellesley.

Hastings.

The restrictions which Wellesley instituted were to a great extent removed by Hastings. In his Governor-Generalship the first native newspaper was published, the censorship was abolished, and the press within certain limits was free. Even Hastings, however, thought it necessary to prevent its handling certain subjects and criticising certain persons; and he not only entrusted the Supreme Court with the power of punishing a refractory editor, but he reserved to the executive the right of banishing journalists. In Hastings' time, however, no use was made of these powers. The Supreme Court declined, on one occasion, to grant a criminal information against a newspaper, Hastings abstained from acting ministerially in a case where the Court had hesitated to act judicially, and the press remained practically uncontrolled. Its freedom caused great indignation in Leadenhall Street, and the Directors of the Company drafted a despatch reprobating the abolition of the censorship and directing its reimposition. Canning, however, though he was sitting in the Cabinet

[1] Pearce's *Wellesley*, vol. i. pp. 282, 288; Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. ii. p. 295.

which was passing the six Acts, declined to interfere with the free publication of opinion in India, and the despatch was suppressed.[1]

Under Adam.

In the interval between Hastings' resignation and Amherst's arrival in India, Adam, a distinguished servant of the Company, succeeded to the post of Governor-General. He had not approved the measures which Hastings had adopted to liberate the press. He found time, in the short interval during which he held office, to deprive it of its freedom. Mr. Silk Buckingham had arrived in Calcutta in 1818, and had established a paper, called the *Calcutta Journal*, which soon gained repute from the ability of its articles and the independence of its criticisms. In April 1823 Adam, who had been three months in office, annoyed at the manner in which this newspaper spoke of the Governor of Madras and of his own secretaries at Calcutta, issued a regulation extinguishing the freedom of unlicensed printing. Silk Buckingham neither moderated his language nor forbore from his criticisms. Dr. Bryce, a Presbyterian clergyman, the editor of a rival paper which was the warm supporter of the Government, was rewarded by an appointment in the Stationery Office. The *Calcutta Journal* attacked the nomination and ridiculed the choice; and Adam had the folly to punish this slight offence by banishing Silk Buckingham from India.[2]

Silk Buckingham's case.

Leadenhall Street warmly approved Adam's action; and his example was, in the first instance, imitated by his successor. But Amherst soon pursued a more generous policy; and, with rare exceptions, no press prosecutions were attempted during his tenure of office.[3] Bentinck's whole training and disposition were in favour of freedom, and the press was practically free during

[1] *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 359, from whose account the preceding paragraph is summarised.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 380; *Hansard, N. S.*, vol. xi. p. 858 *seq.*; Arnould's *Denman*, vol. i. p. 228.

[3] *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 411.

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his administration. It was reserved, however, to Metcalfe to remove from the newspapers even the appearance of control. With the aid of Macaulay, who had become the new Member of Council under the Act of 1833, he repealed the regulation which Adam had framed in 1823, and the Indian press thenceforward became not merely practically but literally free.[1]

Metcalfe and a free press.

This decision was received in Leadenhall Street with the severe displeasure which the Directors reserved for all liberal administrators. The distinguished officer under whose rule the reform had been accomplished found thenceforward that he had nothing to hope from the patronage of the Company, and soon afterwards retired from a service in which he had lost the confidence of his employers. By a singular chance, moreover, while the liberation of the press cost the liberators their popularity at home, another measure equally liberal in its conception cost them the support of the English press in India. Up to the time of Macaulay's arrival in India, English residents had the privilege of appealing in civil cases to the Supreme Court at Calcutta instead of to the Sudder Courts in the provinces, while the native could only carry his appeal to the Sudder Courts. Macaulay decided on abolishing this distinction. 'The chief reason for preferring the Sudder Court,' he wrote, 'is this, that it is the court which we have provided to administer justice, in the last resort, to the great body of the people. If it is not fit for that purpose, it ought to be made so.'[2] But this argument carried no weight with the English residents in India. A native was eligible for appointment to the Sudder Court. A native judge might possibly, therefore,

The right of appeal for English and Indian

[1] *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 91; Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, vol. ii. pp. 134–157; Trevelyan's *Macaulay*, ch. vi. Oddly enough, Kaye does not mention Macaulay, and Mr. Trevelyan does not mention Metcalfe. Surely such a policy as the liberation of a press is large enough to reflect credit on both the Governor who accomplished it and the Councillor who assisted him.

[2] Trevelyan's *Macaulay*, ch. vi.

be called on to aid in deciding an appeal brought by an Englishman against a native. Such an appeal, the Anglo-Indian hastily assumed, was sure to be decided by the native against the Englishman, and the conquerors of the country could not safely trust their rights and property to the justice of those whose race they had subdued. It is needless, however, for a modern historian to recapitulate the arguments which were used by Anglo-Indian newspapers in 1835. The reasoning which was urged at that time was repeated nearly fifty years afterwards when another Governor-General decided on supplementing the work which Macaulay had commenced, and on conferring on native judges of eminence the right of trying Europeans criminally. The old prejudices which had been aroused by Macaulay were stirred afresh by Lord Ripon and Mr. Ilbert, and the inherent conservatism of the British people was again afforded an opportunity of rallying in the defence of privilege.

While these two reforms were exciting debate, another controversy was being decisively settled. Little had been done by the English in India to promote the education of the natives; but since 1813 a small sum had been annually devoted to the encouragement of Hindoo learning. A few men remonstrated against the application of money towards the promotion of an obsolete, imperfect, and useless culture; and from 1813 to 1833 an Indian and an English party prevailed in Calcutta, and carried on a controversy respecting the rival merits of education in Hindoo and English. In 1835 the arrival of Macaulay at Calcutta, and his appointment as President of the Committee of Public Instruction, brought the dispute to an issue. Macaulay found the Indian and English party evenly balanced on the Committee. He threw his whole weight into the scale of the English party, and the Committee was recon-

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structed under his supervision. English books were substituted for the bad vernacular literature which had previously been used in the schools; and the people of India received for the first time an opportunity for acquiring a sound elementary instruction in English.[1]

These three reforms were practically accomplished by Bentinck, Metcalfe, and Macaulay in the short interval which succeeded the announcement of Bentinck's resignation and the arrival of a new Governor-General from England. But for them, indeed, it is possible that Metcalfe's provisional appointment might have been confirmed. The Directors of the Company, in the first instance, were in favour of this arrangement. The ministry, however, had inherited a dictum of Canning, that the highest office in India ought always to be conferred on an English statesman; and the Directors, apprised of Metcalfe's liberal policy towards the press, modified their own views, and concurred in his supersession by an English nobleman.[2]

Lord Heytesbury made Governor-General.

It chanced that the vacancy which Bentinck's resignation had caused became officially known during Peel's earlier and short-lived administration. The choice of the minister fell upon the first Lord Heytesbury, a nobleman who was a good representative of the old system of government which was terminated by the Reform Act. The owner of a borough, he had placed it at the disposal of the ministry, and had received in exchange profitable employment in his early life, and a peerage in his maturity. Successively Minister at Naples, at Madrid, and at St. Petersburg, he had varied diplomatic experience; while, during his residence at the Russian Court, he had formed a high opinion of the 'noble and chivalrous nature'[3] of the Sovereign who sat on the Russian throne.

[1] *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 65; Trevelyan's *Macaulay*, ch. vi.

[2] *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 89.

[3] *Ante*, p. 134.

To the eye of any impartial critic this circumstance made Heytesbury peculiarly eligible for the Governor-Generalship. But, unfortunately, in the opinion of the Whig statesman who was returning to the Foreign Office, it disqualified him for the appointment. From 1835 to 1840 the distinguishing feature of Palmerston's policy was a distrust or dread of Russia. The conditions under which the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was framed, the arrangements which it made, and the manner in which its stipulations were kept secret, indicated, as he thought, an elaborate attempt on the part of Russia to make her influence supreme on the Bosphorus. William IV. both shared and encouraged the feelings of his Foreign Minister, and, towards the close of his reign, the temperament of the Sovereign, the views of the Secretary of State, and the language of the Radicals in the House of Commons, all pointed to the possibility of a Russian war.[1] It could hardly have been expected that the Russian Court would have remained inactive while England was increasing her armaments and English politicians were abusing the Czar. Long experience had shown that there was one method by which Russia could create embarrassment and alarm in the British Cabinet, for statesmen in England were almost as jealous of Russian influence at Teheran as of Russian influence at Constantinople. Conscious, therefore, that Palmerston was desirous to tear up the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi,[2] and to restore the influence of England at the Porte, Russia renewed her overtures to Persia, and secured a preponderating influence at Teheran.

The Whig objection to the appointment.

Russian influence in Persia.

The relations between Persia and England in the

[1] *Ante*, vol. iii. pp. 597, 627; cf. Greville, *Memoirs*, part ii. vol. i. p. 119.

[2] Mr. Ashley says that Lord Palmerston's persistent aim from the moment of the signing of this treaty . . . had been either 'to neutralise or overthrow' the treaty. Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. i. p. 353.

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past, moreover, encouraged the Persian Court to lean upon St. Petersburg. The aid of England had always failed Persia in the hour of her trial. The costly missions which Wellesley had sent to her in 1801, and the rival embassies which had been despatched from London and Calcutta in 1813, might easily have induced Persian statesmen to imagine that England attached importance to their friendship, and was willing to incur sacrifices for the sake of maintaining it. England, in fact, in 1813 had formally undertaken to render Persia help if Persia was attacked by any European Power, and was not the aggressor in the quarrel.[1] Thirteen years afterwards the promise encouraged the Shah to seize the pretext of a frontier dispute to make war upon Russia. But the condition which had been inserted in the treaty afforded England an excuse for declining the assistance which Persia hoped to obtain from her. Persia, in consequence, was easily crushed by her powerful neighbour, and forced to make fresh territorial concessions to Russia; while England, through Colonel Macdonald, her envoy at the Persian Court, a man of energy and sense, confined herself to moderating the terms on which Russia insisted as a punishment for the aggression.[2]

Possibly British statesmen could not have acted otherwise. But probably they were a little ashamed at having availed themselves of a technical excuse to rid themselves from the necessity for fulfilling an inconvenient promise. At any rate they took a course which has been rarely pursued by a great Power. They actually consented to pay a portion of the indemnity which Russia exacted from her foe, in return for being released from the stipulations of the treaty of 1813.[3]

[1] *Ante*, ch. xxv.

[2] Cf. *Ann. Reg.*, 1826, Hist., p. 284; *Wilson*, vol. iii. p. 216; *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 120; Lord Ellenborough's *Diary*, vol. i. p. 46.

[3] Watson's *History of Persia*, p. 244.

The British in India and England, after spending nearly a million of money in costly missions to the Persian Court, were paying to be released from the conditions which were the only result of these embassies, and had the mortification of knowing that their representative had no influence in the Persian capital.

Thus in 1835, when Melbourne succeeded Peel, Russia had acquired through the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi a preponderating power at the Porte, and she had simultaneously increased her influence at Teheran. Palmerston would have regarded these facts under any circumstances with alarm. But he had soon afterwards an additional reason for distrusting the growing influence of Russia in Persia. Up to that time the trade of India had almost uniformly passed round the Cape of Good Hope. But in 1836 efforts were being made to shorten the route and to quicken the journey. The fastest passage which had ever been accomplished round the Cape to Bombay had occupied seventy-five days.[1] It was hoped, by adopting a new route, to save rather more than one day in three, and to complete the journey in forty-six days. Two alternative proposals had been made with this object. One, which was generally supported by the mercantile community, contemplated the formation of a route by Malta to Alexandria, across Egypt and through the Red Sea. The other was based on a line which struck across Syria to the Euphrates, and followed the course of that river to the Persian Gulf. In 1832 various attempts had been made to establish the first of these routes.[2] But they had failed; and in August 1835 the East India Company issued a notice that the mails for India through Egypt might not be carried forward; while Hobhouse, speaking as President of the Board of Con-

The Euphrates route to India.

[1] This was up to 1836, and is given on Hobhouse's authority. *Hansard*, vol. xxxv. p. 1061.

[2] A correspondence full of interest on the subject will be found in *Ann. Reg.*, 1832, Chron., p. 138.

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trol, declared that the south-west monsoons blew with such violence in the Red Sea, during two or three months out of every twelve, that gentlemen whom he had seen were of opinion that no steamboat of whatever size or power would be able to face them.[1]

This failure to establish the Red Sea route confirmed the Government in its desire to make the Euphrates the highway to India; and in 1835 Colonel Chesney was sent to the Mediterranean with the framework of two steamers which he was directed to put together at Bir, and with which he was instructed to attempt the navigation of the Euphrates. Ill-luck attended the enterprise. Russia used all her influence to oppose it;[2] one of the steamers, the 'Tigris,' was lost in a hurricane; the other, the 'Euphrates,' succeeded in reaching the Persian Gulf. But the expedition, and another which followed it, proved that the navigation of the river was so difficult that it was practically impossible to rely on it, and the ministry was forced to fall back on the Red Sea route.[3]

Thus, at the time of Heytesbury's appointment, England and Russia were jealously watching one another in the East. The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had given Russia a commanding position at the Porte, the vacillating policy of England towards Persia had confirmed Russian influence at Teheran, and Russia was using her power by

[1] *Hansard*, vol. xxx. pp. 608, 609.

[2] *Stockmar*, vol. i. p. 348.

[3] For the preliminary vote for the Euphrates expedition, *Hansard*, vol. xxv. p. 930. For a supplemental vote in 1836, *ibid.*, vol. xxxv. p. 1060. For the loss of the 'Tigris,' *Ann. Reg.*, 1836, Chron., p. 64. After the acknowledged failure of the Euphrates route a treaty was concluded with France for the conveyance of the mails from Calais *viâ* Marseilles to Alexandria in 402 hours, or rather less than seventeen days (*State Papers*, vol. xxvii. p. 1004), and it was generally admitted that, while the difficult route of the Euphrates Valley would occupy fifty days, Bombay might be reached by the more direct route of the Red Sea in forty-three days. *Ann. Reg.*, 1837, Chron., pp. 52 and 124. A bimonthly communication with India *viâ* Suez was first established in 1845, *Hansard*, vol. cxv. p. 640. Cf. for the whole subject, *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 60.

trying to exclude her rival from the Euphrates route to India. Under these circumstances the appointment of a Governor-General free from the prejudices of his fellow-countrymen might have done much for the cause of peace both in India and the world. Such an appointment, however, would have seemed to Palmerston a wilful sacrifice of British interests, and he accordingly persuaded the Cabinet to take the unprecedented step of superseding Heytesbury.[1] The Whigs rarely looked beyond a narrow circle for the occupants of office. They selected as Heytesbury's successor the second Lord Auckland. An accomplished nobleman and an amiable man, Auckland had presided over the Board of Trade in Grey's ministry, while Poulett Thomson, as Vice-President, had conducted the business of the department. He had been chosen, to the surprise of many persons, to succeed Graham at the Admiralty, and he had been replaced in that office in 1835. A cousin of the Minto who had governed India with success, believers in hereditary capacity might perhaps hope for his distinction. He is now recollected as one of the most unfortunate statesmen ever sent to govern India.[2]

Lord Auckland Governor-General.

Yet Auckland's administration of India will never be understood by anyone who omits to reflect on the foreign policy of the Cabinet of which he had been a member.[3] It was Palmerston's persistent determination

[1] Auckland's appointment as Governor-General was, 'rightly or wrongly,' ascribed to Palmerston. Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. i. p. 400. The nearest precedent for Heytesbury's supersession was in the appointment of Minto in 1806, and the revocation of the appointment of Sir G. Barlow which had been previously made. See on this point *Thornton*, vol. iv. p. 87 *et seq.*

[2] There are notices of some interest of Auckland in *Life of Spencer*, p. 263, and in *Greville*, part i. vol. iii. p. 88. There are very high opinions of his ability in the second part of these *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 241, and vol. ii. p. 63.

[3] The *Times*, 2nd of April, 1885, contained an excellent summary of the policy of Russia and England in Central Asia. But the *Times*, I think, produces an inaccurate impression by excluding all reference to the strained relations between the English and Russian Foreign Offices from Palmerston's determination to tear up the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

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to tear up the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi which drove Russia to retaliate on Persia, and it was the consciousness of the increasing influence of Russia at Teheran which induced Auckland to interfere at Cabul.

Afghanistan.

East of Persia, and between it and Hindostan, lies the country known as Afghanistan. Torn by civil war, it was still associated with the traditions of its former greatness. Had not Ahmed Khan, the founder of the Afghan kingdom, temporarily shattered the power of the Mahrattas at the great battle of Paniput? Had not Zemaun Shah, by crossing the Indus, frightened Wellesley into despatching a mission to Persia? Had not even Minto sent Elphinstone to Cabul, and courted Shah Sooja's help in an alliance against France? In 1835, indeed, these conditions were changed. Zemaun Shah and Shah Sooja were refugees in the Company's territory; the empire of the Afghans was shrivelled to a fourth of the dominions over which the former of these potentates had ruled; and the remnant was divided among rival princes. Kamram, 'the worst of a bad race,' a son of Mahmood, Shah Sooja's brother, conqueror, and successor, reigned at Herat; the rest of the country was ruled by the brothers of Futteh Khan, a statesman whom Mahmood had murdered.[1] Of these, since 1826, Dost Mahommed had reigned supreme in Cabul.[2]

Of the internal condition of Afghanistan, however, English and Indian statesmen had alike little knowledge, and the Government accordingly decided to send a mission to Cabul, under the pretext of establishing commercial relations with the people. There was one man in India who had exceptional claims for employment on such an embassy. Six years before Alexander Burnes had been despatched to Lahore

Alexander Burnes.

[1] For the murder, to which Kamram was a party, see Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. i. p. 107.

[2] There is a good account of the state of Afghanistan in *Thornton*, vol. vi. p. 123.

with some cart-horses of exceptional size and power, which Ellenborough had presented to Runjeet Singh; and, after fulfilling his ostensible orders, had extended his travels to Cabul and Bokhara. With eyes in his head, and a capacity for using them, he had gained knowledge and experience; and, by the publication of his adventures, had enlarged the information of his fellow-countrymen and acquired the reputation which attaches to bold enterprise and successful authorship. He was now selected for the new mission which it was determined to send, through Scinde and the Punjab, to Cabul. He set out from Bombay on the 26th of November, 1836; he landed in Scinde on the 13th of December; he reached Cabul towards the end of September 1837.[1] His journey and the business and ceremonies connected with it had occupied the intervening months.

Five months before his arrival at Cabul, Burnes, resting in Scinde, had learned news which could not but influence his views. Persia, he was told, had decided on attacking Herat. This famous fortress of Central Asia has for centuries been regarded as the key of India; and, though a high authority has declared that 'to speak of the integrity of the place as of vital importance to British India was a hyperbole so insulting to common sense as scarcely to need refutation,'[2] it undoubtedly possesses the importance attaching to a position on which the great roads from Russia and Persia converge. Surrounded by a strong redoubt, it is capable of successful defence against any enemy not equipped with the artillery of a modern army, but it could not probably be held for any length of time against a European force which had the skill to seize the adjacent hills, and the guns with which to assail it from

The siege of Herat.

[1] The dates will be found in Burnes's *Cabul*, vol. i. p. 140.

[2] Sir H. Durand's *Afghan War*, p. 62.

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this vantage-ground. Almost adjoining the Persian frontier, it had long been a favourite object of Persian ambition;[1] and unhappily, in 1835 the misconduct of its ruler, Kamram, gave the Persians ample excuse for an attack upon it. It is certain that the British in India would not have tolerated for six months the treatment which Persia habitually experienced at Kamram's hands.[2]

Whatever justification, however, Persia may have had for declaring war against Kamram, in 1835 no statesman, either at Calcutta or in London, could be expected to see with pleasure Herat pass into Persian keeping. For Herat was regarded as the gate of India, and the influence of Russia was supreme at Teheran. But the fact that the Persian advance was regarded in London with dislike made every patriotic Russian anxious for the siege. Were not Englishmen in Parliament denouncing the Czar in language of almost unparalleled ferocity? Were not men out of Parliament writing pamphlets and articles to prove the necessity for war with Russia? Were not even the diplomatists in British service encouraged to use language of abuse when they wrote of Russia? Was not the British Foreign Minister obviously eager to tear up the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi? Was not a British squadron stationed in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles,

[1] It had been originally taken by the Afghans under Ahmed Shah in 1749, Watson's *Persia*, p. 42. For an excellent description of the place, see Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. i. p. 202.

[2] The British Minister in Persia, who was strongly opposed to the Persian policy, wrote: 'Unfortunately, the conduct of Kamram Meerza, in violating the engagements entered into with his late R. H. Abbas Meerza, and in permitting his vizier, Yar Mahommed Khan, to occupy part of Seistan, has given the Shah a full justification for commencing hostilities.' *Thornton*, vol. vi. p. 124. Kamram, says Mr. Marshman, 'had openly violated the treaties subsisting between him and Persia, and had likewise made repeated inroads into the territories of the Shah, and kidnapped his subjects to the number, as the Persians affirmed, of 12,000, and sold them into slavery.' *Marshman*, vol. iii. p. 121.

ostensibly for the purpose of checking Mehemet Ali's advance, but really, as the King of England admitted,[1] as a menace to Russia? Great nations have not yet learned, nor is it desirable that they should learn, to adopt the maxims of Christianity, and to turn the cheek to the smiter; and the Russians, conscious that Palmerston was anxious to paralyse their action on the Bosphorus, naturally grasped at a position in Asia which every Englishman regarded as a vantage-ground. Count Simonich, the Russian Ambassador at Teheran, almost openly urged the Shah to quarrel with Kamram and to lay siege to Herat; Russian officers repaired to the Persian head-quarters and occupied themselves with drilling the Persian army; and finlly, at the end of 1837, soon after Burnes reached Cabul, the siege began.[2]

Burnes Cabul.

The circumstances of the siege necessarily made a profound impression on Burnes. But the news of it hardly awakened the same feeling in Dost Mahommed. The Afghan sovereign was mainly concerned with a nearer question. Peshawur had formed part of the Afghan kingdom up to 1834, when it had been taken by Runjeet Singh; and Burnes soon found that, with Dost Mahommed, the recovery of Peshawur was a much more pressing topic than the possible loss of Herat. Conceiving that no price was too heavy to pay for Afghan good-will, Burnes himself offered to mediate between Runjeet Singh and Dost Mahommed for the cession of Peshawur. His offer to do so gained him the complete confidence of the Afghan monarch. Dost Mahommed put implicit faith in Burnes; and Burnes, on his part, formed a high opinion of the ability and honesty of Dost Mahommed. Everything, in short, promised to go well; and England, without expending

[1] *Stockmar*, vol. i. p. 347.

[2] For the correspondence, *State Papers*, vol. xxv. pp. 1218-1299, and vol. xxvii. pp. 5-195; and cf. *Thornton*, vol. vi. p. 125.

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a single penny, without moving a single regiment, succeeded in obtaining high influence at the Court of Cabul.[1]

The confidence, however, which Dost Mahommed reposed in Burnes was not shared by Dost Mahommed's brothers. Kohun Dil Khan, at Candahar, instead of following his brother's lead, opened negotiations with the Persian camp, and despatched his son on a friendly mission to the Russian Embassy at Teheran. Burnes saw that the success which he had himself gained at Cabul would be neutralised by this conduct; and he accordingly decided on sending an officer of his staff to Candahar, on directing him to threaten Kohun Dil Khan with British displeasure if he continued his intrigues with the Persian and Russian Courts,[2] and to promise him British support if he threw in his lot with Dost Mahommed.

There can be no doubt that this policy was bold. If it were desirable for Britain to interfere in Afghanistan at all, it is not clear that it was unwise. It was, however, wholly outside the instructions which Burnes carried with him. Startled at finding that they had been committed by their agent to mediate between Sikh and Afghan, and to an offensive and defensive alliance with Kohun Dil Khan, Auckland and his council refused to confirm the arrangement for mediation, and they desired Burnes to let the Candahar chiefs know that he had held out hopes which his employers could not realise.[3]

Vicovitch's mission.

A little time before these orders reached Burnes, Vicovitch, a Russian officer, with instructions from Simonich, the Russian Ambassador at Teheran,[4] entered

[1] Sir H. Durand takes an unfavourable view of Burnes's conduct and capacity. But so far as I am able to judge, he deserves the praise accorded to him in the text.

[2] Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. i. p. 183.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 185; Burnes's *Cabul*, p. 143. Sir H. Durand throws doubt

Cabul. Vicovitch was either instructed or decided to bid high for a Russo-Afghan alliance. But the offers which he made did not seduce Dost Mahommed from the policy which he had agreed to follow. He remained on the friendliest terms with Burnes, and openly avowed his preference for the British. Auckland's despatches, however, rapidly removed the charm which Burnes had cast over Dost Mahommed. Burnes was forced to confess that the Ameer had nothing to hope from Britain. Vicovitch, aware of Burnes's difficulties, renewed his offers of Russian aid. Dost Mahommed reluctantly determined to prefer the Power which apparently had something to offer, to the Power which had only something to ask; and Russian influence, already supreme at Teheran, rapidly gained predominance at Cabul and Candahar. Disowned by his employers, and consequently distrusted by the Afghans, Burnes could no longer conceal from himself that his mission was a failure; and in April 1838 he retired from Cabul.[1]

Burnes leaves Cabul.

While Burnes was thus retracing his steps, Auckland was sojourning amidst the cool breezes of the Himalayas at Simla. There he was deprived of the services of his Council, but he was accompanied by three men—Macnaghten, the secretary to his Government; Torrens, Macnaghten's colleague; and Colvin, his own private secretary—who suddenly found themselves raised by circumstances to prominence. It was obvious to them all that Burnes's mission had failed. They none of them, perhaps, stopped to inquire whether the failure was due to the obstinacy of Dost Mahommed or to the insufficiency of British offers. It was enough for them that Dost Mahommed had cast in his lot with

Auckland at Simla.

on the genuineness of Vicovitch's mission, *Afghan War*, p. 42, and *note*, but I think that there can be no question that he really was a Russian agent.

[1] Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. i. p 190.

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Russia at a moment when Russia was virtually throwing the armed strength of Persia on Herat. An Indian official does not readily submit to the hostile action of native sovereigns. Auckland's advisers imagined that, if Dost Mahommed preferred Russian help to British neutrality, the time was come for his dethronement. It was remembered that the blind old sovereign Zemaun Shah, and his brother Shah Sooja, were living in exile at Loodiana. It was concluded that Shah Sooja, restored to his sovereignty by British aid, would guide his conduct by British counsels. Dost Mahommed, moreover, had a quarrel which it seemed impossible to compose with Runjeet Singh. If Runjeet Singh could only be made a party in Shah Sooja's expedition, the Sikh and Afghan rulers might compose their differences with ease. Shah Sooja, lifted by Runjeet Singh on to a throne at Cabul, could be required to resign in return the pretensions of the Afghan race to Peshawur.

decides on replacing Dost Mahommed with Shah Sooja.

Reasons of this character convinced Auckland of the necessity of supplanting Dost Mahommed by Shah Sooja. Since the time when Napoleon had taken the fatal step of thrusting his own brother on the throne of Spain, no civilised Power had resolved on a policy of equal injustice. But its folly was even more apparent than its injustice. All civilised communities have an interest in the stability of Governments, and British India was about to embark on the wretched task of destroying a comparatively stable throne. All civilised communities have an interest in maintaining able men on the thrones of neighbouring and barbarous States, and British India was to strike down a man whom all men described as able, and to set up a mere puppet whom all men acknowledged to be a weak fool. The authors of this famous policy seem to have themselves felt shame at their own actions; and, in publishing

the Afghan despatches, they suppressed every passage which told against their own decision. There is, unhappily, reason to believe that their conduct in doing so has been imitated on other occasions. But the mutilation of the Afghan despatches seemed specially infamous because it involved the suppression of Burnes's own views, when Burnes was himself dead.[1]

Mac-naghten's mission to Lahore.

In the first instance, indeed, even Auckland hesitated to send a British expedition to a remote territory with the curious object of pulling down King Stork and setting up King Log. All that he originally contemplated was to employ Runjeet Singh, the ruler of the Sikhs, to do the work for him. Five years before, Runjeet had connived at a bold attempt which Shah Sooja had made to regain his old throne. The success of this expedition had hung suspended on the doubtful chances of a well-contested battle, and Auckland consequently presumed that, if Shah Sooja, with only Runjeet's moral support, had stood on the verge of success, Shah Sooja, with the active help of Runjeet's soldiers and with the moral support of Britain, would win an easy victory. He decided accordingly on sending a mission to Lahore to secure the co-operation of the Sikhs, and he entrusted the mission to Macnaghten—the able but irresponsible counsellor who had stood by his side at Simla. Macnaghten was instructed to propose either that

[1] The policy which Auckland pursued was almost forced on him by instructions from home. Melbourne wrote on the 29th October, 1838: 'Auckland has adopted the course which in the meeting we held at Windsor, where there were seven of us, we agreed to recommend to him; viz. not to follow McNeill's suggestion of moving into Persia from Bushire, but to take decisive measures in Afghanistan.' *Melbourne*, vol. ii. p. 273. The story of the suppression or mutilation of Burnes's despatches will be found fully told in a debate in 1861. *Hansard*, vol. clxi. p. 37. Soon after the publication of these despatches an impression prevailed that they had been unfairly dealt with; but the report was contradicted by two Presidents of the Board of Control. In 1851, however, Mr. Kaye published his history of the *Afghan War*; and, as he had access to the genuine documents, he established the fact beyond dispute; and, in 1859, the real documents were laid before Parliament.

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the Sikh army should advance through the passes of the Himalayas on Cabul, while Shah Sooja, aided by a British contingent, should occupy Shikarpore and move on Candahar; or that the Sikhs, acting alone, should themselves undertake the whole dangers and win the whole glory of the expedition. Runjeet declined the last, but grasped at the first of these alternatives, and Auckland consequently learned that, if Shah Sooja were to be restored at all, the restoration would have to be effected by British bayonets.[1]

The reluctance of Runjeet to act alone did not make Macnaghten pause. Impatient of the slight delays which arose from the natural desire of the Sikh to improve his own position, on the 26th of June, 1838, he put his signature to the treaty. Under it, Shah Sooja unconditionally abandoned all claim to the Afghan territory in Runjeet's hands; he relinquished any right to the allegiance and tribute of Scinde on the payment to him by the Ameers of Scinde of such a sum as the British Government might fix; he agreed, out of the sum thus received, to hand over fifteen lacs of rupees to Runjeet Singh; and he undertook to pay a subsidy of two lacs of rupees to the Sikh Government in return for the contingent of 5,000 men with which Runjeet Singh engaged to assist him.[2] The conditions of the treaty were thus chiefly in favour of Runjeet Singh. Even Shah Sooja—a miserable exile in British India—had the courage to demur to some of them. His remonstrances, however, naturally counted for nothing. He could not afford to refuse the half-loaf which was offered to him and in the middle of July put his signature to the treaty.

The treaty of 26th June, 1838.

A few days after Shah Sooja had signed the memo-

[1] Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. i. p. 315; cf. Durand's *Afghan War*, p. 67 *et seq.*

[2] The treaty will be found in *Parl. Papers, Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 6. It is reprinted, but not quite accurately, *Kaye*, vol. i. p. 319.

rable treaty, Burnes, in obedience to Auckland's orders, arrived at Simla.[1] He had already written to Macnaghten and urged him to deal with Dost Mahommed and abandon the Shah. On his arrival he repeated this advice. But the time was already gone for a policy of this character, and all that Burnes could do was to plead that, if Shah Sooja were restored at all, he should be restored to a strong kingdom. Even this advice fell like an unheeded warning on Auckland and his counsellors. They pushed forward their preparations and assembled their troops. On the 1st of October, 1838, still at Simla, Auckland issued a fresh proclamation in which he recapitulated the objects of his policy. Shah Sooja —so ran the concluding paragraph of a document which has been described not unjustly 'as a most disingenuous distortion of the truth'—'will enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by a British army.'[2] Foreign interference! What foreign interference had ever been greater than Auckland's? Factious opposition! The faction which Auckland was encountering was a nation for once made of one mind by the Governor-General's policy.

Burnes reaches Simla.

The proclamation of 1st October, 1838.

The ink with which the proclamation was written was hardly dry before the whole foundation on which this frail superstructure of a policy had been reared gave way beneath its author. The siege of Herat had been the only circumstance which had suggested a British expedition beyond the Indus; and the siege of Herat was raised on the 9th of October. After months of suffering and failure, the Persian army retired from the slender fortifications of the town. A young British officer, Eldred Pottinger, travelling in Asia, had thrown himself into the place, and had sustained the defence by his prudence and animated the garrison by his valour.

The siege of Herat.

[1] *Kaye*, vol. i. p. 338. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 359, 361.

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A small expedition, subsequently despatched from Bombay, which had occupied the little island of Karrack in the Persian Gulf,[1] had induced the Persian Sovereign, already taught by Pottinger to despair, to give the signal for retreat.[2] The scanty excuse which a Persian expedition had offered for Auckland's policy in the spring had disappeared in the autumn. The bugbear of a Russian advance was also being slowly removed. Russia, with characteristic patience, was abandoning her design and modifying her policy. Instead, moreover, of bidding one against the other on the Bosphorus, British and Russian statesmen were again approaching one another, and laying the foundation of the quadrilateral alliance of 1840. Under these circumstances the humble instruments who had on either side been employed to promote their countries' interests at Cabul were treated with a lack of consideration which was discreditable to their employers. Burnes's despatches were coolly mutilated; poor Vicovitch was simply disowned. Burnes, perhaps the happier of the two, met a soldier's death; Vicovitch, ignored and thrust aside, blew out his own brains.[3]

Thus every justification for interference had disappeared. The Persians had withdrawn from Afghanistan; Russian influence had retreated with the Persian battalions; and the interests of England—if England had any interests at all in these remote districts—were concerned with the preservation of order and not with the destruction of authority. Unfortunately for Auckland, however, the treaty which he had made with Runjeet Singh, and to which Shah Sooja had acceded, made a policy of

[1] It is perhaps worth observing that Ellenborough had contemplated the occupation of Karrack nine years before. *Diary*, vol. ii. p. 93. For Hobhouse's explanation of the occupation, *Hansard*, vol. xliv. p. 574. For the occupation, *Thornton*, vol. vi. p. 131; *Kaye*, vol. i. p. 271.

[2] For the siege of Herat, Watson's *Persia*, pp. 266, 324 *sq.*

[3] For Vicovitch's death, see *Kaye*, vol. i. p. 200, *note*.

non-intervention more difficult. He had not the moral courage to sheathe the sword simply because his object had been secured without using it. Like many weak men, he fancied that his country's reputation depended on the demonstration of its strength and not on the success of its policy; and, with literally no object to secure except the miserable purpose of pulling down one king and setting up another, he plunged into hostilities.[1]

Two armies were collected for the invasion of Afghanistan. One, drawn from the Presidency of Bengal and placed under Sir Willoughby Cotton, was assembled at Ferozepore in the beginning of December 1838. The other, composed of Bombay troops, under Sir J. Keane, to whom the command-in-chief was assigned,[2] was instructed to land at Kurrachee and march through Scinde.

Scinde.

Scinde is the territory through which the Indus, after the junction of its five great confluents, finds its way to the sea. Nearly half a century before the Afghan war, the rule in it had passed to Meer Futteh Ali, chief of the Talpores. Futteh Ali divided the country which he had acquired, and conferred portions of it round Khyrpore and Meerpore respectively on relations of his own. He retained, however, the lion's share of the possession in his own hands, and he associated with himself his three brothers in its administration. The Ameer of Khyrpore imitated his example. Scinde therefore consisted of three distinct principalities; and at Hyderabad, the capital of the chief State, and at

[1] It is worth while adding that some of the highest Indian authorities were opposed to the expedition. For Outram's condemnation of it, see *Life of Outram*, vol. i. p. 170; for Metcalfe's, Greville, *Memoirs*, pt. ii., vol. ii. p. 99.

[2] The force was originally placed under the command of Sir H. Fane, Commander-in-Chief in India. Its strength was reduced after the fall of Herat, and the command entrusted to Keane, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Presidency. Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. i. p. 378; Havelock's *Afghan War*, vol. i. p. 55; Durand's *Afghan War*, p. 92.

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Khyrpore, a plurality of Ameers was associated in the government.[1]

It was only of recent years that much intercourse had taken place between Scinde and Britain. A factory, established in 1758, was withdrawn in 1775, and in 1799 a new attempt to open a factory at Tatta, on the lower Indus, resulted in failure. In 1809, however, a treaty was concluded with the Ameers by which they consented to exclude Frenchmen from their territory; and this treaty was supplemented in 1820 by another, under which the Ameers engaged not to permit any European or American to settle in their dominions.[2] In 1828 Ellenborough,[3] while President of the Board of Control, with his head full of ambitious ideas, and longing to see the British flag float in triumph on the waters of the Indus to the source of all its tributary streams, opened negotiations with the Ameers for the navigation of that river. They were reluctantly persuaded to grant a free passage along the river and roads of Scinde to the merchants and traders of Hindostan, but they expressly stipulated that no military stores should be brought by river or road, and that no armed vessels should come by the river.

No necessity for the infraction of the treaty of 1828 existed in 1839. The direct road from India to Cabul passed through the territory of Runjeet Singh and the Khyber Pass; and the road from Loodiana, where Shah Sooja was residing, through Scinde to Cabul, was three times as long and more than three times as difficult as that by Peshawur. High military authorities were of opinion that the shorter and more direct road should

[1] Thornton's *History of India*, vol. vi. p. 395; *Calcutta Review*, vol. vi. p. 570.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 397. *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. i. Napier's *Conquest of Scinde*, p. 38; Goldsmid's *Life of Outram*, vol. i. pp. 154–5.

[3] Ellenborough's *Diary*, vol. ii. p. 144. The treaty which, in consequence, was concluded in 1828 with the Ameers of Hyderabad is printed in *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, pp. 2, 3.

Auckland's treatment of Scinde

be preferred.[1] The Governor-General, however, thought otherwise. A crisis, in his opinion, had occurred in 'which it was essentially requisite for the security of British India that the real friends of that Power should unequivocally manifest their attachment to its interests;' and in a passage, which was hardly more than a parenthesis of a despatch, the British Resident in Scinde was instructed to inform the Ameers that during the continuance of the war the stipulations of the treaty would 'necessarily be suspended.'[2]

A much more serious demand than the passage of the Indus was simultaneously pressed on the Ameers. In the tripartite treaty Shah Sooja had agreed to relinquish all claim to the tribute of Scinde and its arrears in consideration of such a sum as the British Government might consider fair, and he had undertaken, out of the sum which he so received, to pay fifteen lacs of rupees to Runjeet Singh. The Resident in Scinde was instructed to tell the Ameers that the amount which they would be required to pay would be not less than twenty lacs, and that, if the Ameers refused to pay this sum, Shikarpore and the adjacent territory would be seized as a base for the ensuing campaign. The Ameers met the claim by producing two releases, signed and sealed by Shah Sooja himself, bestowing Scinde and Shikarpore upon them without tribute of any kind. These releases afforded, therefore, a strong presumption that Shah Sooja had no claim on the revenues of Scinde, that he had consequently nothing to surrender as an equivalent for a fixed payment, and that the provision in the tripartite treaty was based on a misapprehension. But these documents caused no difficulty to Auckland and his counsellors. Formal releases, signed and sealed by Shah Sooja, were treated

[1] Napier's *Conquest of Scinde*, p. 59.

[2] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 10.

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as '*ex parte* statements,' and referred to Macnaghten, who by this time had become envoy to the Shah.[1]

It is not surprising that Native princes thus treated should have turned for help to other quarters. The king of Persia was, in their judgment, 'exalted high as the planet Saturn,' and Noor Mohammed, the chief Ameer of Hyderabad, accordingly flung himself into the arms of Persia.[2] The Resident in Scinde reported the circumstance to the Governor-General, and Auckland at once determined that duplicity had deprived Noor Mohammed of all confidence and friendly consideration. The Resident was authorised in consequence to tell the Ameers that 'the share in the government which has been held by the guilty party shall be transferred to the more faithful members of the family,' and that it might be necessary to accompany this stipulation with a condition that a British subsidiary force should be maintained in Scinde.[3]

English writers and English readers, naturally disposed to assume that English statesmen abstain from the practices which their ancestors denounced in France of the first Empire, and which they themselves denounce in Russia to-day, will do well to reflect on this melancholy story. Nor should they forget that Scinde in 1838 was an independent country, only recently brought into commercial relations with British India; that its frontier was remote from British territory; that British statesmen had expressly promised that no arms, and no armed vessels, should pass through its roads or its waters; and that its Ameers were at least as much entitled to seek the alliance of the Persians as the British themselves were justified in agreeing to the tripartite treaty. Might has been too frequently accepted

[1] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, pp. 31, 53, 61; *Thornton*, vol. vi. p. 404; *Life of Outram*, vol. i. p. 156. Durand calls this, 'an iniquitous demand.' *History of Afghan War*, p. 76.

[2] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, pp. 12, 13.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 17.

as a synonym for right in the history of the world. But in the annals of wrong-doing there are few grosser instances of the confusion of right with might than in the dreary history of the Afghan war and of the treatment of Scinde. Even writers who condone Wellesley's conduct towards Oudh have no apology to offer for Auckland's conduct towards the Ameers.

The occupation of Scinde.

But the unrighteous history was not yet completed. On the 5th of October the British Resident was told that 'in the present crisis of affairs no opposition to the arrangements in progress can be tolerated.'[1] On the 29th of October it was added that, whether the present Ameers were suffered to retain power or not, the Governor-General had determined that it was just and necessary to establish a British subsidiary force in lower Scinde.[2] At the end of November Keane and the Bombay troops landed at Kurrachee: and in January 1839 the Ameers were informed that Scinde formed an integral portion of Hindostan; that the supremacy of Hindostan had devolved upon Britain; that Britain could allow the intermeddling of no other Power; that the Ameers must consequently bind their interests irrevocably with those of Britain, and that if they neglected to do so they would deeply regret their neglect.[3] Truths, perhaps, but truths which had rarely been addressed to an independent Power, and which no independent Power could have done else than resented.

The conduct of the Ameers.

Under such pressure the conduct of the Ameers could hardly have been straightforward. Britain was tearing up the treaties which she had made with them, she was infringing the neutrality of their country, she was enforcing the claim which Shah Sooja had surrendered years before. Ignorant probably of the respective strength of Persia and Britain, they had in the

[1] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 27.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

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first instance turned to Persia for help, and Persia had failed them. They thenceforward attempted a policy of delay. With Orientals delay was almost certain to be accompanied with duplicity. The Ameers consented to allow the British a passage through their territories, but they threw every obstacle in the way of their collecting transport and supplies for the army.[1] They even offered to pay the claim which the British had raised in Shah Sooja's favour; but the negotiations moved slowly; and in the meanwhile Keane, imperfectly supplied, was still detained on the lower Indus. Cotton, however, by this time advancing from Ferozepore, had arrived at Roree, where it was intended that he should cross the Indus. The bridge for his passage would not, so the engineers told him, be ready for some days, and he determined to fill up the interval by leading his army on Hyderabad, the richest city in the province, and thus creating a diversion in Keane's favour.[2] The troops heard with eagerness that they were to be led against a town which was reputed to contain 8,000,000*l.* of treasure. But the movement answered its purpose. The Ameers, who had been collecting a rabble which they called an army,[3] unconditionally gave way. They allowed the troops the required passage; they paid a sum of money towards Shah Sooja's expenses; they even consented to accept and to maintain a subsidiary force. Like the king in the parable, they counted the cost. For all practical purposes Scinde ceased to be an independent Power.

The submission of Scinde removed some of the

[1] Havelock's *Afghan War*, vol. i. p. 114.

[2] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 127.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 130; Havelock's *Afghan War*, vol. i. pp. 151, 158; Durand's *Afghan War*, pp. 95–116. In the text I have treated Scinde as a whole, and have omitted the distinction between the conduct of Meer Roostum, the friendly Ameer of Khyrpore, and that of the unfriendly Ameers of Lower Scinde. The reader will find a good account of this in Havelock's *Afghan War*, vol. i. pp. 111–141.

difficulties of the expedition. The troops advanced through Beloochistan on Quetta, where Keane, in the spring of 1839, took command of the force. The town of Quetta lies at the northern entrance of the Bolan Pass. It overlooks, and perhaps commands, the road which, running through the mountains to Candahar, leads either to Cabul on the north-east or to Herat on the north-west. At the end of the first week in April the army left Quetta; towards the end of that month Candahar was occupied; and there, on the 8th of May, Shah Sooja was formally enthroned.[1]

The advance of the army.

Hitherto the army had encountered no military opposition. It had suffered from heat and drought, its baggage animals had died by tens of thousands, and the troops themselves, faint from want of food and parched with thirst,[2] had frequently been forced to do the work of beasts of burden. At Candahar the men enjoyed some weeks of welcome rest. As the summer advanced, however, the march was resumed, and the army was led along the road which leads to Cabul. This road is blocked ninety miles from Cabul by the fortress of Ghuznee. An impression prevailed in Calcutta, which had been accepted by military men, that Ghuznee was only an Oriental fortress commanded by surrounding hills, which would fall an easy prey to an English army. The troops were startled, therefore, to find themselves before a rampart which rose sixty or seventy feet above the plain, which was surrounded by a deep ditch full of water, which was flanked by numerous towers, and which, it was ascertained, was held by one of Dost Mahommed's sons. No battering train of strength adequate for an attack on such a fortification had been attached to the original expedition. The mortality among camels and cattle had forced the army to leave at Candahar the few heavy guns which had been dragged through the Bolan

The fall of Ghuznee.

[1] Durand's *Afghan War*, pp. 150–157. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

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Pass.[1] So little attention, moreover, had been paid to the necessity for scientific knowledge, that the senior engineer officer with the expedition was only a captain of Engineers. Fortunately, however, if Captain Thomson were comparatively young in his profession, he was fertile in expedients and bold in his designs. He had already proved his capacity by throwing a bridge of boats over the Indus. He now saw that a new situation necessitated a new expedient. As the walls were too strong to be breached with the artillery at his disposal, and too high to be scaled, he determined to blast open a gate, and thus afford an entrance to the storming party. A spy, a nephew of Dost Mahommed's, revealed the fact that all the gates of the fortress except that on the opposite side, which led to Cabul, had been walled up. By a movement, imitated years afterwards on a larger scale in the Crimea, the army was transferred by a circuitous route from the south to the north of Ghuznee. On a dark and tempestuous night a small party of engineers placed 300 pounds of powder[2] against the gate. The fuse was lighted, the powder exploded, the gate shivered by the force of the explosion, and the storming party, held in readiness, rushed in over the ruin which had been made. The enemy, stunned by the magnitude of the disaster, and distracted by a false attack which had previously been made, was unprepared to resist the assault. Driven into the central square, it was swept down by the musketry of the troops; and, as daylight dawned, the British army stood in undisputed possession of the fortress.

[1] Havelock's *Afghan War*, vol. ii. p. 62.

[2] Durand's *Afghan War*, p. 174 *et seq.* Sir H. Durand led the Engineers on the occasion. Sir H. Havelock, *Afghan War*, vol. ii. p. 72, talks of 900 lbs. of powder, but this appears to be a mistake. Colonel Yule has published a short sketch of the career of Captain, afterwards Colonel, Thomson (London, 1886), which may be usefully referred to for an account of this officer's great services in the first Afghan war.

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The fall of Ghuznee decided the campaign. On the 30th of July the army resumed its march. Dost Mahommed fled at its approach, and on the 7th of August Shah Sooja entered Cabul. Titles were freely given to those who had taken part in the campaign. Auckland was made an earl; Keane a baron; Wiltshire, who had commanded a division of the army, Macnaghten, and Pottinger, baronets; and a shower of inferior honours was thrown on lesser men. The expedition was regarded as a masterpiece of policy.[1] Its supposed success was emphasised by an ample distribution of rewards, intended to show the importance which the ministry attached both to the achievement and to the cause.[2]

Disraeli's criticism on the war.

Yet even peerages and honours and stars could not reconcile the public to the circumstances of the campaign, or convince it of its wisdom. With a much truer instinct than that of the ministry, the people doubted the policy of plunging into an unknown country for the purpose of meeting Russia in the deserts of Central Asia. 'Would ministers tell us,' asked a rising politician, 'that it was necessary to create a barrier for our Indian

[1] Extraordinary anticipations were formed of the consequences of British predominance in Afghanistan. On the first news arriving of Auckland's decision to make war, Palmerston wrote to Melbourne, 'By taking the Afghans under our protection, and in garrisoning (if necessary) Herat, we shall regain our ascendency in Persia. . . . But British ascendency in Persia gives security on the eastward to Turkey, and tends to make the Sultan more independent, and to place the Dardanelles more securely out of the grasp of Nicholas.' *Life of Melbourne*, vol. ii. p. 274. It seems almost incredible that any man of Palmerston's powers should have persuaded himself that the occupation of Herat should have, in any way, affected the future of the Dardanelles.

[2] Mr. Marshman, with some bitterness but much truth, says that 'Lord Auckland was created an earl, and Sir John Keane, who had done nothing but leave his battering train behind him when he ought to have brought it on to Ghuznee, a baron, with a pension of 2,000*l.* a year for two lives. . . . Captain Thomson, whose exertions at Ghuznee saved the campaign from an ignominious failure, received only a brevet majority and the lowest order of the Bath, and at once retired from the service,' vol. iii. p. 152. Lord Keane placed a representation of Ghuznee on his shield, and assumed the Cabul Gate for a crest. The despatches on the taking of Ghuznee are reprinted in *Ann. Reg.*, 1840, Chron. p. 550.

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Empire? When he looked at the geographical position of India he found an empire separated on the east and west from any Power of importance by more than 2,000 miles of neutral territory, bounded on the north by an impassable range of rocky mountains, and on the south by 10,000 miles of ocean. He wanted to know how a stronger barrier, a more efficient frontier, could be secured than this which they possessed.' Yet this was the frontier which ministers had left behind them—'those fortunate gentlemen who proclaimed war without reason and prosecuted it without responsibility.'[1] It was soon known in England, moreover, that, if the objects of the expedition had in one sense been secured, the need for interference was not over. The ministers had deluded themselves with the expectation that Shah Sooja, their 'puppet' king,[2] would be received with enthusiasm by his former subjects. He was everywhere met, on the contrary, in sullen silence or with open demonstrations of dislike. It was obvious that the withdrawal of the British troops would be the signal for an insurrection against his authority, and the ministry had apparently to choose between the abandonment of the whole programme and the permanent occupation of Afghanistan.

The death of Runjeet Singh.

The choice was, moreover, affected by other circumstances. Runjeet Singh, the old Sikh chieftain, who had been the faithful ally of Britain for nearly thirty years, died while the army was advancing on Cabul. Thenceforward it became increasingly probable that the Punjab, the highway from British India to Afghanistan, would be subjected to influences hostile to those of the Company. About the same time, moreover, Russia decided on sending an expedition to punish the Khan of Khiva, who had carried Russian subjects from

[1] Disraeli (*Hansard*, vol. lxiv. p. 455); words which are worth quoting as they are exactly applicable to Lord Beaconsfield's own policy forty years afterwards.

[2] Durand's *Afghan War*, p. 187.

the shores of the Caspian into slavery.[1] It was impossible to deny the right of Russia to avenge an outrage on defenceless Russians. But it was not the less impossible to avoid perceiving that the Russian advance might counteract all the consequences of Auckland's policy. What Auckland called the just influence of the British Government would hardly obtain its proper footing among the natives of Central Asia if Russia overawed by her arms the Khan of Khiva.

The Russian expedition to Khiva.

The star of Britain has frequently shone clear amidst the gathering clouds of difficulty. It burst forth with fresh lustre in the spring of 1840. The expedition which Russia despatched to Khiva perished of famine and pestilence; the supremacy of Britain in Central Asia was again assured; and Macnaghten, with no European enemy to trouble him, suggested fresh conquests. Kamram at Herat, the worthless monarch whom Eldred Pottinger had saved, was intriguing with Persia. Runjeet Singh's grandson was intriguing at Lahore. Macnaghten coolly proposed to complete the work by the conquest of Herat,[2] and by wresting Peshawur from Lahore. Fresh wars, fresh conquests, were the only means by which a puppet king could be permanently supported on an unstable throne.

Macnaghten's policy in 1840.

Yet, while he was suggesting fresh conquests, his forces, unwisely scattered through a territory only nominally subdued, were hardly adequate for the task of preserving order. Here, there, almost everywhere, the troops were constantly engaged in punishing insurrections against Shah Sooja's authority. At last, in August 1840, Dost Mahommed himself escaped from Bokhara, whither he had fled and where he had been retained captive, and raised his banner on the slopes of the Hindoo Kosh. The troops which had been raised in Shah Sooja's name deserted to Dost Mahommed's

[1] *Kaye*, vol. i. p. 497. [2] See Durand's *Afghan War*, p. 294.

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service; Macnaghten in Cabul wrote urgent letters for reinforcements; and, on the 2nd of November, Dost Mahommed, heading in person a charge upon the British lines, won a signal victory. Yet, in this the darkest hour which had yet been experienced, the star of Britain again rose with a happy augury. Dost Mahommed, better acquainted than his countrymen with the strength of Britain, determined to yield in the hour of his triumph, and rode with only a solitary attendant into the British lines. Macnaghten, and those who were with him, did their best to secure their victim an honourable retreat in India, where a pension on the Indian revenues compensated him to some extent for his fall.

The surrender of Dost Mahommed.

Macnaghten declares the country quiet.

The surrender of Dost Mahommed in the closing weeks of 1840 afforded for the moment fair prospects of a settlement. During the first eight months of 1841, indeed, the country was disturbed by an insurrection of Douranees, the most important of the Afghan tribes, and of the Ghilzies, the most numerous and warlike of the subject races. This new insurrection was, however, quelled, after months of disturbance, by a victory on the Helmund; and, for the first time since he had entered the country, Macnaghten was able, in August 1841, to proclaim that the land was quiet from Dan to Beersheba.[1]

It was high time for quiet to come. Three years had been spent in the conduct of an operation which had been reckoned on its inception as easy of accomplishment; and men in London, in Calcutta, and in Cabul, were weary of a story which seemed never to approach its end, and of an expense which was drying up the resources of the East India Company. Macnaghten, indeed, thought that the whole difficulty

[1] *Kaye*, vol. i. p. 603. The account of the Douranees and Ghilzies in Elphinstone's *Cabul*, p. 391 *et seq.*, is even now worth reading; cf. for the Ghilzies, Durand's *Afghan War*, p. 252.

arose from Auckland's reluctance to complete the work. Afghanistan would never be quiet till its boundaries were enlarged to its old limits, and Herat on the west and Peshawur on the east were permanently annexed to Shah Sooja's dominions. Afghanistan, even when thus enlarged, would only remain at peace if Shah Sooja were upheld by British bayonets; and Dourances and Ghilzies were conciliated by British gold. Strange to say, if any advice which the Melbourne Cabinet offered can be considered strange, ministers at home shared a portion of Macnaghten's views, and sent out a despatch in the spring of 1841 to seize Herat. But the orders were not carried out. The Commander-in-Chief in India declared that he had no troops for a fresh adventure. The Governor-General, negotiating for a new loan, was forced to admit that he had no money for it. As peace too was at last said to reign from Dan to Beersheba, a new reason was afforded for doing nothing; and the Government accordingly determined to retain what it had got, and to refrain from encountering further risks by attempting to acquire more.[1]

Macnaghten and Cotton succeeded by Burnes and Elphinstone.

And there was another reason for preserving the *status quo*. A change was contemplated in the machinery of government. Cotton, in the previous January, complaining of ill-health, had been relieved of the command; and Auckland had chosen as his successor General Elphinstone, an officer the weight of whose declining years[2] was aggravated by confirmed ill-health,

[1] The orders to seize Herat were not cancelled till the Conservatives accepted office. Ellenborough's *Indian Administration*, pp. 3,4; cf. *Kaye*, vol. i. pp. 587, *note*, 588, and 621.

[2] Kaye writes of him as the poor old man, but he was under sixty years of age. Elphinstone was first cousin to the distinguished civil servant who had been sent to Cabul by Minto in 1809, and who subsequently published the great account of Afghanistan which ranks even now as a standard work, and first cousin once removed to Lord Elphinstone, who, as Governor of Bombay during the Mutiny, displayed capacity and energy. It may be some consolation to a distinguished family to reflect that, if it produced the most unfortunate general, it contributed to the Indian civil service its most capable statesman, and to Bombay its most energetic Governor.

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but who enjoyed the advantage of being the grandson of a peer and the son of an East India Director. In August, Macnaghten, who had already been raised to the baronetcy for his services, was given a more substantial reward, the governorship of Bombay;[1] and Burnes, who had been serving under him in an undefined and irresponsible capacity, was selected to succeed him. Thus, as the autumn wore on, the fortunes of Britain were apparently to be entrusted to new guidance, and the man who had shaped the Afghan policy was to be transferred to new quarters.

The cantonments.

Busily preparing for his coming journey, Macnaghten occupied a house near the British cantonments outside Cabul. On their first arrival barracks for the troops had been erected on the Bala Hissar, a hill which overlooked and commanded the city. But Shah Sooja required the Bala Hissar for the ladies of his harem; and Macnaghten, to please the king, withdrew the troops from the fort to the plain.[2] Few precautions were taken to fortify the new position. It was flanked by hills, it was encompassed with villages. Only a rude mound and ditch, over which an officer offered to ride a pony, was drawn round it. The cantonments, moreover, were separated from the stores and from an adjoining enclosure in which the houses of the Mission were placed. In this indefensible position, Macnaghten, accompanied by his wife, passed the fine autumn month which preceded his anticipated departure. The officers with whom he was surrounded, enjoying the bracing climate, were pursuing the amusements of Englishmen amidst the snowy hills of Cabul. Sport in the daytime, entertainments in the evening, shortened the hours of their exile; the presence of a few English ladies among them gave both tone and zest to their amusements; and

[1] *Kaye*, vol. i. p. 609. [2] Durand's *Afghan War*, pp. 206–208.

perhaps in no portion of the Eastern possessions of England was society more gay or life more pleasant than within the slender pale which surrounded the cantonments of Cabul.

Retrenchment in Afghanistan.

Men, indeed, who stopped to think amidst the gaiety which diverted most of their comrades from thought, must have detected even in the prevalent peace many causes for anxiety. It was known in India that the ministry which had suggested or sanctioned Auckland's Afghan campaign was doomed to perish; it was inferred that the access of a new ministry to office would lead to the modification of a policy which its probable leaders were known to disapprove; it was assumed that Peel would not easily be reconciled to an occupation which was costing India from 1,000,000*l.* to 2,000,000*l.* a year;[1] and it was concluded, therefore, that retrenchment, which would be inevitable a few weeks later, might as well be begun at once. Thus it was decided to withdraw most of the troops on Macnaghten's departure, and to withhold many of the allowances with which the chieftains had hitherto been conciliated. Macnaghten had endeavoured to strike terror by force, and to win friendship by gold. New men were to introduce new measures, and were to be deprived both of the power to strike and of the money to bribe.[2]

The Ghilzies and Sale.

Yet even the mere suggestion of a new policy produced danger. The Ghilzies of Eastern Afghanistan, finding that their allowances were discontinued, occupied the hills between Cabul and Jellalabad. Macnaghten desired Sir Robert Sale, an officer who was already under orders to return to India, to sweep the Ghilzies from the passes on his way. Sale, leaving his wife at Cabul, set out for Jellalabad, and, partly by

[1] *Kaye*, vol. i. p. 619.

[2] Cf. *Quarterly Review*, vol. lxxviii. p. 490, and cf. Durand's *Afghan War*, p. 298.

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arms, partly by negotiation, made some sort of terms with the Ghilzies. Even Macnaghten, however, anxious as he was to leave the country, and to leave it at peace, was not wholly satisfied with the sufficiency of the arrangement. He could not be deaf to the story of an enemy threatening to block the passes which led to Peshawur, to Calcutta, and to Bombay.

And other danger was now imminent. It will perhaps be always doubtful whether the rising which almost immediately occurred was the result of an organised conspiracy or the consequence of an accidental outbreak. If, indeed, the revolt were prepared, it is difficult to explain why it occurred on the 2nd of November. Had its authors waited only a few days, Macnaghten and more than half the troops would have been on their way to Hindostan.[1] Afghan statesmen were, at any rate, farseeing, patient men, unlikely to attack an army, when a respite of a few days would have left them only a brigade to deal with. Men there are of authority and repute who believe that the rising was, in the first instance, due to a private injury and not to a public wrong, and that the unexpected success of a mob induced its leaders to convert a riot into a revolution.

The nature of the rising.

Private injury unfortunately existed, and afforded pretext for outrage; armies encamped far from home are not usually famous for virtue, and Englishmen are not more moderate in their passions than men of other countries. And in Afghanistan a departure from virtue was especially unfortunate. In the elaborate account which Elphinstone gave of the manners and customs of the Afghans, he paid them the striking compliment of saying that they were the only people in the East among whom he had seen any trace of the sentiment of love.[2] The love of Door-

[1] See these facts well stated in *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 4.
[2] Elphinstone's *Cabul*, p. 184.

khaunee for Audam, and her murder and her lover's murder by her husband, formed the subject of the poem which, at the time of his visit, was 'read, repeated, and sung' through all parts of the country.[1] There were Audams among the British, there were Doorkhaunees in Cabul in 1842; and the Doorkhaunees had jealous husbands ready to avenge the treatment of their wives.[2]

Most of the British occupied quarters either in cantonments or in the adjoining mission-compound. But Burnes, Macnaghten's successor-designate, was living in a house in the city, which adjoined the residence of a British officer, Captain Johnson, the paymaster of Shah Sooja's army. On the night of the 1st of November, Abdoolla Khan, an Achekzye[3] whom Burnes had insulted,[4] suggested an attack on the mission-house. A friendly Afghan warned Burnes of his danger;[5] Burnes sent a message to Macnaghten asking for support, but he declined to leave the mission. He was rudely wakened from his confidence. Early in the morning an angry crowd of Afghans surrounded the house and clamoured for Burnes's blood. Burnes, relying on his influence, harangued the men from a gallery. The mob answered the harangue by renewing the attack. A young English officer, Broadfoot, was shot dead at Burnes's side. Burnes himself, trusting to the protection of a native who promised him a safe-conduct, was betrayed to the mob by his guide. He was at once cut to pieces by the rabble. Johnson's house,

The murder of Burnes.

[1] Elphinstone's *Cabul*, p. 185.

[2] *Kaye*, vol. i. p. 614; cf. Durand's *Afghan War*, p. 211.

[3] According to Elphinstone the Achekzyes, or Atchikzyes, were one of the four clans into which the Zeeruk branch of the Douranees were divided. Elphinstone's *Cabul*, p. 397.

[4] 'Aware of Abdoolla Khan's designs (intrigues with the Ghilzies), Burnes sent him an angry message, called him a dog, and threatened to recommend Shah Sooja to deprive the rebel of his ears.' *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 5. It is odd that English gentlemen fail to see that they gain nothing, but lose both dignity and influence, by language of such a character.

[5] Lady Sale's *Journal*, pp. 48, 440.

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the treasury of the Shah, was immediately afterwards sacked; and the mob, gathering confidence by success, and with appetite sharpened by the taste of blood and treasure, gave themselves up to the plunder of Cabul.

At half an hour's march from these deeds of violence a British army lay secure in its cantonments. News of the rising reached it at nine in the morning; and Shelton, Elphinstone's second in command, was ordered to march with a small force into the Bala Hissar. He had hardly received his orders, when his march was countermanded. Allowed later on to proceed, he was again halted; and he ultimately only arrived in time to cover the retreat of a small force which Shah Sooja had himself sent into the city, and which, entangled in narrow streets, had been severely handled. This, the only effort made to stop the rising, thus ended in a victory for the insurgents. Prospering by success, a riot in the morning became a revolution in the evening; and the chiefs, who had hitherto abstained from a movement which seemed foredoomed to failure, placed themselves at the head of the insurrection.[1]

Spread of the insurrection.

It is somewhere related that a caricature was published in the last century representing Paul of Russia holding in his right hand a scroll on which the word 'ordre' was written, in his left hand another scroll with the word 'contre-ordre' upon it, while upon his forehead was the word 'désordre.' Gout had reduced Elphinstone to the same condition. Orders and counter-orders had made Shelton powerless for good, and the difficulty of restoring quiet was increased tenfold by inaction. On the morrow, indeed, a small force was sent to force its way into the town. But it was weak; its commander misunderstood his orders; and it retired unsuccessful but unscathed. This fresh failure taught

[1] Lady Sale's *Journal*, p. 39. Durand, *Afghan War*, p. 353, defends Shah Sooja's conduct on this occasion. Other writers doubt whether he made any serious effort to check the rising.

Macnaghten the gravity of the situation. He abandoned the mission-compound and withdrew into cantonments. He sent pressing messages to Sale at Jellalabad, urging him to return to Cabul. He despatched a message to Candahar to recall a body of troops which was marching back to India. No help was forthcoming from either Candahar or Jellalabad, where other work was in progress. Fresh humiliations were, however, in store for the British. On the 4th the commissariat stores outside the cantonments were evacuated by Elphinstone's orders,[1] and Shah Sooja's stores nearer the city were taken by the enemy. On the 5th Elphinstone was already writing to Macnaghten, and suggesting that he should make terms.[2]

Fresh disasters.

A record of military events forms a small part of a historian's duty, and the author who resists the temptation of describing the tactics by which a nation's victories are won may spare himself the humiliation of describing the story of its disasters. It is enough to say that, with the capture of the stores, the fate of the army was virtually sealed. The commissariat officers soon exhausted the supplies of the surrounding neighbourhood, and the troops showed an increasing indisposition to take part in distant expeditions for forage. The infirmity of a general infected an army; and, for the first time in the history of the British in India, a British army allowed itself to be bearded by an enemy which, under other guidance, it would have scattered to the four winds of heaven; to talk of retreat instead of attack; and to waste away from inaction, when its own right hand should have gotten it the victory.

One man, indeed, in authority, suggested from first to last a worthier course. Macnaghten had a heavy responsibility on his shoulders. As Auckland's secretary he had devised the Afghan policy; as envoy to Shah Sooja he

Macnaghten and Elphinstone.

[1] Lady Sale's *Journal*, p. 51.

[2] *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 36.

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had given it form and shape. Unwilling to recognise his own failure, he had persuaded himself that the country was at last pacified. The engineer who closes the valve of his boiler might as well conclude that he had condensed the steam. But it is bare justice to Macnaghten's memory to add that, amidst the crash of a policy, he understood the military situation better than the military men. If the good genius of the British nation could have changed Elphinstone with Macnaghten, Afghanistan would occupy a different place in English history. If Elphinstone had been in Macnaghten's place in 1838 the first Afghan war would never have occurred. If Macnaghten had been in Elphinstone's place in 1841, the British army would, in all probability, have extricated itself from its difficulties.

Ten days passed away. On the 13th of November the troops won some advantage over their assailants. Two days afterwards a strange foretaste of their own fate was given to them. Pottinger, in the beginning of November, was stationed near Chareekar, in Kohistan, with a single Ghoorka regiment. His position was assailed by a swarm of Afghans. Water failed, and tortured by thirst the troops had no alternative but to abandon the defence and retire on Cabul. In the retreat they broke their slender ranks to cool their parched lips at every pool, and were shot down one at a time by their enemies. Two officers alone, Pottinger and Haughton, wounded and faint, made their way on horseback to the cantonments on the plain, the solitary survivors of the force by which Kohistan had been held.[1]

Pottinger in Kohistan.

Even such a story brought no wisdom to those in command. Every day made the necessity for action more apparent, and yet day after day was suffered to pass without anything being done. Elphinstone could

[1] Lady Sale's *Journal*, p. 103.

not make up his mind to fight, and Macnaghten could not make up his mind to retire. And so, while the days became shorter, while the nights grew colder, while the forage failed, and the fainting beasts died for want of food, the doomed army of 4,500 fighting men and 10,000 camp followers lingered in an indefensible position and did nothing.

At last, at the end of November, Macnaghten reluctantly consented to negotiate with the enemy. He was met with a demand to surrender at discretion, and at once broke off the negotiation by saying that he preferred death to dishonour. But, though Macnaghten's words were worthy of an English gentleman, the conduct of the army showed that it preferred dishonour to death. The demand of the enemy had proved the necessity for action; and Elphinstone insisted on the necessity of resuming negotiations. The highest officers of the army concurred in his opinion. Abdoolla Khan, who, during the first three or four weeks of the rising, had led the enemy, fell, towards the end of November, in an ill-contested battle. His place was filled by the arrival at Cabul of Akbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mahommed. This change in the Afghan counsels suggested the possibility of easier terms, and on the 11th of December Macnaghten resumed the negotiations. A treaty was concluded for the complete evacuation of Afghanistan by the British. The Afghans were to aid the retreat by furnishing carriage and provisions.[1]

The treaty of the 11th of December.

If, even then, Macnaghten and Elphinstone had known their own minds, if they had occupied the succeeding day in procuring supplies, and, after a twenty-four hours' interval, had started on their journey, they might have warded off disaster. But the one negotiation was followed by another. The Afghans would not send in

[1] The treaty is reprinted in *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 123, and for the previous statements in the paragraph, see Lady Sale's *Journal*, pp. 142, 168.

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supplies till the British evacuated the few forts they held. The British hesitated to evacuate the forts till the supplies were brought in. Thus day after day passed, and the army still lingered on in cantonments. But a new difficulty was superadded to the many difficulties inseparable from the retreat. The elements declared war against Macnaghten. On the 18th of December it began to snow.[1]

Even the fall of snow did not quicken Macnaghten's action. The Afghans, regarding the British with distrust, withheld the supplies. It is painful to add that the distrust was deserved. It may, indeed, be hoped that the offers of gold made by English gentlemen for the heads of their principal enemies were unknown to Macnaghten.[2] But it is at least certain that the last days of his life were spent in plots to evade the treaty which he had signed. Catching like a drowning man at any straw, he consented on the 22nd of December to meet Akbar Khan and conclude a fresh arrangement. But in plots he was no match for an Afghan. Whether Akbar Khan intended to assassinate Macnaghten, or whether he enticed him to an interview for the purpose of detaining him, are questions which cannot now be settled. Sufficient to say that, on the 23rd of December, Macnaghten kept his appointment, and, while resisting an effort to pinion him, was shot dead by Akbar Khan.

Macnaghten's murder.

Within a few hundred yards of the spot where Macnaghten fell, 4,500 British soldiers were in position. The shot by which the envoy was slain was heard in the lines;[3] the rumour of his death circulated among the troops. But Elphinstone, ever loth to pluck the flower safety out of the nettle danger, did nothing. He

[1] Lady Sale's *Journal*, p. 183. There had previously been snow in November. *Ibid.*, pp. 141, 143.

[2] Durand's *Afghan War*, p. 365.

[3] Lady Sale's *Journal*, p. 194.

suffered the day to pass, and waited for the explanations of the morrow. And, when with the morrow arrived news confirmatory of the murder, he had nothing to propose but fresh negotiations. Pottinger, sorely against his will, was thrust into Macnaghten's place, and persuaded to arrange terms with the enemy. For the first time in history a British army consented not only to surrender arms, ammunition, guns, and hostages, for the sake of procuring food and transport for its retreat, but to stipulate that the other British garrisons in the country should also abandon their trust and participate in their dishonour.[1]

The treaty of the 1st January, 1842.

The treaty was signed on the first day of 1842, and the dispirited army recommenced its preparations for its departure. Snow was lying thick on the ground, and still falling. Mules and camels, exhausted by a long continuance of insufficient food, were in poor condition for labours which were made tenfold heavier by the snow. Authority had been destroyed by the British; and the new men with whom the treaty was signed had not the power, if they had the will, to restrain the crowds of fanatics who were daily spoiling the British camp, or the bands of Ghilzies who held the hills between Jellalabad and Cabul.

On the 6th of January, 1842, the retreat began. The road on leaving the cantonments crossed the Indus, and a temporary bridge had been constructed to facilitate the passage of the army. The bridge was to have been finished by eight—it was not ready till noon; the troops, to whom time was safety, were delayed at the outset of their march in the snow. When, at last, later on in the day, they moved forward, their advance was hindered by the crowd of camp-followers, who, without order themselves, infected everything with disorder. So slow, under these circumstances, was the march, that

The commencement of the retreat.

[1] This treaty is in *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 182.

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the rearguard did not reach the further bank of the river till the early hours of the following day. It had to fight its way through a crowd of fanatics with whom treaties had no weight, and who paid no heed to anything but plunder. Huddled together, the men passed the first night of their retreat on the snow. The morning rose on an army which was already little better than a mob. The march was resumed, and new indignities were in store for it. The Ghilzies, ever renewing their attacks, seized guns and baggage; and Elphinstone, instead of pushing forward, recommenced negotiations, and surrendered three more hostages, Pottinger among them, as security for the evacuation of Jellalabad.

The morning of the third day rose on an exhausted army. It had only accomplished, in two days of suffering, ten miles of its journey. It had lost many men during the attacks of the Ghilzies; it had lost more men who fell asleep in the snow and never woke. Surging around it were bands of fanatics already emboldened by success. Before it the road ran for five miles through a narrow defile enclosed by precipitous hills. Soldiers, camp-followers, women, children, plunged into the gorge, and from every vantage-ground bands of Ghilzies poured a deadly fire into the miserable crowd of fugitives. Three thousand men are said to have fallen on that terrible day. Akbar Khan, accompanying the retreat, endeavoured to restrain the attacks of the Ghilzies. The Ghilzies cared not for Akbar Khan. He offered, if Elphinstone would only halt, to supply the troops with food; and Elphinstone, against the advice of those around him, halted another day in the snow. And so from morning to evening of the fourth day the doomed force waited for relief that never came; while at the close of it Akbar Khan, either from pity or from policy, asked for the surrender of the

The annihilation of the force.

ladies and the children, and consented that the husbands of those who had husbands with them should accompany them. Lady Macnaghten, Lady Sale, and a few other women and children were, with one or two officers, given up to the enemy. They escaped from a certain death to a captivity whose dangers were unknown.

On the morning of the fifth day the army, thus relieved of one of its charges, resumed its march. Its resumption was the signal for the renewal of the slaughter. As soldiers and camp-followers wound their way through the defile, they were shot down at every stride. 'Tis said that on the evening of that fearful day only 4,000 enfeebled men remained out of the 14,500 who had started from Cabul. Despair gave them strength, and they decided, without halting, to push on. All night long, all through the next day, the remnant of an army, constantly reduced by the enemy's fire, fought its way to Jugdulluck. There the weary men passed the sixth night and the seventh day, while their leaders entered into fresh negotiations with Akbar Khan. Elphinstone, Shelton, and another officer were detained as hostages, and endeavoured, in their detention, to purchase terms for the safety of the residue of the army. An arrangement was nominally concluded; and the force, without its leaders, on the evening of the seventh day prepared to resume its march. But again the renewal of the march led to a repetition of the slaughter. The dispirited and weakened troops found themselves in face of a barricade which stretched across the narrow defile. There the little remnant of soldiers who had survived the dangers of the march fought with a courage which redeems the character of the retreat, and there, one by one, they were shot or cut down. When the morning of the eighth day dawned only sixty-five men were still alive. Still fighting, still hoping, still seeing its dwindled numbers lessening, the little band pushed on

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to Futtehabad. Six British officers reached it alive, and Jellalabad, with its shelter, was only sixteen miles away. But five out of these six survivors were to fall in these sixteen miles, and one man alone, Dr. Brydon, faint from his wounds, was suffered to struggle on his jaded horse to the walls of Jellalabad. A great English poet has told the story of the memorable night ride by which the good news were brought from Ghent to Aix. No poet, either in verse or prose, has yet told—perhaps no poet will ever dare to tell—in fitting language how the story of shame and suffering was brought to Jellalabad.

Sale at Jellalabad.

On the day on which Dr. Brydon staggered into Jellalabad exactly two months had passed since Sale had thrown his column into the town. Few men in responsible positions had ever passed a more anxious period, or done more by courage and judgment to retrieve a desperate fortune. On the outbreak of the insurrection at Cabul he had been pressed by Macnaghten to return.[1] On the conclusion of the arrangement for the retreat he had been desired by Pottinger and Elphinstone[2] to retire to India. Compliance with the first order was, perhaps fortunately, impracticable. Sale had no animals with him which would have enabled him to move his brigade to Cabul.[3] The second order Sale determined to disregard. He felt that the fate of the troops at Cabul was, in all probability, decided before it reached him. He concluded that their chances of safety would be increased by his remaining at Jellalabad. There could be no doubt that British honour and British in-

[1] These orders were sent not from Elphinstone to Sale, but by Macnaghten to his deputy, MacGregor. There are some very pertinent remarks of the Duke of Wellington's on the singular arrangement which enabled political agents to direct military movements in Ellenborough's *Indian Administration*, p. 240 *et seq.* For the orders, *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 63. For Sale's reasons for disobeying them, *ibid.*, p. 195.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 212.

[3] This is a point which has been disputed. The opinion in the text is Wellington's, in Ellenborough's *Indian Administration*, p. 227.

terests required that, amidst humiliation and disaster, a brigade of British soldiers should prove that they could behave like Britons in the hour of danger.[1]

Yet, in truth, when Sale threw himself into Jellalabad on the 13th of November his chances of safety seemed inferior to those of the army at Cabul. His army, almost destitute of transport and of food, was surrounded by a yelling crowd calling upon it to abandon the town. In the immediate neighbourhood hovered armed bodies of Afghans. The feeble ramparts filled with rubbish afforded little or no resistance to an attacking force. To the north, between the garrison and Elphinstone, was the narrow defile, blocked by the guns of the enemy, which ran among the hills between Gundamuck and Jugdulluck. On the south, the only road to India and safety, was the Khyber, the most dreaded of all the passes which led to Hindostan. The men had reason for depression in the vague rumours of disaster and defeat which continually reached them from Cabul; their commander had his own cause for anxiety, since his wife shared the dangers of Elphinstone's force. Yet the circumstances which might have paralysed the arms of other men only braced the garrison of Jellalabad to action. Captain Broadfoot, an engineer officer of capacity, undertook the task of making the weak defences of the town a little stronger. Colonel Monteith, an Indian officer of vigour, issued from the city on the 16th of November and attacked the Afghan forces which surrounded it. Colonel Dennie, an English officer who had led the assaulting column at Ghuznee, fought a new battle outside the walls on the 1st of December. Macgregor, the political agent, who accompanied the force, busied himself in

His position.

[1] The reasons for refusing to retire will be found in MacGregor's words in *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 213. It is perhaps fair to add that Durand condemns Sale's original decision to withdraw from Gundamuck to Jellalabad. *Afghan War*, p. 360.

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procuring supplies. The common soldiers, sharing the energy of their leaders, cheerfully consented to live on half-rations and to do double work.[1] Yet the men who held Jellalabad were only made of the same stuff as those who were beleaguered at Cabul. The gallantry with which an ever-dwindling band of heroes fought its way from Jugdulluck to Gundamuck proved that there were Dennies and Monteiths and Broadfoots and MacGregors at Cabul. The energy of one man galvanised the garrison of Jellalabad into life. The incapacity of another paralysed the army at Cabul.

Two months had passed when Dr. Brydon bore into Jellalabad such a story of shame and suffering as no British messenger had ever told before. The extermination of the Cabul army increased the difficulties of the garrison. The bands of Afghans who had hitherto hovered round the town were reinforced by the Afghan army and Akbar Khan; and the garrison, which had held its own against mortal foes, was assailed by a new and greater force than the Afghans.

The earthquake.

A severe earthquake shattered the town, demolished the parapet of the ramparts, and in a few moments annihilated the labours of two weary months. If Akbar Khan had ordered an attack immediately after the shock, his troops, like the Jews of old, might have marched over the prostrate fortifications to a contest in which numbers would have given them an overwhelming advantage. But even the recollection of recent slaughter could not nerve the Afghans to a new fight with British soldiers who stood firm. Akbar Khan, instead of venturing on an assault, relied on the slower but surer operations of blockade. He had not yet counted on the endurance of British troops when they are worthily led. Throughout February and March, the garrison, ever toiling at the works, its sup-

[1] *Kaye*, vol. ii. pp. 205, 206.

plies growing less day by day, patiently waited for the aid which was so long in coming. On the 1st of April the troops issued from their ramparts, and swept a flock of 500 sheep and goats into their lines from the enemy's camp. Flushed with their success, they ventured, six days afterwards, to move out of the town and attack Akbar Khan's beleaguering army. Their courage and confidence were justified by the event. Dennie, who had figured in almost every glorious action, attacked the centre of the position, and found a soldier's death in the field. Havelock, whose name was then unknown beyond a narrow circle, and who in 1842, after twenty-seven years of service, still held only a captain's commission, turned the enemy's left. Sale, seizing the opportunity, ordered a general advance, and secured a victory. The enemy hastily abandoned guns, camps, and equipage, and fled before the little force, which it outnumbered as five men outnumber one.[1]

The siege raised.

Jellalabad was not the only place in Afghanistan in which a British garrison was endangered by the outbreak of November. In Western Afghanistan a large force held Candahar; while small garrisons were placed at Khelat-i-Ghilzie and Ghuznee on the road from Candahar to Cabul. On the first outbreak of insurrection at Cabul, Nott was ordered to despatch a brigade to Elphinstone's assistance. As a soldier, he could not venture to disregard the command, but, with an intemperance which unfortunately characterised him, he almost publicly avowed his disapproval of the movement. Conscious of Nott's views, the officer in command of the brigade availed himself of the first pretext—the death of a few baggage-animals—to abandon the march, which he knew his commanding officer disapproved, and to return to Candahar; and thenceforward Nott had the satisfaction of knowing that

Nott at Candahar.

[1] *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 342. *Life of Sir H. Havelock*, p. 119.

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his whole force was assembled under his own orders for the defence of his own position.

In the meanwhile Auckland at Calcutta was receiving message after message announcing the annihilation of his policy and the accumulation of disaster. Distrustful of his own judgment, aware of the fall of his old colleagues, the Whig ministers, and conscious that his tenure of office was only provisional, he was as anxious in 1842 for retreat as he had been emulous in 1838 to advance. He deprecated the despatch of more reinforcements; he thought that his Sikh allies could spare artillery to clear the Khyber of insurgents; and he suffered, rather than supported, the efforts which were made by men subordinate to himself to hurry up men and guns to Peshawur. Fortunately, however, he took one step of importance to retrieve the credit of his country; he chose a new commander; and, almost for the first time during his rule, his choice fell on a competent officer. George Pollock was the youngest of four brothers, three of whom won distinction by their abilities. The eldest brother, after a comparatively short career, died a premature death as judge in India; the second, after achieving the highest distinction at his university and at the bar, became Attorney-General under Peel. The youngest, after serving under Lake in Nepaul and in Burma, was selected for a command which has placed his name among the military heroes of England. Some marriages seem exceptionally productive of able and energetic children. Those who are familiar with the histories of the Napiers and the Lawrences know how men of the same family, with few advantages to aid them, have hewn their way to use and distinction. The Pollocks form a third example of the same kind.

Auckland at Calcutta.

Sir G. Pollock.

Pollock reached the frontier on the 5th of February. Everything was in disorder. His predecessor, Wild, in

a vain attempt to force the Khyber Pass, had experienced a new disaster. There were no guns, no supplies, no baggage animals; a thousand men were in hospital; the Sepoy regiments, unnerved by stories of disaster and suffering, were verging on mutiny; even European officers were asserting that it was better to sacrifice Sale than to risk the loss of another army. Pollock had to infuse confidence in his own troops and to refuse the pressing demands which Sale was making on him for assistance. He had to organise everything, and, till everything was organised, to attempt nothing.

While Pollock was thus laboriously preparing an advance, a new Governor-General arrived in Calcutta. On ordinary occasions neither a change of ministry nor an alteration of administrative machinery necessitates an interruption of the policy of the nation. But the defeat of the Whigs in 1841 was no mere downfall of a Government; it expressed and precipitated the termination of a policy. The story has already been told in previous chapters how Peel, entering the Treasury, effected a revolution in finance, and how Aberdeen, entering the Foreign Office, effected a revolution in foreign policy. A change at least as great was made in the affairs of India. Ellenborough, who in the first instance resumed his old seat at the Board of Control, but who was almost immediately afterwards selected to succeed Auckland as Governor-General, was authorised by his colleagues to reverse the Indian policy of his predecessor both in Afghanistan and in China.[1]

The change of ministry.

[1] The first Chinese war was in one sense directly attributable to the altered position of the East India Company after 1833. Up to that year trade between England and China had been conducted in both countries on principles of strict monopoly. The Chinese trade was secured to the East India Company, and the English trade was confined to a company of merchants specially nominated for the purpose by the Emperor. The change of thought which produced the destruction of monopolies in England did not penetrate to the Conservative atmosphere of the Celestial Empire, and, while the trade in one country was thrown open to everyone, trade in the other was still exclusively con-

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The man who was thus selected to govern India had, unquestionably, abilities of a brilliant character.

fined to the merchants nominated by the Chinese Government. These merchants, Hong merchants as they were called, traded separately, but were mutually liable for the dues to the Chinese Government and for their debts to the foreigners. Such conditions neither promoted the growth of trade nor the solvency of the traders; and, out of the thirteen Hong merchants in 1837, three or four were avowedly insolvent. (*State Papers*, vol. xxvii. p. 1310.) Such were the general conditions on which the trade was conducted. The most important article of trade was opium. The importation of opium into China had, indeed, been illegal since 1796. But the Chinese Government had made no stringent efforts to prohibit the trade, and a Select Committee of the House of Commons had declared that it was inadvisable to abandon an important source of revenue to the East India Company. (*State Papers*, vol. xxix. p. 1020.) The opium trade consequently throve, and grew from 4,100 chests in 1796 to 30,000 chests in 1837, and the Chinese connived at or ignored the growing trade. (*Ibid.*, p. 1019.)

The growth of the trade, it must be recollected, was attended with another circumstance which in the result proved a source of embarrassment. It was practically transferred from the ships of the East India Company to the whole of the British people. So long as 'the trade was a monopoly in the hands of the East India Company, the ships could not trade without licences, and the licences contained an obligation to obey the orders of the Supercargo at Canton.' But, 'when the trade was freed, the Superintendents succeeded to the duties of the Supercargoes, but not to their powers; because, as no licences were required, no obligation could be enforced.' (*Autobiography of Sir H. Taylor*, vol. i. p. 347.) In other words, a vast extension of trade was accompanied with the removal of the regulations which had hitherto prevented its abuse.

In 1837 the Chinese Government adopted a fresh policy. It decided on rigorously stopping the trade at which it had previously tacitly connived. It is not perhaps necessary in this note to consider very minutely the causes which led to this change of policy. Whether the Chinese Government was really shocked at the growing use of the drug and the consequences of its use, or whether it was alarmed at a drain of silver from China which disturbed what the political arithmeticians of England a hundred years before would have called the balance of trade, it undoubtedly determined to check the traffic by every means at its disposal. With this object it strengthened its force on the coast and sent Lin, a man of great energy, to Canton with supreme authority. (*State Papers*, vol. xxix. p. 934, and *Autobiography of Sir H. Taylor*, vol. i. Appendix, p. 345.) Before Lin's arrival cargoes of opium had been seized by the Custom House authorities. On his arrival Lin required both the Hong merchants and the Chinese merchants to deliver up all the opium in their possession in order that it might be destroyed. (*State Papers*, vol. xxix. p. 936.)

The interests of England in China were at that time entrusted to Charles Elliot, the son of Hugh Elliot, once Minister at Berlin, and the original of Athulf in Sir Henry Taylor's play of *Edwin the Fair*. (*Sir Henry Taylor's Autobiography*, vol. i. p. 165.) But Elliot occupied a very difficult position in China. The Chinese placed on their communications to him the Chinese word 'Yu,' and wished him to place on his despatches to them the Chinese word 'Pin.' But Yu signifies a command, and Pin a humble address, and a British Plenipotentiary could not receive commands from, or humble himself before Chinese officials. (*State Papers*, vol. xxix. pp. 881, 886,

His great qualities, however, were injured by an egregious vanity which made him too frequently exag-

888.) And hence the communications between him and the Chinese Government were unable to follow a direct course, but were frequently or usually sent through the Hong merchants.

Such was the state of things in China when Lin, arriving in Canton, insisted on the surrender and destruction of all the opium there. Elliot was at Macao. He at once decided on returning to the post of difficulty and danger; and, though Canton was blockaded by Chinese forces and its river guarded by Chinese batteries, he made his way up in a boat of H.M.S. 'Larne,' and threw himself among his imprisoned countrymen. After his arrival he took the responsibility of demanding the surrender into his own hands, for the service of his Government, of all the British opium in China, and he surrendered the opium which he thus obtained, amounting to 20,283 chests, to the Chinese authorities, by whom it was destroyed. (*Ibid.*, pp. 945, 967.)

The imminent danger to the lives and properties of a large number of British subjects was undoubtedly removed by Elliot's action. Though some difficulty arose in connection with the surrender, Lin undertook gradually to relax the stringency of the measures which he had adopted (*ibid.*, p. 977), and Elliot hoped that his own zealous efforts to carry out the arrangement which he had made would lead to the raising of the blockade. He was, however, soon undeceived. On the 4th of April Lin required him, in conjunction with the merchants, to enter into a bond under which all vessels hereafter engaged in the opium traffic would have been confiscated to the Chinese Government, and all persons connected with the trade would 'suffer death at the hands of the Celestial Court.' (*Ibid.*, p. 989.) This bond Elliot steadily refused to sign (*ibid.*, p. 992); and feeling that 'all sense of security was broken to pieces' (*ibid*, p. 978), he ordered all British subjects to leave Canton, (*ibid.*, p. 1004), he himself withdrew to the Portuguese settlement at Macao (*ibid.*, p. 1007), and he wrote to Auckland, the Governor-General of India, for armed assistance. (*Ibid.*, p. 1009.)

These grave events naturally created profound anxiety. A Select Committee of the House of Commons had formally declined to interfere with the trade. The opium monopoly at that time was worth some 1,000,000*l.* or 1,500,000*l.* a year to British India (*ibid.*, p. 1020); and India, engaged in war with Afghanistan and already involved in a serious deficit, could not afford to part with so large an amount of its revenue (*ibid.*, p. 1020). Nine-tenths of the British merchants in China were engaged in the illegal trade (*ibid.*, p. 1030), while Elliot, in enforcing the surrender of the opium, had given the merchants bonds on the British Government for its value, and the 20,000 chests surrendered were supposed to be worth from 600 to 1,200 dollars a chest (*ibid.*, p. 987), or say from 2,400,000*l.* to 4,800,000*l.*

Complications of this character, moreover, tend from their very nature to become more acute. Lin found that his arbitrary termination of the ordinary trade had raised the price of opium and given a new impulse to the smugglers (*ibid.*, p. 1036), and Elliot declared that 'the true and important question to be solved is whether there shall be honourable and extending trade with the (Chinese) Empire or whether the coasts shall be delivered over to a state of things which shall pass rapidly from the worst character of forced trade to plain buccaneering.' (*Ibid.*)

As the summer advanced, moreover, a fresh outrage increased the intensity of the crisis. On the 7th July some British seamen landed near Hong Kong, and engaged in a

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gerate his own capacity and underrate the abilities of serious riot. A native was unfortunately killed on the occasion, and though Elliot, at his own risk, gave the relations of the victim a large pecuniary compensation, and placed the men engaged in the riot on their trial, Lin was not satisfied. He moved down to the coast, cut off the supplies of British subjects, and threatened to stop the supplies to Macao if the Portuguese continued to assist the British. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1037–1039.) The British were in consequence forced to leave Macao; and about the same time a small schooner, the 'Black Joke,' was attacked by the Chinese, and a British subject on board of her seriously wounded. Soon afterwards, however, the arrival of a ship of war, the 'Volage,' in Chinese waters enabled Elliot to assume a bolder front. He returned to Macao; he even attempted to procure supplies from the mainland. But, though he succeeded in purchasing food, 'the Mandarin runners approached and obliged the natives to take back their provisions,' and Elliot, exasperated at their conduct, fired on some war junks of the Chinese, which returned the fire. A week afterwards Elliot declared the port and river of Canton to be in a state of blockade. (*Ibid.*, p. 1066.)

The commencement of the blockade, however, did not lead to immediate war. On the contrary, the Chinese showed considerable desire to avert hostilities. They insisted, indeed, that some British sailor must be surrendered to them to suffer for the death of the Chinaman who had fallen in the riot of Hong Kong. But they showed so much anxiety to conclude an arrangement on this point that they endeavoured to induce Elliot to declare that a sailor who was accidentally drowned in Chinese waters, and whose body they had found, was the actual murderer. (*State Papers*, vol. xxx. p. 27.) And in the meanwhile the trade which Lin had intended to destroy went on at least as actively as ever. Lin's proceedings had, indeed, the effect of stimulating it to an unprecedented degree. The destruction of vast stores of opium led to a rise in the price of opium in China. The rise in price produced the natural consequence of an increased speculation; and, though British shipping was excluded from Chinese waters, and the contents of British vessels had to be transferred to American bottoms for conveyance into Chinese ports, British trade had never been so large or so advantageous as in the period which succeeded Lin's arbitrary proceedings.

Elliot was, of course, unable to prevent war either by the surrender of a British sailor to the Chinese, or by even assuming that a drowned man was a murderer; and war in consequence became daily more probable. In January 1840 operations actually commenced. Elliot was instructed to make an armed demonstration on the northern coasts of China, to take possession of some island on the coast, and to obtain reparation and indemnity, if possible by a mere display of force, but otherwise to proceed with the squadron and thence send an ultimatum to Pekin. In accordance with these orders the Island of Chusan was occupied in July, and the fleet was sent to the mouth of the Peiho with orders to transmit a letter to Pekin. But the sea off the Peiho is shallow, the ships could not approach the coasts, and the Chinese naturally refused to yield to an empty demonstration. The expedition was forced to return to Chusan, where it found that the troops whom they had left behind were smitten by disease, that one out of every four men were dead, and that more than one half of the survivors were invalided.

Thus, throughout 1840, the Chinese war was only attended with disaster and distress. Things commenced a little more prosperously in 1841 by the capture of the Chinese position at the mouth of the Canton

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Ellenborough Governor-General.

other men.[1] His speeches and writings were usually composed for effect; and he constantly introduced into papers, intended for the public eye, gaudy passages which he would never have inserted in his private correspondence. He was, moreover, singularly disqualified to carry out the sober policy of the new Cabinet. The publication of the private diary which he had kept years before as a Cabinet minister has shown that he was filled with the dread and jealousy of Russia

river. Elliot, after this success, was even able to conclude a preliminary treaty with the Chinese authorities. But this treaty did not prove satisfactory either to the British Government or to the Chinese. The British saw with dismay that the treaty made no mention of the trade in opium which had been the ostensible cause of war. The Whig Government accordingly decided on superseding Elliot. He was recalled and replaced by Henry Pottinger. Before news of his recall reached him, however, the treaty which had led to his supersession had been disavowed by the Chinese authorities, and Elliot had commenced a fresh attack on the Chinese force which guarded the road to Canton. British sailors and British troops, under the command of Bremer and Gough, won a victory which placed Canton at their mercy. But Elliot, shrinking from exposing a great town to the horrors of an assault, stopped the advance of the troops and admitted the city to a ransom of 1,250,000*l.* (*Sir H. Taylor's Autobiography*, vol. i. Appendix, pp. 353–363.) His moderation was naturally unacceptable to the troops and not entirely approved by the British Government. It constituted, however, Elliot's last action as agent in China. The subsequent operations were conducted under Pottinger's advice. Chusan was retaken in September 1841, and in 1842, after various reverses, the Chinese were forced to sign a disadvantageous peace. Hong Kong was permanently ceded to Britain. The Chinese were forced to pay a heavy indemnity of 4,375,000*l.* in addition to the ransom of 1,250,000*l.* already extorted from Canton, and they were compelled to open five ports to the trade of the world. In addition to the authorities quoted, see *Ann. Reg.*, 1840, Hist., pp. 241, 254; *Ibid.*, 1841, Hist., p. 276 *sq.*; *Ibid.*, 1842, Hist., pp. 264–278.

These successes increased the reputation of the Conservative administration. The Opium war, like the Afghan war, had been everywhere regarded as a Whig blunder. Its conclusion was accepted as a Conservative triumph. The news arrived by the same mail which brought tidings of the recapture of Cabul; and men at home, as well as statesmen abroad, were ready to forget the follies and faults which had led to both wars, and to think only of the bravery of the troops and the endurance which had changed disaster into victory. See a remarkable letter in Metternich's *Mémoires*, vol. vi. p. 636. Ashley, after the war, brought forward a resolution for the suppression of the opium trade, but the resolution was withdrawn after a motion for the adjournment of the debate had been defeated by 118 votes to 26. *Hansard*, vol. lxviii. p. 362.

[1] Cf. his sneers at Aberdeen in his *Diary*, *e.g.*, vol. i. p. 127, and his equally unjust depreciation of Pollock in *Indian Administration*, p. 257; cf also *Greville*, second series, vol. ii. p. 141.

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which had been the inspiring causes of the ill-fated expedition to Afghanistan. If possibly he could be trusted to withdraw from the policy of his predecessor, no reliance could be placed on his abstaining from fresh schemes of ambition.

Ellenborough was the agent of a ministry anxious above all things to retire.[1] Fifteen days after he reached Calcutta, he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief in India, flung over the policy of his predecessor, and declared that future action must depend on military considerations alone, without any reference to the provisions of the tripartite treaty.[2] 'Military considerations' seemed likely to dwindle in importance from the gradual fall of the places still garrisoned by the English in Afghanistan. On the 6th of March the officer in command at Ghuznee surrendered to the enemy.[3] On the 26th, General England, moving to Nott's assistance, experienced a check which induced him to retreat.[4] Fortunately, these new reverses were soon retrieved by great successes. Pollock, by an admirably executed movement, swept the Khyber Pass of its defenders and joined hands with Sale.[5] Even England, urged forward by Nott, plucked up courage to force the Bolan, and entered Candahar on the 10th of May.[6] These achievements restored the reputation of the English, and at any rate removed a load of anxiety from British statesmen.

His anxiety to retire.

True, however, to the pledges which he had given before he left England,[7] and to the policy which he had enunciated on reaching India, Ellenborough saw only in these successes fresh reasons for withdrawal. When the news of the passage of the Khyber reached him, he

[1] See a remarkable letter to the Duke of Wellington in which Ellenborough expressed his doubts whether the Duke would approve his retiring *vid* Cabul, in Ellenborough's *Indian Administration*, p. 275.

[2] *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 458.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 428.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 435.
[5] *Life of Pollock*, p. 256 *sq.*
[6] *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 448.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

declared both in his public and in his private correspondence that it was his object to direct the retreat of Nott from Candahar, and of Pollock from Jellalabad at the earliest practicable period.[1] He at once issued secret orders with this object. Pollock, however, unable to retreat till he was supplied with transport, and unwilling to retire till he had released the English prisoners in the hands of the Afghans, took upon himself the responsibility of telling Nott to disregard these orders,[2] and forwarded to the Governor-General a long argument against the policy of withdrawal.[3] Ellenborough, satisfied that Pollock could not retire in safety till the summer was over, and that he could not retire at all till he was supplied with additional transport, adopted a new policy. On the 1st of June he wrote to Pollock, sanctioned his remaining at Jellalabad till October, and expressed a hope that in the interval he might be enabled to draw the enemy into a position in which an effectual blow could be dealt him.[4] On the 4th of July he wrote to Nott still directing him to retire, but authorising him to retreat either by Quetta and Sukkur, or by Ghuznee and Cabul; and, on the 23rd of July, he suggested to Pollock that, if Nott should adopt the latter alternative, he might advance his army in Nott's support.[5]

Ellenborough authorises Nott to retire by Cabul.

More unworthy orders than these have rarely been issued by a man filling a high position. Ellenborough threw the responsibility, which was his by the right of

[1] *Kaye*, p. 460, and *Indian Administration*, p. 29.

[2] *Life of Pollock*, p. 297.

[3] This is the famous despatch of the 13th May which was left out of the Afghan published correspondence. Its omission produced the erroneous impression that Ellenborough had ordered the famous policy of retreating by Cabul. Whether its omission were accidental or designed is one of those questions which cannot be settled off hand in a footnote. The curious on the subject are referred to Kaye's *War in Afghanistan*, vol. ii. p. 466, and Low's *Life of Pollock*, p. 303.

[4] Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. ii. p. 474; *Life of Pollock*, p. 324.

[5] *Kaye*, vol. ii. p. 557; *Pollock*, p. 330; and cf. also Ellenborough's *Indian Administration*, p. 39.

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his office, on the men who held only subordinate commands. Fortunately for the unhappy prisoners who were still in the hands of the Afghans, and for the reputation of their country which was at stake, neither Pollock nor Nott hesitated to assume the responsibility thrown upon them. The story of their advance can find no detailed account in this history. Other pens have told how Pollock's army carried the heights of Jugdulluck; how it defeated Akbar Khan at Tezeen; how it arrived at Cabul; how the Bala Hissar was reoccupied; how the capital was plundered; how Ghuznee was taken by Nott; and how, in accordance with Ellenborough's instructions, the gates of the temple of Somnauth were removed from the tomb of Mahmoud. These operations had the effect of restoring British credit, and the still happier consequence of liberating British prisoners from their captivity.

The successes of Pollock and Nott.

British credit had been effectually restored, the survivors of the captivity had been released, and the British armies, laden with their trophies and encumbered with the huge gates which Ellenborough had willed should be borne away from Ghuznee, returned through the passes in which Elphinstone's men had been slaughtered in the previous year. Of the famous policy which Auckland had initiated in 1838 nothing remained but the story of disaster and vengeance, the unburied bones of dead men, and the withered branches of the trees which had been destroyed as a punishment for outrage.[1] Shah Sooja, the puppet whom we had set up at Cabul, had been murdered on the 4th of April; and Dost Mahommed, released by Ellenborough from Loodiana, was suffered to return to

Dost Mahommed restored.

[1] It is melancholy to find English officers *imitating* the example of Oriental barbarians, and destroying trees. Probably the destruction of trees by successive conquerors accounts for the desolate condition of huge tracts of Asia, which were once the most populous and fertile portions of the world.

Afghanistan and to remount his throne. His restoration was an appropriate conclusion to a story of folly, crime, disaster, and vengeance, such as happily can be rarely met with in English history.

The Gate of Somnauth.

But the story had, strangely enough, a ludicrous conclusion. Ellenborough, in his desire to be dramatic, succeeded in making himself ridiculous. The gates of the temple of Somnauth, so the story ran, had been taken by Mahmoud eight centuries before, and had since guarded his tomb at Ghuznee. Ellenborough persuaded himself that every Hindoo, for eight centuries, had earnestly desired to recover the gates,[1] and that their recovery would be accepted in Hindostan as a sign of Mahomedan defeat. A sorely overladen transport was, therefore, encumbered with these spoils through the passes of the Koord, Cabul, and the Khyber. The arrival of the gates in India was announced by the Governor-General in a proclamation, to all the princes and chiefs and people of India, which has hardly yet ceased to provoke laughter. 'Our victorious army,' wrote Ellenborough, 'bears the gates of the temple of Somnauth in triumph from Afghanistan, and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahommed looks upon the ruins of Ghuznee. The insult of eight hundred years is at last avenged. The gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your humiliation, are become the proudest record of your national glory, the proof of your superiority in arms over the nations beyond the Indus. To you, princes and chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwarra, of Malwa, and of Guzerat, I shall commit this glorious trophy of successful warfare. You will yourselves, with all honour, transmit the gates of sandal wood through your respective territories to the restored temple of Somnauth.' Perhaps it would be difficult to find in history a more injudicious or idle document.

[1] See his letter to the Queen in his *Indian Administration*, p. 52.

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The man who penned it was governor of an empire which embraced a large and powerful Mahomedan population. The gates, the record of national glory, were pronounced by competent authorities to be base coin, mere substitutes for the originals. The restored temple of Somnauth, to which they were to be brought in triumph, still remains a Hindoo ruin surrounded by a Mahomedan population; and the gates themselves, instead of being taken to the ruinous temple, have been left far away, unnoticed and uncared for in an armoury at Agra.[1]

Ellenborough and Scinde.

It would be well, however, if the shameful story of the Afghan war had left no worse consequence behind it than a proclamation which has provoked ridicule. Unhappily, it was attended with other results which, if they were less disastrous than the war itself, were equally shameful. Auckland had willed that the expedition to Afghanistan should march through Scinde, and his will had prevailed. In 1842 British armies were evacuating Afghanistan, and the solitary reason which had suggested the occupation of Scinde no longer existed. Ellenborough, however, could not bring himself to recede from a position which, fourteen years before, he had longed to occupy. His dream had been fulfilled, the British flag waved in triumph on the Indus, and the river, so it seemed to the Governor-General, might be substituted for the Ganges 'as the line of military communication between England and the North-West.'

The valley of the Indus was, of course, the point which Ellenborough chiefly coveted. The free navigation of the Indus could plainly be held by the permanent occupation of certain places on its banks. The road to the Bolan Pass, through which Keane had

[1] Kaye's *Afghan War*, vol. ii. pp. 650-652; *Life of Pollock*, p. 389. Mahmoud's mace was still over the head of the tomb in 1839. Havelock's *Afghan War*, vol. ii p. 94.

marched, crosses the Indus at a spot where the island of Bukkur divides the stream into two portions; and throughout the campaign British troops had occupied this island and the adjacent banks. It would not have been safe, however, for an English garrison to have been permanently encamped in the centre of a hostile country without easy means of obtaining reinforcements; and the English had consequently also seized Kurrachee, a port on the extreme north-west of Hindostan, and communicating with all the roads which run through Scinde. It was clear that the permanent occupation of these places would give the command both of river and territory to the Power which held them. Nor was it difficult to find reasons for converting a temporary force into a permanent garrison. In the treaties, which the Ameers had been forced reluctantly to accept at Auckland's bidding, the Ameers had bound themselves to pay a definite sum towards the support of the British troops, and this payment had fallen into arrear; they had undertaken to enter into no negotiation with foreign chief or State without British sanction, and there were grave suspicions that they were intriguing with Lahore and other Powers; they had promised that no toll should be charged on boats trading on the Indus, and they had continued to charge their own subjects with toll.[1] It was true, indeed, that the clauses of the treaty relating to tolls were of difficult construction, that the evidence of treachery rested on documents of doubtful authenticity, and that one of Auckland's last acts in India was to express to the Ameers his satisfaction at their friendly disposition and liberal policy.[2] A Governor-General had arisen who knew not Auckland, and who did not consider himself bound by Auckland's declarations.

Pretexts for intervention.

[1] For the treaty, *Papers relating to Scinde*, pp. 174, 175.

[2] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 309.

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During 1838-9 Henry Pottinger, uncle to the defender of Herat, had filled the place of political agent in Scinde. Other work had been found for him in China, and he had been succeeded at Hyderabad by Outram, a comparatively young officer, whose signal services in organising a Bheel corps and in pacifying a wild and warlike tribe, had won him the respect of his contemporaries without always securing for him the approval of his employers.[1] Soon after Ellenborough's arrival in India, Outram reported certain intrigues on the part of the more restless Ameers, and Ellenborough sent to him three letters to the chiefs, which he was authorised either to use or to suppress, expressing his confidence in their fidelity, but declaring that, on the day on which they should prove faithless, their sovereignty would pass from them, their dominion would be given to others, and that all India should see that the British Government would not pardon an injury from those whom it believed to be its friends. These words, Outram was told distinctly, were no idle threat, but conveyed a resolution to punish, cost what it might, the first chief who proved faithless by the confiscation of his dominions.[2] The threat, however, never reached the Ameers. Outram believed that all of them had been more or less concerned, directly or indirectly, in treasonable plottings; he thought that these intrigues, commenced after the news of British reverses in Afghanistan, had been suspended on the intelligence of the successes of Pollock and Sale; he believed that the Ameers were anxious to regain British friendship; and he feared that the delivery of Ellenborough's threat would force them into overt acts of hostility. Availing himself, therefore, of the discretion which the Governor-

Ellenborough's threats to the Ameers.

Suppressed by Outram.

[1] For the Bheels, *ante*, p. 226 *note*, and for Outram's conduct in reclaiming them, and for the official censures on his later conduct for over-zeal, *Life of Outram*, vol. i. pp. 51–94 and 125–145.

[2] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 315.

General had given him, he abstained from delivering to the Ameers the letters which had been entrusted to him, and his decision to refrain from so doing was formally approved by Ellenborough.[1]

Treaties are equally binding on all the parties who agree to them. The British were technically as much bound as the Ameers by the pledges which they had given. But when a strong Power negotiates with a weak one the strong Power frequently places its own construction on the bargain. Auckland had openly torn up the stipulations of previous treaties, and there was no power to reckon with the formidable Company which he represented. The Ameers had endeavoured to evade their promises, and evasion was to be punished with pitiless severity. The Ameers had not paid the tribute which had been demanded of them, and territory, whether they liked it or not, was to be taken from them instead of it. The Governor-General required Sukkur and Kurrachee, and these places were to be seized for the tribute. But spoliation was not to be limited to these positions. The Khan of Bhawulpore had displayed an unwavering friendship to the Company throughout the operations in Afghanistan. It was desirable that he should be rewarded for his services, and the reward could be most cheaply obtained by taking it from the Ameers. All that Ellenborough desired for himself, all that he desired for his allies, was to be obtained from the unfortunate princes whom his predecessor's conduct had driven into hostility.[2]

Ellenborough's demands on the Ameers.

Outram was startled at learning Ellenborough's intentions. He knew that the Ameers would resist the cession of territory; he thought that if Ellenborough were set on spoliation he had better at once declare it

[1] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, pp. 319, 338. I have, as far as possible, in this and in all cases, reproduced the exact words of the official documents. Cf. Outram's *Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary*, vol. i. pp. 47–48.

[2] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, pp. 317, 318, 338.

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to be a punishment for intrigue. He submitted a draft treaty to the Governor-General, declaring in its preamble that new arrangements had become necessary in consequence of the treasonable correspondence into which certain of the Ameers had entered,[1] and he suggested that an article should be added to it pledging the British Government to remit all arrears of tribute and to make no further claims on the Government of Scinde. But the proposal found little favour with Ellenborough. He doubted the expediency of resting his case on a correspondence whose authenticity was suspected, and, perhaps with a keen recollection of the past, he declined to make any promises for the future.[2] He concluded, too, that the policy on which he was bent required a tougher agent than the high-minded officer who had hitherto represented him at Hyderabad; and he decided on sending Sir Charles Napier, perhaps the most distinguished member of a distinguished family, with full military and political power, to Scinde. Napier was the eldest son of Colonel George Napier, by Sarah, the widow of Colonel Bunbury, and the daughter of the Duke of Richmond. Those who now admire Lady Sarah Bunbury's portrait associate the charms which Reynolds has preserved with the romantic attachment which they inspired in George III. Lady Sarah, however, was reserved for other fortunes than the throne to which the King's admiration seemed at one time likely to elevate her. She was destined to become the mother of a family of heroes who proved themselves the bravest among the brave in every battlefield in the Peninsula. Napier was told to retain Kurrachee, to concentrate his force at Sukkur, and thus maintain a firm grasp on Upper and Lower Scinde. It was convenient, so Ellenborough thought, that he should know that any

Outram superseded by Napier.

[1] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, pp. 341, 343.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 349; *Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary*, vol. i. p. 42.

evidence of hostility on the part of any Ameer would meet with punishment which should be a warning to every chief in India, and that the Governor-General was determined to seize the first opportunity for conferring substantial rewards on the Khan of Bhawulpore.[1]

Bad luck in the first instance attended Napier's mission. The vessel in which he sailed from Bombay was attacked with cholera. Of the troops which she carried, one in four died at sea. Three days after Napier landed, a rocket during practice exploded, and tore the calf of his right leg open to the bone. Such incidents might have dulled the ardour of many brave men. But disease and wounds had no effect on the bold member of a family of heroes. Three times wounded at Corunna, wounded at Busaco, shipwrecked on his return from Waterloo, wounds and dangers had been the lot of his hard life, and the new injury did not confine him for a week to his tent. Five days after his wound he was travelling up the country, and on the 19th of September he was received by the Ameers at Hyderabad.[2]

Napier's demands on the Ameers.

The language which Napier used reflected the determination of the Governor-General. The Ameers were told that the British would not suffer any infraction of the treaty, and that they must at once direct their officers to abstain from levying tolls on boats on the Indus, and to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the supplies to the British cantonments at Kurrachee.[3] One of them at once complied with Napier's demands. Nusseer Khan, the chief Ameer of Hyderabad, however, showed no inclination to do so;

[1] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 352.

[2] *Conquest of Scinde*, pp. 16–22.

[3] The demand was put in writing on the 25th of September, *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 358. I have confined my narrative to the matter of Napier's mission; for comments on the offensive manner of it, see *Calcutta Review*, vol. vi. p. 575, and the *Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary*, vol. i. p. 62.

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and Ellenborough, still adhering to his old intentions, told Napier, on the 23rd of October, 'that if Nusseer still persisted in disregarding the conditions of the treaty he would forfeit all his property and rights in Kurrachee, Tatta, Shikarpore, Sukkur, the pergunnahs adjoining the Bhawulpore district, and Subzulkote.' If Napier found it necessary to move troops and the slightest resistance were made, the whole property of Nusseer Khan was to be forfeited to the British Government.[1]

Napier's proposals to Ellenborough.

Steeped like an Oriental in intrigue, Nusseer Khan was practically allowed by this decision the bare alternative of peaceably surrendering a portion of his territory or of being forcibly deprived of the whole of his possessions. If, however, the Governor-General had hard measure in store for the Ameer, Napier had hardly passed a month in Scinde before he was suggesting still harder terms. Barbarous princes without feeling for their subjects were, he thought, unfit for government. If the British were to evacuate Scinde, they would sooner or later inevitably return. If, then, it were possible to do so honestly, it would be wiser and better to coerce the Ameers at once. A fair pretext for such a policy could easily be found. Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, especially, was treasonably corresponding with Shere Sing of Lahore in defiance of the treaty of 1838. His treachery and the intrigues of Nusseer Khan afforded ample excuse for a fresh policy of aggression, and, in Napier's judgment, the seizure of Bukkur and Sukkur, of Kurrachee and Shikarpore, was both expedient and justifiable.[2]

The advice fell on willing ears. Ellenborough at once directed Napier to lay before the Ameers fresh draft treaties. Roostum Khan was to suffer for his alleged

[1] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 361.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 363–369.

ntrigues with Shere Sing, Nusseer Khan for a letter which he was said to have addressed to Beebuck Boogtee.[1] The Ameers were to cede all the territories which the British required either for themselves or for the reward of their ally the Khan of Bhawulpore. They were to renounce one of the chief attributes of sovereignty—the right of coinage. They were to supply British steamers with ample fuel at a price to be agreed upon, or to allow the British to fell it for themselves on either side of the Indus. In return for these concessions, they were to be relieved from paying tribute to the British Government.[2]

These hard terms seemed to Ellenborough justifiable because of the treacherous correspondence into which Roostum Khan and Nusseer Khan had entered. It is remarkable, however, that before drawing up the treaties the Governor-General did not take the trouble to ascertain whether the alleged offences had really been committed. All he thought it necessary to do was to tell Napier to satisfy himself of the truth of the charges before actually proceeding to exact the penalty.[3] To this day it is still doubtful whether the alleged correspondence was authentic or not. Nusseer Khan, in particular, denied its authenticity.[4] Napier himself thought that Roostum Khan had been a mere puppet in the hands of his minister.[5] Satisfied, however, that Roostum was technically responsible for the acts of his agent, and that Nusseer was, at any rate, indirectly

[1] Chief of the Boogtee hill-tribes. *Calcutta Review*, vol vi. p. 583.

[2] Ellenborough's decision and the draft-treaties will be found set out at length in *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, pp. 436–444. The territorial cessions exacted represented a revenue of above 110,000*l.* a year; those suggested by Outram rather more than 30,000*l.* a year; the tribute to be remitted in either case 35,000*l.*

[3] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 440.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 474, and cf. Napier's account of his examination of the matter in *ibid.*, pp. 454, 455, and Outram's *Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary*, vol. i. p. 74 *sq.*

[5] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 454.

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guilty, at the end of November 1842 Napier presented the new treaties.[1]

The well-worn adage, 'si vis pacem, para bellum,' has passed with Englishmen into a truism. Ignorant of Latin, the Ameers had probably never heard of it, but they understood its lessons as well as Napier. They professed to wish for peace; but, as demand after demand was sent to them, they collected their forces and prepared for war. Whatever lessons, however, the saying may convey to strong nations, it is full of danger to weak ones. Napier regarded the Ameers' preparations as overt acts of hostility, and prepared to set his own forces in motion. Before war actually commenced, however, an opportunity arose for fresh negotiations. Roostum Khan, charged with fresh infractions of the treaty, pleaded his inability to obey Napier's instructions, and offered to escape to his camp. Napier thought that the presence of the Khan would embarrass his operations, and persuaded him to repair to Ali Moorad, Roostum's brother, who might induce him to resign the chiefship. The friendship of Ali Moorad was purchased by the promise that British influence should be used to secure him the throne. Roostum's family naturally resented an act which deprived them of their influence and authority, and fled to Emaum Ghur, a strong fortress in the desert, whither they assumed that even British troops would be unable to follow them. Though war had not been declared, though, on the contrary, negotiations were in active progress, Napier determined to seize the opportunity of proving that the desert afforded no protection to the Ameers, and that, wherever the men of Scinde could go, the British could follow. Assuming then that Roostum's family were mere rebels against the chief in whose favour Roostum had been persuaded to abdicate, and that it was the special

The Ameers collect their forces.

[1] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 462.

mission of the British to uphold Ali Moorad, he resolved on marching with a small force on Emaum Ghur. Roostum, a 'poor old fool' of eighty—to use the description which Napier thought proper to apply to him—fled at once from Ali Moorad's protection and joined the other Ameers. His flight gave Napier an additional excuse for precipitate action. He moved through the desert to Emaum Ghur, and, as the garrison abandoned it on his approach, blew up the fortress. From Emaum Ghur he despatched Outram to the Ameers, to negotiate the details of the treaty.[1]

The march on Emaum Ghur.

As a military feat the march through the desert upon Emaum Ghur may or may not excite admiration; as an act of policy it deserves reproof. The march, however, displayed Napier's vigour, and consequently strengthened Outram's hands in the negotiation of the treaty. 'Why is it,' asked the Ameers in the conference with him, 'that you make new demands? Four years ago the British solemnly promised never to covet any portion of our territory. Why should more be required of us now?' Outram urged that the treaties had been broken. The Ameers denied that they had broken any of them. Outram declared that the particular breaches complained of had been submitted to them by Napier's orders. The Ameers replied that they had never been even allowed to see the treasonable letters which it was alleged that they had written, and they solemnly denied that they were written by them or by their authority. Outram had no authority to discuss these matters; he had simply to present an alternative to the Ameers. Sign the treaty, or submit to Napier's advance. Then the Ameers predicted exactly what occurred. 'If the army advances our Beloochees will not be restrained, and we shall be blamed for the consequences. . . . If

A new treaty presented to the Ameers.

[1] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, vol. i. pp. 112, 218, 253; *Life of Outram*, vol. i. p. 304. pp. 477-485; Outram's *Commentary*,

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the army advances they will plunder the whole country. . . .' 'The only way to stop this result,' replied Outram, 'is to sign the treaty, and so stop Napier's advance.'[1]

Reluctantly the Ameers gave way, and on the 12th of February 1843 signed the treaty. Their troops, however, regarded the arrangement with little favour. Outram was mobbed on his return to the Agency, and one of his followers was struck by a stone. Three days afterwards the Agency was attacked, and Outram and his retinue with difficulty effected their escape to a steamer moored in the Indus, which fortunately commanded the approaches to the building.[2] This attack gave Napier a new pretext for hostilities. He advanced against the Beloochees, whose army was drawn up at Meeanee in an exceptionally strong position. Their front was protected by the dry bed of the Fulaillee. Their flanks rested on woods, which Napier judged it impossible to penetrate. This position, held by 28,000 brave men, Napier had the courage to attack with 2,800. He succeeded; and his victory has made Meeanee one of the brightest names in Anglo-Indian warfare. The Beloochees lost guns, ammunition, treasure, and 5,000 men. Six of the Ameers surrendered on the field; and the victorious general marched from the battlefield into Hyderabad, whose towers had looked down on the field of action.[3]

The attack on the Agency.

The battle of Meeanee.

Meeanee virtually decided the fate of Scinde. Ellenborough concluded that the position of the Ameers was entirely changed by the battle. 'They had only held their power by the sword—by the sword they had lost it.'[4] They were consequently removed as prisoners to

[1] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 502, and Outram's *Commentary*, vol. ii. p. 344.

[2] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, pp. 505, 509; cf. *Life of Outram*, vol. i. p. 316–323.

[3] *Correspondence relating to Scinde*, p. 512.

[4] Ellenborough's despatch, reprinted in *Thornton*, vol. vi. p. 452, *note*.

Bombay, their territory was annexed to British India, and its government was entrusted to the officer by whose victory it had been won. Scinde, under Napier's administration, became an integral and flourishing part of British India, and its people prospered from the removal of rulers who had been cruel, avaricious, and weak. Some people have even excused Ellenborough's treatment of Scinde by pointing to the results which his conquest secured. If such excuses, however, be available, it is difficult to see where war can ever end. If it be justifiable to attack a Government because it is bad, for the sake of liberating a people that is ill-governed, other and sterner work remains undone, and other Ellenboroughs and other Napiers may wage aggressive wars through a weary and bloody eternity.

The annexation of Scinde.

In England, however, in 1843, the news of the conquest excited indignant feelings. Ellenborough's conduct towards Afghanistan had been already severely criticised. His readiness to abandon the country, and to leave the prisoners to their fate, had been blamed; his proclamations and his pageants had been laughed at; and Parliament had only reluctantly consented to include the Governor-General's name in the vote of thanks accorded to the men who had restored the credit of British arms in India. While the public in and out of Parliament were discussing and condemning Ellenborough's policy in Afghanistan, news arrived of his treatment of the Ameers of Scinde. Nothing could have been more unfortunate for the Governor-General. The man, who was hurriedly retiring from Cabul, who was hardly concealing his disapproval of his predecessor's conduct, who had chosen 'Pax Asiæ restituta' as the motto for an Afghan medal, was adopting in Scinde the same aggressive policy which Auckland had pursued in Afghanistan. The Cabinet unanimously disapproved his policy; it hardly ventured to lay before the public

The feeling in England.

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all that it knew.[1] The India House formally condemned the conduct of the Governor-General. Unfortunately, moreover, for Ellenborough, a change in the composition of the ministry increased his difficulties. Fitzgerald, who had succeeded him at the Board of Control, died in May 1843, and was replaced at the India Board by Ripon, the statesman who had been known as Prosperity Robinson under Liverpool, and Goody Goderich under Canning. Fitzgerald had steadily supported Ellenborough. Ripon showed no disposition to excuse his eccentricities.[2] The Directors of the India House were encouraged by the change at the Board of Control and the language of the press to find fault with the Governor-General, and Ripon forwarded their censure of him without expressing his own dissent from it.

Formally condemned by his employers, Ellenborough foresaw his recall. But he was allowed to remain in office until a new act of vigour excited fresh controversy. In the beginning of 1843 the Maharaja of Gwalior died. His heir was a boy only eight years old; his widow a child of twelve.[3] On the advice of the British Resident and with the approval of Ellenborough, Mama Sahib, a relative of the late Maharaja, was appointed Regent of the principality. For a few weeks Gwalior remained undisturbed. In May, intrigues which the Ranee or her friends encouraged forced Mama Sahib to fly, and placed the power in the hands of a new Regent. Gwalior contained some 40,000 troops, and this force ranged itself in support of the revolution. Disorder seemed

[1] Ellenborough's *Indian Administration*, p. 388; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 351, 369. Mr. Gladstone, in *Contemporary Review*, November 1876, p. 875, says, 'The conquest was disapproved, I believe unanimously, by the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel; of which I can speak, as I had just entered it at the time.' Wharncliffe, who was also a member of the Cabinet, told Greville that 'Ellenborough's conduct had been to the last degree arbitrary and unjustifiable, and such as nothing can justify.' *Greville*, second series, vol. ii. p. 165.

[2] Ellenborough's *Indian Administration*, p. 440.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

under such circumstances probable, and, in Ellenborough's judgment, the Company, as the paramount Power in India, had the right to enforce peace and prevent disturbance. The Governor-General accordingly determined to move a force on Gwalior. In the concluding days of 1843, the Gwalior troops were decisively defeated in a couple of battles, in one of which Ellenborough was present in person, and a new treaty, practically placing the power in the hands of the British Resident, restored order to Gwalior.

The operations in Gwalior.

This new act of vigour on the part of the Governor-General excited fresh indignation in England. The Court of Directors at once decided on recalling the man whose conduct towards Scinde they had already censured, and whose conduct towards Gwalior no one seemed inclined to justify. A motion in the Lords for papers was only averted by the news of his recall. A similar motion in the Commons was postponed for the same reason.[1] All parties felt that the peace of India was more sure from the termination of the rule of the brilliant but erratic statesman who had boasted that he had restored peace to Asia; and, except that Wellington generously defended the ruler whom he had himself introduced to high office, and that the ministry softened his recall by conferring upon him an earldom, everyone acquiesced in an act which was almost without precedent, but which was justified by necessity.

Ellenborough is recalled.

The Indian career of Ellenborough lasted only a little more than two years. During that period he retreated from Afghanistan, he conquered Scinde, and he pacified Gwalior. Engaged almost continuously in military operations, he had little leisure to attend to internal policy; and, during much of his rule, he lived far away from his capital, within reach of the busy scenes which were taking place at Peshawur, at Hyderabad,

The characteristics of his rule.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. lxxiv. pp. 275, 285.

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and at Gwalior. Like Auckland, he had arrived in India the messenger of peace; like Auckland he had drifted into war. Under Auckland, however, an unrighteous war, feebly waged, led to disaster. Under Ellenborough, unrighteous war, conducted with vigour, produced victory after victory. The critic who believes in success will have no apology for the Whig Viceroy and no blame for his Tory successor. And, in truth, there can be little doubt that, if Auckland were the better man, Ellenborough was the abler ruler. Some persons may, indeed, reply that, if Napier had been in Cabul in 1841, the story of disaster might not have occurred; and that, if Elphinstone, or even Keane, had been in Scinde in 1843, the battle of Meeanee would not have been fought. But the true answer to this contention is that it was Auckland who sent Elphinstone to Afghanistan, and that it was Ellenborough who sent Napier to Scinde. The one ruler rarely or never made a happy appointment; the other ruler hardly ever chose a weak agent.

Nor should it be forgotten that Ellenborough himself had much to do with the victories of those who carried out his orders. Under Auckland the Indian army had accustomed itself to defeat. Ellenborough had the merit of persuading it that it was invincible. Ever ready to recognise a brave action, with no mercy for the men who failed, he taught general and soldier to believe that his own eyes were upon them, and he managed to infuse his own spirit into the hearts of his battalions. With a contempt for tradition, he startled military martinets by his wholesale distribution of medals, and taught the private to expect the rewards which had been hitherto reserved for generals and field officers. Napier, imitating or exceeding his example, even named private soldiers in despatches, and thus introduced a new and salutary influence into an exclusive service.

The private soldier who knew that he would secure the same medal as his general, who learned that his own name might be preserved for ever in despatches, had a new incentive to good conduct. He was no longer a mere atom in a multitude, which it was the fashion to praise in the aggregate and to flog in the individual. He was a man, with a man's ambition and a man's career before him. Exclusion even in the army was being destroyed by Napier and Ellenborough.

It is true that, in endeavouring to infuse his own spirit into the army, the Governor-General said, wrote, and did many foolish things. He reproduced on the plains of the Punjab the triumphs of ancient Rome. He imitated in his proclamations the language of Napoleon. But his stage machinery too often resembled the frippery of an amphitheatre; and his turgid sentences, intended to create enthusiasm, too frequently excited laughter. He was, in other words, too fond of display, too apt to attempt the task of governing by phrases. Eloquence, either in written or spoken speech, is a great gift. But it is a weapon which sometimes wounds the man who uses it. There is but a slight boundary between the sublime and the ridiculous, and they are rare men who do not cross the frontier in attempting to attain the sublime.

Sir H. Hardinge becomes Governor-General.

Ellenborough was succeeded by Hardinge, the distinguished officer who has been occasionally mentioned in this history. No other selection that could have been made would have been so pleasing to Ellenborough. Hardinge and he had married two sisters, the half-sisters of Castlereagh; and, though Ellenborough had shortly after his own marriage been left a widower, he had ever regarded Hardinge with brotherly affection. Of his capacity he had the highest opinion. Fifteen years before he had suggested to him that, in the event of Bentinck's recall, he should go out to India as Governor-

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General, and in recording his offer in his diary he had added the remarkable opinion, 'I wish we had him as Secretary in Ireland, but he is wanted *everywhere*. He is so useful.'[1] And, in truth, among the soldier statesmen whom England has produced, few men have attained so exceptional a position as this gallant officer. Born in 1785, he had, in accordance with the bad practice of those times, received his first commission in 1791. It might therefore be said of him, as was said in a different sense of Coriolanus, 'how youngly he began to serve his country.' It was, however, as no mere carpet knight that Hardinge rose to the highest honours of his profession. He was present at almost every battle in the Peninsula, from Vimiera to Vittoria. Wounded at Busaco, at Vittoria, and at Ligny, he had done soldier's service and received a soldier's reward. Returned for Durham in 1820, he commenced a parliamentary career which in its way was unique. An excellent Secretary at War and Chief Secretary for Ireland, he enjoyed, though never raised to the Cabinet, more influence than many Cabinet ministers. In the House of Commons he was regarded as the type of honour; and the strange circumstance has already been recorded in this history that a member of Parliament withdrew a challenge, not in deference to the remonstrance of the Speaker or the expressed wish of the House, but on the assurance of Hardinge that he would not himself think it necessary to fight under similar circumstances.

Like Auckland, like Ellenborough, like most of his predecessors, Hardinge bore with him a message of peace. The indignation which Auckland's policy towards Afghanistan had excited in London, and the sympathy which had been expressed in England for the Ameers of Scinde, seemed to afford a guarantee against fresh acts of aggression. Yet, like Auckland and most

[1] Ellenborough's *Diary*, vol. ii. p. 143.

of his predecessors, Hardinge, before many months were over, was forced into a fresh war, and the enemy with which he came into collision proved the most formidable that the English had ever encountered in India.

The Sikhs

In the preceding chapter some allusion has been made to the rise and progress of the religious sect which had established temporal as well as spiritual sway in the Punjab. In the present chapter it has been seen how the head of the Sikhs, Runjeet Singh, had extended his authority and become the ally of the Company. The death of Runjeet during the Afghan war, withdrew the chief guarantee for the continuance of order in his dominions. Runjeet left behind him several children. His first wife had presented him in 1807 with two boys, Shere Singh and Tara Singh. By another woman, to whom he was betrothed as a boy, Runjeet had a son, Khurruk Singh, a weak and indolent lad, whose claims to the succession were set aside in favour of his son, Nao Nihal Singh. In addition to these descendants, a few months before the Afghan War, another woman, wife or concubine to Runjeet, had borne him a son, known afterwards as Dhuleep Singh.[1]

The descendants of Runjeet Singh.

The children or descendants of Runjeet Singh each had their own adherents. But, in addition to his descendants, Runjeet, throughout his reign, had always had favourites around him. The men who ranked highest in his favour were three brothers whose behaviour and whose grace had promoted them from menial offices to the highest positions at his Court. The eldest of the three, Gholab Singh, was given the chieftainship of the great hill district of Jummoo, in Cashmere, to which he either had or was supposed to have some hereditary claim. The two younger, Dhian and Soochet Singh, were retained near Runjeet's person and ad-

[1] Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs*, pp. 228–230, 238.

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mitted to his closest confidence.[1] On his deathbed in 1839, Runjeet either nominated or was said to nominate his son Khurruk Singh as his successor, and Dhian Singh as minister of the kingdom.[2]

Khurruk Singh Maharaja.

A settlement thus made hardly endured the making of it. Shere Singh, on his part, raised his claim to the throne; Nao Nihal Singh, forcing himself into his father's apartments, suffered his father's favourite to be murdered in his presence. Thenceforward he became king in fact, though his father remained king in name. But his reign was of short duration. After a little more than a year, the father, Khurruk, died prematurely old. The son, celebrating his father's obsequies, was either accidentally or purposely destroyed by a falling gateway, and Shere Singh rose to the throne to which he had so long aspired.

Shere Singh Maharaja.

These successive changes did not tend to peace. Chund Kour, mother to Nao Nihal, and widow of Khurruk Singh, could not be expected to acquiesce in a settlement which had been baptized at the obsequies of her husband with the blood of her son. She asserted her right to the throne, and for a short time temporarily filled it. But, in the beginning of 1841, her pretensions were destroyed by the action of Shere Singh. That chief had the dexterity to gain the support of the capable Dhian Singh; he placed himself at the head of the army, and, submitting to its dictation, was recognised as monarch. Thenceforward the supreme authority in the Punjab was practically held by an army which punished its own officers, plundered the people, and conducted, by a committee of its own choosing, its own affairs and the affairs of the country.[3] The evils which Rome had experienced during the decline and fall of the Empire from the predominance

The Sikh army supreme.

[1] Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs*, p. 182.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 241, 246.

of the Prætorian Guards, recurred in the Punjab during the closing period of Sikh independence.

Disorder in a native Indian State always produces the same advice from Indian statesmen. From their standpoint a British army cannot be better employed than in punishing a mutinous soldiery encamped in a territory adjoining the British frontiers. Happily this advice, given to the Governor-General by the British Resident in the Punjab, could not be acted on. In 1841, Auckland, meditating on the probable fall of his old colleagues in England and on his own approaching retirement, was much more anxious to retreat from Afghanistan than to commence a new act of interference in the Punjab. In 1842, Ellenborough, preparing for war with the Ameers, was in no mood for fresh undertakings on the upper Indus. In 1843 the campaign of Napier in Scinde was sufficient work for the British army; and throughout these years disorder went on increasing in the Punjab, and the turbulence of the Sikh soldiery rose and fell as the star of the British waxed or waned. In 1842, Chund Kour, the mother of Nao Nihal, was beaten to death by her own retinue; in September 1843, Shere Singh was shot dead by one of his companions, and Dhian Singh, who accompanied his master, shared his fate. One of Shere Singh's sons, Heera Singh, 'roused by his own danger and his filial duty,' boldly appealed to the troops to avenge their monarch's murder. Bribed by a promise of higher pay, the troops responded to the call. Shere Singh's murderers were slain; Dhuleep Singh, the child of Runjeet's declining years, was raised to the throne, and Heera Singh assumed the office of minister.[1]

Increasing disorder in the Punjab.

Those who succeed to power by the sword sometimes perish by the sword; and the adage proved true of Heera Singh. After a year of vigorous and not

[1] Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs*, pp. 238, 261, 263.

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unsuccessful office he offended the soldiery by whom he had been raised to power, and the same bloody fate which he had allotted to his father's murderers was reserved for him in 1844. On his death the power temporarily fell into the hands of Jowahir Singh, the brother of the Raja Dhuleep's mother.[1] His short administration was marked by the insurrection of Peshawura Singh—real or adopted son of Runjeet.[2] Peshawura met the usual fate of unsuccessful insurgents, but his murder was the last success of his rival Jowahir. Drinking heavily, immersed in intrigues, plotting to assassinate his rivals, and dreading their counterplots, he drifted through the summer of 1845 to his inevitable end. On the 21st of September, the army, by an act such as even the Sikh army had not hitherto committed, decided that he should die, and, executing its own sentence, slew him by a discharge of musketry.[3]

The attitude of India.

These events naturally excited many apprehensions in the Viceroy's council chamber. A mutinous army, wielding the whole authority of a State, was not an agreeable neighbour. With unusual forbearance, however, the British abstained from interference in Sikh affairs. The Governor-General hoped that anarchy might be exhausted by its own violence, or that some chief might arise able to control a mutinous army and to construct a strong government.[4] Bent on maintaining a pacific policy, he contented himself therefore with strengthening the British forces on the frontier, and he proceeded thither himself in October 1845. These measures of precaution had the effect, however, of irritating rather than alarming the mutinous Sikh soldiery.

[1] Arnold's *Administration of Lord Dalhousie*, vol. i. p. 33 *sq.*; Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs*, p. 274.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 268, 277.

[3] *Papers respecting late Hostilities on N. W. Frontier of India*, Session 1846, No. 85, p. 8.

[4] See Lord Hardinge's despatch, *ibid.*, p. 1.

'Defensive measures took in their eyes the form of aggressive preparation;'[1] and, as they could not imagine that their own divisions endangered the British Empire, they concluded that the army mustered on the Sutledge was formed for the invasion of the Punjab. CHAP. XXVI. 1845.

Thus, as the autumn of 1845 wore on, the Sikhs, turbulent from mutiny and alarmed at the defensive measures of the British—the British, anxious for peace, but disturbed by the mutinous conduct of the Sikh soldiery—both drifted towards war. Unfortunately, moreover, for the cause of peace, Clerk, who for years past had been British agent in the Punjab, and who had won by his conduct the confidence of his employers and the regard of the Sikhs themselves, was promoted in June 1843 to the Lieutenant-Governorship of Agra. He was ultimately succeeded at Lahore by Broadfoot, an Engineer officer who had acquired repute in Afghanistan, but whose temperament was better fitted for the stern work which he helped to do at Jellalabad than for the delicate negotiations in which he was involved in Lahore. Broadfoot succeeded in making the Sikhs distrust the British, and in making the British distrust the Sikhs.[2] On the 20th of November he formally reported that the mutinous Sikh army was about to cross the Sutledge and invade British territory. On the 11th of December the entire Sikh army, convinced by its leader that the British preparations for defence were intended for aggression, passed the frontier and entrenched itself in what was known as protected territory at Ferozeshah.[3]

Broadfoot at Lahore.

[1] Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs*, p. 282; cf. as to Hardinge's defensive measures an important note in the *Quarterly Review*, vol. lxxix. p. 269.

[2] Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs*, p. 287.

[3] *Papers relating to Hostilities on the N.W. Frontier of India*, p. 24. By the arrangements made between the British and the Sikhs under Runjeet, the whole of the Punjab north of the Sutledge was virtually given up to the Sikhs. Between the Sutledge and British territory were several small tribes known as Protected

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The first Sikh war.

A movement of this character was not merely an act of war, it constituted a serious danger. Ferozeshah is situated to the south-west of Ferozepore, a station where Sir John Littler with a force of 7,000 men was stationed. Littler's position was threatened by the movement of the Sikh army; and accordingly Gough, the Commander-in-Chief in India, who had been joined by the Governor-General, moved from Umballa with all the force at his disposal in Littler's support. Hastening by forced marches, under an Indian sun, the troops suffered greatly from heat and from want of food. Inspirited, however, by the example of Gough and the presence of Hardinge, the army moved on without complaint, and advanced to a struggle without desponding. On the 18th it won a battle at Moodkee; on the 21st and 22nd it achieved a decisive victory at Ferozeshah against an enemy superior in numbers and artillery, and with a discipline almost equal to its own. More than 100 guns, the prizes of success, fell to the conquerors. Never before had a British army fought under greater disadvantages or won a greater victory.

Yet, if the victory were great, the price paid for it was heavy. 872 officers and men fell at Moodkee; and Sale, the hero of Jellalabad, met a soldier's death on the battlefield. At Ferozeshah, where Hardinge himself offered his sword to Gough, and assumed the second place in the army, 2,415 officers and men were killed and wounded. The Sikhs, however, disheartened by the issue of the battle, withdrew across the Sutledge, where the British, enfeebled by their losses, were unable to follow them. In the course of January, 1845, the Sikhs, emboldened by the forced inaction of the conquerors, recrossed the river, entrenched themselves on its left bank, and thus held command of both banks of the

States. In the protected territory the British held military stations at Loodiana, a place well known in the history of Shah Sooja, and at Ferozepore.

stream Towards the end of the same month they passed the upper Sutledge and established a magazine at Dhurrumkote, between Loodiana and Ferozepore. These movements drew on a fresh battle and victory. Sir Harry Smith, overtaking the enemy at Aliwal, drove him across the Sutledge with severe loss of men and guns. The new victory further inspirited the British troops, and induced their commander to make one more vigorous effort to bring the struggle to a conclusion.

The spot where the main army of the Sikhs was entrenched on either side of the Sutledge was known under the name of Sobraon. A ford at this point enabled their troops to cross from bank to bank. The entrenchments which the enemy had constructed to cover his position were of great strength, they were crowned with artillery more numerous and powerful than any which Gough could bring against them. This position Gough, on the 8th of February, decided to storm. Even Hardinge, brave almost to a fault, shrank from the responsibility of attacking works of so great strength, manned by troops of such proved resolution. Three times he urged the Commander-in-Chief to desist from the attack unless he felt confident of success. The troops were already in position, the artillery was already opening fire, when Hardinge for the third time suggested caution. 'What!' replied Gough, 'withdraw the troops after the action has commenced, and when I feel sure of victory? Indeed I will not; tell Sir Robert Dick (who was to lead the assault) to move on in the name of God.'[1]

[1] The story has never been told publicly before, but it rests on unimpeachable authority. For the facts of the campaign see a rare book, *Despatches and General Orders announcing the Victories achieved by the Army of the Sutledge, &c.* These despatches, &c., however, will also be found in *Papers respecting the late Hostilities on the N. W. Frontier of India; further Papers respecting the late Hostilities* (*Parl. Papers*, 1846, Nos. 77, 85); Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs*, p. 297 *sq.*; *Quarterly Review*, vol. lxxviii. pp. 196 *sq.*; *Calcutta Review*, vol. vi. p. 241 *sq.*

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The confidence of Gough was justified; the enemy's entrenched camp was carried by storm and his army almost annihilated; sixty-seven guns were captured, and, during the night of the 10th, on which this victory was achieved, the advanced brigade of the British army were thrown across the Sutledge.[1] But the political consequences of the battle were more considerable than its military results. The earlier reverses of the Sikhs had induced them to place authority in the hands of Gholab Singh. This able but unscrupulous chieftain had repaired, after Aliwal, to Lahore, and had ever since maintained a secret correspondence with the Governor-General. The total defeat of the Sikhs at Sobraon compelled the Sikh Government to authorise Gholab to offer unconditional submission to the conquerors.[2] And the terms on which Hardinge insisted were exceptionally severe. The British frontier was advanced from the Sutledge to the Beas; a vast tract of fertile territory was thus added to the Company's possessions; and the Sikhs were required to pay an indemnity of a million towards the expenses of the war. A treasury exhausted by misgovernment could not of course produce so vast an amount of treasure, and in lieu of it, the Hill States from the Beas to the Indus were taken from Lahore. This acquisition would, however, have inconveniently increased the British frontier, and Hardinge accordingly decided on transferring it to Gholab Singh, this chieftain undertaking to pay in return for it the price of the indemnity. Gholab was thus rewarded for his treachery and for his services by being made an independent sovereign, and the boy Dhuleep was left the Maharaja of an impoverished and diminished territory.[3]

The terms of peace.

[1] The text is taken almost literally from Sir H. Hardinge's despatch, *Parl. Papers*, p. 68.

[2] *Further Papers respecting late Hostilities*, pp. 53, 67, 68.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 90, 99.

The whole history of the British in India affords one long proof that it is easier to destroy than to restore a system. Deprived of his artillery, stripped of much of his territory, his army beaten, his treasury exhausted, the boy king of the Sikhs could not stand alone, and his advisers urged the Governor-General to give him the support of a British force and a British Resident. Hardinge acceded to both requests. He consented that a British army should remain, for a limited period, at Lahore. He appointed as agent at the Maharaja's Court, Henry Lawrence, an officer whose life was a noble sacrifice to duty. At the same time he entrusted a brother of this officer, John Lawrence, with the administration of the territory between the Beas and the Sutledge which had just been annexed to the Company's dominions.[1]

The Lawrences.

Wiser appointments could not have been made. During the present century the Indian service has produced few greater and no better men than the two Lawrences. The stories of their lives should be familiar to those who have work to do, and desire to learn how good and great men do it. John Lawrence obtained a success such as no Anglo-Indian had achieved before. He was selected by his Sovereign for the Viceroyalty of that vast Empire to whose service his best energies had been devoted. Years before the younger brother attained this high position, the elder brother, Henry, met a soldier's death at Lucknow. Yet many persons will be disposed to think that, if Henry had survived, he would have been the greater man and more capable Viceroy. The two brothers bore in some respects close resemblance, in others a notable contrast, one to the other. Henry, a soldier by profession, and no mean soldier by proof, was destined to achieve his chief successes in political and civil work. John, a member

[1] *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 189.

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of the civil service, in several instances proved that he had singular knowledge of and capacity for military affairs. Both men had the readiness to incur responsibility which forms high qualification for independent rule. But, while John had that command of detail which makes a man the best of subordinates, Henry had the self-confidence and dislike of control which fits him for command.

Both brothers had that keen sense which all the best Anglo-Indians have displayed of the duty of England towards India. But they had different conceptions of policy. John was anxious to confer on the natives the benefits of English administration. Henry was more desirous of considering the views of the natives themselves. On the most memorable occasion of their lives, when these two high-minded men parted one from the other, John was in favour of the annexation of the Punjab, while Henry resisted its annexation; John was desirous of introducing the full benefit of English rule into the province, while Henry was anxious to defer to the scruples and feelings of native Indians.

Their work in the Punjab.

The appointments which Hardinge thus made were fully justified. John Lawrence succeeded in organising an efficient administration in the recently annexed territory which he had been selected to rule. Henry Lawrence rapidly secured the confidence of the Sikhs among whom he had been deputed to reside. It is impossible, however, in a work of this kind to enter into details of their administration. It is sufficient to say that firm and just government pacified the country; and that Hardinge, on resigning the Governor-Generalship in 1848, declared to his successor that it would not be necessary to fire a shot in India for another five years.[1] When Hardinge returned to England, Henry Lawrence accompanied him. Long residence in India

[1] *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 245.

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Lord Dalhousie Governor-General.

had impaired the latter's health, and necessitated relaxation and rest in a temperate climate.[1] The Governor-General received as his successor Dalhousie, who had held office under Peel, and who had remained in office under Russell; while the Residency at Lahore was temporarily entrusted to Frederick Currie, a member of the Governor-General's Council at Calcutta. No two opinions have ever been expressed upon Dalhousie's capacity. During his long rule he showed more character than any man who had governed India since Wellesley. *Fortis in re*, however, he was rarely *suavis in modo*; and even those who agree most closely with his decisions will regret that in communicating them to his subordinates he did not show more consideration for their feelings.

Some months elapsed after Henry Lawrence had left the Punjab before Currie entered upon the duties of the administration; and, in the interval, the work of organising the territory was to some extent delayed. Though Lawrence was nominally only political agent at Lahore, he was virtually ruler of the Punjab; the removal of Lal Singh for treachery and of the Maharanee for corruption, forced the English to assume

[1] Henry Lawrence was made, on his return, a K.C.B. *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, p. 418. Hardinge and Gough had both been already rewarded for their share in the Sikh war. Hardinge received a Viscount's coronet with a pension of 3,000*l.*; Gough a Baron's coronet with a pension of 2,000*l.* a year for three lives. For the proposal of these pensions, see *Hansard*, vol. lxxxvi. p. 9. The East India Company, imitating the liberality of Parliament, introduced a bill enabling it to settle 5,000*l.* and 2,000*l.* a year on the two men, *ibid.*, p. 613. On this bill Peel engrafted a clause suspending the English pension to Hardinge while he was in receipt of the Indian pension, *ibid.*, p. 856. The Lords, rallying in defence of a lord, struck the clause out; and Lansdowne moved its restoration on the third reading, producing a letter from Lady Hardinge, assenting to its being restored. *Ibid.*, vol. lxxxvii. p. 1138. Lady Hardinge, it has already been stated, was half-sister to Castlereagh; she was therefore niece to the second Lord Camden, who in 1817 voluntarily surrendered to the public the fees of his sinecure office of Teller of the Exchequer. Different opinions may possibly be formed on the propriety of such concessions as those which were made by Lord Camden and Lady Hardinge. But their example has been so rarely followed that it is pleasing to find uncle and niece both distinguished for similar abnegation.

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the Regency during the minority of Dhuleep Singh. One delicate task remained for accomplishment. The fortress of Mooltan, famous since the days of Alexander, is one of the strongest places in Hindostan. It lies on the left bank of the Chenab, some distance below its confluence with the Ravee. Taken by Runjeet Singh, it had been entrusted to the care of Sawun Mull, who, after twenty years of vigorous and successful rule, left his wealth and the fortress to his son and heir, Moolraj. Lal Singh, who, at the time of Sawun Mull's death, was the guiding genius of the Sikh Government, claimed from Moolraj a large payment as succession duty. For many years the claim was not acknowledged. After the first Sikh war, however, Moolraj was persuaded to come to Lahore, and payment was arranged. Moolraj, however, vexed at the issue of the negotiation, 'expressed a wish to resign his post, and was taken at his word.'[1] Another Sikh was appointed in his place; and two English officers, Vans Agnew and Anderson, were deputed to accompany him to Mooltan, and help him to conduct the administration of the surrounding district. On the 20th of April, 1848, as they rode into the fortress, they were struck down, and, after a gallant defence by a portion of their escort, murdered. It is still uncertain how far Moolraj was concerned in the outrage;[2] but there is no doubt that he used it as a reason for reasserting his authority. He at once called on the Sikhs to rise against the British; and he succeeded in persuading Dost Mahommed to link the Afghans with the Sikhs. The traditions of the Sikhs, their faith, their organisation, all favoured the new movement. The British, it was at

Mooltan.

Vans Agnew and Anderson murdered.

[1] *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 248.

[2] On this point cf. *ibid.*, p. 249, Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 20, *Life of Outram*, vol. ii. Appendix I.—Anderson was brother-in-law to Outram—and *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, p. 420, *note*, where Lawrence's memorandum that the murder was not committed by Sikhs is worth remembering. For the whole history cf. Arnold's *Administration of Lord Dalhousie*, vol. i. p. 63 *sq.*

once seen, were likely to be involved in a new Sikh war.

Yet the highest men in India and the Punjab hardly realised the situation. New to the country, Dalhousie imperfectly understood that the troops which had been defeated at Sobraon could be induced to resume a struggle with their victors. New to the Punjab, Currie was more anxious to lean on Calcutta than to extinguish the conflagration before it spread. The season was notoriously unhealthy, military operations could be more safely undertaken in the cool months of winter, and the men, therefore, who should have taken action at once were content to wait and do nothing. A young subordinate, indeed, stationed on the frontier, with the Afghans on one side of him and the insurgent Sikhs on the other, understood the situation more accurately than his chiefs. Herbert Edwardes, for this was the young officer's name, occupied Leia, enrolled 3,000 Patans, awaited the attack which Moolraj made upon him, and 'drove him headlong back towards Mooltan.'[1] This victory induced Currie to send a force, under General Whish, to besiege Mooltan. But the movement was too late; Whish's Sikh troops passed over to the enemy, Whish himself was forced to raise the siege and fall back. It was no longer doubtful that the British would have to fight, the experience of 1846 had taught them that they would have to fight hard, to re-establish their predominance.

Herbert Edwardes

The full truth dawned at last on the Governor-General. 'Unwarned by precedent, uninfluenced by example,' so he publicly said as he hurried up from Calcutta to the front, 'the Sikh nation have called for war, and, on my word, sirs, they shall have it with a vengeance.' In November, Gough, the victor of So-

The second Sikh war.

[1] *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 254, and Arnold's *Dalhousie*, vol. i. p. 80 *sq.*

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braon, put himself at the head of the army which was by this time massed at Ferozepore. After two indecisive actions at Ramnuggur and Sadoolapore, the Sikh army withdrew to a strong position at Chillianwalla, on the Jhelum. There, on the 13th of January, 1849, Gough fought the great battle which was publicly announced as a victory, but which was privately admitted to be a reverse.[1] British supremacy in India seemed, for the moment, imperilled by an engagement whose issue had long been doubtful, and whose slaughter for a few weeks paralysed our arms.

News of the battle was received everywhere with dismay. 'All that we can do,' wrote Dalhousie to Henry Lawrence, who had flung up his leave and returned to the Punjab on the first news of the war, 'will hardly restore the prestige of our power in India, and of our military superiority, partly from the evidence of facts, and partly from the unwise and unpatriotic and contemptible croaking in public of the European community itself all throughout India, high and low.' So great was the consternation in England that the ministry at once sent for Napier, the victor of Meeanee, and sent him out in haste to supersede Gough and to assume the chief command. But, before Napier could arrive, the gallant old hero of Sobraon had retrieved his failure. On the 21st of February, 1849, he attacked the Sikhs at Gujerat, broke them with his artillery, drove them from their position, and following up his advantage, forced them to surrender all their guns and all their ammunition. The Sikh army was destroyed by the battle.[2]

[1] *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 257, where Mr. Bosworth Smith follows the usual account. I have the high authority of Sir Patrick Grant for saying that Chillianwalla was 'not, as has been suggested, a drawn battle, it was a decisive victory, though not so decisive as it would have been had the plans of the Commander-in-Chief been duly carried out.' The account in the text, however, represents accurately enough the general impression both in India and England at the time.

[2] Kaye, in his *History of the Sepoy War*, vol. i. pp. 1–47, has a brilliant

The annexation of the Punjab.

It was then that the iron nature of Dalhousie's character became apparent. He would hear of no terms but unconditional surrender, of no arrangement but the annexation of the Punjab. He brushed away with scorn the arguments of Henry Lawrence for lenient treatment of the enemy; he turned a deaf ear to his suggestion that annexation, though perhaps just, was inexpedient. Two such wars as those of 1846 and 1849 no doubt justified a policy of conquest, and the Governor-General declined to leave the Sikhs the power which might enable them to force the British to do their work a third time.

In fact, of all the acquisitions which the British had made, the annexation of the Punjab stands in least necessity of defence. The outbreak of 1848 could only lead to two results—victory or defeat. Successful, moreover, as Indian administration on the whole has been, its success was nowhere greater than in the Punjab. The province was placed under a commission of which Henry Lawrence was chief, and on which John Lawrence served. The story of that commission, of its external labours and internal differences, is so blended with the lives of the Lawrences that it has been made more familiar to Englishmen than any other work which their fellow-countrymen have achieved in India. It cannot be told at length in these pages. Those who wish to know how internal peace was preserved; how the frontier was guarded; how the various establishments of the State were organised; how violent crime was repressed; how the penal law was executed; how prison discipline was enforced; how civil justice was administered; how taxation was fixed and the revenue was collected; how

summary of these transactions. The East India Company, with the recollection of Scinde before it, strongly objected to Napier's appointment; and it was only with the utmost difficulty that the Ministry obtained the consent of the directors to it. *Greville*, second series, vol. iii. pp. 274, 280; and for the Duke of Wellington's opinion of Napier, *ibid.*, p. 214.

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commerce was set free, agriculture fostered, and the nation's resources developed,[1] must refer to the commissioners' report. When they have mastered it they will perhaps realise the full meaning of the touching words which their Chairman desired for an epitaph, or the similar, though more flattering inscription, which it was afterwards suggested should be placed on Lord Lawrence's grave.[2]

[1] The words in the text are, *mutatis mutandis*, from the 452nd paragraph of the first Punjab Report; cf. Arnold's *Administration of Lord Dalhousie*, vol. i. pp. 227–403; cf. *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 280 *et seq.*

[2] 'Here lies Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty,' is the simple inscription on the tombstone of one brother in Lucknow. 'Here lies John Lawrence, who did his duty to the last,' was the epitaph which it was suggested should be placed on Lord Lawrence's tomb in Westminster Abbey. The touching epitaph on Henry Lawrence's grave was no new phrase for him to use. It occurs in the beautiful letter in which he announced to his sons their mother's death, and is applied to them; 'her pleasure, nay delight, was always great when all was well, and her sons seemed trying to do their duty.' *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, p. 521.

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CHAPTER XXVII.

THE annexation of the Punjab under Dalhousie concludes a distinct period of the history of the English in India. For the eleven years which preceded it, the gaze of Indian statesmen had been almost exclusively concentrated on the north-western frontier of Hindostan. Dread of danger from this quarter had driven Auckland into the follies of the Afghan war, had led Ellenborough into the iniquitous annexation of Scinde, and had produced the long chain of circumstances which had culminated in the conquest of the Sikh territory. The dread had at last been temporarily removed. The huge range of mountains, the north-western barrier of Hindostan, seemed adequate protection against the advance of an external enemy. The men who had experienced the difficulties and dangers of the Bolan and Khyber Passes were not likely to suffer from the later delusion that these mountain tracts afforded a convenient approach for a Russian army. The laurels, which had been gathered at Meeanee, at Sobraon, and at Chillianwalla, had effectually covered the stain with which the disasters at Cabul had tarnished the British armour. Secure, therefore, both in their position and in the proved prowess of their troops, Indian statesmen were once more able to turn their attention to other Indian questions, and the fears which had influenced Auckland, and from which his successors had been hardly free, were, except during one short interval in 1856, forgotten for a quarter of a century.

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Burma.

In 1826 a long and difficult war in Burma had been brought to a successful conclusion. The Burmese, worsted in the struggle, had been forced to sign two treaties with their conquerors. The first had settled the terms on which peace was made. The second, concluded some months afterwards, had pledged each of the contracting parties to afford to the traders of the other the utmost protection and security.[1] The arrangements which had been thus made might have endured if other nations besides the British had not been 'busy in the Eastern Seas.' Americans and French were 'notably looking towards the delta of the Irrawaddy,' and Dalhousie concluded that, if he took no action himself, action might be taken by these Powers. Under these circumstances he was led seriously to contemplate a fresh act of interference in Burma.[2] In the course of years disputes had naturally arisen between the Burmese authorities and British traders, and in 1851 two specific complaints were brought under the notice of the Government of India. In June of that year, Captain Sheppard, the master of the British barque 'Monarch,' was arrested at Rangoon on the charge of having thrown his pilot overboard. According to Sheppard's story, the pilot had run the ship into shoal water, had failed to extricate her, and, 'from fear or shame,' had jumped overboard. The man, however, had disappeared; it was alleged that a sum of money had disappeared with him; and, even in civilised communities, investigation would have been ordered into the causes of his death. In Rangoon judicial inquiries were certain to be attended with abuse. The Governor ultimately released Sheppard,

[1] *Ante*, p. 213. The first of these treaties is known as the treaty of Yandaboo. It was signed on the 24th of February, 1826. It and the subsequent commercial treaty are printed in the *Papers relating to Hostilities with Burma*, presented to Parliament in 1852, pp. 87–91.

[2] Arnold's *Dalhousie*, vol. ii. p. 14, 15. I have given the case almost exactly in Mr Arnold's words.

but he ill-treated one of his crew, and he extorted from Sheppard himself, in fees and fines, a sum of rather more than 100*l.*

Four months afterwards, another British sailor, Captain Lewis, of the 'Champion,' was charged before the Governor of Rangoon, at the instance of some of his crew, with murdering a sailor. There does not seem to have been any foundation for the charge. The men who brought it were Lascars and deserters, and the remainder of the crew unanimously declared the captain innocent. In this case, however, there was again excuse for inquiry, and inquiry again led to injustice, abuse, and extortion. After some detention, Lewis was allowed to depart, but he was required to pay some 70*l.* to the Governor.

In both these cases the Governor of Rangoon had undoubtedly been wrong, and both of them afforded good grounds for the interference of the British Government. No great country can allow its subjects to be ill-treated by the authorities of other nations, and it is a good thing for British trade that every people should know that the arm of England is long, and that she will not suffer any of her sons to be subjected to injury or extortion. Unfortunately, however, the Don Pacificos who see England in arms to avenge their cause are not usually moderate in their demands. Unfortunately, too, the breed is one which is easily multiplied. Lewis valued his losses and his sufferings at 900*l.*, Sheppard presented a claim of 1,000*l.*, the owners of the 'Monarch' made a further demand for 800*l.*, and a Mr. Potter—seeing that money was to be asked for, and fancying probably that it was to be got for the asking—sent in a statement of a new grievance, accompanying it with a claim of 2,600*l.*

The original claims on Burma.

The Government of India, with these claims before it, acted with desirable promptitude and commendable moderation. It instructed Commodore Lambert, of

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Lambert's mission.

H.M.S. 'Fox,' to proceed to Rangoon, to satisfy himself of the accuracy of Sheppard's and Lewis's statements, to address a note to the Governor declaring that the British could not allow a treaty to be disregarded or its subjects abused, and to demand such pecuniary compensation as on inquiry might seem reasonable. If the Governor of Rangoon refused to make the necessary reparation, the Court of Ava was to be asked to disavow his acts, and to pay the compensation which the Governor refused to concede. The Government of India, in issuing these orders, abstained 'from every expression' even, which might have appeared unfriendly; it distinctly forbade the inception of hostilities without its own express authority.[1]

Armed with these instructions, Lambert, in November 1851, set sail for Rangoon. On his arrival he was met by a deputation of British residents, who complained of numerous grievances of which they were the victims. These complaints ought obviously to have been addressed to the Government of India, instead of being made to a naval officer. They clearly did not affect the specific instructions which Lambert had received. Lambert, however, came to a contrary conclusion. He fancied that the long list of fresh complaints prevented his holding direct communication with the Governor. Instead, therefore, of making the demand for reparation on that officer, he at once applied for redress to the King of Ava, and, while he sent one of his officers to Calcutta to explain his reasons for deviating from his orders, he himself awaited at Rangoon the decision of the Burmese Court.[2]

Lambert's disregard of his orders, which was, how-

[1] *Parl. Papers relating to Burma*, pp. 1–24. The compensation was cut down by the Indian Council in the case of Sheppard from 1,000*l.* to 350*l.*, in the case of Lewis from 900*l.* to 500*l.*, and the claim of the owners of the 'Monarch' was pronounced inadmissible.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–33.

ever, approved by the Government of India, was fortunately not attended with the serious consequences which might have been apprehended from it. The Court of Ava at once gave way; it removed the obnoxious Governor; it promised to settle the demands made upon it by the Indian Government; and it despatched a new Governor to Rangoon with full power to settle them. Barbarous Courts, however, occasionally make promises which they have no intention to redeem. It ought therefore to be added that Lambert—no partial authority—believed in the sincerity of the Court, and in the desire of the Burmese ministers to carry out their pledges.[1]

The Court of Ava yields.

So far, therefore, all had gone well. On the first day of 1852 Lambert received the pacific message from the Court of Ava; on the 4th of January the new Governor arrived; on the 5th, Mr. Edwards, a clerk or assistant-interpreter, was sent to arrange an interview with him; and on the 6th, Commander Fishbourne, Lambert's second in command, was instructed to carry a letter to him, and to arrange a settlement of the difference. In his interview with Edwards, nothing could exceed the courtesy of the Governor; he even summarily and severely punished one of his subordinates who had threatened Edwards on his approach. But he displayed an intense dislike to receiving Fishbourne on the following day. This officer was constantly informed that the Governor was asleep and could not be awakened, and he returned to his frigate without delivering his message.

The new Governor of Rangoon refuses to receive Captain Fishbourne.

There is, unhappily, too much reason to suppose that Fishbourne, by a neglect of etiquette, partially brought upon himself the discourtesy which he undoubtedly experienced. The Governor, though he had offered no objection to receiving letters or messages informally through Edwards, thought and declared that a formal

[1] *Parl. Papers relating to Burma*, p. 34.

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mission should have been headed by Lambert himself. And Fishbourne's behaviour increased his dislike to receiving that officer. He rode into the Governor's compound, and by doing so probably unconsciously outraged the Governor's sense of decorum.[1] And, when he was refused an interview, he displayed an irritation which offended the Governor's dignity. In the East, minute points of etiquette have an importance almost unintelligible to European readers; and the Governor, irritated at Fishbourne's neglect of rule, behaved with scant courtesy. His faults, however, whether grave or venial, were faults of manner, and they were the faults not of the Court of Ava but of the Governor of Rangoon.

Under the circumstances, what was Lambert to do? He had a few days before expressed his belief in the sincerity of the Burmese Court; he had received instructions to refrain from hostilities without express orders from India; and, if he felt himself precluded from pursuing the negotiation with the Governor, he had the alternative of again complaining to Ava or of referring to Calcutta for fresh orders. Instead of doing so, he chose to interpret the conduct of the Governor as the act of a nation. He wrote to the Court of Ava, stating that he was obliged to suspend all communication with the Burmese Empire, he declared the Burmese coasts in a state of blockade, and he seized and detained a vessel belonging to the Court as security for the indemnity which he had been instructed to claim.

Captain Lambert's stringent measures.

These harsh and unauthorised measures did not immediately precipitate hostilities. The Burmese, on the contrary, showed a disposition to give way, and an effort towards a reconciliation was made by the Governor of the adjoining territory of Della, who had won Lambert's confidence and respect by his conduct. But these nego-

[1] Cobden's *Political Writings*, vol. ii. p. 57.

tiations fell through; and on the 10th of January, Lambert, collecting his prize and the merchant vessels which required his protection, moved down the river. In doing so, for the purpose of affording protection to the squadron, he anchored the 'Fox' abreast of a battery or stockade which commanded the passage of the river. The Burmese, who were in considerable force in the stockade, perhaps naturally, but unwisely, opened fire on the 'Fox.' The captain of the 'Fox' returned the fire, silenced the stockade, and drove out its garrison; the Burmese war-boats which were stationed nearest the stockade were destroyed by Lambert's orders; and Lambert, having secured a complete and easy victory, stationed the 'Fox' at the mouth of the river.[1]

The Burmese fire on H.M.S. 'Fox.'

Hitherto the responsibility for the quarrel had mainly rested with subordinates. The management of the matter was now assumed by the Governor-General. Dalhousie on the 26th of January issued fresh instructions. He demanded—1st, that the Governor of Rangoon should express in writing his deep regret for the manner in which British officers had been treated; 2nd, that the indemnity should at once be paid; 3rd, that the Governor should consent to receive an accredited agent of the British Government with due honour. If these concessions were made, he undertook to send an officer of rank to adjust the final settlement of the difference, and on its adjustment to restore the Burmese ship and to raise the blockade. If, on the contrary, these concessions were refused, he declared that the British Government would exact for itself reparation for the wrong which it had suffered.[2] In writing this letter, the Government of India undoubtedly avoided some of the

Dalhousie's ultimatum.

[1] *Parl. Papers relating to Burma*, p. 41. I have followed in the text the official account. Mr. Arnold declares the men-of-war passed and repassed the stockades with an unmistakable meaning, and the 'Hermes' beat to quarters, her captain knowing very well what would follow. Arnold's *Dalhousie*, vol. ii. p. 46.

[2] *Papers relating to Burma*, p. 52.

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mistakes which had previously been made. In particular, it did not repeat the error of wounding the susceptibilities of an Oriental by asking him to receive an officer of inferior rank. But it ignored the circumstance that the conduct of Lambert in seizing a Burmese ship had altered the whole conditions of the quarrel. Up to that point the sole grievance had been a British grievance, and the demand for reparation had been exclusively a British demand. Lambert by his action had thrown away this advantage. He had, in his turn, given the Burmese a grievance; and the Governor of Rangoon thenceforward insisted, and from a Burmese standpoint rightly insisted, that the Burmese ship should be surrendered at the same time as the indemnity was paid.[1] This circumstance was, however, of less importance as the difference was already getting wider. The despatch in which the Government of India made its last demand was forwarded through Lambert; and Lambert, in order to deliver it, carried the 'Fox' up the river. To do so he had necessarily to repass the stockade which he had already encountered; and its garrison, untaught by previous experience, re-opened fire on the vessel. In this conflict the 'Fox' was again successful, and the stockade silenced. But in the course of the contest a sailor on board the 'Fox' was mortally wounded. The prospects of peace were not increased by successive encounters unfortunately attended with bloodshedding.

Renewed combat.

[1] *Papers relating to Burma*, p. 63. It may be thought that I have been influenced in the text by the arguments in Cobden's very able paper, *How Wars are got up in India*. I subjoin, therefore, the opinions of Derby, the Prime Minister, and Herries, the President of the Board of Control. The former said in the House of Lords: 'Commodore Lambert, unfortunately, as I think, took upon himself, without previous instructions, to seize a vessel of the King of Ava.' *Hansard*, vol. cxx. p. 656. The latter wrote to Dalhousie: 'With more discretion on the side of the naval negotiators, and a strict compliance with your instructions, the affair might perhaps have been terminated without having recourse to the strong measures which you are now forced to adopt.' *Memoir of Herries*, vol. ii. p. 250. Derby and Herries in these two passages practically endorse the chief part of Cobden's contention.

Up to the date of this occurrence Dalhousie had acted with laudable moderation. In his original instructions to Lambert, as well as in his demand of the 26th of January, he had studiously avoided requiring more than the Burmese had originally conceded. If common care had been taken in the first instance by Lambert to respect the susceptibilities of an uncivilised people; if Lambert, in opposition to his orders, had not committed an act of war by seizing a Burmese vessel, and by blockading the Burmese coasts; if even he had taken the precaution to notify his reasons for passing up the river in the 'Fox;' there is every reason for believing that war might have been avoided. But the responsibility for the later proceedings does not rest with Lambert but with Dalhousie. He had hitherto wisely separated the Governor of Rangoon from the Burmese Government; the only chance of peace lay in maintaining this distinction. Instead of preserving it, and of waiting for an apology from Ava, he decided on at once exacting reparation by arms. Orders were issued for the immediate preparation of a considerable expedition. It was calculated that the troops selected for the service could be ready by the 20th of March. Only one loophole was left for the Court of Ava. If, on the arrival of the force at Rangoon, the required apology were offered, it was to be accepted. But, in addition to the original compensation of 1,000*l.*, a further sum of 100,000*l.* was to be exacted from the Burmese. If these demands were at once conceded, but difficulty arose in obtaining so large a sum of money, Rangoon and Martaban were to be placed temporarily in British hands as security for the payment; but, if either the demand were refused, or the Burmese declined to yield two of their most important towns, war was at once to begin.[1]

The expedition to Burma.

Such were the circumstances under which the

[1] *Parl. Papers relating to Burma*, p. 67, cf. 74.

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The second Burmese war.

second Burmese war commenced. Whatever judgment may be formed as to its policy, no two opinions can be expressed upon its conduct. When Dalhousie struck, he always struck hard. By the end of March the expedition which he had prepared was ready for action. General Godwin,[1] its commander, attempted to ascertain whether the Burmese Government had made the requisite concessions; but the vessel which he despatched with a flag of truce for the purpose was fired on by the Burmese, and Godwin had no alternative but to commence the war. Martaban was taken by the British on the 5th of April; Rangoon itself fell a week afterwards. After these successes a short respite was afforded in order that the Burmese Government might have the opportunity of making terms. But the Burmese Government did not, perhaps dared not, concede the reparation which the British demanded. In consequence the war was continued till Pegu, and the whole province of which it is the capital, were conquered. Even then, the Court of Ava refused to yield; and the British, instead of continuing the war, decided on annexing the conquered territory to the British dominions.[2] Few nations ever resented a conquest more bitterly than the Burmese. The King of Ava lost his throne; and his successor, for years, declined to acknowledge that the province of Pegu was no longer a part of the Burmese Empire. At last, ten years after the Burmese war, he consented to conclude a treaty with the British, and to recognise the loss which it was useless for him any longer to deny.

Its termination.

There is a tide in the affairs of men, which taken at the flood leads on to fortune. There is a tide in the affairs of India which bears on the strongest men to a policy of annexation. Since the days of Wellesley no

[1] There is a very pleasant and just tribute to General Godwin's merits in Mr. Arnold's *Dalhousie*, vol. ii. p. 100.

[2] *Further Papers relating to Burma*, p. 160; Arnold's *Dalhousie*, vol. ii. p. 96.

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stronger man than Dalhousie had been sent to govern the Indian Empire. Since the days of Cornwallis no Governor-General had been more anxious to refrain from increasing the Company's dominions. Yet events had proved too strong for Dalhousie, as they had proved too strong for all his predecessors. The mutiny of the Sikh army had forced him to commence the war which had been terminated by the annexation of the Punjab. The lawlessness of the Burmese and the errors of Lambert had carried him into the hostilities which had terminated with the conquest of Pegu; and, in the four years which had passed since he set foot in India, Dalhousie had done more than almost any of his predecessors to extend the sway of British rule and to enlarge the responsibilities of British rulers.[1]

Yet, great as were the additions which he had already made to the British possessions in India, when men talk of the annexations of Dalhousie they do not usually refer to the consequences of the second Sikh war, or to the conquest of Pegu; they generally allude to the annexation of Oudh. The formal addition of that great province to the possessions of the Company is rightly regarded as the most important circumstance in Dalhousie's administration, and the verdict on the character of his rule will probably ultimately depend on the opinion which may be formed on this part of his policy.

Oudh.

The state of Oudh.

There are few circumstances in the history of the British in India on which a greater conflict of thought exists, or on which it is more difficult to form a correct judgment, than on this very question. No impartial Englishman would indeed care to defend the treatment of Oudh in the eighteenth century; he must be a

[1] I have omitted from this review all allusion to Dalhousie's annexations of Sattara, Nagpore, and Jhansi, since it seemed more desirable to concentrate light on great events than dissipate it among smaller matters. For these annexations, see Arnold's *Dalhousie*, vol. ii. p. 107 *sq.*, Duke of Argyll's *India under Lord Dalhousie*, p. 23 *sq.*, and *Lord Dalhousie's Review of his Administration, Papers of House of Lords*, 1856, No. 161, p. 8.

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brave writer who undertakes the defence of Wellesley's treatment of Oudh in the nineteenth century. Most persons cognisant of Indian history would admit that the maladministration of the province, which is the only real justification of its annexation, was intensified by the extortionate demands of successive Governors-General. But for these acts Dalhousie was not responsible. He had only personally to deal with the facts before him, and it is on these facts that his policy was based, and on these alone that his conduct should be criticised.

The salient features of Wellesley's policy towards Oudh have already been related.[1] The attitude of Zemaun Shah induced him to increase the British force stationed in Oudh; and the unpunctual payment of the subsidy for its support afforded him an excuse for appropriating one-half the province in order that its revenues might be applied to the payment of the troops. This harsh and unjust policy undoubtedly weakened the position of the Nawab. Yet for many years relations of close friendship existed between Lucknow and Calcutta. The reigning Nawab was a man of ability, acquainted with society, trained to business, and able, by prudence and economy, to reduce expenditure, to preserve order,[2] and to amass considerable treasure;[3] and, though complaints of maladministration arose, those readers who are acquainted with the 'Life of Metcalfe,' with the 'Diaries' of Moira, and the 'Memoirs of Heber,' will possibly doubt whether the government of Oudh was worse than that of any other independent Indian principality.[4]

[1] *Ante*, p. 158.

[2] All these compliments are paid to him by Sleeman. *Tour in Oudh*, vol. ii. p. 190. The passage seems to have been strangely overlooked by the Duke of Argyll in his *Review of India under Lord Dalhousie*, p. 12.

[3] 14,000,000*l*. Sleeman's *Tour in Oudh*, vol. i. p. 309.

[4] Heber, who visited Oudh in 1824–5, wrote: 'I was pleased, however, and surprised, after all which I had heard of Oudh, to find the country so completely under the

But a different state of things gradually arose under the Nawab's successors. The British troops found themselves constantly asked to support oppression, under the pretext of putting down disorder. The Government of India and the British Resident at Lucknow not unnaturally felt an increasing indisposition to employ a British force for the purpose of enforcing an oppressive policy, and the Nawab, unable to rely any longer on extraneous aid, and powerless to collect his revenues without force, gradually, in defiance of the treaty, enlisted troops of his own.[1] This measure, in its turn, produced two consequences. The treasure which had been amassed from 1801 to 1814 was gradually spent, and the Nawab, having forces under his own control and finding his treasury becoming exhausted, increased his exactions.[2]

Breaches of the treaty of 1801.

Whether the province were well or ill administered, successive Governors-General undoubtedly obtained considerable pecuniary assistance from its rulers. Hastings, in sore straits for money for the Nepaulese war, persuaded the Nawab to grant him, in two separate sums, a loan of 2,000,000*l.*, and repaid one million of it with a portion of the territory conquered from Nepaul, which it would have been inconvenient for the Company to retain, and which proved a burden rather than a source of profit to Oudh.[3] Amherst, in similar

The Nawabs advance money to Hastings and Amherst,

plough; since, were the oppression so great as is sometimes stated, I cannot think that we should witness so considerable a population or so much industry.' Bird, not unnaturally, placed the passage on his title-page, *Dacoitee in Excelsis*; cf. *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, pp. 528, 545 *sq.* Hastings says, 'The Vizier's country from Lucknow hither (Powain) is rich in point of soil, and is in general well cultivated; indeed, I should rate it higher in both respects than some of ours to the south-east.' *Private Journal*, vol. i. p. 237.

[1] Sleeman's *Tour in Oudh*, vol. ii. pp. 191, 192.

[2] Sleeman notices, vol. i. p. 310, that from 1814 to 1827 the treasure was reduced from 14,000,000*l.* to 10,000,000*l.* But he omits to add that the reduction of 4,000,000*l.* represents the amount of the loans to Moira and Amherst. From 1827 to 1837 the treasure was further reduced to 700,000*l.*

[3] *Ante*, p. 194. The first million was nominally offered to Hastings as a gift, and accepted by him as a loan. 'Nothing could be more

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financial embarrassments during the first Burmese war, accepted like assistance; and, in language of profuse adulation, which, if he believed in the reports of mal-administration, was as false as it was unwise, described the Nawab as imparting 'lustre to the throne and dignity to the State,' and declared that he owed 'a debt of heartfelt thanks and boundless gratitude' to his Majesty.[1]

The credit of the East India Company must have been low or its needs must have been great when a Governor-General could stoop to use such language in return for a loan of money. But Amherst's apologists may at least plead that if, in accepting this loan, he trod in the footsteps of Moira, his own example was followed by his successors. In 1829, soon after the accession of a new Nawab, Bentinck accepted another loan of 624,000*l.*, the interest of which was to be applied by the British Resident to the payment of certain pensions to members of the Oudh royal family, but was to revert, as the pensions fell in, to the Nawab himself. This loan was never repaid, and, as the pensions fell in, the reversion was appropriated by the East India Company.[2] In 1842 the reigning Nawabs lent the British Government a further sum of 460,000*l.* to enable it to push on its preparations for retrieving disasters in Afghanistan.[3]

and to Bentinck.

If Bentinck, however, imitated Amherst's doubtful example in accepting the Nawab's money, he at least refrained from addressing the Nawab in terms of flattery both gross and false. On the contrary, he told the Nawab plainly that the continuance of his rule must

Bentinck's threat of interference.

opportune, for this command of ready cash emancipated the Company from many urgent financial difficulties.' Hastings' *Private Journal*, vol. i. p. 184. Hastings himself called the arrangement under which the territory was ceded, 'a prodigious point gained for the Company.' See *ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 55.

[1] *Ducoitee in Excelsis*, pp. 69, 71.

[2] This statement rests on a statement of Bird, which, so far as I know, has not been contradicted. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[3] *Oudh Blue Book*, p. 226.

depend on the better government of the province, and that he was himself prepared to recommend that, if reform did not take place, the Governor-General should be authorised to 'assume the direct administration of the country.'[1] 'After the most serious consideration,' the Court of Directors accorded to Bentinck a discretionary power of placing Oudh 'under the direct management of British officers.' Bentinck, however, though he had received the authority which he had sought, hesitated to enforce the policy which he had recommended. Instead of doing so, he used his power to put strong pressure on the Nawab to induce him to execute the necessary reforms.[2]

In 1837 the ruling Nawab of Oudh died. A dispute arose as to the succession. The Queen Dowager favoured the pretensions of a boy who was alleged to be the late Nawab's son; the British Resident at Lucknow, Colonel Low, an officer of much experience, supported, in accordance with his orders, the claim of Mohammed Allee Shah, the late Nawab's uncle. British troops were used to enforce the Resident's decision, and, with some bloodshed, Allee Shah was seated on the throne of Oudh. In supporting Allee Shah, however, Low thought proper to extort from him a written promise, binding himself to accept 'any new treaty the Governor-General might dictate to him.'[3] Auckland, who was then Governor-General, not unnaturally concluded that a promise thus extorted was likely to be attended with many inconveniences. He was anxious to conclude a new treaty

The policy of Auckland towards Oudh.

[1] *Oudh Blue Book*, p. 210; Sleeman's *Tour*, vol. ii. p. 195; Argyll's *India under Lord Dalhousie*, p. 13.

[2] Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction of the *Parl. Papers* of 1857, No. 102, in which it is stated that there is no despatch from the Secret Committee directing Lord W. Bentinck to annex or otherwise assume the administration of Oudh, there seems to be no doubt about these circumstances. See Argyll's *India under Lord Dalhousie*, p. 13; *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 211; and cf. Sleeman's *Tour in Oudh*, vol. ii. p. 198.

[3] Sleeman's *Tour in Oudh*, vol. ii. p. 154; *Papers relating to the King of Oudh, Parl. Papers*, 1858, No. 125, p. 4, and cf. p. 36.

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with the Nawab, but he felt certain that the Nawab would be inclined to accede to any conditions which might be prescribed from Calcutta, and a previous and unconditional promise was therefore superfluous and liable to misconstruction.[1] This view, which was ultimately supported by the Court of Directors, was not adopted unanimously by the Governor-General's Council.[2] But, with the promise or without the promise, the Council agreed with the Governor-General that the time had arrived for reviewing the treaty made with Oudh in 1801.

The treaty of 1801.

The leading provisions of the treaty of 1801 have already been stated in a previous chapter of this history.[3] The Company, at that time, in return for one-half of Oudh, which the Nawab was forced to surrender, undertook to remit the subsidy which the Nawab in 1798 had agreed to pay, to provide a guard for the Nawab's person, and to defend the Nawab's remaining territory against external and internal enemies. The Nawab, on his part, agreed to dismiss all his troops except a small force whose numbers were carefully defined; 'to establish in his reserved dominions such a system of administration, to be carried into effect by his own officers, as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants;' and to 'advise with and act in conformity to the counsel of the officers of the Company.'[4]

Thus, under the treaty of 1801 it was the duty both of the Government at Calcutta and of the Resident at Lucknow to devise means for securing the lives and property of the people; it was incumbent on the Nawab to adopt this advice. But, when the necessity

[1] *Papers relating to the King of Oudh*, p. 9.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[3] *Ante*, p. 159.
[4] See for this treaty, Sleeman's *Tour in Oudh*, vol. i. p. 186 *sq.*; *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 51, *note*.

for enforcing reform arose, a defect in the treaty at once appeared. The treaty had omitted to provide for the contingency of the Nawab neglecting to follow the advice which he thus received. The history of the last six years had indeed shown that this defect, if defect it were, had not much real importance. Notwithstanding the treaty of 1801 Bentinck had not scrupled to threaten, if maladministration continued, to govern the province with British officers, and the threat which he had thus made had been upheld by the decision of the India House. Auckland, however, decided that advantage should be taken of the opportunity which a new reign afforded for obtaining power to do regularly what Bentinck had proposed to do of his own volition. He therefore determined to secure the Nawab's consent to a stipulation that 'if his Majesty should neglect to attend to the advice of the British Government or its local representative,' or if 'gross and systematic oppression, anarchy, and misrule should hereafter prevail within the Oudh dominions, such as seriously to endanger the public tranquillity,' the British Government 'should be entitled to appoint' its own officers to the management of the whole or any part of those dominions for so long a period as it might deem necessary; the surplus receipts in such case, after paying all charges, being paid to the Nawab.[1]

Defect of the treaty of 1801.

The treaty of 1837.

Such a provision could not be palatable to any sovereign. But Auckland proceeded to insist on another agreement of even more doubtful propriety. The arrangement made by the treaty of 1801, under which the British had undertaken the internal and external defence of Oudh, had permanently locked up a con-

[1] *Papers relating to the King of Oudh*, Sess. 1857, No. 125, p. 12. It was further proposed that, in the event of this stipulation being enforced, the British should, as far as possible, maintain Native institutions and forms of administration, so as to facilitate the restoration of the territories to the Sovereign of Oudh when the proper period for such restoration should arrive.

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siderable British force in Oudh, which, as it was no longer available for the collection of revenue, had not relieved the Nawab from the cost of maintaining an army of his own. Auckland desired to cancel the provisions which compelled him to keep British troops in the Oudh territory, and to authorise the Oudh Government to organise a force, to be subject to British officers, to be stationed at such places as the Resident should select, and to be employed on such occasions as the Nawab and the Resident might approve, but under no circumstances to be used for the collection of revenue. No reference was made in the original draft of the treaty to the manner in which the force was to be supported, but the Resident was told that a sum of 200,000*l.* would be required for the purpose, to be provided out of the revenues of Oudh.[1]

It is difficult to understand how any statesman in Auckland's position could have brought himself to suggest so manifestly unjust an arrangement. The British, who by the treaty of 1801 had secured half Oudh on the understanding that they were to maintain a force in the other half at their own cost, had the effrontery, through Auckland, to suggest that they should be relieved of this obligation, and that the cost of maintaining an auxiliary force should be thrown on the province. Low, as Resident at Lucknow, at once strongly protested against so grave an injustice;[2] the Governor-General's own Council supported Low's protest;[3] and Auckland found it necessary to modify his proposal. The expense of the force was limited to 160,000*l.* a year; and, in consideration of the poverty of Oudh, no demand for its payment was to be made for eighteen months, or until March 1839.[4]

[1] *Papers relating to King of Oudh*, p. 10.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 18.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–30.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

With these modifications, which reduced and postponed, though they did not remove, the objection to the treaty, the Nawab was induced to assent to it. But its injustice was so obvious that the Court of Directors at once issued orders that Auckland should conclude no new treaty with any Native Power, stipulating for the employment of British officers in its service, without the previous sanction of the Court; and the Secret Committee, in a still more emphatic despatch, directed that the treaty should be abrogated, and that any auxiliary force which it was determined to form should be paid by the Company.[1]

The treaty disallowed.

These orders were not strictly obeyed. Auckland, indeed, told the Nawab that he had been directed to relieve him of the burden of paying the auxiliary force, but he did not add a single word about the abrogation of the treaty;[2] and, so far as the Nawab knew, nothing transpired to show that the treaty which he had been reluctantly compelled to sign, and which the Secret Committee had directed should be abrogated, was not in full force.

Its abrogation not communicated to the Nawab.

Thus ended Auckland's indefensible dealings with Oudh. Before they closed he was involved in other and worse affairs, the management of which was equally unfortunate for his reputation, and even more fatal to the interests of his country. Engaged, however, in Afghanistan, in Scinde, and in the Punjab, the rulers of India had other things to occupy their thoughts than the misgovernment of Oudh. Nawab succeeded Nawab, Governor-General followed Governor-General, and the position of Oudh remained unchanged. Hardinge, however, returning from the Punjab after the first Sikh war through the Nawab's territory, used the opportunity to address some friendly advice, but emphatic

[1] *Papers relating to King of Oudh*, pp. 36, 37, 40.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

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Hardinge's warning to the Nawab.

warning, to the Nawab.[1] The time was come, he wrote, when misrule must cease. The first and most important object to be secured was a fair and reasonable assessment of the land. The Nawab was to be allowed two years, and, if he required them, the services of British officers for making this assessment. If it were made within the specified time he would have the satisfaction of knowing that he had eradicated the worst abuses and maintained his own sovereignty. If it were not made within that time, the Nawab was 'aware of the other alternative, and of the consequences.' It would then 'be manifest to the whole world, whatever may happen, that he had received a friendly and timely warning.'[2]

To the tone and temper of this remonstrance no one can take exception. It was the most creditable document which had ever been addressed to any Nawab of Oudh by any Governor-General. Yet even this dignified memorandum was disfigured by the trail of Auckland's policy. The Governor-General was evidently at a loss to know whether to base his arguments on the treaty of 1801, or on the treaty of 1837 which his own archives showed him that Auckland had been directed and had omitted to abrogate. Was the treaty of 1801 or the treaty of 1837 in force? Jurists might dispute on the technicalities which such a question involved. Hardinge evaded the difficulty by basing his remonstrance on the treaty of 1801, but alluding incidentally to the treaty of 1837 as confirmatory of the original treaty of 1801. His demand, however, was based on the 6th article of the treaty of 1801, and not on the 7th article of the treaty of 1837, by which the 6th article of the treaty of 1801 had been professedly modified.[3]

[1] See *paragraph* 15 *of Memorandum in Papers relating to the King of Oudh*, p. 63.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[3] Bird, who cites an elaborate opinion of Twiss to show that the treaty of 1837 was in force, ignores, as Twiss also ignores, the peculiarly timid manner in which Hardinge referred to this treaty. *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, pp. 101, 192.

The two years of grace which Hardinge allowed expired at the end of 1849, and in the interval little or nothing was done to effect the settlement which Hardinge had declared to be indispensable.[1] But at the end of the two years another Governor-General was at Calcutta, and another Resident guarded his country's interests at Lucknow. Colonel Sleeman, who filled the latter office in 1849, was an officer whose name stands high on the roll of Indian officials. He had done more than any Englishman to suppress the horrid murders of the Thugs and the lawless robberies of the dacoits.[2] He was selected by Dalhousie as Resident with especial reference to the changes which it was probable would be made when the two years of grace, which Hardinge had allowed, expired; and in words of not unjust appreciation he was told that the Government wished to entrust 'the reconstruction of the internal administration of a great, rich, and oppressed country . . . . to one of the best of its servants.'[3] There can, therefore, be very little doubt that at the end of 1848, when the selection was made, Dalhousie contemplated executing his predecessor's threat. A respite was allowed to Oudh at Sleeman's own suggestion. Before carrying out so momentous a change as was involved in the assumption of the administration, he desired to travel through Oudh, and to ascertain for himself the condition of its people. The necessary permission was given him; the inquiry was commenced at the close of 1849; and Sleeman's report, or rather the elaborate diary of his tour, was forwarded to the Government.[4] As an official

Colonel Sleeman Resident at Lucknow.

His tour in Oudh.

[1] Bird, *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, pp. 101-108, shows that the Nawab was ready to introduce the settlement tentatively into two provinces adjoining British territory. But the Government rejected this small reform as not worth considering.

[2] *Ante*, p. 227.

[3] *Tour in Oudh*, Introduction, p. xviii.

[4] The editor of the *Tour* has misstated these facts, assuming that Sleeman was instructed to make the inquiry at the time of his original appointment (p. xvii). If he had read Dalhousie's letter or the opening

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report the diary, which was published after Sleeman's death, is open to much criticism. It details gossip collected by a traveller which ought not to have been included in a grave document. But it is an elaborate account of the condition of Oudh in 1849; and, if the chaff be winnowed from the grain, contains material of the highest significance.

Sleeman's judgment was not favourable to the Oudh Government. The King he thought 'utterly unfit to have anything to do with the administration.' His singers and his eunuchs were almost his only companions; and 'to secure any reform in the administration,' it would be necessary 'to require him to delegate all the powers of sovereignty' to a board of three capable men, one of whom would settle the land revenue, a second of whom would reform the Judicial Courts, and a third of whom would control the army. The board, in Sleeman's judgment, might be composed 'of the first members of the Lucknow aristocracy;' and its formation, Sleeman hoped, might obviate the necessity of carrying out the extreme threat which Hardinge had given.[1]

Such a recommendation must have placed Dalhousie in some difficulty. A good deal could no doubt be urged for the interference of the Company in the affairs of Oudh; but it required a great deal of faith to believe that the substitution of three of the chief men of Oudh for the chief man would accomplish any reform worth achieving. The peasants of the province were suffering from the rapacity of the aristocracy; and an oligarchy of three aristocrats was not likely to lessen their burdens. It is probable, therefore, that Sleeman's recommendation had the effect of postponing the

sentences of the *Diary* with ordinary care, he would at once have seen his mistake. The error is unfortunate, as it gave Bird a pretext for saying (*Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 109) that Colonel Sleeman was the emissary of a foregone conclusion.

[1] *Introduction to Tour in Oudh*, pp. lxi., lxii, lxxii.

Governor-General's action. But delay did not improve matters. Weak already, the King's understanding became weaker. The treasure in the treasury was exhausted. Even the members of the royal family, finding their pensions withheld, desired British interference; while the people, or 'all the well-disposed' people, conscious that there was 'not a man of integrity or humanity left in any office,' equally wished for it. Writing, therefore, at the close of 1851, Sleeman declared the affairs of Oudh to be in such a state as 'to require the assumption of the entire management of the country;' the principal question for the consideration of the Governor-General was not whether this policy should be carried out, but whether it should be effected by proclamation or treaty.[1]

Sleeman's first recommendation in 1849.

Yet again a short respite was afforded to Oudh. The rupture with Burma left Dalhousie little leisure for other matters; and 'the untoward war,'[2] as Sleeman called the Burmese campaign, prevented interference. Yet the Burmese war had no sooner come to a successful close than Sleeman renewed his recommendations. 'The longer the present King reigns,' so he wrote in September 1852, 'the more the administration and the country deteriorate. . . . The King is a crazy imbecile, surrounded exclusively by eunuchs, fiddlers, and poetasters worse than either, and by the minister and his creatures, who are worse than all. The fiddlers have control over the administration of civil justice, the eunuchs over that of criminal justice, the minister has the land revenue, and all are making enormous fortunes.' People of all classes he described as utterly weary of the Government, and all of them, from the highest to the lowest, were ready to welcome the introduction of British administration with joy.[3]

[1] *Tour in Oudh*, vol. ii. pp. 353, 354.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 358.

[3] Abbreviated from Sleeman's *Tour in Oudh*, vol. ii. pp. 369, 370.

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Still Dalhousie did nothing. 'An unfeigned reluctance' to resort to extreme measures induced him again and again to postpone any definite action; and, during the whole time that Sleeman remained at Oudh, no further step was taken. In the summer of 1854 Sleeman's health failed, and he resigned the post which he had held for so many years. His resignation afforded Dalhousie a fresh opportunity. Some men in India declared that the abuses which Sleeman had detected were the offspring of his fertile imagination, and that the Government of Oudh was no worse than the Government of any other Native State. This doubt could be definitely resolved if an officer of tact, ability, and impartiality were sent to Lucknow, and ordered to report on the state of the province. Dalhousie was usually fortunate in his appointments. He chose as Sleeman's successor James Outram. Probably if all India had been searched, only one other man equally fit for the post could have been found. In his long service Outram had displayed an independence of character which was, on the whole, more creditable to himself than satisfactory to his employers; his treatment of the Bheels had shown, years before, that he had remarkable capacity for gaining the confidence of Native races; his defence of the Ameers of Scinde had won for him a reputation as the chivalrous or, as some people thought, quixotic supporter of Native rulers. Brave, true, wise, and good, his chief adversary had named him the Bayard of India; his friends had adopted the title as peculiarly suited to him.

Sleeman succeeded by Outram.

Outram, appointed at the close of 1854, was instructed to inquire into the state of the country; to ascertain whether its affairs continued in the condition which Sleeman had described; to report whether the improvements which Hardinge had peremptorily demanded had been effected; and whether the duty im-

posed on the Government of India by the treaty of 1801 would justify its 'honestly indulging the reluctance' it had hitherto felt to take over the administration of the country.[1]

Outram's report on Oudh.

To these questions Outram, in the course of a few months, returned a definite answer. The internal condition of Oudh was, in his judgment, most deplorable. It was due to 'the culpable apathy and gross misrule of the Sovereign and his Durbar.' The improvements which Hardinge had peremptorily demanded had not in any degree been effected; and Outram had therefore no hesitation in declaring that the duty imposed on the British Government by the treaty of 1801 compelled it 'to have recourse to those extreme measures which alone can be of any real efficacy in remedying the evils from which the State of Oudh has suffered so long.'

Such a report would have come with crushing effect from any officer of rank. It came with double force from Outram, because his recommendation was opposed to his well-known predilections. As he himself said: 'In pronouncing an opinion so injurious to the reigning family of Oudh, I have performed a very painful duty, for I have ever advocated the maintenance of the few remaining Native States in India, so long as they retain any principle of vitality, and we can uphold them consistently with our duty as the paramount Power in India, and in accordance with our treaty pledges. It is therefore peculiarly distressing to me to find that, in continuing to uphold the sovereign power of this effete and incapable dynasty, we do so at the cost of 5,000,000 of people, on whose behalf we are bound to secure—what the Oudh Government is solemnly pledged to maintain—such a system of

[1] *Papers relating to Oudh presented to Parliament in* 1856, p. 5. I shall in future refer to this volume by its popular title, the *Oudh Blue Book*.

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government as shall be conducive to their prosperity, and calculated to secure to them their lives and property'[1]

The manner of interference.

Outram's report could not be suffered to remain a dead letter. The time for interference had plainly come; the manner of interfering was the only question worth considering. Should the Government of India act under the treaty of 1801, or under the treaty of 1837, or, brushing away all treaties, assert its right to interfere as the paramount Power? Dishonest conduct, in the long run, is frequently followed by embarrassment; and the dishonest conduct of the Government of India respecting the treaty of 1837 now produced this consequence. There was no doubt that the treaty of 1837 had been disallowed by the East India Company, and there was equally no doubt that its disallowance had never been communicated to the Court of Lucknow. The King of Oudh and his ministers were of opinion, and could not but be of opinion, that the treaty was in full force.[2] If, indeed, the Court of Oudh ever read Parliamentary Papers, it had been given in 1853 new reason for supposing that the treaty was in operation. In that year a return had been presented to Parliament containing the treaties and engagements between the East India Company and the Native Powers in Asia; and, by an unpardonable blunder, the treaty of 1837 had been included in the return. The Government of India had drawn attention at the time to the error, and, the Court of Directors had not had the moral courage to acknowledge it.[3] Both by what it had done and by what it had left undone, the Court of Directors had given the King of Oudh reason to rely on the treaty of 1837, and this circumstance gave him a moral right to

[1] *Oudh Blue Book*, p. 46.

[2] See *Captain Hayes' report in Oudh Blue Book*, p. 81.

[3] *Papers relating to the King of Oudh*, Session 1858, No. 125, pp. 68, 70.

claim that the treatment accorded to him should not be more harsh than that which the treaty of 1837 had indicated.

Nor was there anything in the terms of the treaty of 1801 opposed to this view. So far as Oudh was concerned, the interference which had been contemplated by Wellesley was even smaller than that which had been contemplated by Auckland. For the treaty of 1801 had distinctly declared that the improved administration which the Sovereign of Oudh pledged himself to introduce should be carried out under British advice by his own officers. This condition, however, all the best authorities agreed, made the treaty of 1801 practically useless. 'All who have written upon this subject'[1] were 'unanimous in the opinion that the management of the province of Oudh and the reform of its administration could not be undertaken with any hope of success by the Government of India, unless through the agency of British officers. But the treaty of 1801 peremptorily and insurmountably bars the employment of such officers in carrying into effect any system of administration of Oudh.'

The claims of Oudh on British forbearance.

Nor should it be forgotten that the King of Oudh had peculiar claims on the British Power. Whatever charges could be brought against him for the maladministration of his own territory, no charge could be preferred against him for his conduct to the British Government. 'The rulers of Oudh,' wrote Dalhousie,[2] 'however unfaithful they may have been to the trust confided to them, however gross may have been their neglect, however grievous their misgovernment of the people committed to their charge, have yet ever been faithful and true in their adherence to the British Power. No wavering friendship has ever been laid to their

[1] From Lord Dalhousie's Minute in *Oudh Blue Book*, p. 182.

[2] *Oudh Blue Book*, p. 184.

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charge. They have long acknowledged our power; have submitted without a murmur to our supremacy; and have aided us, as best they could, in the hour of our utmost need.' 'The grand errors of the Oudh Kings,' added Low, in quoting and endorsing the paragraph, 'have been their sad mismanagement of their own interior affairs, and their culpable neglect of our advice in regard to those interior concerns. In regard to their exterior relations with us, their conduct has been remarkably irreproachable.'[1]

The treaty of 1801 was, however, useless; the treaty of 1837 had been disallowed; and no provision existed for effectually carrying out the threat which Bentinck had made and which Hardinge had repeated. It was necessary either to sweep away or to ignore the stipulations of 1801 before any interference could be attempted with advantage. Dalhousie himself thought that the time had come for telling the Court of Lucknow that the treaty of 1801 was annulled because its provisions had not been faithfully observed by Oudh; that the termination of the treaty would be followed by the recall of the Resident and the withdrawal of the troops; and that this measure, which would endanger the stability of the throne, would be carried out unless the King consented to sign a new treaty vesting the whole civil and military administration of the province in the hands of the East India Company.[2]

Dalhousie's opinion.

If this advice had been followed, the King of Oudh would undoubtedly have been compelled to choose between submission and revolution. 'It was by our troops that the Native Government was maintained. Experience had proved that it could not stand without them.'[3] But the advice was not followed. The

[1] *Oudh Blue Book*, p. 226.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 188.
[3] Duke of Argyll, *India under Lord Dalhousie*, p. 19. The Duke says 'the veriest formalist must admit our right to do what Lord

Governor-General of India is surrounded at Calcutta by a Council whose members criticise his proposals and suggest alterations of their own on important subjects. Their minutes are forwarded with the Governor-General's own memorandum to the Home authorities. In 1855 the Governor-General was surrounded by four men of very unequal capacity—Dorin, Grant, Low, and Peacock. Low's long service as Resident at Lucknow enabled him to speak with weight on the affairs of Oudh; Peacock, an English barrister, ought to have been able to speak decisively on the legal aspects of the question; Dorin, who ranked first among the Council, was probably the weakest man upon it. Energy and ability had given to the remaining colleague an authority which none of the other councillors exercised.[1]

His Council.

All of these four men agreed with Dalhousie in thinking that the maladministration of Oudh required the interference of the Government. But none of them concurred in the course which Dalhousie had recommended. Dorin was in favour of asserting the rights of the Government of India as paramount Power, of requiring the King to abdicate the sovereign power he had abused, and of incorporating his territory in the British dominions.[2] Grant recommended a similar proceeding, though he could not bring himself to think that the King should be degraded from his rank, his title, and his honours.[3] Low, like Dalhousie, was in favour of declaring the treaty of 1801 annulled, but he shrank—as indeed the three others shrank—from inflicting on a wretched population the disorders and

Dalhousie recommended—which was simply to withdraw our troops, declaring the treaty of 1801 to be at an end.' Yet is this clear? Oudh in 1801 had surrendered half its territory, nominally as the price of these very troops. Had we the right to retain the territory and withdraw the troops?

[1] The characters of these men are sketched from an unfavourable standpoint in the *Red Pamphlet*, p. 13.

[2] *Oudh Blue Book*, p. 192.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 213.

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bloodsheddings which he foresaw would inevitably result from the withdrawal of the British garrison. Instead of doing so he wished to tell the King that he must either conclude a new treaty, surrendering the administration but retaining his rank and an adequate revenue, or submit to see still harder terms meted out to him by the Company.[1] Peacock, approaching the question from a lawyer's standpoint, advocated, like Dalhousie, the assumption of the administration of the kingdom by the British, but, unlike Dalhousie, thought that this might be done under the treaty of 1801. If one party to a treaty did not observe its conditions, the other party to it was entitled to compel its observance by force; and without, therefore, going beyond the letter of the treaty, the British had, in his opinion, ample means of terminating abuse and misrule.[2]

The decision of the India House.

These important State Papers were forwarded to London in the summer of 1855. Towards the close of that year the Court of Directors pronounced a decision upon them. The Court agreed with all its Indian advisers in deciding to terminate maladministration in Oudh. It shared the fears, which Dalhousie's Council had expressed, of the consequences of the Governor-General's proposal. The 'sole motive,' the 'sole justification' of interference was the misgovernment of the people; and the Court could not bring itself to encounter the risk of promoting fresh disorder by withdrawing, in the British Resident and in the British troops, the only guarantees of order. It could not, therefore, sanction the threat which Dalhousie proposed, unless the Governor-General had reason to know that its utterance would be followed by the immediate submission of the King. In any other event it preferred the advice of Grant and Dorin to the milder alternative of Dalhousie. It proposed to take over the administration of the pro-

[1] *Oudh Blue Book*, p. 220. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

vince, to deprive the King of all power except in his palace and in his parks, and, after making a liberal provision for him, and a provision somewhat less liberal for his successors, appropriate the revenues of the province for the purposes of the Indian Government. It concluded by expressing a hope that this great measure would be executed by a Governor-General who had ruled with such signal ability and success, and who had bestowed so much consideration on this particular subject.[1]

This despatch left Dalhousie and his Council little room for further reflection. The policy of the Directors was plain; the Government of India had only to carry it out. Troops were at once concentrated on Oudh. Outram was directed, as soon as their concentration was complete, to summon the minister to the Residency, and announce to him the decision of the Government. He was subsequently to seek an audience with the King, to deliver to him a letter from the Governor-General, and to ask him to sign a treaty consenting to hand over the government of the kingdom to the East India Company. If the King consented to sign the treaty, Outram was authorised to guarantee him a revenue of 150,000*l.*, which he was instructed he might even raise to 180,000*l.*, and to make adequate provision for his family. If he declined to sign the treaty, the government of the country was to be assumed by proclamation, and the King was to be left without security for the continuance of his title or for the payment of his pension.[2]

Dalhousie's ultimatum.

Nothing better illustrates the course of British policy in India than the circumstance that Outram should have been the agent to give effect to this policy. Outram, in fact, was forced to do what men in still higher positions

[1] *Oudh Blue Book*, pp. 233–236.

[2] Dalhousie's Minute settling these arrangements is in *ibid.*, p. 237; the instructions to Outram, *ibid.*, p. 241; the draft treaty and the alternative proclamation, *ibid.*, pp. 251–257.

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had been doing for eighty years before him. No leading Indian statesman was so prominent an opponent of the policy of annexation which Parliament and the East India Company had resisted, and which successive Governors-General had come out to India to withstand. The drift which had been too strong for the Legislature and the Company was proving too strong for Outram. Aiming at one object, he was borne against his will in the other direction; and the man who had raised his voice against the annexation of Scinde, who had refused to touch his share of the prize-money of the Scinde campaign,[1] was compassing and effecting the annexation of Oudh. Yet one advantage resulted from Outram's presence at Lucknow. The work to be done was carried out with a courtesy and a firmness which gave the Court of Oudh no pretext for complaining of the agent who did it. The King, indeed, declined to sign the treaty which was presented to him,[2] and Outram, in obedience to his orders, had to assume the government against the will of the sovereign. But, in executing that task, in the subsequent organisation of the raw machinery of administration, he displayed tact and ability of a high order. Whatever predilections he entertained for Native rule, he strove that the great revolution which he was ordered to make should be accomplished without bloodshed and remembered without bitterness. And thus the Court of Directors was able to declare that 'an expanse of territory embracing an area of nearly 25,000 square miles, and containing 5,000,000 inhabitants, has passed from its native prince to the Queen of England without the expenditure of a drop of blood, and almost without a murmur.'[3]

The annexation of Oudh.

The annexation of Oudh was the last and the

[1] *Life of Outram*, vol. ii. p. 5.
[2] *Oudh Blue Book*, p. 303.
[3] See the despatch of 10th of December, 1856, in *Parl. Papers*, 1857, No. 12, p. 1.

greatest acquisition of the East India Company, and it was also the concluding act of Dalhousie's administration. In this narrative of the circumstances which produced it, more pains have been taken to set out the facts than to express an opinion upon them. In no fair statement is it possible, indeed, to omit the conclusion that the princes of Oudh were treated with scant justice and were requited with hard measure. Even if maladministration were as great as Sleeman declared, the King of Oudh was a good neighbour, and the services which he had rendered to us should have saved him from the shameful fraud which was practised on him by concealing from him the disallowance of the treaty of 1837. Maladministration, moreover, could undoubtedly have been terminated by a milder reform than that which the East India Company forced Dalhousie to adopt. If it were competent for the Company to annex the province, it must have been within its powers to appoint its own officers to conduct its administration. If nothing but better government were required, other means than the dethronement of a dynasty were available.

Its policy considered.

If, then, in considering the annexation of Oudh, the reader confine his attention to the relations between the Nawab and the Company, he will probably conclude that annexation was a sheer act of robbery. If, however, he approach the subject from another standpoint, he may possibly form a different conclusion. Events had made the British the paramount Indian Power. Millions of the human race, victims of wrongdoing, had no remedy against their oppressors except through British interference. Was it worth while setting the feelings or the interests of the King and his family against the feelings and interests of his unfortunate subjects? Were the wrongs of peoples always to be sacrificed to the rights of kings? Was a garden for

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ever to remain a desert because a worthless potentate was amusing himself with his fiddlers?

'Tis worth a wise man's best of life,
'Tis worth a thousand years of strife,
If thou canst lessen but by one,
The countless ills beneath the sun.

So wrote John Sterling. Were not the lines to hold good of Oudh?

He, then, who examines the annexation of Oudh from this standpoint will perhaps as hastily conclude that the policy was right as he who studies exclusively the relations between King and Company will think it wrong. The only doubt which he will perhaps feel will arise not from principle but from expediency. He may tremble at the prospect before his race if it embark upon a universal crusade against misgovernment. This fear, perhaps, partly accounts for the remarkable circumstance that the men who have the smallest scruples in striking down dynasties among coloured races are usually those who regard with most consideration the rights of kings in the continent of Europe. The political party which has walked in Wellesley's footsteps in India has not displayed much eagerness to terminate misrule nearer home. The year in which England used its might to terminate misrule in Oudh was the same year in which she employed her whole power to maintain a Government, far worse than that of Oudh, in Turkey. The fact may be palatable or bitter, but there can be no doubt that the code of morality which we apply to Asia we do not apply to Europe.

The real motives of annexation.

But the true reason for the annexation of Oudh is not to be found in any State Paper, and was not based on any moral code. Oudh was annexed because British interests seemed to require its annexation, and Turkey was maintained because British interests seemed to require its preservation. The acquisition of Scinde and

the conquest of the Punjab had made the appropriation of Oudh inevitable. It was not merely required to round off an estate. It cut the British territory into two parts. The Company wanted it, and it took it. Its maladministration might have been tolerated for another century if its independence had not interfered with the consolidation of the British Empire.

Its annexation was Dalhousie's last act. In the month in which it was accomplished he handed over the reins of power to his successor. His retirement closed a rule which is strongly marked with his own personality. Among all the statesmen who governed India, from Wellesley to our own time, no other man stands out so clearly on the Indian horizon. In some of the chief attributes of kingship—in the caution of his judgments, in the vigour of his actions, in the perspicacity with which he chose his agents, in the confidence with which he inspired them—he displayed the characteristics of successful empire. Like other rulers, too, vested with autocracy, he showed little consideration for the feelings of subordinates who either failed to understand his policy or differed from his judgment. And so, though no Governor-General ever left behind him more ardent admirers, hardly any Governor-General made fewer friends.

The retirement of Dalhousie.

It would be both an injustice to Dalhousie himself and to the great Company he represented if the student of Indian history concentrated all his attention on the salient features of his policy, and omitted to notice other and more beneficial consequences associated with his administration. No previous Governor-General had ever conferred such material and varied benefits on the country which he was called on to rule. It was under Dalhousie that railways in India were first projected, first sanctioned, and first constructed; it was under Dalhousie that uniform postal rates both throughout

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India and between India and England were first adopted; it was under Dalhousie that the first telegraph lines were laid, and the first telegraphic communication instituted; it was under Dalhousie that canals for the double purpose of navigation and irrigation were pushed forward with an energy which the world had never previously seen.[1] Nor was it in work of this character alone that Dalhousie's administration stands pre-eminent. It was under his rule that vernacular schools were first instituted in India,[2] and it was under his rule, though not by his action, that the civil service of India was first thrown open to public competition. Such achievements as these are the true monuments of British rule in India, and ought to be set against the many actions of British Governors which it is neither possible nor desirable to defend. If England has frequently waged war without cause and annexed provinces without justification, she has at least been the instrument of accomplishing material and moral progress; and the Englishman who relates these things, and who scruples not to condemn what he cannot excuse, may point to the material blessings which England has given to her great dependency, and say of them and of his country—

These are imperial works, and worthy thee.

He is succeeded by Canning.

In the place of Dalhousie the choice of the Government at home fell upon Lord Canning, the younger and only surviving son of the great statesman whose politi-

[1] The Ganges Canal, the greatest of these works, extended over 525 miles in length, measuring in its greatest depth ten feet, and in its extreme breadth 170 feet. 'Its length is fivefold greater than that of the main lines of Lombardy united, and more than twice the length of the aggregate irrigation lines of Lombardy and Egypt together, the only countries in the world whose works of irrigation rise above importance.' The Baree Doab Canal, begun under the same administration, had a length of 465 miles. *Dalhousie's Minute*, pp. 27, 28.

[2] The first impulse in this direction was given by Mr. Thomason. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

cal career occupied so large a space in the first two volumes of this history. The new Governor-General had filled with credit subordinate office in the Peel administration; he was acting as Postmaster-General under Aberdeen when he was selected to succeed Dalhousie. The choice was unexceptionable. Without his father's genius, without his predecessor's vigour, he had character, position, and ability, and was quite competent to navigate the vessel of state on a sea which was free from storm. And India, when Canning landed on its shores in 1856, seemed at last secure from war. The power of the British was both paramount and unquestioned; even the little cloud was not visible on the horizon; and Canning had more grounds than any of his predecessors for imagining that peace during his rule would be undisturbed.

In 1856, moreover, the British themselves had other matters than the affairs of India to occupy their attention. The changing fortunes of the Russian war absorbed the thoughts of the nation. The possibility of obtaining peace, and the terms on which it was procurable, were the chief subjects of discussion both in senate and in drawing-room; the people, engrossed with Russian policy, had no leisure to examine the wrongs of an Eastern Nawab; and beyond a vague idea, for which they could have given no substantial reason, that Dalhousie had proved a great governor, and an instinctive faith that the annexation of Oudh was right because it was sanctioned by British statesmen and carried out by British administrators, they paid little or no attention to the affairs of India.

It happened, moreover, that any little leisure which British statesmen had for Indian matters was devoted to the consideration of affairs on the North-Western frontier. The Crimean war had resulted in the usual

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consequences. Russia, finding herself involved in war with England, had naturally moved in the direction which was likely to cause the British trouble and annoyance. Her statesmen could hardly mistake their path.

Persia

The Persians had never forgiven England for abandoning them in 1828, and for thwarting them in 1838. Under ordinary circumstances, indeed, they would have hardly ventured to provoke the opposition of the British nation. But, though they yielded a nominal deference to British counsels, they secretly resented the restraint which the British Embassy at Teheran placed upon them. For Persian policy was radically opposed to British policy. The British had been educated into the

Herat.

belief that Herat was the key of India; they were alarmed at the possibility of Persia becoming at any moment the creature of Russia; and they concluded, therefore, that Herat should never be allowed to pass into Persian hands; and that 'the key of India' should be entrusted to other keeping. Probably the day will arrive when Englishmen will recognise that this policy is both inconsistent and unwise. The true key of India is held in London, and, if the gates of India are to be defended, they must be held on the British frontier, by British treasure, by British bayonets, and by British courage. But, if Britain has fallen so low that she must rest her defence on other races, she should at least place her chief outposts in strong keeping. Yet so plain a policy was not accepted by British statesmen. They would not place Herat in the hands of a powerful nation for fear that the watch-dog might be bribed and pass over to the enemy. And so Herat was left in weak hands, a prey to the first Power who had courage to attack it; and the two nations, who might have held it with British aid against the armed strength of Russia, were alternately bullied and coerced into hostility. Persia was driven from Herat by Auckland and Pottinger;

and the most competent ruler in Central Asia—Dost Mahommed—was converted into an enemy.

If the British were determined that Herat should never pass into Persian hands, the Persians in their turn never ceased to covet the famous city. And, though their army retreated from its battlements in 1838, their agents succeeded in practically effecting their policy. The ablest man in Herat, who had stood at Pottinger's side and seconded his efforts, was Yar Mahommed Khan, its ruler's minister. Some time after the siege, Yar Mahommed succeeded in grasping the power which Kamram nominally held. A bold, able, and unscrupulous chief, he retained his position till his death in 1851, leaning on Persia for support, and on some occasions lending the Persians valuable aid. Through Yar Mahommed's policy, Herat practically became a Persian city. Yar Mahommed coined money in the Shah of Persia's name, and 'considered himself a servant of the Shah, and Governor of Herat on the part of his Majesty.'[1]

Yar Mahommed Khan.

In 1851 Yar Mahommed died; his son Syed succeeded to his rule. Devoid, however, of his father's ability, Syed was evidently unable to maintain the independence of his territory. Disorder soon prevailed, and neighbouring potentates were naturally tempted to look with covetous eyes on the envied city. Persian troops, under the command of a Persian prince, were manœuvring in the neighbourhood, and, under the pretext of suppressing risings in the Shah's dominions, were hovering in dangerous proximity to Herat. The British envoy at the Persian Court, Colonel Sheil, impregnated with the views which had been adopted by his employers, asked for an explanation of this movement from the Persian Court, and succeeded in obtaining from the

[1] This is the Persian account. See the curious Persian State Paper in *Correspondence respecting relations with Persia, in Parl. Papers*, 1857, p. 116.

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Persian Prime Minister a distinct assurance that the Persian Government had not 'the slightest intention of sending troops to Herat.'[1]

This assurance, however, was accompanied with a very natural stipulation. Persia would leave Herat alone if other Powers would exercise similar forbearance. But if either Dost Mahommed, the Ameer of Cabul, or Kohendil Khan, his brother and representative at Candahar, should approach the city, it might be necessary for Persia to interfere and prevent the annexation of Herat either to Candahar or to Cabul. And, before two months were over, the contingency which the Prime Minister foresaw actually occurred. Kohendil Khan marched a force on Herat.[2] Syed Mahommed, surrounded by disorder at home, and threatened with invasion from abroad, applied to Persia for protection; and the Persians, with the double object of assisting an ally and of checking disorder in territories contiguous to their own, temporarily occupied the city.'[3]

The Persian occupation of Herat.

Critics may approve or disapprove the policy which Persia thus pursued. But no fair person can doubt that the Court of Teheran acted on this occasion exactly as an English Governor-General would have acted. The President of the Board of Control had the good sense to see that, however much he might have preferred the independence of Herat, the ruler of Herat was accepting the presence of Persia as a lesser evil than the presence of the Afghans.[4] But the Foreign Office, unfortunately, was unprepared to abandon so easily its old traditions. Though the Indian Government could not see 'any possible danger' to India in the occurrence, though there was 'no apprehension of any hostile movement on the part of Russia,' it could

[1] *Papers respecting Persia*, p. 5.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

not shake off its old forebodings. The British Minister at Teheran was consequently instructed to make it clear that the occupation was 'extremely displeasing to England;'[1] and, on news arriving that Herat had been formally declared an appendage to the Persian monarchy, the British Foreign Minister declined to hold further official intercourse with the representative of Persia at the English Court.'[2]

British intercourse with Persia suspended.

Whether vigorous measures of this kind were wise or necessary is a matter of opinion. That they were attended with partial success is a matter of fact. The Persian Government consented to an arrangement which received the approval of the British ministry; it engaged not to send troops to Herat unless Herat were threatened by attack from some foreign country; and it undertook, when the invading army withdrew, to recall its own forces.[3]

Fresh arrangements with Persia

The negotiation, which was thus concluded, had commenced in the latter half of 1851, it was protracted till the commencement of 1853, and for another year no overt difference existed between Persia and this country. Unhappily, however, while one cause of difficulty was in process of removal, another ground for dispute was gradually forming. Russia, quarrelling with France about the Holy Places, was brought into open collision with Turkey; and the Czar, confronted with the Western Alliance, turned to Persia for help. The Shah was dazzled by the proposals which the Czar made to him, and he was only dissuaded from declaring war against Turkey by the attitude of his Prime Minister. Through the latter's influence Persia was induced to remain neutral.[4] If England under such circumstances had been well served, she would have done her utmost to

[1] *Papers respecting Persia*, p. 23.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 30, 35.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 64.
[4] Watson's *History of Persia*, p. 415 *sq.*

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support the power and to attend to the wishes of the minister. Instead of doing so, two successive envoys at the Persian Court took a step which was certain to be offensive to him. In 1854, Mr. Thomson, the British representative at Teheran, appointed as his first Persian secretary one Meerza Hashem Khan, a man who had been in Persian service, who had not been officially removed from it, and whose 'family' had for a long time been at enmity with that of the minister.[1] The minister, however, flatly declined to receive Meerza Hashem, and neither the Chargé d'Affaires in Persia nor the Foreign Office in London thought it desirable to force him to do so. Unluckily, however, the *chargé d'affaires* still thought it necessary to provide for Meerza Hashem, and, as he was not allowed to appoint him Persian secretary, he selected him for the post of British agent at Shiraz. A more foolish arrangement could not have been made. By a treaty of 1841 'it was expressly provided that England should have no commercial agent except at Teheran and Tabreez, and a Resident at Bushire.'[2] It was true, indeed, that the British had for a long time been in the habit of employing an agent at Shiraz.[3] But the mere fact that he was there, not in accordance with but in opposition to a treaty, ought to have induced the British *chargé d'affaires* to take exceptional care in selecting an unobjectionable person for the place; while Mr. Murray, who had now become British Minister in Persia, chose the man whom he knew to be offensive to the Persian Prime Minister. Some diplomatists, like some statesmen, delight in building walls for the express purpose of knocking their heads against them.

Meerza Khan.

His appointment to Shiraz.

Only one result could follow from Murray's proceed-

[1] *Papers respecting Persia*, p. 70.

[2] *Hansard*, vol. cxl. p. 1717. The speech of Mr. (now Sir A.) Layard, from which the quotation in the text is taken, is worth reading.

[3] See Palmerston's statement in *Ibid.*, p. 1722.

ing. The Persian minister declared that, if Meerza Hashem left the Embassy to take up his duties, he would be arrested. Murray retorted that, if Meerza Hashem were either seized or molested, the minister well knew the consequences which would ensue.[1] Not venturing to carry out his threat, the minister laid hands on Meerza Hashem's wife, and Murray demanded her release, threatening even to haul down his flag if she were not restored to her husband.[2] The minister, instead of complying with this demand, published and inserted in a despatch offensive insinuations of the relations between Murray and Murray's predecessor and Meerza Hashem's wife, and Murray at once struck his flag. He offered to re-hoist it if the lady were restored, and if the minister came to the Embassy, withdrew his despatch, and apologised for writing it.[3]

Murray strikes his flag.

In insisting on this apology, Murray was undoubtedly right, but his previous conduct in demanding the liberation of Meerza Hashem's wife was as certainly wrong. 'If there is one subject,' said a good authority in the House of Commons afterwards, 'upon which Easterns are more jealous and sensitive than another, it is with regard to their women. . . . It was, therefore, the duty of our representative to avoid any discussion with the Persian Government relative to women.'[4] For a second time in the same autumn, Murray had raised an issue, which could not do otherwise than result in a quarrel.

Not unnaturally, the Persian Government decided, if quarrel were before it, to act in the way most distasteful to England. Britain and Russia were still locked in a deadly struggle, and the British Government would be sure to take alarm at a fresh advance on Herat. Persia

The Persian manifesto.

[1] *Parl. Papers respecting Persia*, pp. 80, 81.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[4] Mr. Layard. *Hansard*, vol. cxl. p. 1716.

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accordingly issued a manifesto, declaring that Dost Mahommed was moving from Cabul on Candahar; that he was ultimately intending to march upon Herat; and that, as it was unwilling to tolerate such a movement, it was determined to send well-equipped troops to Herat to prevent the place falling into Dost Mahommed's hands.[1] A Persian advance on Herat was always attended with the same consequences. In July 1856 the Government of India was instructed to prepare a force at Bombay for the occupation of the island of Karrack and the city of Bushire.[2] It was assumed that a pressure which had proved sufficient in 1838 would again induce the Shah of Persia to withdraw his army from before the gate of India.

Indirectly, however, still stronger pressure was brought on the Persian Government. The ground on which it mainly relied crumbled beneath its feet. So long as the Crimean war continued, it assumed, rightly or wrongly, that England had no troops to spare for other expeditions; and that Persia might venture, therefore, to repay the British representative's indiscretion with insulting contumely. But, before the summer of 1856 had well begun, peace between Russia and England was assured, and Persia found herself alone in her quarrel. She had no hope of success in a single-handed combat of this description, and she accordingly made a serious effort for the removal of the misunderstanding. A special Ambassador was sent from Teheran to Paris, with instructions to stop at Constantinople on his way, and to endeavour to arrange terms with Stratford de Redcliffe.[3] The terms which Stratford de Redcliffe was instructed to ask included the withdrawal of Persia from Herat, and the dismissal of the Persian minister.[4] On the first of these points Stratford de

The Persian mission to Constantinople.

[1] *Papers respecting Persia*, p. 109.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 154.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 173.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

Redcliffe met with unexpected success. News of the capture of Herat by Persia arrived at Constantinople while the negotiation was in progress. But the Persian envoy nevertheless consented to the evacuation of the town.[1] On the other point he was much more resolute. He had either no power or no will to consent to the dismissal of the Persian minister.

Its failure.

If the Persian envoy were unwilling to give way, the British Government was equally firm. It had already resolved on war; it had directed the Indian Government to prepare war; and it had persuaded Outram, seeking health in England, to return to the East and assume command of the expedition. Yet the declaration of war involved a curious inconsistency. The Governor-General rested the case for the war on the expedition to Herat, and the Persian envoy had already offered full satisfaction on this point. The English Government, on the contrary, was breaking off the negotiations on its demand for the dismissal of the Persian minister, and the Governor-General was absolutely silent on this part of the question.[2]

The Persian war of 1856.

On the war which thereupon ensued it is not necessary to say much. Karrack was occupied, Bushire was taken, the Persian army was defeated, and British troops proved their capacity and power to overthrow the feeble Empire of the Shah. But the war was not decided by Outram and the army. Its declaration was unpopular in England; a grave constitutional question arose on the conduct of the ministry in declaring and prosecuting a war without calling Parliament together;[3]

[1] *Papers respecting Persia*, p. 209.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 211 *et seq.*

[3] *Hansard*, vol. cxlvi. pp. 1578–1655. The ministers succeeded in resisting the attack made on them on this account, but 'they were compelled to assent to an Act which made it unlawful to apply the revenues of India in support of any military operation beyond the frontiers of India, unless with the consent of both Houses of Parliament.' Duke of Argyll, *India under Lord Canning*, p. 72. The provision to which the Duke refers will be found in 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, sec. 55.

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and the Government, finding its authority decreasing, was almost as anxious to conclude peace in the beginning of 1857 as it had seemed resolute for war at the end of 1856. An opportunity was still open to it to terminate hostilities. The Persian envoy, after his abortive negotiation with Stratford de Redcliffe, had travelled on to Paris, and was just as ready to make terms with the British Ambassador at the Court of France as with the British Ambassador at the Porte. The British Government consented to accept an apology from the Persian minister, instead of insisting on his dismissal; and on these terms, on which peace might in all probability have been secured in the autumn, the war was concluded in the spring.

Its termination.

War is so great an evil, peace is so unmixed a blessing, that most men hesitate to criticise the terms on which the one is terminated and the other concluded. Yet it is difficult to find any instance in which the terms of peace more completely condemn the inception of hostilities. If nothing but the removal of the Persian Prime Minister could atone for Murray's outraged dignity in the autumn of 1856, why should minor terms have been exacted after armies had been moved, towns had been taken, and skirmishes had been fought and won? But the fact is that the insulting language which Shah and minister applied to the diplomatist was due to the diplomatist's own errors. In selecting for employment a Persian whom he knew to be offensive to the Persian Government, in insisting on his retention in a post to which the English had no right to make any appointment and in throwing the shield of the Embassy not only over Meerza Hashem but over Meerza Hashem's wife, Murray was guilty of grave indiscretions. Great Governments must, perhaps, support their agents at barbarous Courts; but, if true justice had been done in 1856, the British ministry would have recalled its own

agent instead of insisting on the dismissal of the Persian minister.[1]

Yet, if it be difficult to justify the conduct of the ministry, never before had peace been more opportune. For, while British statesmen had been nervously gazing at the movements of Persian and Afghan on the North-Western frontier of India, they had been characteristically overlooking a far greater danger which was rapidly assuming huge dimensions in the British dominions.

The state of India.

If, indeed, Englishmen had paused to consider the circumstances under which India had been won and on which it was held, they would have found room enough for anxiety and disquietude. Ninety-nine persons out of every hundred, however, who ever turned their thoughts to Indian politics, probably regarded India as a great country which had been conquered by men of English race, and which was held by the armed strength of England. Every one of these propositions contained a fallacy. India is not a great country in the sense in which that phrase is usually understood. It is what Metternich declared Italy to be—a geographical abstraction. It contains men of different races, different languages, and different creeds, who have no common bond of union except the circumstance that they all inhabit the same great peninsula. Nor was this India, thus variously inhabited, ever conquered by men of British origin. The soldiers who fought at Plassey and the soldiers who fought at Chillianwalla were mainly drawn from India itself. Nor is this all. If India has supplied the troops by whom India has been gradually won for England, India has also supplied the garrison by which India has been held. It was to Native troops

[1] In this account of the Persian war of 1856 I have avoided entering into the negotiations with Dost Mahommed which were concurrently undertaken by the British. They will be found described in Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. pp. 427-443.

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that the British victories were largely due; it was on Native troops that England mainly relied to sustain her authority.

The proportion of European and Native troops in India.

The rapid accumulation of territory which this century witnessed led to large additions to the Native Indian army. In 1838, when the Afghan war broke out, 'the total Native force was under 154,000 men.' In 1845 it was raised to 245,000 men; and at the close of Dalhousie's administration it included 233,000 men. But, while this prodigious increase was made in the roll of the Native troops, no corresponding additions were sanctioned to the numbers of the European army maintained in India. On the contrary, the Crimean war, by producing a new demand for English regiments, necessitated the recall of European regiments to Europe; and the total number of European troops suffered a gradual diminution from 48,709, at which it had stood in 1852, to 45,322 at which it stood when Dalhousie closed his government of India.[1]

At the time, therefore, at which Dalhousie left, and Canning reached, India, the country was held by some 233,000 Native and by some 45,000 British troops. Of recent years the Indian garrison has consisted of 180,000 men, of whom 1 man in every 3 is a European. While, then, of recent years it has been thought necessary to maintain 1 British soldier to every 2 natives, Dalhousie left behind him only 1 British soldier for every 5 natives. Nor did these figures represent the whole truth. It has been sometimes said, on the authority of a Parliamentary paper, that there was only 1 European to every $9\frac{2}{3}$ natives in the Bombay army, 1

[1] Duke of Argyll, *India under Lord Dalhousie*, pp. 58, 63; *Hints on the Reorganisation of the Bengal Army by Colonel Hough*, p. 4; Holmes's *History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 64, and notes; Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 341, where Sir J. Kaye says somewhat rhetorically, 'Stated in round numbers it may be said that the normal state of things, for some years, had been that there was an army of 300,000 men, of which 40,000 were European troops.'

European to every 16⅔ natives in the Madras army, and only 1 European to every 24⅔ natives in the Bengal army.[1] But these figures, though they are quoted by respectable authorities, are calculated to mislead. They do not take cognisance of all the European troops employed in India, but only of that portion of them which was comprised in the Company's army. In addition to the Company's troops, however, a considerable number of regiments of the regular army were maintained in Hindostan, many of which were stationed in Bengal. But the events of the last few years had destroyed the cohesion of this force. The necessities of the Crimean war had actually led to a reduction in the number of battalions stationed in the Presidency; and those which remained, instead of being quartered over the Lower Provinces, were sent to garrison the new acquisitions in the Punjab, in Scinde, and in Oudh. 'Twenty years before there had not been less than six European regiments in the Lower Provinces between Calcutta and Allahabad. Dalhousie found in the same space only two regiments, and he was never able to increase the number.'[2]

Thus it is evident that, while the red line which marked the boundary of British territory on the map of India was constantly advancing, the red line which supported and consolidated the Indian army was as regularly getting relatively and actually thinner. For good or for evil, the British were more and more relying on Native troops, and India was being held more and more for the British Crown by natives of the Indian soil.

The troops on which the British were thus mainly

The Native troops.

[1] See *Parl. Papers*, 1857 (*Mutinies in India*), p. 9; Lieutenant-Colonel Hough's pamphlet on the *Reorganisation of the Indian Army*, p. 5; and cf. Martin's *Indian Empire*, vol. ii. p. 125, quoted in Holmes's *History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 65, note.

[2] Duke of Argyll, *India under Lord Dalhousie*, p. 62. Canning, in May 1857, said that in 750 miles, from Barrackpore to Agra, 'there is one European regiment at Dinapore, and that is all. Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. ii. p. 111.

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relying for the maintenance of their authority were composed of men of different races and different creeds. But they were chiefly drawn from the Mahomedan and the Hindoo races. As a general rule, so wrote the author of a famous pamphlet, the Hindoo was to the Mahomedan in the proportion of 5 to 1.[1] The Hindoos were divided into Brahmins or priests, Rajpoots or soldiers, and men of inferior caste; and the Brahmins exercised a preponderating influence among all the Hindoos. It may, therefore, be roughly computed that at the end of Dalhousie's administration from 75 to 80 per cent. of the Bengal army was composed of Hindoos; and, it may be added, that the whole of these troops were under Brahminical influence.[2]

The services of the Native army.

The good conduct of the Native army had passed into an axiom. It had shared with English troops the glories of a dozen campaigns. It was the native soldier —the Sipahi, or Sepoy, as his British employer spelt the word—who had done chief service in every great battle which had illustrated the career of the British in India. The Sepoy had laid the foundations of an empire on the field of Plassey; he had carried Seringapatam; he had helped to win for Wellington his maiden victory at Assaye; he had perished with his British comrades in the memorable retreat from Cabul; he had done his best to restore the British cause by joining in the defence of Allahabad and in the advance of Pollock; he had participated in the glories of Meeanee; he had charged the Sikh entrenchments at Sobraon. Led by British

[1] *Red Pamphlet*, part i. p. 6. In 1852 the Bengal infantry contained 1,118 Christians, 12,699 Mahomedans, 26,983 Brahmins, 27,335 Rajpoots, 15,761 Hindoos (inferior castes) and 50 Sikhs. Lieutenant-Colonel Hough's pamphlet, p. 7.

[2] 'If a low-caste Hindoo happened to fill the responsible post of subahdar (the highest native officer), he would be entirely under the spiritual guiding of the Brahminical clique. Were a mutiny hatching in the lines, he would not dare to divulge it, from the fear of a penalty more dreadful even than death—excommunication.' *Red Pamphlet*, p. 7, and cf. Colonel Hough's pamphlet, p. 12, and note.

officers, supported by British troops, commanded by British generals, the sepoy had displayed fidelity and courage in a hundred fields. 'I have seen most of the armies of the world,' wrote Napier in 1850,[1] 'and I have never seen one that is better cared for than the army of the East India Company. Neither have I ever seen a more obedient, more honourable army.'

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Yet the sepoy, though he had on the whole earned his character as a faithful and brave soldier, had occasionally displayed symptoms of a wayward disobedience which at rare intervals had ripened into actual mutiny. Even in the eighteenth century a serious rising was stamped out by a stern act of repression;[2] and, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, two memorable outbreaks occurred, one in 1806, the other in 1824. The former, which is known in history as the Vellore Mutiny, was in some respects a prototype of the great rising which succeeded it more than half a century afterwards. Ill-considered orders affecting the drill and dress of the soldier gave Mahomedan and Hindoo agitators an excuse for saying that the distinctions of caste were to be swept away in order that the men might be forced more readily to adopt the Christian religion. The family of Tippoo Sultan, detained in honourable captivity at Vellore, naturally encouraged suspicions which gave them hopes of recovering their lost dominions. The fanatics in the army were thus stirred by fear, the traitors in the army were thus roused by ambition, to rise against their employers and strike down the English troops in the garrison. But their success was neither complete nor of long duration. An officer of the garrison, appreciating the

The earlier mutinies of the Native army.

At Vellore.

[1] This opinion, perhaps, bears requoting, though it is familiar to most persons from having been quoted by Dalhousie and Wellington. *Correspondence relating to Resignation of Sir C. Napier*, pp. 17, 59.

[2] For the mutiny and its repression, see Holmes's *History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 50; *Thornton*, vol. i. p. 452.

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crisis, carried news of the mutiny in hot haste to the neighbouring station of Arcot. Gillespie, who commanded a regiment of British cavalry at that station, lost no time in bringing succour to the beleaguered men. Swift in coming, sharp in striking, his troopers dealt terrible retribution to the mutineers. English writers who mention the massacre of Vellore allude to the murder of a portion of the garrison by the mutineers. An Indian writer who employed the phrase would as certainly refer to the retributory slaughter by which the mutiny was quelled.[1]

It is a characteristic of the British race that its children rapidly forget the dangers which they happen to experience. The incidents of the Vellore rising, its causes and its consequences, might have usefully occupied the thoughts of statesmen for a lengthened period. But, if it had not led to a difference of opinion between the Governor of Madras [2] and the Commander-in-Chief, which ultimately involved the Governor's recall, it would probably have never troubled British statesmen at all. Yet surely it was no slight matter to ascertain that the subordination of a great army might depend on trivial regulations affecting the form of a hat, the shape of a beard, or the ornaments which routine might allow or refuse a soldier to wear. All, however, that statesmen condescended to recollect was that the mutiny had been stamped out on the day of its birth, all that they thought it necessary to do was to punish, with the one hand, officers who, warned by the mutiny, distrusted their own troops, or high officers of state, who, unwarned by its lessons, were in favour of undue leniency. No measures of any moment were taken to prevent the outbreak of similar rebellions in

[1] *Ann. Reg.*, 1806, Hist., 253; *Thornton*, vol. iv. p. 63; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 209; Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. pp. 218–232.

[2] Lord W. Bentinck. *Vide supra*, p. 217.

future ; and no serious consideration was accorded to the question whether the defence of India could safely be trusted to an army whose religious prejudices might at any moment be aroused by the ill-considered orders of an inexperienced commander.

If it be the characteristic of the British race rapidly to forget the danger which is past, insensibility to peril is a source of strength to the nation. Empires are not founded by men who are always brooding over the risks which surround them, and the heart that dares and the arm that strikes are better allies in some circumstances than the brain which reflects and the hand that hesitates. Confidence in difficulty is frequently rewarded with immunity from danger; and so it proved in India. Native troops bore their part and did their duty in the wars of Wellesley and in the wars of Hastings; and Indian statesmen thought it ungenerous to dwell on one unhappy circumstance in the history of an army which had so frequently rendered faithful and brilliant service.

The Mutiny of the 47th Regiment in 1824.

And so, for another eighteen years, the Vellore Mutiny and its lessons were forgotten. In 1824, however, another rising again drew attention to the conditions on which the Indian army serves. The Bengal army was enlisted for service in India. By the terms of its enlistment the authorities had the right to call on it to march at any moment on any service. But they were not entitled to order it to cross the sea. On the occasion of the first Burmese war, it was accordingly decided to march the regiments of Bengal round the Indian frontier instead of transporting them across the gulf which separates Burma from Calcutta. The march was attended with many difficulties, the transport animals were inadequate, and the sepoys incurred a fear that, as the transport had failed, they might, in defiance of the terms on which they served, be carried

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by sea. Instigated by these fears the 47th Regiment refused to march. But an officer was again at hand prepared to punish mutiny with stern measures. The guilty regiment, persisting in its refusal, was without warning mowed down by artillery, its leaders who survived were tried and hanged, and the regiment itself was struck out of the Army List.[1]

Thus for a third time in sixty years the sword on which the British relied had wounded the hand which held it, and for the third time mutiny had been punished with severe retribution. Another twenty years passed away before mutiny again appeared in the ranks of the Bengal army; and in the interval the lessons of 1806 and 1824 were almost wholly forgotten. During much of that period India enjoyed an exceptional and unparalleled peace; and peace, however pleasant it may be to the citizen, neither improves the prospects of the soldier nor promotes the discipline of an army. Before the twenty years were over, however, the policy of Auckland and the ambition of Ellenborough brought the sepoy new service. The conquest of Scinde and the annexation of the Punjab threw new duties on the Bengal army and produced new dangers for British rule. The European troops which had previously been stationed in the Lower Provinces were moved towards the frontier, and Bengal itself was almost denuded of any garrison except that which a Native force supplied. The sepoys in Bengal could hardly avoid perceiving that the British were relying almost solely on their protection. The sepoys in the North-West were discontented on finding that the conquests which brought their employers fresh territories gave them only increased duties and reduced allowances. For when a

[1] Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. pp. 266–271; Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 55; *Wilson*, vol. iii. p. 100; *Thornton*, vol. v. p. 105; *Marshman*, vol. ii. p. 309.

sepoy was engaged outside the Company's dominions custom and regulation gave him double allowances; but when the territory was once acquired and the new conquests were incorporated in the Company's possessions the double allowances immediately ceased.

The Mutiny of the 34th Regiment.

It was this circumstance that produced the third serious mutiny in the native army during the nineteenth century. The 34th Regiment, warned for service in Scinde and halted at Ferozepore, refused to march unless double allowances were assured to it. Three other regiments moving towards the frontier followed its example. Two regiments of the Madras army, employed on special service, thinking that the Government did not keep faith with them, also ventured on mutiny; and the Government, hardly knowing where it could rely for help, did not venture on requiting these risings with prompt and adequate punishment. For the first time in Indian history stern retribution had not rapidly followed military crime; and, though punishment ultimately came and the name of the 34th was struck out of the Army List, the sepoy had been taught to know his own power, and had learned from experience that occasions might arise when the British Government would be unable to enforce subordination in its own army.[1]

But, whatever conclusions the sepoy may have drawn from these circumstances, they made little or no impression on his employers. Nothing was done either to improve the discipline or to remedy the grievances of the Native soldiers. The misconduct of a few regiments was not allowed to throw suspicion on an army, and the Company proceeded to fresh wars and fresh conquests without thought for the consequences. And, in one sense, they were justified by the event. In the assault on Sobraon, amidst the mismanagement of Chil-

[1] Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 58; Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. pp. 276–298.

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lianwalla, and in the crowning victory of Gujerat, the sepoy showed his old courage and rendered his old services. But the defeat of the Sikhs produced the same difficulties which had resulted from the conquest of Scinde. The sepoy failed to understand the reasoning which led his employer to requite his services with reduced allowances; he could not appreciate the principle of lowering his pay because he had won a noble victory. Hence, in July 1849, two regiments of the army of occupation at Rawul Pindee struck for higher pay. The first news which greeted Napier on his arrival in India was the tidings of the mutiny. But it so happened that the command at Rawul Pindee was held by a stout soldier, and that European troops were in the neighbourhood of the discontented regiments. Colin Campbell under these circumstances knew how to deal with the difficulty, and the mutineers returned to their duty and bided their time.[1] But mutiny was not averted, it was merely postponed. In the following December two other regiments stood out for increased allowances, and mutiny for a second time was only averted by the tact and firmness of a commanding officer.[2] On both these occasions the sepoys had only shown a passive insubordination. In the following month, however, the 66th Native Infantry rose at Govindghur. Fortunately for the British, a cavalry regiment at the same station stood firm and crushed the mutineers. The number of the guilty corps was struck out of the Army List and a regiment of Ghoorkas raised in their place.

The Mutiny at Rawul Pindee.

Warning enough had now been given to the blindest Government, but other circumstances diverted attention from it. A Governor-General and a Commander in-Chief publicly engaged in an exciting controversy,

[1] Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 312; Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 59.

[2] Brigadier Hearsey. Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 313, and Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 59.

and the personal considerations, which their altercation involved, effaced the graver question of mutiny which had been at the root of the misunderstanding. The controversy arose in this way. Hearsey, who was in command of the troops at Wuzeerabad, drew Napier's attention to a grievance under which he considered the men were lying. Up to 1844, whenever grain was exceptionally dear, the Government had granted to the Sepoy a pecuniary compensation equivalent to the increased cost of the grain on which he lived. But other things besides grain formed a portion of the sepoy's food, other things also in distant countries occasionally commanded exceptional prices, and in 1844 the Company accordingly consented to place these articles on the same footing as grain, and to allow the sepoy pecuniary compensation when they were exceptionally dear.

In sanctioning this arrangement the Company intended to secure the sepoy his ration at a fixed and moderate price of seven shillings a month. Experience, however, proved that the change involved great complications in the accounts, and that it did more for the sepoy than the Company had intended to do. For it occasionally occurred that, while one article of the sepoy's ration was exceptionally dear, other articles were unusually cheap; and it seemed, consequently, unnecessary to compensate the sepoy for the increased cost of some commodities without setting against it the diminished expense of the others. The Company, therefore, in 1845 took the opportunity, which the issue of some new and beneficial regulations afforded, to correct the error; and the troops were then told that they would be only entitled to compensation when the price of provisions forming their diet exceeded in the aggregate seven shillings a month.[1] The new regulation,

The Order of 1844.

Its modification.

[1] Correspondence relating to Resignation of Sir C. Napier, *Parl. Papers*, 1854, p. 61.

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which was warmly approved by Gough, was in the first instance applied to the troops which occupied Scinde; after Sobraon it was extended to the regiments which entered the Punjab, and in 1847 it was applied to the Native army generally. In 1850 Hearsey, whose prudent conduct had just averted mutiny at Wuzeerabad, drew Napier's attention to the circumstance that at that time and at that place the new regulation was less favourable to the troops than the old order of 1844.[1] The obvious answer was that it was meant to be less favourable. The Company had purposely intended to remedy the mistakes made in 1844, and to secure the sepoy his rations at 7*s.* a month, not to enable him to obtain it for a lower sum. The order of 1844 had gone too far; the order of 1845 had corrected the error.

No harm would probably have resulted from Hearsey's application if the Commander-in-Chief had been one of those men who are content to move in the grooves which ordinarily regulate official intercourse. But unluckily Napier had an impulsive temperament which was more fitted to win him laurels in the field than to gain him respect in the council chamber. Unfortunately, too, he had contracted a distaste for the supervision of civilians over military men, and he had a personal dislike for the Governor-General under whom it was his lot to act. Dalhousie happened, moreover, to be at sea on one of those excursions which diversified his busy rule. The Supreme Council at Calcutta was 1,500 miles from the Punjab; and Napier therefore had the opportunity, as he had the will, to act alone. He took upon himself to suspend the order of 1845, and he not only did so, but he proceeded to brand it as 'impolitic and unjust,' and to declare that it only required to be brought to the notice of the Government to insure its immediate rectification.[2]

Napier's conduct.

[1] The loss to the troops was 2¼*d.* a month. *Ibid.*, pp. 5 and 62.

[2] *Correspondence relating to Resignation of Sir C. Napier*, pp. 3, 4.

Whatever excuse Napier might have had for temporarily suspending an order of the Government till the decision of the authorities was known, it was impossible to justify language of this character. Dalhousie was the last man likely to brook such conduct.[1] He refrained from reversing Napier's order so far as it applied to the Punjab. But he intimated that he would 'not again permit the Commander-in-Chief, under any circumstances, to issue orders' changing 'the pay and allowances of the troops serving in India, and thus practically to exercise an authority which has been reserved, and most properly reserved, for the Supreme Government.'[2] Just as heat begets heat, so rejoinder produces rejoinder. The Commander-in-Chief retorted on the Governor-General, the Governor-General replied to the Commander-in-Chief. The dispute, which resulted in Napier's resignation, was ultimately carried from India to London. It was referred to Wellington; it was criticised by the Directors of the East India Company; its details were laid before Parliament; it gave birth to a literary controversy whose fires are hardly yet extinguished.

His controversy with Dalhousie.

In the heated conflict which thus took place between two officials, exaggerated arguments were used on both sides. Napier, on the one hand, was naturally induced to aggravate the character of the crisis which had led to his intemperate action, while Dalhousie, on the other, was tempted to minimise its significance. Napier declared that he had acted 'in a moment of great danger,' that he was 'surrounded by a hostile population,' and that he had 'an army of upwards of 40,000 men infected

[1] Napier in 1849 had suggested Dalhousie's recall, and had proposed that he himself should be made Governor-General in his place. *Greville*, second series, vol. iii. p. 280. He was not likely under such circumstances to work smoothly with Dalhousie; and, if Dalhousie were by any chance acquainted with the suggestion, he was not likely to work smoothly with Napier.

[2] *Correspondence relating to Resignation of Sir C. Napier*, p. 8.

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with a mutinous spirit.' Dalhousie distinctly denied that there was any mutiny at all, and declared that the safety of India had 'never for one moment been imperilled by the partial insubordination in the ranks of its army.'[1] Napier declared that 'all was on the balance when I flung the Ghoorka battalion into the scale as Brennus did his sword, and mutiny having no Camillus was crushed.' His detractors, on the contrary, declared that 'the idea of replacing our sepoys with Ghoorkas was a mere absurdity; that the mountaineers could not be enlisted in sufficient numbers; and that, if they were, the notion of their military value would prove a delusion.'[2]

Its consequences.

Into the details of this altercation, however, it is unnecessary to enter at length; it is sufficient to say that the glare of a personal controversy dazzled men's eyes and prevented them from penetrating the mysteries of an important question. It was much more exciting to attend to a duel between heroes than to master the dull financial regulations of which the Native army was complaining.

The mere fact, too, that the Governor-General's success in the controversy was both necessary and assured, had an unfortunate result. Dalhousie was thenceforward bound to deny the reality of the insubordination which he had officially refused to recognise. He was disabled from taking steps to probe the realities of mutiny. Regard for his own consistency compelled him, in fact, to ignore the circumstances which required immediate and prompt consideration.

The 38th Regiment.

Yet two years afterwards a fresh warning was given to him. The first Burmese war had produced the second mutiny of the nineteenth century. The second Burmese war was destined to result in a refusal which was almost tantamount to mutiny. The 38th Native Infantry had

[1] *Correspondence relating to Resignation of Sir C. Napier*, pp. 11–18.

[2] *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, pp. 447, 448.

a high reputation—'it was believed that it would follow its officers to any part of the world'—and it was asked to embark for Rangoon or Aracan. And the sepoys refused. The terms of their engagement freed them from crossing the seas, the obligations of caste disinclined them from encountering a voyage, and, respectfully but firmly, the regiment declined the service [1] A ruler less occupied than Dalhousie with war and annexation might have foreseen the fatal consequences of this decision. A wish conveyed by authority to a military body almost necessarily partakes of the nature of a command, and, if a regiment once learn that it may decline the services which it is asked to undertake, it will soon venture to refuse the duties which it is ordered to perform. The 38th should never have been invited to volunteer for a foreign service if it had not previously been ascertained that the men were ready to accept the invitation. The sepoys, however, were within their rights; Dalhousie could hardly venture on punishing them for their conduct; and he 'meekly' ordered them to march to Dacca, where, as his apologist remarks, 'cholera decimated them.'[2] If it were unfortunate for Dalhousie to drift into a situation which compelled him to tolerate a refusal which outsiders could magnify into mutiny, it was equally unfortunate that disaffected persons should have the opportunity of thinking that troops whom the Governor-General was afraid to punish would be selected for unhealthy stations.

But still graver difficulty resulted from these circumstances. The war was waged, the Burmese were subdued, and, across that black water on which the 38th had refused to embark, there were thenceforward new duties for the Native Indian army. So long

[1] For this incident, Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 461; Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 61.

[2] Arnold's *Dalhousie's Administration*, vol. ii. p. 51.

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as the Company's possessions had been confined to Hindostan and the Deccan, no serious embarrassment had proceeded from the terms on which the Bengal army was enlisted. But the annexation of Pegu made their continuance impossible. There were only six general service regiments in the Bengal army, and in 1856 three of these were in Pegu, and two out of the three had been promised relief, while the remaining three had lately returned from the same possession.[1] Canning, Dalhousie's successor, had to fall back upon the Madras army, which was enlisted for general service, to enable him to provide the necessary reliefs. The authorities at Madras helped him in his difficulty, but they protested against being compelled to afford a permanent garrison for Pegu.[2] Canning was almost driven by this protest to consider the terms on which the mass of the Bengal army was enlisted. He found in his records an old despatch from the Company, suggesting that the army should in future be enlisted for general service. He saw that both at Madras and at Bombay the armies were thus raised, and he concluded that there could be no insoluble difficulty in accomplishing in Bengal what had already been effected in other Presidencies. Accordingly, in 1856, he issued a general order declaring that the Government of India, thenceforward, 'would not accept the service of any native recruit who would not, at the time of his enlistment, distinctly undertake to serve beyond the seas, whether within the territories of the Company or beyond them.'[3] To the eyes of an ordinary administrator no harm deducible from such an order was visible. The experience of Bombay and Madras proved that the policy which Canning was originating was practicable, and an arrangement which

The garrison of Burma.

Canning's General Service Order of 1856.

[1] Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 463.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 465.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 467.

was purely prospective could not inflict hardship on any existing soldier.

Yet the step which Canning thus took was attended with momentous consequences. The sepoy of the Company's Indian army was the representative of a class, composed of men on whom, for many reasons, the British were dependent. Service in the Company's army was to these men both an advantage and a pride; it gave the soldiers not merely pecuniary benefit but civil privileges.[1] Hence it followed that military employment, instead of being, as in England, a subject for reproach, was in India an object of ambition; and the sepoy, whose father had perhaps fought and bled for the Company, looked forward to the period when his son would follow his father's and grandfather's example. These anticipations were destroyed by the new order. The high-caste sepoy thenceforward was aware that his sons could not adopt the profession which he had chosen for them without risking the injury to their caste which a sea voyage would involve. It was no answer to him that the regulation did not apply to himself. It applied to his class, and was in consequence almost equally objectionable to him.

The sepoy's objection to it.

The sepoys, moreover, were largely recruited from Oudh, and Oudh was a province where discontent had much fuel to feed upon. The worst governments have some supporters, and the destruction of a bad government must always arouse opposition. It is, indeed, permissible to believe that the supporters of misrule have a direct interest in its continuance which a good sovereign can hardly hope to find in his own adherents. For misrule always leans on abuse, and gilds the pockets of the agents it finds necessary to employ. The king of Oudh, moreover, had maintained a considerable force which

The state of Oudh.

[1] These privileges will be found described in Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 255, and *Appendix*, p. 619.

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had cut itself adrift after the annexation of the province, and its members were left without employment, without resources, to brood over their wrongs and seek opportunity for remedying them.

Various causes, then, existed in 1856 which might have induced a cautious ruler to forecast the possibility of coming trouble. A series of mutinies had shown that the sepoys were neither contented nor subordinate; the annexation of conquered provinces had increased their duties and diminished their allowances; the general service order had deprived the army of some of its attractions; while vast numbers of persons in Oudh, deprived of occupation by the appropriation of the province, were dissatisfied with their position. To the outward eye, indeed, everything was peaceful; English officers, with their wives and children, lived surrounded by their men, and trusted implicitly to their fidelity. But, if the fire had not begun, the materials were already prepared. A chance spark might at any moment ignite the heated pile, a chance breath might at any moment fan the incipient flame, and, if fire once burst forth on Indian soil, no human being could venture to assign a limit to the conflagration.

And in the beginning of 1857 a spark was thoughtlessly allowed to fall on the inflammable mass which was already prepared for its reception. Military men, warned by the losses and the lessons of the Crimean war, were introducing a new weapon into the army. It is an instructive but lamentable fact, that invention, which during the first half of the century was busy in promoting the works of peace, has been occupying itself, since the last half of the century began, with perfecting the implements of war. Except that the percussion cap had superseded flint and steel, just as flint and steel had superseded more than a hundred years before the old matchlock, the soldiers who climbed the slopes of the

Alma were furnished with a musket similar to that which their predecessors had carried through the Peninsula and at Waterloo. But, before the Crimean war was over, proof had been furnished of the efficacy of a new rifle which owed its name to its inventor, a Frenchman, M. Minié. In 1856 it was wisely decided to issue the improved arm to the Native Indian army. But it was most unfortunately forgotten to accompany its issue with a precaution which might easily have been taken, and which ought not to have been overlooked. The cartridge in which the bullet of the Minié rifle was enclosed could not be forced into the barrel unless the paper were first lubricated with fat or other grease. It was well known that no Hindoo could touch the fat of ox or cow without consequences to his caste which in his judgment would seem worse than death; it was equally well known that no Mahomedan would touch the fat of swine. Yet, though the army consisted mainly of Hindoos and Mahomedans, no adequate precautions were taken to provide that the cartridges should be lubricated with the fat of mutton or other unobjectionable ingredient.[1]

The Minié rifle.

And so, without thought, without care, the new cartridges were lubricated, were sent out to India, and were issued to the Sepoys. 'One day in January 1857, a lascar, attached to the magazine at Dum Dum near Calcutta, asked a sepoy of the garrison to give him a drink of water from his lotah. Nettled by the haughty reply that the vessel would be contaminated by the lips of a low-caste man, the lascar retorted that the sepoy

The Lascar and the greased cartridges.

[1] Cf. the indent on the contractor for grease and tallow published by Kaye, *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 519, *note*, and Lord Canning's opinion: 'In the matter of grease the Government was in some degree in the wrong (not having taken all the precautions that might have been taken to exclude objectionable ingredients).' *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 559, and the *Military Report*:—'Captain Boxer is quite unable to offer any decided opinion as to the particular description of animal from which the tallow is derived.' *Parl. Papers*, 1857; *Mutinies in the East Indies*, p. 2.

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would soon be deprived of his caste altogether; for the Government was busy manufacturing cartridges greased with the fat of cows or swine, and the sepoys would have to bite the forbidden substance before loading.'[1]

The sepoy heard, believed, and retold the story. It passed from mouth to mouth, it was carried from station to station. It was everywhere repeated, it was everywhere credited, that the English Government was lubricating cartridges with fat of kine in order to destroy the soldiers' caste. And, as the report spread, and was magnified in the spreading, there fell on the Native army a mighty terror, the terror of a defilement which was worse than death, which would separate men from every object of their love in this world, from every hope in the world to come.[2]

The terror of the sepoys.

Dum Dum is on the outskirts of Calcutta. A few miles further north, on the banks of the Hooghly, is the great military station of Barrackpore. Four native regiments were quartered at the station in January 1857. Thither came the news; there it was circulated; there, as at Dum Dum, it was believed; and there the same terror fell on the men's minds. Maddened by fear, they did not wholly abstain from overt acts of injury. Fires broke out which were traced to incendiaries; and

[1] Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 82. The story is always related in almost the same words. Cf. Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 490; Argyll, *India under Lord Canning*, p. 77 *et seq.*

[2] The Duke of Argyll, with excellent point, quotes a story told by Colonel Skinner. Wounded severely in 1800, he crept into the bush for shelter in company with two other wounded men, one a native officer of his battalion, whose leg was shot off below the knee. They passed two terrible nights and one terrible day, tortured with pain and thirst. 'Next morning we spied a man and an old woman who came to us with a basket and a pot of water, and to every wounded man she gave a piece of bread from the basket and a drink from her water pot. To us she gave the same, and I thanked heaven and her. But the soobahdar was a high-caste Rajpoot; and as this woman was of the lowest caste, he would receive neither bread nor water from her. I tried to persuade him to take it that he might live, but he said that in our state, with a few more hours to linger, what was a little more or a little less suffering to us? Why should he give up his faith for such an object? No, he preferred to die unpolluted.' *India under Lord Canning*, p. 76.

The sepoys at Barrackpore.

Hearsey, who was in command at Barrackpore—the same Hearsey whose tact and firmness had averted mutiny in December 1849—reported the facts to the Government. The Indian Government acted with commendable promptitude. It at once gave directions that cartridges should be issued without grease, and that the men should be allowed to apply with their own hands whatever mixture they might prefer. It directed the Commander-in-Chief to institute experiments for the purpose of ascertaining the best ingredients to be used in greasing the cartridges, with reference both to the feelings of the Native soldiery and to the requirements of the service; it desired that the whole matter should be fully explained to the men both at Barrackpore and at Dum Dum; and it congratulated itself on allaying the fears and on satisfying the scruples of the troops.[1]

But the terror which had fallen on the sepoys was not allayed. Men indeed allowed to choose their own grease could not, even under the influence of fear, repeat the old rumour. But, relieved from one suspicion, they almost immediately fell back on another. A specially fine and smooth paper was used in the manufacture of the new cartridge, and the men declared that the glaze on the paper was due to the presence of fat. This new suspicion fell in the first instance on the troops at Barrackpore; it was temporarily allayed by the tact of Hearsey. Assembling his men around him, he exposed in their own language the absurdity of their fears. He assured them, on the word of a good officer, that neither the Government nor their officers had any design of attacking either their faith or their caste, and he sent them away relieved, and as he thought happy.[2]

[1] *Parl. Papers, Mutinies in East Indies*, p. 1. Cf. Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 515; Holmes' *Indian Mutiny*, pp. 84, 85, whose accounts, however, hardly tally with the distinct statement in the Parliamentary papers, on which the text is founded.

[2] Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 524.

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But events soon proved that the suspicion had not been destroyed. A detachment of the 34th, one of the regiments stationed at Barrackpore, happened to be sent to Berhampore, where the 19th Native Infantry was stationed. The men of the 19th inquired of the detachment as to the truth of the story of the greased cartridges; and they were then told of the new suspicion, the new fear, which had fallen on the troops at Barrackpore. It so happened that, on the morning after the arrival of the detachment, the 19th Regiment was ordered to parade with blank cartridges; these cartridges had inadvertently been made up with two kinds of paper. This unlucky circumstance strengthened the suspicion which had seized the men's minds. They thought that new cartridges fatal to their caste had been purposely mingled with the old, and, in an agony of fear, they refused to receive the percussion caps. Their refusal was reported to the Colonel. Unfortunately, Mitchell, the Colonel in command, had neither the tact nor the temper of Hearsey. Hastily imputing to insubordination a movement which was really due to fear, he hastened to the lines, railed at the men, and threatened them with severe punishment if the caps were still refused. It was in vain that the Native officers begged the Colonel to be less violent. He was in no mood to restrain his temper; and the sepoys, their panic increased by the Colonel's language, hastily concluded that their suspicions were confirmed. He would not have spoken so angrily—thus they said to one another—if he had not known the cartridges were greased.[1]

Berhampore.

The Mutiny of the 19th Regiment.

That night, fear—for no critic has ever imputed a worse influence to the 19th—drove the regiment into open mutiny. It rose, seized its arms, and stood in array, uncertain what to do. The tumult of the revolt

[1] *India under Lord Canning*, p. 82; Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 502; Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 86; cf. *Red Pamphlet*, p. 21.

gave Mitchell warning of what had occurred, and in the dead of night, with no European troops to rely upon, he had to devise means for meeting the peril. Two other Native regiments—cavalry and artillery—were stationed at Berhampore; and these, though Mitchell knew not whether he could rely upon them, were at once ordered to be brought to the spot where the 19th stood to arms. With this force closed up upon it, Mitchell sent for the Native officers of the mutinous regiment, and again addressed them in words of wild passion. The officers endeavoured to turn their Colonel's wrath; the men, they said, were panic-struck, not mutinous—suspicious, not violent. While the cavalry and the artillery surrounded them, they were afraid to lay down their arms; if the cavalry and the artillery were removed, they would lay down their arms and return to their duty. Mitchell had, no doubt, at that moment a question to decide which it might tax the bravest and best of men to answer. He could not withdraw the force which he had summoned to his aid without making terms with mutineers. He could not order it to act without encountering the risk of driving it into common cause with mutiny. He chose the safer course, withdrew the artillery and the cavalry which he had collected, and the men of the 19th resumed their allegiance.

It was impossible for the Government to pass over conduct of this character. Though the mutiny of the 19th was due to fear, though it would probably have been averted if a Hearsey instead of a Mitchell had been in command, the broad fact remained that the regiment had risen and had stood in arms against its officers. Canning rightly judged that such conduct could not be condoned, and that the regiment must be disbanded. But this decision brought home to him, perhaps for the first time, the defenceless nature of his singular position.

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'Between Calcutta and Dinapore, an extent of 400 miles in length and enormous breadth, there was but one European regiment. Half of this regiment garrisoned Fort William, the other half was stationed at Dum Dum, about seven miles from Calcutta. In case of any disturbance not a single man could have been spared from the wing located in the fort, whilst the other wing was insufficient in strength to put down a simultaneous rising of the town and of the Native army.'[1] Canning, therefore, was in no common dilemma. A regiment could not be disarmed without force; he could not rely on one Native regiment to enforce the disarmament of another; and he had no British troops whom he could employ on the duty. He did perhaps the only thing which, under the circumstances, it was possible for him to do. He sent for the 84th Foot, a British regiment, from Burma, and postponed until its arrival the disarmament of the 19th. The latter regiment was ordered to march down from Berhampore to Barrackpore, where the 84th could more conveniently reach it.

The defenceless condition of Bengal.

Thus it happened that, while the rising at Berhampore had occurred in the end of February, the last day of March arrived before the punishment of the regiment was effected. In great crises rapidity creates more effect than even certainty of punishment; and a delay which is due to want of power, not of will, creates an impression of weakness. This effect was perhaps increased by some other circumstances. The day before the 19th reached Barrackpore, the 34th showed signs of violent excitement. Mungul Pandy, a high-caste sepoy, drunk with drugs and frenzied with fanaticism, addressed the men, urged them to rise, and threatened to shoot any European he came across. The adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Baugh, at

Mungul Pandy and the 34th Regiment.

[1] *Red Pamphlet*, p. 19.

once rode up to seize the man. Mungul Pandy fired and wounded the adjutant's horse; on foot Baugh proceeded, pistol in hand, to close with the mutineer; but he missed his aim, and was cut down by Mungul Pandy. A European sergeant-major called on the men of the quarter-guard to help him seize the mutineer. Only one man, and he a Mahomedan, responded to the call, and it was not till Hearsey himself rode up that the furious fanatic was finally overpowered.[1]

In reality this circumstance was much more serious than the so-called mutiny of the 19th. At Berhampore the 19th had allowed their fears to drive them into insubordination. At Barrackpore, Mungul Pandy had acted from fanaticism. At Berhampore, Mitchell's ill-timed anger gave the sepoys some excuse for their conduct; at Barrackpore the sepoys in Hearsey had a commander whose tact and temper made it difficult for even the mutinous to rise. It was, moreover, the detachment of the 34th which had aroused in the 19th the fears and suspicions which had driven them to mutiny. It afterwards transpired that the 34th, on the evening of the day on which Mungul Pandy had been seized, had sent messengers to the 19th, urging them to join in a common revolt, and to murder their officers.[2] It was subsequently recorded by a court, which investigated these matters, that in the 34th the Sikhs and Mussulmans could alone be trusted, and that the Hindoos were untrustworthy.[3] Yet, though the 19th was disbanded, the 34th was left unpunished. Mungul Pandy was, indeed, hanged; the native officer who commanded the quarter-guard was also hanged; but the regiment as a whole received for the present no punishment; the

[1] Kaye's description of what he calls the story of Mungul Pandy is admirably told. *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 538; cf. Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 88, and *Parl. Papers, Mutinies in India*, p. 5.

[2] Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 544; cf. *Red Pamphlet*, p. 26.

[3] *Ibid.*, and Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 551.

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Governor-General went out of his way to record his conviction of its loyalty.[1]

The man who preserves the even balance of his mind in moments of difficulty is so rare that the just critic will hesitate to condemn Canning's moderation. While other men were demanding stern measures, he, almost alone, refused to be moved by either passion or panic; and, while mutiny was bursting out around him, acted with the caution of a judge on assize. His, at the time, was the reward which most good and great men may expect—abuse and contumely from the baser crowd. His memory should, at least, now be safe from the obloquy which was cast on him then. Yet, though it is difficult to award too high praise to the ruler who knew how to display confidence amidst panic and to dispense even justice amidst massacre, it is impossible to avoid concluding that he formed an inadequate view of the conduct of the 34th. True justice, true mercy, demanded its sharp and prompt punishment. The execution of a couple of sepoys, days and weeks after the offence, did not satisfy the requirements of the occasion.

Yet, throughout the month of April, Canning had reason to hope that he had gained his end. In Bengal, to which insubordination had been hitherto confined, all was quiet. Mutiny had not yet become 'epidemic,' and the Government had removed one cause of discontent by altering the platoon exercise and suffering the sepoy to tear instead of to bite his cartridge-papers.[2] Far away, indeed, from what is still called the North-West, though the annexation of the Punjab has long made the name a misnomer, news came that the sepoys were influenced by the same fears and displaying the same excitement. The Commander-in-Chief, who happened to be at Umballa, where the sepoys were collected for train-

The sepoys in Umballa.

[1] *Red Pamphlet*, p. 27.
[2] *Parl. Papers, Mutinies in India*, p. 3.

ing, convinced of the genuineness of the panic, thought of breaking up the depôt before the rifle practice began, and of thus evading the difficulty. The Governor-General, on the contrary, satisfied that every real grievance had been removed, and perhaps imagining that other men were as much influenced by logic and as little swayed by passion as himself, declined to concede to unreasonable suspicions, and the rifle practice went on. But the commencement of the practice was accompanied with the same symptoms which had heralded mutiny at Barrackpore. Fires broke out night after night. It was thought by British officers that the regimental sepoys still undefiled fired the huts of the musketry depôt, and that the men in the musketry depôt retaliated by firing the huts of the regimental sepoys.[1] Be this as it may, the offenders were not discovered, the offences were not punished, the warning was not heeded.

The sepoys at Lucknow.

And yet one more warning was to be given to the Government. At the end of April some recruits in the 7th Irregular Native Infantry in Oudh refused to bite their cartridges. On the 1st of May the whole regiment sullenly refused to do so. On the 3rd Lawrence, who had just taken up his residence at Lucknow, determined to act promptly and sharply. He paraded the guilty regiment, he surrounded it with an irresistible force, and compelled the men to lay down their arms. For the time, at any rate, prompt action had suppressed the mutiny.[2]

The news of this fresh outbreak, carried to Calcutta, convinced both Governor-General and Council that sharper measures than those which they had hitherto considered necessary were required. The tardy disbandment of the 19th, the tardier treatment of the 34th, and

[1] Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 562.

[2] *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, p. 563; *Red Pamphlet*, p. 31; Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 99.

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the righteous execution of a couple of mutineers, had evidently not been sufficient to prevent panic ripening into mutiny. Lulled by the comparative quiet of April, Canning had hoped and believed that the worst was over; convinced by the fresh outrage in May, he saw that, on the contrary, mutiny was 'epidemic,' and that the plague could only be stayed by stern but just measures of retribution. But the conclusion formed in the second week in May was too late. Two days before Canning recorded his opinion, an event had occurred hundreds of miles from Calcutta which had changed the whole aspect of affairs. The insubordination of isolated regiments had been followed by the defection of an army; the mutiny had become a war.[1]

The chupatties.

Early in the year a strange occurrence had been reported from the North-West. The Magistrate at Goorgaon told the Commissioner of Delhi that small baked cakes were brought to the head man of the village with orders for their circulation in the neighbourhood; that more of these cakes (chupatties the natives call them) were immediately prepared and promptly distributed. From village to village, from district to district, through hill land and lowland, the signal—unexplained at the time, inexplicable still—sped; and, in village after village, in district after district, the spreading of the signal was followed by the increased excitement of the people.[2] Yet no overt act of mutiny immediately followed the strange portent. Even in April, when the people of Umballa saw with alarm the glare of midnight fires, the sepoys stood firm, and it was not till the beginning of May that sullen discontent kindled into active mutiny.

Many miles to the south-east of Umballa lies the

[1] For Canning's memorandum of the 12th May, see Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 99, note; Argyll's *India under Lord Canning*, p. 87.

[2] Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 570; Appendix, p. 632 *sq.*

The mutiny at Meerut.

ancient city of Meerut, whose situation on a broad and fertile plain between the Jumna and the Ganges had probably led to its selection as an important military station. No place in India seemed more secure. There indeed were stationed the 3rd Native Cavalry and the 11th and 20th Native Regiments. But there also were quartered the 60th Rifles, the 6th Carabineers, two troops of horse artillery, and a light field battery. At Barrackpore and Lucknow Hearsey and Lawrence had been compelled to deal with mutiny with only a native force. At Meerut, Hewitt, who was in command, had a British force under his orders large enough to face any possible emergency. Perhaps this very circumstance suggested sterner measures at Meerut than those that had been taken elsewhere. Towards the end of April eighty-five men of the 3rd Native Cavalry refused to receive the obnoxious cartridges. They were tried, the court sentenced them to ten years' imprisonment with hard labour on the roads, and Hewitt, so far as seventy-four out of the eighty-five men were concerned, confirmed the sentence. But the fact of the punishment alone was not thought sufficient. To make it more impressive, the whole force at Meerut was paraded on the 9th of May, and in its presence the prisoners were stripped of their uniforms, loaded with chains riveted upon them, and marched off to gaol. It was in vain that, with the prospect of an awful punishment[1] before them, they appealed to British officers for mercy and to their comrades for succour. The British were determined to drive home a stern lesson, and the sepoys did not venture to rise in the presence of two English regiments. And so the wretched men were led away in manacles to gaol, and the Native regiments separated, angry at the spectacle, angry with themselves for having stood passively by.

[1] The Duke of Argyll says rightly of this sentence, that it is 'tremendous anywhere, but doubly tremendous in the climate and in the prisons of India.' *India under Lord Canning*, p. 89.

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But they did not remain passive long. On the evening of the following day, the first day of the week, as the English were going to church, while the Rifles were assembled for church parade, the men of the 3rd Cavalry rose, galloped to the gaol, forced its gates, and liberated their comrades. The Native Infantry regiments gathered tumultuously in their lines, wild with panic and excitement. The men of the 20th seized their arms, the men of the 11th wavered in uncertainty—their colonel, Francis, implored them to be faithful, when he was struck down by a volley from the 20th. The death of its colonel decided the attitude of the wavering regiment. The sepoys of both corps, firing their huts, murdering any British whom they encountered, a mob rather than a force, moved forward on the Delhi road. The insurrection had begun.[1]

Yet, if Hewitt had been as prompt to act as he had proved stern to punish, the worst even then might have been averted. With a British regiment on parade, with a British cavalry regiment within call, with guns at his disposal worked by British gunners, in the cool of that Sunday night, by the light of a friendly moon, the mutineers might have been taught a lesson whose meaning would have been plain from Peshawur to Calcutta. But, unhappily, Hewitt was old, his second in command, Archdale Wilson, the Brigadier commanding at the station, only made a feeble and ill-arranged attempt to check the mutineers, and concluding that it was his duty to protect Meerut where the peril was over, and not to save Delhi where the danger was impending, he withdrew his men from the pursuit.

The mutiny at Delhi.

And so, when the morning of the 11th of May rose on Delhi, no warning had been given to its garrison of coming danger, no help was forthcoming to ward off

[1] There are two accounts from eye-witnesses of the events at Meerut in Frost's *Complete Narrative of the Mutiny*, pp. 6-10; cf. Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. ii. pp. 43-74.

the impending blow. The first tidings of disaster were brought by the troopers of the 3rd Cavalry swarming into the city, and urging the king, who still retained his old title in his old capital, to make common cause with those who had struck down his enemies. The three Native regiments at Delhi, the 38th, the 54th, and 74th, after some show of hesitation, murdered their officers and made cause with the mutineers. With Orientals, perhaps unfortunately with all men, the taste of blood begets an appetite for bloodshedding, and murder tracked the white faces through the streets of the imperial city. Yet, though nothing was done, though nothing could be done, to save the city, one or two Englishmen on that day displayed qualities which their fellow-countrymen should not lightly forget. No truer moral courage was ever shown than that of a young clerk in the telegraph office, who, while his murderers were closing round him on every side, went on till he was cut down at his desk, sending his fatal news to the Punjab. No more daring act was ever done than that of a young lieutenant, Willoughby, who, with a garrison of eight men under him, held the great magazine till it was crowded with assailants, and then, at the risk of his own life and of his men's lives, gave the signal which involved a thousand mutineers in a common ruin.[1]

The outbreak at Meerut and the capture of Delhi by the mutineers deprived the British of the services of six regiments and of authority in an imperial city. But they did much more than this. They turned a mutiny into an insurrection, and kindled a conflagration which it took months of bloody labour to extinguish. In the vast territory, indeed, known as the North-West, defeat at Delhi and inaction at Meerut made an almost universal rising certain; and it so happened that authority in the

[1] Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. ii. pp. 75–110.

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Colvin in the North-West.

North-West had been confided to an administrator who neither physically nor morally was equal to the crisis. It is Colvin's misfortune that his memory is identified with two of the most disastrous events in the history of the British in India. He was one of the advisers on whom Auckland leaned in the consultations which preceded the Afghan war, and he was the Lieutenant-Governor who in comparative security at Agra proved incapable of dealing with the crisis of 1857. Verily his task was hard. From every side came tidings of mutiny, of insurrection, and of massacre. Before the month of May was over the whole of Rohilcund had passed from British rule to anarchy under a Mahomedan chief; the vast territory between the Ganges and the Jumna was similarly lost; in Gwalior, Scindia was only kept faithful by the exertions of an able Resident; and in Rajpootana authority was solely preserved by the energy of George Lawrence. While message after message of disaster and murder were brought to him, Colvin remained at Agra struggling manfully to do his duty, maintaining the struggle till he died. But, if at first he proved unequal to gauge the extent of the revolt, so from first to last he proved lacking in the indispensable qualities for dealing with it. He failed, as nine men out of ten would perhaps have failed, in his situation. His metal was neither stern enough nor hard enough to deal with the crisis in which he was involved.[1]

Oudh.

It was not, however, in the North-West that the greatest danger was visible; it was not to the North-West that men turned with chief anxiety. Oudh, the latest of the Company's acquisitions, was the chief recruiting ground of the sepoy; and the territory, which English administrators had not yet found time to regulate and pacify, contained a population necessarily

[1] For the mutiny in the North-West, Malleson's *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, vol. i. p. 144 *sq.*; Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, pp. 131–165; *Red Pamphlet*, pt. 2, ch. i., iii., v., ix.

sympathising with the mutineers. It was, moreover, the misfortune of the British that annexation in Oudh had been followed by a totally different policy to that which had been adopted on the annexation of the Punjab. The country of the five rivers had become, as it has been called, the spoilt child of India. The most capable Governor-General of the century had spared neither labour nor expenditure to make its administration successful; and he had placed two brothers, the ablest administrators in India, perhaps the ablest administrators in the world, at the head of its affairs. He had done even more. He had given the Lawrences a blank cheque on the whole *personnel* of Hindostan, and had allowed them an almost unlimited discretion in the selection of their subordinates. No reader acquainted with the achievements of these men can avoid marvelling at their success; but no reader acquainted with the contemporary history of the British in India can doubt that success in the Punjab was purchased at a heavy price. The best administrators, the best troops, were quartered in the new territory, and the rest of Hindostan was impoverished by their withdrawal.

Its administration.

In the older possessions of the Company, whose administration was already complete, this loss was not attended with any very striking consequences. But in Oudh, when Oudh fell into British custody, a want of adequate administrators was plainly perceptible. If the best men in India had been sent to govern the Punjab, any men were thought good enough for the administration of Oudh. At the head of the province, indeed, Dalhousie, in the first instance, placed Outram, and Canning ultimately appointed Henry Lawrence. But Outram's health broke down at the commencement of his rule, and Henry Lawrence only arrived on the very eve of insurrection. The men who, between Outram and Lawrence, administered the province had

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neither consideration for the feelings of the people nor accurate perception of the right duties of government. An English officer declared that men were wanted whose policy would be just, not inhuman, 'whose manners are not haughty but conciliatory, whose language and views are those of English statesmen, not of revolutionary tribunals.'[1] The military arrangements were, moreover, defective. Outram had enlisted, both in the police and in the army, sepoys who had been in the service of the king of Oudh. Elements, therefore, there were in abundance portending trouble. And so, while Dalhousie was complacently reporting that all was well in Oudh, want of tact, want of sympathy, were making it impossible that all should be well.

For the moment, indeed, Lawrence's energy averted disaster. The 7th Native Infantry were disarmed, and authority was restored by an act of vigour.[2] But the future could hardly be regarded without anxiety. In 1857 Lucknow ranked after Calcutta as the largest and finest of Indian cities;[3] and Lucknow, with its 700,000 inhabitants, and only a weak British force, was teeming with disbanded mercenaries, disappointed landowners, and hungry, nay starving dependents[4] of the late Government. News of the Meerut rising was plainly calculated to excite a discontented population: and Lawrence, conscious of his own difficulties, thought it necessary to provide for the safety of the European inhabitants. He decided on holding two separate points—one the Residency, the other an old Sikh fort, which 'from some emblematic figure on its exterior,' was known as the Fish Tower.[5] The inconvenience likely to result from the separation of the Europeans into two distinct buildings, unconnected with one another, was

[1] *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, p. 557.
[2] See *ante*, p. 401.
[3] *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, p. 558.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 564.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 560.

in his judgment worth encountering for the sake of showing that the British were not dismayed, and were still confident of maintaining their authority.

And so, thus preparing for the coming storm, Lawrence waited throughout May, and on the last day but one of this month the sepoys in Lucknow rose. Attacked by the small European force which Lawrence was able to bring against them, they retreated from the city, and, streaming northwards, joined other insurgents at Delhi. For the next few weeks, so far as Lucknow was concerned, Lawrence had to face a discontented city rather than an insurgent soldiery. But he had the anxiety of knowing that forty miles south of him, at Cawnpore, another handful of Europeans were exposed, in an even more critical situation, to a graver danger. Their fate, moreover, he knew was interlinked with his own. For he saw that the fall of Cawnpore would inevitably lead to the siege of the Residency at Luck now.

Cawnpore.

Cawnpore, a city of 100,000 people, lies on the Ganges, in a hot dusty plain. In 1857 Wheeler, who was in command of the garrison at that place, had under him four native regiments and about threescore European soldiers. A large civilian population, accompanied with many ladies and their children, was living at the station. Wheeler foresaw that, amidst an insurrection which was becoming universal, Cawnpore would be attacked; and accordingly, early in May he took steps to avert the coming danger. He drew a hasty and wide entrenchment round the barrack, whither he decided that the Europeans in case of need might withdraw. On the night of the 21st of May the whole English population withdrew into this temporary fortress. Slender reinforcements—the forerunners, it was hoped, of further aid—raised the number of its garrison to 210 men. Officers of other regiments, women and

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children, raised the population of the fortress to nearly 1,000 souls.[1]

It was inevitable that such a population, crowded together in such buildings, should be exposed to discomforts almost fatal in their character. The European who passes a June in India takes special precautions to protect himself from the heat; and in these crowded buildings, surrounded by the hot dusty plain, the heat was excessive and precautions were impossible. It was inevitable, too, that a weak band of Europeans, isolated amidst a mutinous army in a rude earthwork, should regard the future with anxiety: yet the anxiety was alternated with hope. Officers of sepoy regiments, inmates of the fortress, relied to the last on the fidelity of their men. Their commander, though not sharing their confidence, trusted to the sufficiency of his preparations. He did not contemplate the possibility of a siege. He thought that the regiments, if they rose, would hasten to withdraw to the centre of insurrection at Delhi, and it would thus be with himself at Cawnpore as it was with Lawrence at Lucknow.

Nana Sahib.

There was another reason, moreover, which diminished Wheeler's anxiety. There was staying at Cawnpore in May 1857, a native—a Mahratta—who was living on the friendliest terms with the English residents. Joining their sports, sharing their hospitality, mingling with them in the smoking-room and at the billiard-table, this Mahratta had won the confidence of British officers. He was a man, moreover, in whom it seemed generous to confide. For this agreeable Mahratta youth had been the adopted heir of the last Peishwa of Berari; and Dalhousie, strong in asserting the right of lapse, had refused to continue to him the pension guaranteed to the Peishwa and his successors. It is not in the nature of Englishmen to speak harshly

[1] Cf. *Red Pamphlet*, p. 130, with Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 239.

to those whom British policy degrades, and the Mahratta youth had been fêted in London, when he had journeyed thither to plead his claims, and had been hailed as good fellow in India when he travelled through Oudh in the autumn of 1856 and the spring of 1857. His smooth manners, his winning talk, commended him to society in Oudh, as it had already won him an entrance to society in London. Even Wheeler, distrusting his own men, decided on asking him to take charge, with his armed retinue, of the treasury. And thus, while he watched and waited with his thousand companions in the hot and dusty barracks to which he had retreated for safety, he was able to reflect that British treasure was safe in Mahratta keeping. Safe! The story of that protection will last as long as the most solid building in Cawnpore. The name of that Mahratta will be remembered when the names of Wheeler and his comrades are forgotten. For that smooth Mahratta youth was to do a deed of blood such as this world of bloodshedding has not often seen, and the name by which he is commonly known is the Nana Sahib.

The rising at Cawnpore.

Watching and waiting, the Europeans remained within their slender entrenchment. On the 4th of June the crisis for which they had watched and waited came. The sepoys rose. Making common cause with the Mahratta's retinue, they joined them in plundering the treasury. Seeking a leader, they asked the young Mahratta himself to take the command. And, rich with spoil, they set out on the 5th of July to swell the crowd of insurgents at Delhi. But the Nana had other thoughts than those which were precipitating his new followers on Delhi. Instead of helping to restore the Mogul Empire, why should he not carve a kingdom for himself at Cawnpore, out of the vast possessions of the Company? Instead of leading his troops to Delhi, he persuaded

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them to return, attempt to overwhelm the feeble English cantonments, and assert his and their authority at Cawnpore. The sepoys listened to his smooth talk as the English had listened before. They listened and he prevailed; and on the evening of the 6th of June the siege of Cawnpore began.

On the story of that siege it is unnecessary to dwell. Other pens have told how the thousand souls, their numbers constantly lessening, without hope, almost without food, fought and endured for twenty days. On the twentieth day the sorely tried garrison was tempted to surrender by a promise from the Nana of a safe passage to Allahabad for all who had not been connected with the acts of Lord Dalhousie.[1] Beguiled by this assurance, on the 27th of June the survivors of the siege evacuated their entrenchments and moved to the Ganges to embark on the boats which the Nana had prepared for them. But their embarkation was only the signal for massacre. A sepoy force, held in ambush, opened on them with artillery and musketry. Crowded in boats which were aground on the shore, the English proved an easy mark for their enemies. Only one boat succeeded in pushing off into the stream. Its crew, without oars, without rudder, without food, was followed on the banks by a crowd of Sepoys who poured upon it their fire, and ultimately brought back all the survivors, except four, captives to Cawnpore. Thither the survivors from the other boats had already been carried by the Nana's orders. There in a miserable house, enduring a captivity worse than death, these unfortunate individuals lingered till the 15th of July. On that day they were butchered by the Nana's orders, and, on the following morning, their bodies, some still alive, were thrust into an adjacent well.[2]

The massacre at the boats.

The murder of the survivors.

[1] Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 245. Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, pp. 232-253;

[2] For this account see, *inter alia*, Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. ii. p. 286 *et*

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Lawrence had foreseen that the capture of the entrenchments at Cawnpore would increase his own difficulties. And his anticipations proved correct. Twenty miles from Lucknow an army of mutineers were waiting tidings from the Nana; and, at the end of June, when the Nana's work was done, they closed on Lucknow. Instead of waiting a siege, Lawrence was persuaded to move out of his fortress and attack the enemy. But the sortie led to a disaster. The Native troops who had till then remained faithful behaved badly. Lawrence's small force was outflanked and forced to retreat, leaving five guns with the enemy. Thenceforward the English at Lucknow, abandoning the Fish Tower, were closely besieged in the Residency. But worse was still in store for them. On the second day of the siege, a chance shot, finding its way into the exposed room in which Lawrence was resting, inflicted on him the terrible wound which, after thirty-six hours' suffering, caused his death.[1] With him died one of the noblest and truest of the many noble and true men who have laid down their lives for India.

The sortie at Lucknow.

Thus, at the commencement of July, the North-West and Oudh were for the time lost to Britain. In the North-West, a feeble descendant of the Mogul Emperors had, with sepoy aid, re-established his authority at Delhi. In Oudh the most treacherous and bloodthirsty of Indians was revelling in blood at Cawnpoor. In the North-West, Colvin was maintaining a feeble authority at Agra. In Oudh a small body of Europeans, closely besieged, were deploring the loss of their great leader. The Empire of the Company seemed crumbling to pieces; its possessions had no longer to be saved, they had to be re-won.

And, as the story of massacre and defeat was told

seq; *Red Pamphlet*, pt. ii. pp. 130–143.

[1] *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, pp. 598–613.

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in Calcutta and London, and, hideous as it was, was exaggerated in the telling of it, there arose from the English public and the English press, both in India and in England, a wild cry for retributive vengeance, which good men would gladly forget, but even good men will possibly excuse. For man, in periods of excitement, whatever be the colour of his skin, loses the self-control which custom imposes, and meets outrage with outrage, slaughter with slaughter. Half-mad from panic,[1] quite mad from fury, men of gentle birth and kindly hearts wrote and did things which nothing but the horror of the occasion could excuse. The pamphlet which was most widely read at the time declared that, 'as a preliminary measure it will be necessary, merciless as it may sound to English ears, to hunt down every mutineer. India will not be secure so long as a single man still remains alive.'[2] The precepts of the writer were adopted in many parts of India. One officer, to whose gallantry in the field his country stands in debt, recollecting the Hindoo doctrine that the man who lost his caste had no hope hereafter, forced the murderers whom he hanged to lick up a portion of the blood of their victims. A writer who has become famous, defending this policy, declared it good that the murderers 'should leave this world with the conviction that their vile souls were about to migrate into the bodies of cats and monkeys.'[3] One deputy-commissioner, after shooting without trial 237 sepoys, flung their dead bodies into a well, and concluded the despatch in which he described this massacre with the sickening phrase,[4] 'There is a well at Cawnpore, but there is also a well at Ujnalla.' In

The cry for vengeance.

Its answer.

[1] Lord Canning says: 'The panic of some of the people here, officers of Government, who ought to set the example of a bold front at least, seeing that some of them have swords by their sides, is disgraceful.' *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, p. 575.

[2] *Red Pamphlet*, pt. i. p. 46.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

[4] Holmes, in his *History of the Indian Mutiny*, calls the act 'a splendid assumption of responsibility,' p. 373, but he does not refer to the despatch. John Lawrence, with

the march on Delhi, officers selected to serve on courts martial 'swore that they would hang their prisoners, guilty or innocent.' Prisoners condemned to death after a hasty trial were mocked and tortured by ignorant privates before their execution, while educated officers looked on and approved.'[1] When Delhi ultimately fell, a British officer, the bravest of the brave, slew the king's sons in cold blood with his own hand. The pillage which followed the fall of the imperial city was more complete than that which had disgraced its capture by the barbarian, Nadir Shah. Natives were brought forward in batches to be tried by a military commission, or by special commissioners, each one of whom had been invested by the Supreme Government with full power of life and death. These judges were in no mood to show mercy. Almost all who were tried were condemned, and almost all who were condemned were sentenced to death. A four-square gallows was erected in a conspicuous place in the city, and five or six culprits were hanged every day. English officers used to sit by, puffing at their cigars, and look on at the convulsive struggles of these victims.[2] More than three thousand men, twenty-nine of whom were members of the royal family, were thus hanged.[3] In the Punjab, excluding those slain in arms, 2,384 sepoys were executed. The Governor-General declared that the proceedings of the Courts

far truer judgment, approved the act of his subordinate, but called the account of it 'that nauseous despatch.' *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. ii. p. 175.

[1] Holmes's *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, p. 124; *Hist. of Siege of Delhi, by an Officer who served there*, pp. 59–60; and cf. Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. ii. p. 170 and *note*. For the retribution at Benares, *ibid.*, p. 236; for that at Allahabad, *ibid.*, p. 268. I have not specifically referred to either of these in the text. The native servants of the relieving army at Delhi were shamefully treated by their employers. See *ibid.*, p. 605. For the retribution at Cawnpore, see Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. ii. p. 399, and Valbezen, *English in India*, p. 166.

[2] The text is taken word for word from Holmes's *History of Indian Mutiny*, p. 406; cf. *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. ii. pp. 218, 253, and 262.

[3] Valbezen, *The English in India*, p. 127.

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were 'indiscriminate judicial murder.' 'There is,' so he wrote to the Queen, 'a rabid and indiscriminate vindictiveness abroad; . . . not one man in ten seems to think that the hanging and shooting of forty or fifty thousand mutineers can be otherwise than practicable and right.' 'Lord Canning will easily believe,' so ran the Queen's reply, 'how entirely the Queen shares his feelings of sorrow and indignation at the unchristian spirit, shown, alas! also to a great extent here by the public, towards Indians in general and towards sepoys without discrimination.' [1]

Lawrence at Lahore.

But, amidst the cries for vengeance and the taunts of the crowd around them, there were happily two men in high office in India who could discriminate between massacre and punishment, and resolutely resist involving guilty and innocent in a common fate. And these two men, who proved their coolness in panic and their capacity in danger, were stationed at vast distances one from the other, and were separated by the rebellion. For one of them, John Lawrence, was at Lahore; the other, the Governor-General, was at Calcutta.

Good fortune has frequently befallen England in the hour of her peril; it was her singular good fortune in 1857 that Lawrence was in the Punjab. If the rest of India had been impoverished by the draining of her best men into the old Sikh kingdom, the debt was nobly repaid when the crisis of 1857 occurred. To the outward observer, Lawrence's situation was almost as difficult as that of his brother at Lucknow. He was surrounded by the most warlike population in India, large portions of his garrison consisted of Hindoo soldiers, and his frontier was exposed to the incursions of bold and hostile tribes. A man in such a situation might easily have concluded that his first duty was to maintain his own authority unimpaired, and to strengthen his own

[1] *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. iv. pp. 146, 147.

position. But Lawrence had the courage to perceive that one way of averting danger was to affect to despise it, and that the best method of preventing the spread of mutiny from the Hindoo to the Sikh was to fling the Sikh at the Hindoo. With the training, moreover, of only a civil servant, but with the instinct of a soldier, he saw that Delhi was the centre of the revolt; that everything should be risked, and that almost everything should be sacrificed, to the paramount necessity of an immediate onslaught on the Mogul capital. 'Clubs not spades are trumps,'[1] was his emphatic declaration when he heard that Anson was entrenching himself at Umballa, instead of ordering an immediate advance. The siege of Delhi would have been delayed, its capture would have been almost indefinitely postponed, if Lawrence had not hurried men, guns, and stores from the Punjab. The hero of the assault was Chamberlain, a Punjab officer.

The Commander-in-Chief.

The command in India was held in 1857 by Anson, a man whose untimely end might have saved him from some of the strictures to which he has been exposed. His life had been devoted rather to pleasure than to war, his appointment had been due rather to his birth than his merit, and he formed therefore an easy mark for hostile criticism.[2] Yet it may be fairly pleaded that, if he did not do much, he had not much time for doing it. News of the mutiny reached him at Simla on the 12th of May. He reached Umballa on the 15th. Though the number of troops available was

[1] *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. ii. p. 22; cf. Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. ii. pp. 151–155.

[2] Mr. Holmes, quoting Sir H. Norman, that Anson did the best that could have been done under the circumstances, adds the sneer that he did *his* best. *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, p. 123, *note*. Sir J. Kaye gives a fairer account of him, *Hist. of Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 393; and cf. vol. ii. pp. 137–171. He adds that 'there was one thing at least to be said in his favour, he was not an old man.' Sir J. Kaye was probably thinking of his descripton of Elphinstone at Cabul, 'the poor old man.' Historians would do well to verify their facts. Anson in 1857 was older than Elphinstone in 1841.

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small, though stores were deficient and transport scanty, against his own judgment he decided to advance. On the 25th he had already reached Kurnaul, and there, on the following day, he was seized with cholera, and on the 27th May he died.[1] The critic who denounces the incapacity of the commander should recollect that the only period of Anson's life which engages the attention of the historian was limited to fifteen days, and that in those fifteen days he moved from Simla to Umballa, and from Umballa to Kurnaul. Where is the commander, in ancient or modern history, whose reputation could stand, if it were judged only by the first fifteen days of hurried preparation for a campaign?

His death.

Consistently with the plan which Anson had drawn up, Barnard, who succeeded him, at once resumed his march southwards. On the 5th of June, nine days after Anson's death, he was at Alipore, and there he was joined, on the 7th of June, by a welcome reinforcement which had marched in accordance with Anson's orders from Meerut under Wilson, and which, in its march, had twice proved its metal against the mutineers. Thus reinforced, on the 8th of June, Barnard attacked the mutineers in an entrenched position at Badlee Serai, four miles to the north of Delhi; and, driving the enemy from his trenches, won a noble victory.[2]

Barnard.

The victory of the 8th of June won for the British the famous ridge which overlooked the town, and which they were destined to hold under an Indian sun for three long weary months. And during those months they remained, as their brothers-in-arms had remained before them in the Crimea, nominally a besieging, really a besieged army; in the presence of a strong enemy, a weak force, anxious for its communications, ill-provided with supplies, and exposed, without adequate

The siege of Delhi.

[1] See Major (now Sir H.) Norman's *Narrative of Campaign of Delhi Army*, pp. 1-6.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

shelter, to the fierce rays of a summer sun in India. And before the end came the army—waiting, fighting, suffering—was deprived of its second chief. Barnard died of cholera on the 5th of July, and was temporarily succeeded by Reed. On the 17th of July Reed made over the command to Wilson.[1]

Archdale Wilson.

It is not possible, in a short narrative of this kind, to pronounce any decisive opinion on the merits of these four commanders. Two of them, Anson and Barnard, have found a competent military apologist,[2] and the brief periods for which they were spared, and the difficulties which they had to encounter, ought perhaps to save them from other criticism. Of Wilson it is perhaps fair to speak more fully. He held the command till Delhi fell, and victory always throws a halo over a commander. Yet Wilson, in his conduct of the operations, showed rather knowledge than genius. His knowledge of a soldier's art was always prompting him to observe the rules of war, which a man of genius would probably have disregarded. And so, though Wilson commanded when Delhi fell, the merit of its fall has been usually ascribed to another officer, Chamberlain, who led a welcome reinforcement from the Punjab in the middle of August.[3] And Chamberlain, in a double sense, is the hero of the siege; for, while he was at once the most active and most able of the besiegers, he died of the wound which he received in the assault.

The fall of Delhi.

The revolt of Delhi marks the true commencement of the Indian mutiny. Its capture marks the beginning of the end. In Oudh, however, still sterner and harder work had to be accomplished; and to understand the operations in Oudh it is necessary to realise what was

[1] Holmes's *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, p. 358.

[2] For Sir H. Norman's character of Barnard, see his *Narrative*, p. 22.

[3] For the whole siege, cf. Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. ii. p. 513 to end of volume.

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occurring in Calcutta. For, if the men who captured Delhi were launched by Lawrence from the Punjab, the men who saved Lucknow and avenged Cawnpore were despatched by Canning from Bengal. Till the middle of May, the Governor-General had persisted in regarding the events which had occurred as the mutinies of regiments rather than the insurrection of an army. But the occurrences at Meerut and the loss of Delhi either changed the nature of the crisis or opened his eyes to its exigencies. Yet at that fatal moment, while all around him were agitated with anger and alarm, the Governor-General never lost his calm composure. And the course which he took to restore the authority of the British was, even in the opinion of his detractors, the very best which he could have taken. He telegraphed to Bombay for the soldiers which the peace with Persia had freed from duty; he telegraphed to Madras and Ceylon for any troops which could be spared from presidency or colony; he sent to Singapore for the regiments which were on their way to China to punish an aggression of the Chinese. His numerous critics, indeed, are never tired of stating that these measures were suggested to him by subordinates with more energy than his own.[1] The man, however, who authorises, not the adviser who suggests a policy, should have the credit attaching to it. The measures which Canning took in May saved India for England, and to Canning should belong the credit of saving it.

Nor was it only for bringing up reinforcements that Canning deserves praise. He had the wisdom to see that a great crisis requires exceptional proceedings. To the two Lawrences in the Punjab and Oudh he gave, practically, unlimited authority. Though he felt much more strongly than his detractors that a rebellion against British rule should be put down by the unaided

[1] See, e.g., *Red Pamphlet*, p. 61.

strength of Britain, he gave a reluctant consent to Henry Lawrence to seek aid from Nepaul.[1] No one except John Lawrence saw so clearly as he the paramount necessity of striking a prompt blow at Delhi.[2] But he saw, what John Lawrence did not see, that even Delhi could be recovered at too high a price.[3]

In the two Lawrences he had the best subordinates a Governor General could require; and, fortunately, at Bombay the British had a representative who had both the capacity and the energy for dealing with the crisis. John, Lord Elphinstone, was the nephew of that distinguished official who stands in the very front rank among the great servants of the Company. His father was, therefore, the cousin of that unfortunate general whose name is associated with the greatest reverse that a British army ever sustained in India. Twenty years before, Elphinstone had been sent out as a young guardsman to govern Madras. He had now returned to India to contribute to the preservation of British authority. Appreciating the full extent of the crisis and the true mode of dealing with it, he took every precaution for preserving authority in his own Presidency, while he hurried up reinforcements towards Calcutta; and thus, towards the end of May, and throughout the succeeding months, troops and leaders gradually came from Madras, from Bombay, from Ceylon, from Singapore, and finally from England, who were destined to restore the authority of the British and enable the Company to reassert its authority.

Lucknow.

And help was sorely needed. Ever since Lawrence had died of his wound, Inglis, whom he had selected to succeed him, with a small force, assailed by heavy battalions, had gallantly held the Residency at Lucknow. Exposed to incessant attacks by a vigorous enemy,

[1] *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, p. 575.
[2] *Red Pamphlet*, p. 61.
[3] For the Peshawur and Delhi dispute, see Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 364, and Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. ii. p. 607 *sq.*

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constantly disturbed by false alarms, in a building not intended for defence, and surrounded by houses which afforded shelter to the enemy, decimated by illness, with no communication with the outside world, Inglis and his comrades held out against the mutineers, during the three months which passed before the reinforcements which were gradually arriving were able to relieve the beleaguered garrison.[1]

Measures for its relief.

The story of its relief cannot be told at length in these pages. The first help reached Calcutta on the 23rd of May. Neill on that day brought a fusilier regiment from Madras, and was hurried on towards Cawnpore.[2] In the next four months Neill wrote his name in the blood of his country's enemies; and his arm never wearied, his heart never softened, till he found, in the hour of victory, a soldier's death in the streets of Lucknow.[3] His fusiliers were rapidly followed by two regiments from Persia, and with these regiments came a man of spare frame but large heart, who in Burma, in Afghanistan, in the Punjab, and in Persia had already on a score of fields done soldier's service, and who, throughout his career, had been sustained by his indomitable spirit and his undying faith in the God of battles. Havelock, like Neill, whom he superseded, was destined to fall a victim to the mutiny. He died of disease two months after his comrade fell in battle.[4] In death *sans peur*, in life *sans reproche*, he is the hero of the mutiny; and, so long as the world honours courage and reverences worth, the story of his career will not be forgotten.

Havelock.

Havelock superseded Neill, and Havelock in his turn was superseded by Outram, who was selected by Canning

Outram.

[1] See Inglis's account of the defence in despatches relating to the relief of Lucknow, p. 14. Canning said of this despatch, 'Never has a tale been told which will so stir the hearts of Englishmen and Englishwomen as the simple, earnest narrative of Brigadier Inglis,' p. 11.

[2] *Red Pamphlet*, p. 62.

[3] For his death, *inter alia*, see Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 318.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 424.

as Lawrence's successor.[1] But, with a generosity which has left few brighter examples, Outram left the honour of the relief of Lucknow to Havelock, and accompanied him only in his civil capacity as chief-commissioner. On the 25th of September, these gallant men forced their way through the streets of Lucknow, and joined hands with the survivors of the band who had held the Residency.

Yet the danger was not over. Havelock and Outram had fought their way into Lucknow; but it was one thing to enter the city, it was another to withdraw from it. Outram, who after the relief of the Residency had assumed the command, found that he had no means of removing his sick and wounded men. Instead of doing so, he therefore decided on remaining at Lucknow. But his decision involved a new series of operations. Havelock and Outram had relieved Inglis, but Outram in his turn required relief. A new duty was to test the endurance of a new hero.

By Anson's death the Bengal army had been deprived of its commander in the hour of its supreme need. On Canning being told of its occurrence in May, he telegraphed for Sir Patrick Grant, the Commander-in-Chief in Madras; on the news of Anson's death being brought to England, Colin Campbell, the most distinguished of the Crimean generals, was sent to India. Sir Patrick, the son-in-law of Gough, had done good service in the Sikh war; he reached Calcutta on the 17th of June;[2] and, with perhaps a sound appreciation of his own capacity, and of the immediate requirements of the situation, he remained at Calcutta to organise a force with which the rebellion could be quelled. Colin Campbell, who in his youth had served throughout the

Colin Campbell.

[1] *Life of Outram*, vol. ii. p. 192, 196.

[2] Holmes's *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, p. 177.

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Peninsular campaign,[1] who as a man had shared the glories and dangers of the second Sikh war, and who had proved his capacity and courage on the Alma and at Balaklava, did not suffer a day to pass[2] before he set out for India. He reached Calcutta on the 13th of August, and on the 17th of August assumed the command. He threw all the energy of a strong will into the work of preparation. But even his efforts did not enable him to collect troops and supplies sufficient to justify an advance for more than two months afterwards. On the 27th of October he set out from Calcutta, on the 17th of November the British at Lucknow were a second time relieved, and within the following week withdrawn from the Residency.

Lucknow finally relieved.

Thus at the end of November the tide was already turned. British authority had been reasserted at Delhi, the British garrison had been removed from Lucknow. Months of labour and of battle were indeed still in store before the mutineers were finally dispersed and order was completely restored. But no detailed account of these events can be given in the narrow compass of these pages. Those who wish to know how Oudh was reconquered, how Havelock died, or how the Queen of Jhansi, whose son's territory had been escheated by Dalhousie, rallied her countrymen on the plains of Gwalior, and died, fighting to the last gasp, the heroine of the mutiny,[3] must turn for this knowledge to other works. In these pages all that it is possible to do is to dwell for a few more sentences on the policy of the Governor-General.

[1] He was at Vimiera and Corunna as well as in the later campaigns of Wellington from 1811 to 1813. Shadwell's *Life of Lord Clyde*, vol. i. pp. 1–34.

[2] He was offered the command late in the afternoon of the 11th of July, he undertook to start that evening, and he did start the following day. *Life of Lord Clyde*, vol. i. p. 405.

[3] For the Ranee of Jhansi's case, Arnold's *Dalhousie's Admin.*, vol. ii. pp. 146–153, where Sir H. Rose's emphatic testimony will also be found: 'The best *man* upon the side of the enemy was the *woman* found dead, the Ranee of Jhansi;' and cf. Malleson's *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, vol. i. p. 182, and vol. iii. p. 221.

Of the efforts which Canning made to reinforce his slender armies, enough has already been said. Whether he deserves credit for the action which he took, or whether the credit of it is due to others, no one can doubt that the measures themselves were vigorous and admirable. But, while his exertions to obtain regular military aid were great, he undoubtedly at one time showed a reluctance to resort to other assistance which he was compelled ultimately to accept. He refused in the first instance to accept the voluntary service of the citizens of Calcutta; he refused for a time the offer of aid which was tendered to him from Nepaul. Hardly realising the extent of the disaster, he did not at once appreciate the necessity of resorting to extraordinary help.

Canning's administration.

But, as message after message was brought to Calcutta of new risings, new losses, and new dangers, the Governor-General was constrained to accept assistance which he had previously ventured to refuse; and, as the true nature of the crisis was gradually revealed to him, he was driven to other measures characteristic of his even judgment. The British around him were clamouring for severe measures of repression, and Canning had the courage to determine, if he were forced to be severe, at least to be just. The British demanded that the Native press should be suppressed. Canning, on the 13th of June, acceded to their request, but he applied the measure to the English as well as to the Native press. Three months afterwards, in disarming the population of Calcutta, he displayed a similar impartiality by requiring British as well as Native residents to take out a licence to carry arms. These measures excited a storm of disapproval. The English in India have always opposed, and perhaps always will oppose, legislation which places the natives and themselves on an equality, and Canning had emphasised the policy of Bentinck and Macaulay. For, while

The Gagging Act and Arms Act.

The attack of the English upon Canning.

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the Black Act had been passed at a period when the dominant and subject peoples had been at peace, the Gagging Act and the Arms Act were passed when Briton and Native were locked in war.[1]

These measures gained for Canning endless abuse. But even these measures were less offensive to the English population than another order which he issued at the same time. At the end of July the British in India were longing for revenge. The tide of disaster had not yet turned; and, as story after story was told of outrage and massacre, English men and women displayed a savage appetite for vengeance. Almost alone in Calcutta, Canning saw that the wholesale and indiscriminate slaughter of mutineers was both impracticable and unwise; and, in the midst of a mutiny, he had the courage to offer terms of reconciliation to the least guilty among his country's enemies. On the 31st of July he issued a manifesto distinguishing between the guilt of mutineers. This proclamation was received with a storm of abuse. In India the British drew up a petition to the Crown for the Governor-General's recall. In England the ruler who issued it was nicknamed Clemency Canning.[2]

The manifesto of July.

In 1857, therefore, Canning incurred the unpopu-

[1] For the animosity which the Gagging Act provoked, see *Red Pamphlet*, pp. 102 *sq.*; but cf. its author's maturer judgment in *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, vol. i. pp. 16–21. Sir H. Lawrence's emphatic testimony, 'Whatever may be the danger of the Native press, I look on it that the papers published in our own language are the more dangerous' (*Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, p. 506), affords strong presumption that, if it were desirable to muzzle the press, Canning was right to apply the gag to English as well as Native papers.

[2] For this order see *Red Pamphlet*, p. 181; but cf. Holmes's *Indian Mutiny*, p. 178; Temple's *Men and Events of My Time in India*, p. 168. Deserters belonging to regiments which had not mutinied were, unless found with arms in their hands, to be made over to the military authorities or kept in imprisonment. Deserters belonging to regiments which had mutinied, but which had not murdered their officers, were to be sent to a fixed place to be dealt with by the military authorities. Deserters belonging to regiments which had murdered an officer, or committed other sanguinary outrages, were to be dealt with by the Civil power. Malleson's *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, vol. i. p. 135.

larity of a ruler who busied himself to moderate violence, to deal justice, and to restrain the passions which outrage had aroused. But, by a singular circumstance, when the mutiny was suppressed in 1858, the Governor-General, who in the previous year had been condemned for leniency which was thought ill-timed, was destined to receive censure for harshness which was declared unnecessary. On the eve of the fall of Lucknow, he drew up a proclamation confiscating the lands of all the great landowners in Oudh. Exceptions were, indeed, made to this sweeping decree. Landowners who could prove their loyalty were promised exemption from it, just as rebels who unconditionally surrendered, and whose hands were not stained with British blood, were offered pardon. There is no doubt that Canning, in drawing up this proclamation, relied on the exceptions which it contained, while there is equally no doubt that the critics who objected to it overlooked its parentheses. But its issue was made the basis of an attack which well-nigh proved fatal to the Governor-General's administration. The chances of party warfare had replaced Palmerston with Derby; and the Conservative minister had entrusted the Board of Control to the brilliant but erratic statesman who, fifteen years before, had astonished India with pageant and proclamation. Forgetful of the complaints which he had himself made of the insufficient support which he had received from his friends at home, forgetful of the danger to which his ready pen had already exposed him, Ellenborough thought proper to condemn Canning's proclamation in a severe despatch, and to allow his censure to be made public.[1] For a short time it seemed impossible that the Governor-General who had received such a despatch could continue his government. But

The Oudh proclamation.

The proclamation condemned by Ellenborough.

[1] See Malleson's *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, vol. i. p. 172; Holmes' *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, p. 454 *sq.*; *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 222.

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the lapse of a few days showed that the minister who had framed the despatch, and not the Viceroy who had received it, was to suffer from the transaction. The public, recollecting the justice of Canning's rule, the mercy of his administration, almost unanimously considered that he should not have been hastily condemned for a document which, it was gradually evident, had only been imperfectly understood; and Ellenborough, to save his colleagues, volunteered to play the part of Jonah, and retired from the ministry.[1]

The Government of India transferred to the Crown

His retirement closes, in one sense, the history of the Indian Mutiny. But the transactions of the Mutiny had, almost for the first time, taught the public to consider the anomalies of Indian government. In the course of a hundred years a Company had been suffered to acquire an empire nearly ten times as large and as populous as Great Britain. It was true that the rule of the Company was in many respects nominal. The President of the Board of Control was the true head of the Indian Government, and spoke and acted through the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. But this very circumstance only accentuated the anomaly. If the President of the Board of Control was in fact Indian minister, it was far simpler to make him Indian minister by name, and to do away with the clumsy expedient which alone enabled him to exercise his authority. Hence it was generally decided that the rule of the Company should cease, and that India should thenceforward become one of the possessions of the Crown. Nearly thirty years before, Ellenborough had himself advocated this change. If it had not been for his unseasonable despatch, he would have had the satisfaction of accomplishing it. The want of tact and temper which necessitated his resignation left the honour of carrying the reform to his successor, Lord

[1] Cf. Malleson's *Hist. of Indian Mutiny*, vol. iii. p. 254 *sq.*

Stanley, Derby's eldest son; a minister strikingly destitute of those specious qualities for which Ellenborough was distinguished, and singularly endowed with the caution and judgment in which Ellenborough was deficient.[1]

A great danger thus led to the removal of a great anomaly, and the vast Indian empire which Englishmen had won was thenceforward taken into a nation's keeping. But, though the change was as inevitable as it was wise, it constitutes one of those reforms which the imagination concedes to the reason. The old Company, whose rule was abruptly ended, had undoubtedly played a great part in the world's history. In a single century it had amassed an empire, and had brought one person in every six in the world into subjection. Its servants had been guilty of some crimes and some blunders, yet they had shown a capacity for rule directly attributable to the circumstances in which they had been placed. Where else in the world's history can be found a dependency which, in the course of one short century, has had its fortunes entrusted to three men of the capacity of Warren Hastings, of Wellesley, and of Dalhousie? and which has produced in the same period among its subordinate officials such men as the two Lawrences, as Havelock and Outram, as Mountstuart Elphinstone and Malcolm, as Metcalfe and Munro? 'Great countries,' said Disraeli long ago, 'are those which produce great men.' The old East India Company may at least boast that it produced great administrators.

The rule of the Company.

It is no doubt true that the servants of the Company did not all possess the capacity of Munro, the

[1] I have not thought it necessary in this account to state the history of the India Bills successively introduced by the Palmerston and Derby administrations, or to describe the nature of the government which was then instituted. The Indian army was subsequently abolished, and united with the Royal army. There is a curious reference to the Queen's anxiety on this subject in Lord Malmesbury's *Memoirs*, p. 464.

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culture of Elphinstone, the energy of John Lawrence, or the kindly nature of his brother Henry. They were, of course, men with the faults and passions of men. Many of them, placed in situations of great power and great independence, did and said many brutal and corrupt things. It would have been strange if it had been otherwise. But it is none the less true that the best and wisest of the Company's servants, the men who have at once been the guides and the examples of their fellows, have displayed a pure and unselfish desire to promote the moral and material prosperity of the vast population amidst which their life has been spent; and that the world has seen few instances of purer and holier work than that which such men as Outram, as Sleeman, as the Lawrences, and a score of others, have done in India in the present century.

A great thinker has made the striking remark, that the wise men of the world pass most of their time in undoing the harm which the good men of the world are doing. And this remark is no doubt as true in India as it is at home. Good men, in India as elsewhere, have undoubtedly done much mischief, and have been guilty of many crimes. The story of the causes which produced the great Mutiny is an instance in point. The Mutiny would perhaps never have occurred if British officers, turning themselves into missionaries, had not fostered the notion that the Company was anxious to convert its subjects to Christianity. But, when this has been said, the fact remains that the rule of the Company, as a whole, was both great and good; and that, with all its shortcomings and all its faults, it deserved the commendation bestowed on the faithful steward in the parable.

This result has been quite as much due to the capacity and conduct of the officers trained in the Company's service as to the men who have presided as

Governors-General over the empire. With the exception, indeed, of Wellesley and Dalhousie, no Governor-General during the present century has impressed his personality on the history of India; and Dalhousie is not merely the last of the great Governors, he has probably made it impossible for the future to produce a great Governor-General. For the material improvements, which had their origin in his administration and which owed their inception to his energy, have brought the Indian Government into closer dependence on the ministry at home. In Wellesley's time the authorities at home were only able to discuss his ambitious policy months after it was concluded. In the present day the telegraph has brought Calcutta within speaking distance of London, and a Governor-General, in lieu of devising his own policy, has only to execute the policy of his employers at home. Responsibility is almost inseparable from greatness; and the man who leans on others will never develop the great qualities which, forced to rely on himself alone, he is able to display.

Its Governors-General.

If, however, India is not, consequently, likely to produce in the future either a Wellesley or a Dalhousie, its future rulers may display qualities less brilliant and less dangerous, but at least as beneficial to the mighty province over which they are called on to preside. The men whom England has lately sent to govern India have, with few exceptions, displayed a deep and religious sense of the vast trust committed to them. They have laboured to promote the moral and material progress of the country; to elevate the masses; to fit them, in a constantly increasing extent, to discharge the higher duties of citizenship; and to entrust the best of the Indians with a larger share in the administrative and judicial duties of their country. To preserve peace, to maintain order, to promote justice—these are the arts of modern government, and by these arts, and not by

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conquests and wars, is the empire which the Company won to be preserved.

If Dalhousie was the last, and in some respects the greatest of the old type of governors, Canning was one of the first and one of the greatest of the new class of rulers. That he had defects in his character, and that his defects were attended with serious consequences, it would be absurd to deny. A Clive or a Wellesley, or even a Hastings or a Hardinge, would possibly have stamped out rebellion more rapidly, or confined a revolt within narrower limits. But neither Clive nor Wellesley, neither Hastings nor Hardinge, would have furnished subject India with so grand an example of the nobler features of the British character. The man who maintained his equanimity amidst panic, whose courage never quailed amidst disaster, who, conscious of his own virtue, moved calm amidst obloquy; who, amidst rage and tumult, in the hour of severity never forgot to be just, was a ruler worthy of the great country whose honour, in the hour of her supreme peril, was entrusted to his keeping.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CHAP. XXVIII. India and the Colonies.

THE position of the British in India during the nineteenth century has had a constant effect on the foreign policy of England. It has inspired British statesmen with the jealousy of Russia which was the true cause of the Crimean war; it has induced them to support the worst Government in Europe; it has driven them into expeditions in which they have expended blood and treasure without obtaining any compensating advantages. The prominent facts in the history of India require consequently to be understood by any student of the modern history of England, and three long chapters have hardly afforded room enough for the purpose. It is fortunately unnecessary to relate in equal detail the history of the new Britains which have been springing into existence in a new world and in another hemisphere. Centuries hence, indeed, some philosophic historian, generalising on the rise and possibly on the decay of England, will probably dwell with different emphasis on the two circumstances. He will relate the history of the British in India as a romantic episode which has had no appreciable effect on the progress of the human family. He will describe the growth of England's Colonial Empire as the true monument of British greatness.

The Colonies at the beginning of the century.

Yet, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the colonies of England were associated with ideas quite opposite to those which pass current to-day. At that time, they were almost without exception possessions conquered from other Powers, and none of them had

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afforded shelter and home to any large numbers of the English people. Men of French extraction occupied considerable portions of Canada; the Cape and its contiguous territory were still chiefly peopled by Dutch settlers; the British West Indies and the English settlements in South America were cultivated by the forced labour of imported negroes. The voice of no white man had disturbed the internal solitudes of Australia. The cold of a Canadian winter, the dangers and expense of a six months' voyage, placed apparently insurmountable obstacles in the path of emigration; and the Indian consequently roamed undisturbed through the lone North-West of one continent, while the other territory seemed a convenient receptacle for the worst members of British society.

The United States.

British colonies indeed there were which were proving, by their progress and their independence, the capacity of the Anglo-Saxon race to dominate the earth. The descendants of those true men, who, driven by persecution from their own homes, had founded New Englands, New Yorks, New Jerseys, New Brunswicks, New Bostons, New Hampshires, in a new world, were showing, for the first time, what the English race could do. 'Plenty of good land, and liberty to manage their own affairs their own way,'[1] had already made them the most prosperous and the most happy people upon earth. It was truly said of them in 1775, that they afforded 'an ever-memorable example, at how small an expense three millions of people may not only be governed but well governed.'[2] But, by an unfortunate succession of events and an unfortunate confusion of ideas, the greatest of English colonies was no longer considered an English colony. The swarm from the parent hive had disowned its original allegiance. Yet the colony which has become

[1] The expression is Adam Smith's, vol. ii. p. 370.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 373.

an empire is still a colony, or, if the far better word were admissible, an *ἀπόικια*. Great as is the history of this great England, the greatest fact in her history is that she is the mother of the United States. It would be well for her to recollect that it is with nations as it is with families. The parent who desires the affection of her offspring must take pride in the progress of her child.

Since the United States, however, acquired their independence, few people have continued to regard them as a collection of British colonies. The colonies of England were naturally limited to those possessions of the British Crown which maintained their connection with the mother country; and, even in this description, the greatest dependency of England was not included. India, in one sense of the term, is nothing but a colony. Except that it is governed from the India Office in St. James's Park, and not from the Colonial Office in Downing Street, there is no real difference between its position and that of the Mauritius. Ceylon, which geographically is almost as integral a part of India as the Isle of Wight is an integral part of Hampshire, is and always has been a colony: and India, therefore, is in one sense nothing more than the greatest and most important colony of the Crown.

India.

The circumstances, moreover, which led to the first settlements in India were similar to those which led to the first plantations. The views of trade which influenced statesmen and thinkers of the seventeenth century are not yet entirely extinct. It was assumed in the seventeenth century, and it is in some quarters assumed still, that the true way to increase British trade was to increase the number of British possessions. The colonist, it was thought, would naturally prefer to dea with the mother country rather than with some other and foreign nation. It was the easy, though illogical

The mercantile system.

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corollary of this argument, that the colonist should be forced to deal with the mother country and with the mother country alone. Thus arose that elaborate engine of statesmanship which is known as the mercantile system. Statesmen found a broad river flowing unrestrained in its own course. They undertook to divert it into a given channel, to feed it with new tributaries, and to pour its waters into a certain ocean. By dint of hard fighting and harder laws they achieved a certain success. But the victory had not been definitely won before the foremost men were inquiring whether the achievement was worth its cost. Even irrigation may be secured at too high a price, and trade may not be worth the money that is paid for it. It is possible, both for nations as well as for men, to pay a pound for an article that is only worth a shilling.

It was the policy of the older economists 'always to sell and never to buy.' 'All trade and no barter' was 'the grand maxim of the mercantile system.'[1] 'It was,' as another great writer put it, 'the policy of all Governments to interdict the exportation and the melting of money; while, by encouraging the exportation and impeding the importation of other things, they endeavoured to have a stream of money constantly flowing in. By this course they gratified two prejudices; they drew, or thought that they drew, more money into the country, which they believed to be tantamount to more wealth; and they gave, or thought they gave, to all producers and dealers high prices which, though no real advantage, people are always inclined to suppose to be one.'[2]

When, indeed, the colonies were first planted, no restrictions were placed on their commerce. It was only when their progress made their custom desirable

[1] This rhetorical expression is from Brougham on the *Colonies*, vol. i. p. 264.

[2] Mill's *Political Economy*, book iii. ch. ix. sec. i.

that the legislature undertook to secure it for the mother country. The Navigation Act virtually declared that the colonies should buy everything they wanted in England, and sell everything they had to sell[1] in England. And the word England was used in the narrowest sense. Though Scotland had given a Sovereign to England, the Scotch were excluded from the advantages of the Act. Though the King of England was the King of Ireland, the Irish were excluded from it. So far as the colonial trade was concerned, the English Parliament was prepared to treat Irish and Scotch as it treated Russians or French, and to exclude them from the benefits which it reserved for the English alone.

Some of these provisions were relaxed in the course of years. The Union admitted Scotland to a share of the American trade. The American war, the Volunteers, and Grattan secured for Ireland similar advantages. Even the colonies, by an Act of 1739, were allowed to carry their sugar to foreign markets.[2] But these were only paltry and, as British statesmen thought, inevitable concessions. Monopoly was the prevailing object of the mercantile system and colonial policy. For the sake of securing a monopoly for the British manufacturer, the colonists were forbidden to engage in any manufacture; they were even prohibited from refining their own sugars. They were regarded as mere dependencies of the mother country—as useful in promoting British trade.

Parliament, indeed, which was ready to sacrifice the interests of the colonies to those of England, was equally prepared to favour the colonies at the expense of foreign countries. Differential duties gave the

[1] The enumerated articles to which this provision was limited practically included everything the colonies had to sell.

[2] 12 Geo. ii. c. 30.

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colonial producer an advantage in the home market; and foreign timber, foreign sugar, and foreign spirits were not allowed to compete with his wares on equal terms. These complicated regulations were supposed to favour the British manufacturer, the British merchant, and the British colonist. The British manufacturer was given a monopoly of the colonial market; the British merchant was given a monopoly of the colonial trade; and the planter, in his turn, was given a monopoly in the British market for such of his goods as England could not produce. But, though these ends were undoubtedly secured to a limited and imperfect extent, the cost which was paid for them was frightful. Parliament, while it was painfully protecting the manufacturer, the trader, and the producer, forgot the interests of the consumer, or, in other words, the interests of the nation. By excluding foreign sugar and foreign timber from British markets, it forced the English people to pay excessive prices for articles of the first necessity. By excluding foreign goods from the colonial markets, and by forbidding the colonists to manufacture for themselves, it raised the price of English goods in the colonies. Every Briton, every colonist, was subjected to the arbitrary and excessive taxation which all monopolies impose for the sake of securing a doubtful advantage to the manufacturer, the tradesman, and the planter.

Objections to it.

For the advantage was very doubtful. Trade is like a plant. It thrives best in the soil and in the climate to which nature has adapted it. No doubt, like an exotic, it may be transplanted from tropical to temperate regions; and, in an artificial atmosphere and amidst artificial surroundings, assume the appearances of health and vigour. But, though rich men may grow their pine-apples in a hothouse, the same outlay devoted to the growth of apples and plums would

yield a far larger and more remunerative harvest. And so it is with trade. No human being doubts that, by a complicated system of regulations, it is possible for a legislature to discourage certain trades and to foster other industries, just as it has proved possible to check the conversion of arable land into pasture or to prohibit the cultivation of tobacco in Ireland. But what men of sense believe is that all such restraints on freedom are in themselves bad; that the individual is the best judge in what trade he shall engage, just as the farmer is the best judge what crops he shall grow. 'Liberty, not trade,' said a great writer, 'has been the cause of England's greatness. Commerce, and all its consequences, have been the effect, not the cause, of our happiness.'[1]

England has been called a nation of shopkeepers, and the modern English gentleman, who dislikes the legislation which is associated with the names of Peel and Cobden, is always ready to repeat the reproach. The course of events which has removed the reins of government from the hands of his own class, and has committed them to the representatives of the great commercial centres of England, seems to him to justify the reproach. But the modern English gentleman is usually very ill read in the works of those great writers who have made it their business to analyse and explain the causes of a nation's greatness. If he were better instructed in their works and in his country's history, he would hesitate to prefer the charge. For there was a time when this country pursued a shopkeeping policy, and there was a time when English policy was described as fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. But that phrase was first used neither by Napoleon, nor in condemnation of Peel and Cobden, but in condemnation of the policy which Peel and Cobden destroyed. And

[1] Young's *Tour in Ireland*, Preface, p. xi.

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perhaps the modern English gentleman may hesitate before he repeats the familiar charge when he learns that it was first brought against the mercantile system by the great advocate of free trade—Adam Smith.[1]

While the mercantile system which was thus established endured, the foremost thinkers of the age naturally set themselves to inquire whether the colonies were worth their cost. The maintenance of a monopoly had up to that time 'been the principal, or perhaps the sole end and purpose of the dominion which Great Britain' had assumed over the 'colonies . . . The monopoly' was 'the principal badge of their dependency, and the sole fruit gathered from that dependency.' . . . For the sake of that fruit, Great Britain incurred heavy expense in supporting the colonies during peace and defending them during war;[2] and at the opening of the century, many persons were of opinion that Great Britain would be a stronger and wealthier nation without her colonies.

This conclusion, however, necessarily led to another reflection. Men there were prepared to endorse all the arguments against monopoly, who were yet unprepared to sever the connection of England with the colonies, which were the chief prizes of successful warfare. Instead of denouncing the maintenance of the Colonial Empire, they contented themselves with condemning the system on which the colonial trade was regulated. Monopoly and protection were denounced by thinkers of repute for a century or half a century before they finally perished. 'It is now,' wrote Brougham

[1] 'To found a great empire, for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers, may at first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers, but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers.' *Wealth of Nations*, vol. ii. p. 439. Arthur Young says practically the same thing. 'The entire administration of the colonies has been commercial. It has been made a tradesman's project.' *Tour in Ireland*, Introduction, p. viii.

[2] *Wealth of Nations*, vol. ii. p. 441.

in the work which created his reputation, 'the universally received opinion among all men of enlightened political views, that the interests of trading nations are mutual, and that the celebrated prayer of Mr. Hume for the prosperity of Spain, Italy, Germany, and even France itself, as subservient to the prosperity of Great Britain, ought to be adopted by every true patriot.'[1] 'Nothing,' wrote Arthur Young,[2] 'can be more idle than to say that this set of men, or the other administration, or that great minister, occasioned the American war. It was not the Stamp Act, nor the repeal of the Stamp Act; it was neither Lord Rockingham nor Lord North, but it was that baleful monopolising spirit of commerce that wished to govern great nations on the maxims of the counter.'

Its fall.

The fall of the mercantile system has already been related in this history. The first blow was struck by Wallace in 1822; the last blow was dealt to it by Russell in 1850. Eight-and-twenty years were, perhaps, not too long a period for the destruction of a policy which had been a century and a half in consummating. Before, however, the mercantile system fell, one of its chiefest and most characteristic achievements was destroyed. The mercantile system survived in its integrity for the first quarter, and partially endured for the first half, of the nineteenth century; but the trade in slaves—its pampered offspring—perished prematurely in 1807.

The slave trade.

It may surprise some persons, who have read history without thought, to learn that the slave trade and the mercantile system had anything in common. But a little reflection will show that this hideous traffic was a natural and logical outcome of commercial legislation. The chief object of the legislators of the six-

[1] Brougham on *Colonies*, vol. i. p. 303.

[2] *Tour in Ireland*, Introduction, p. ix.

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teenth and seventeenth centuries was to secure trade for their own countrymen, and their most decisive success was the contract known in history as the Assiento treaty. By that contract England, not content with the huge slave trade with her own colonies, secured a monopoly of the supply to the Spanish West Indies. It is one of the most remarkable circumstances in modern history that this contract, when it was made in 1713, was approved both by statesmen and philanthropists. For sixty years after it was signed, neither Parliament nor ministers listened to any objections to it. The traffic in slaves was declared to be advantageous to Britain and necessary for the plantations; and 'as late as 1775,' . . . . Lord Dartmouth, the 'Secretary of State for the Colonies, and one of the most conspicuous leaders of the English religious world,' declared, 'We cannot allow the colonies to check or discourage in any degree a traffic so beneficial to the nation.'[1]

Yet, at the very time at which an English minister could make such a declaration, the agitation had actually begun which ultimately led to the abolition of slavery. Granville Sharpe obtained the famous decision that slavery could not exist in England three years before Dartmouth was authoritatively stating its benefits. At that very time, indeed, the foremost thinkers of the age were beginning, under Adam Smith's guidance, to doubt the wisdom of the commercial fabric which had been reared by their ancestors. The doctrines of Adam Smith, however, took many years in filtering through the upper strata of educated society to the masses of the population; and the abolition of the slave trade was the triumph of the uneducated rather than the achievement of the educated classes. It was

Its abolition.

[1] For further details on this subject, see Mr. Lecky's excellent account in *England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. ii. pp. 12–17.

no disbelief in the mercantile system, but a firm and growing faith in a new religion, which stimulated Wilberforce's eloquence and won for him support. Slavery would never have been abolished if the careless and sceptical atmosphere of the eighteenth century had remained undisturbed. But the trumpet which Wesley sounded was echoed through the length and breadth of England. The men who gathered round the great preacher were drawn from classes more solicitous for the claims of labour than for the rights of property. The disciples of the new faith were influenced by a truer and purer humanity than had previously existed in the world; and the trade in slaves, which had appeared desirable to Church and Tory, fell a victim to the religious reaction which Wesley promoted.

Slavery was, of course, much more difficult to destroy than the slave trade. The latter was by no means so important to the planters as the former. Every agricultural community, indeed, dislikes the competition to which it is subjected by trade; and the planter with a large stock of negroes was frequently as anxious for protection as the farmer with a large stock of bullocks. The trade in slaves was chiefly beneficial to the merchants, while slavery itself was solely beneficial to the colonists. Thus it took more than a quarter of a century after the abolition of the one to destroy the other. And the termination of slavery was both preceded and followed by other legislation equally opposed to the ideas of the eighteenth century. Parliament in the eighteenth century tried to gain markets by its laws. In the nineteenth century it trusted to enterprise alone. Chatham, in the eighteenth century, had not hesitated to declare, in his place in Parliament, that 'the British colonists of North America had no right to manufacture even a nail for a horseshoe.'[1] Peel, in

Slavery.

[1] Edwards, *West Indies*, vol. ii. p. 166; quoted by McCulloch, *Commercial Dict., ad verb.* 'Colonies.'

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the nineteenth century, delivered the exactly opposite opinion, that 'colonies should as far as possible be treated as though they were integral parts of the kingdom.'[1]

Change of ideas respecting the Colonies.

As then the nineteenth century rolled on, the old ideas which had pervaded colonial policy were gradually discarded; and contrary views, one after another, were adopted. But this change revived in a new form the old inquiry, *cui bono?* Men who had grown up in the faith that foreign possessions were advantageous because of their trade could not be expected to admit that the dependencies were still useful when the exclusive trade was destroyed. And this reasoning was apparently strengthened by the difficulties which subsequently occurred in the West Indies. The prosperity which these colonies enjoyed at the beginning of the century disappeared soon after the conclusion of the great war. In 1815 the West Indies took from us more than 7,000,000*l.* of British and Irish produce, an amount equal to one-sixth of the whole export trade at that time.[2] In 1845 the West Indies only imported a little more than 2,500,000*l.* of British produce, or only one twenty-fourth part of British and Irish exports.[3]

Decreasing importance of West Indies.

If, then, the true worth of a possession is to be ascertained from its trade, the value of the West Indian colonies decreased very rapidly after 1815. And the difficulties which their administration involved were continually subjecting the mother country to a severe strain. It was in the face of the colonies that Parliament carried emancipation in 1833; it was in face of colonial opposition that it terminated apprenticeship. The controversy between the Imperial and the local legislatures became so acute that, in 1839, the

[1] Porter's *Progress of the Nation*, p. 733.
[2] McCulloch's *Commercial Dict.*, *ad verb.* 'Colonies.'
[3] *Statistical Abstract*, 17th Number.

Whig ministry desired to suspend constitutional government in Jamaica.[1] The ministry failed to carry its proposal, and for another quarter of a century Jamaica was left to constitutional rule. But the colony was the perpetual prey of deficit and distress. The expenditure was 'habitually allowed to exceed the income.'[2] The debt consequently grew to embarrassing dimensions. Unwise extravagance was succeeded by unwise retrenchment. The local legislature, differing from the Imperial Government, refused the supplies; and at last administrative confusion, ripening into active rebellion, forced the ministry to interfere and to suspend constitutional government in Jamaica.

It would have puzzled anyone, under these circumstances, to have proved that Jamaica was a source of strength to the mother country. The dwindling trade of the colony in no sense repaid the British Government for the embarrassment of conducting a difficult administration in a disturbed society, or compensated it for the duty of defending the island in the event of war. If this country had not already obtained possession of the British West Indies, no sane person would probably recommend their appropriation. But it is one thing to dislike the assumption of fresh responsibilities, it is another to repudiate existing obligations. It is with nations as with men. It is for them to do with all their might the work which they find ready to their hand to do; and they cannot lightly shake off an inconvenient task because its discharge is attended with little profit and is productive of occasional embarrassment.[3]

[1] *Ante*, vol. iii. p. 474; cf. Sir H. Taylor's *Autobiography*, vol. i. p. 261.

[2] Grey's *Colonial Policy*, vol. i. p. 273.

[3] So lately as 1848 one of the most enlightened statesmen of the day, Graham, declared that 'we ought to limit instead of extending our colonial empire; that Canada must soon be independent. He condemned the extension of the Cape Colony, thought that we ought only to have a Gibraltar there—a house of call—

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If then the plantations which were of chief importance in 1815 ranked first in importance still, it would not be necessary to devote much space in modern history to the colonies of England. But in the half-century which succeeded Waterloo a change gradually occurred which gave to these possessions a new and unforeseen value. It has been already stated in this chapter that the greatest fact in the history of England is that she is the mother of the United States. It may be similarly added that the greatest fact in the history of the nineteenth century is the foundation of a new Britain—which may eventually prove a greater Britain—in the Southern Hemisphere.

It has been lately objected by a competent critic[1] that 'historians, when they come to these modern periods, lose their clue, betray embarrassment in the choice of topics, and end by producing a story without a moral.' And the writer evidently thinks that historians err in this respect because they devote their space to the record of what he elsewhere calls parliamentary tongue-talk, and dismiss with insufficient notice the great causes of the growth of England at home and abroad.

The new colonial empire of England.

It is not the business of the present work—in which parliamentary tongue-talk has only been suffered to assume a secondary position—to dispute the accuracy of Professor Seeley's conclusion. Yet it may perhaps be worth while to point out that, though the professor is right in his facts, he is not so certainly right in his inferences. The rise of the British colonial empire is undoubtedly a much more important fact in the world's history than the legislation of Melbourne and Russell.

condemned New Zealand and Labuan and Hong Kong; considered the West India interest a farce,' &c. *Greville*, 2nd part, vol. iii. p. 124. In the text I have dealt with Jamaica as typical of the other West Indian possessions.

[1] Professor Seeley, *Expansion of England*, p. 307.

Yet it does not follow that the greater event requires to be related with the detail which it is necessary to devote to the minor circumstance. The planet Jupiter is a much more important body in the heavens than the planet Mars. Yet, if it were possible to investigate the events which occur on these distant bodies, the historian of the solar system would probably devote a much larger space of his work to the history of Mars than to the history of Jupiter. For Jupiter is still an aqueous body, surrounded by clouds, and, if we may argue from analogy, still inhabitable only by those creeping things whose fossil relics on this earth impress the imagination only from their size, while Mars has already passed through all the changes which the earth has undergone, and has, even for a longer time than our own world, been capable of developing beings whose intelligence may be equal to our own. What Jupiter is to Mars in the planetary system, Australia is to England in this planet on which we live. The great island in the Southern Hemisphere is still in a state of preparation, sparsely inhabited, imperfectly dominated by man. The little island in the Northern Hemisphere has already attained the first place among the nations of the earth. Her children have set an example to other nations of what man, free to act, free to speak, free to think, is capable of doing. If it be the business of the historian to investigate the progress of man in the same way as the geologist traces the growth of the earth's crust and the biologist determines the evolution of species, England is a country, the English are a race, which must always absorb a large portion of his attention. For the tree of liberty has attained its noblest dimensions in English soil; the torch of learning, extinguished elsewhere by the foul vapours of sacerdotalism, has burned with a clear and brightening light in English atmosphere; and man, by his intellect,

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has obtained in England a dominion over the forces of nature which he has gained nowhere else in the world.

On the causes which have led to the development of such a nation, on even its parliamentary tongue-talk, the articulate expression of its opinions and its aspirations, the historian is right in dwelling. Nor is he wrong in relating in less detail the doings of her children who have sought homes in other lands. The colonist engaged in subduing the soil of a distant colony is no doubt helping to found new and greater Britains. But his occupations do not afford much material for history. It is much more important to trace the causes which have led to the foundation of a colonial empire, and to relate the circumstances which have led to colonial autonomy, than to describe the even course of colonial history; and, in the present chapter, therefore, it is much more necessary to state a few general conclusions, than to weary the student with a mass of historical details.

The causes of emigration in the 16th and 17th centuries.

When the earliest English settlements were made in America in the course of the seventeenth century, the settlers were animated by different motives from those which influence the emigrants of the nineteenth century. They left a land where they were not allowed to follow their own convictions, and sought in another continent the freedom which they could not find at home. Just as the Dutch, in the crisis of their great struggle, once contemplated leaving a country in which a strong and brutal despot was endeavouring to crush free thought, just as the Huguenots carried to England their industry and their faith, so the men who sailed in the 'Mayflower,' and the men who followed Baltimore and Penn, sought freedom from persecution in a new world. No other impulse drove them from their old homes. England was still broad enough to support a far larger population than that which had gathered on

English soil; she still contained vast tracts of woodland and upland which had never rung with the woodman's axe and which had never felt the farmer's plough. The population, except possibly in one or two towns, grew so slowly that the competition for land was small, and the people had much more temptation to let their own land fall out of tillage than to seek new lands to till in other hemispheres.

Increase of population.

Mr. Froude relates in the opening pages of his history,[1] that the population of England and Wales at the time of the Armada was supposed to be something under five millions. Macaulay assumes that a hundred years later England did not contain more than 5,500,000 souls.[2] If, however, it be concluded that at the close of the seventeenth century England and Wales contained 6,000,000 persons, a little more than a century of progress had augmented the English race by a little more than a million people. The succeeding century added some 2,800,000 persons to its numbers, and raised the population to 8,873,000.[3] But the next forty-five years added more than 8,000,000 people. In other words while, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the population only increased by 10,000 and 28,000 persons annually, from 1801 to 1846 it rose at the rate of 180,000 persons a year.[4] The same thing was true of Scotland. Chamberlayne, in the edition of 1727, writes that 'a million and a half of people is the most that has been reckoned' in Scotland.[5] As Chamberlayne's estimates are usually high, it will perhaps be safer to conclude that there were about 1,250,000 persons in Scotland in 1700. In 1801

[1] *History of England*, vol. i. p. 3.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 285.
[3] *Ante*, vol. i. p. 25.
[4] The estimated population in the middle of 1846 was 16,944,000. I have taken 1846, as the year in which the great Irish emigration commenced.
[5] *Present State of Great Britain*, p. 345.

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Scotland contained 1,599,000 persons.[1] She had not added more than 350,000 people, or 3,500 persons a year to her numbers during the century. In 1846 her population was estimated at 2,770,000. In this interval she had added 771,000 people, or 17,000 a year, to her numbers.

It may, therefore, be concluded that from the end of the eighteenth century the population of Great Britain had been growing with an increasing rapidity. The gradual development of the country, the expansion of its external and internal trade, and the vast industrial revolution which resulted from the inventive activity of the century, all tended to add to the numbers of the people. The growing population increased the demand for agricultural produce; both the circumstances of the war and the character of legislation tended to encourage the home farmer; land was enclosed in large quantities, pasture was broken up, and the discovery that, by a proper rotation of crops, fields need not be left fallow, increased the productiveness of the soil, and enabled a large population to be employed on its cultivation.

These conditions continued in force through the first two decades of the present century. The people grew in number, but the demand for agricultural labour also grew. From 1811 to 1821 more than one-third of the entire population of Great Britain was dependent on agricultural pursuits. But these conditions rapidly altered after the accession of George IV. Land which had been broken up during the war was suffered to relapse into pasture. The introduction of threshing-mills reduced the demand for agricultural labour. In 1811 thirty-five families, and in 1821 thirty-three families out of every hundred, had been dependent on agriculture; in 1831 only twenty-eight families, and in 1841

Diminishing demands for agricultural labour.

[1] *Ante*, vol. i. p. 26.

only twenty-six families out of every hundred were employed in farming.[1]

While, then, other classes were multiplying their numbers and finding on the whole increased employment, the agricultural labourers were every day discovering that there was less and less work for them to do. But these poor villagers, including the poorest and least provident of the population, married and brought up children without thought for the morrow. The third decade of the century had hardly begun when thinking and unthinking men alike perceived that in every rural district there were more hands requiring work than there was work requiring hands. It was not easy before the introduction of railways for the labourers of Southern England to move into the northern hives of industry, and the rustic, whose ideas are bounded by the limits of his own village, in any event adapts himself with difficulty to the life of an artisan in a town. Hence a gradual conviction arose that the best fate for these men was their removal from their old homes, where there was no work, to the vast untilled lands in other continents.[2]

The increase in emigration.

Then began the vast stream of emigration which is one of the most remarkable facts of the nineteenth century. Like a great river, its volume was originally

[1] It is very difficult to obtain these figures accurately. For the purposes of the text I have followed the figures cited in Porter's *Progress of the Nation*, pp. 52 and 53.

[2] See the fine passage in *Sartor Resartus*. 'Meanwhile, what portion of this inconsiderable terraqueous globe have ye actually tilled and delved, till it will grow no more? How thick stands your population in the Pampas and Savannahs of America; round ancient Carthage and in the interior of Africa?' &c. *Sartor Resartus*, p. 223. Few people now recollect that the fifth Lord Selkirk founded a colony of Celtic Highlanders in Prince Edward's Island in 1803, and founded another colony of Highlanders in what is now called Manitoba in 1809. He was the author, in 1805, of a work called *Emigration and the State of the Highlands*. An interesting account of this very remarkable man will be found in *Manitoba, its Infancy, Growth, and Present Condition*, by the Rev. Professor Bryce, head of the Manitoba College.

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only slight. A small body of people annually left the country for North America; and in 1819, the ministry, alarmed at the prevalence of distress, procured a vote of 50,000*l.* to assist a few hundred labourers to the Cape of Good Hope.[1] It is not difficult to understand the reasons which prompted this singular selection. The Cape was popularly considered as one of the most important of the acquisitions made during the war. It had twice been taken by us from the Dutch, and permanently surrendered by the treaty of 1814. The most important station on the common high road to the East, it seemed desirable, on national grounds, to increase the British element in the colony. The emigrants indeed themselves preferred to seek their fortunes either in the United States or in Canada. But the ministry declined to increase the population of a foreign country at public cost, and hesitated to send large contingents of poor men to face the hardships of a Canadian winter. The Cape enjoyed a mild climate, its soil was favourable for the multiplication of stock,[2] and 5,000 persons were ultimately sent there. The experiment was undoubtedly successful. Landing at Algoa Bay, these 5,000 persons laid the foundations of the thriving settlements which now include Graham's Town and Port Elizabeth.

Successful, however, as the experiment ultimately proved, the Government hesitated to persevere in it. And it was fortunate that it did not do so. Emigration would never have prospered if the emigrants had been unnecessarily fettered in the choice of their destination. Some years afterwards, moreover, the opening of an overland route to the East diminished the strategic value of the Cape of Good Hope, while constant dis-

The Cape.

[1] See *ante*, vol. iii. p. 94.

[2] See an abstract of Vansittart's speech in *Ann. Reg.*, 1819, Hist. p. 87, and Lord Grey's *Colonial Policy*, vol. ii. p. 249 and *note*.

turbances and frequent war to a certain extent hindered the development of the colony and increased the anxiety of those who were responsible for its destiny.

Yet, though the Cape became consequently an unpopular country, its history presents many points of interest which will repay a short digression. The Cape occupies a sort of middle position between colonies such as the West Indies and settlements such as Australia. It comprises a mixed race of white men, black men, and Malays. The Dutch conquerors had deprived the Hottentots of their lands, and reduced large numbers of them to slavery, while they had also imported negroes and Malays whom they used as slaves. But round the enclosures of the settlers there surged a large native population, which regarded property in cattle from the standpoint which every freebooter has assumed from Anchises to Rob Roy. Cattle-lifting, in other words, was 'the natural and most honourable pursuit for brave men to follow.'[1] The Government at home could not, of course, allow the settlers to be plundered with impunity, and they were consequently forced into the serious and difficult Kaffir wars which tried the metal both of colonists and troops in 1811, in 1819, in 1835, in 1836, and in 1849. And the successful termination of each war laid the foundation for a new struggle. For in 1819 the eastern frontier of the colony was advanced from the Fish River to the Keiskamma; in 1835 it was further pushed forward to the Kei; and, though the intermediate territory was subsequently restored to the Kaffirs, it was permanently annexed to the colony after the fifth Kaffir war.[2]

These events increased to a very large extent the responsibilities which the British had assumed in

[1] Lord Grey's *Colonial Policy*, vol. ii. p. 250.

[2] I have used popular language in the text, but strictly speaking the territory was not annexed, but taken possession of by the Crown. For the distinction and the reasons for it, see *ibid.*, p. 201.

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Southern Africa. And another chain of circumstances, to which some reference must also be made, had even more largely augmented the British dominion. The Dutch settlers (or Boers, as they were called) whom the British had found at the Cape had, from the first, proved intractable. Admirable as are the qualities of the Dutch race, it has not proved successful in the art of colonisation. The mother country has attempted to interfere in the ordinary arrangements of the colony, and the Dutch settlers have become, in consequence, dissatisfied and averse from government. The policy of the Whig ministry of 1830 increased this dissatisfaction. Slavery was abolished; and the Boers, irritated at the measure, and angry with the rulers who had promoted it, sold their estates, and settled in the fertile territories which are now known as Natal and the Orange River Free State. There they established a republic, and maintained a doubtful independence till 1843 when the government of Natal was assumed by the British. On the west of the great chain of mountains, however, which divides Natal from the Orange River Free State, the Boers more successfully maintained their position; and, though they were temporarily brought under British rule in 1848, their independence was again conceded to them some years afterwards.

The Boers.

Addition to the Cape Colony.

These great changes had enlarged to a considerable extent the British dominion in Africa. In 1814 the Cape Colony comprised about 120,000 square miles; by the middle of the century the British flag waved over a territory of nearly double that extent. In the interval, provinces having an area as large as that of Italy had been added to the British dominion in South Africa. Except in the East Indies, no addition of anything like the same extent has been made to the British Empire during the present century. Like the acquisitions in

the East Indies, those at the Cape were made by a reluctant Government; like the possessions in the West Indies, the wisest persons were constantly objecting to them as useless and cumbersome. A general feeling existed in England that the Cape was not worth the sacrifices which it imposed, and that statesmen were making a grievous error in entangling their country in a situation which was constantly demanding fresh sacrifices.[1]

The policy of these additions.

Many people possibly still share the conviction which was thus formed. Few persons would probably dissent from the opinion that it would be far better for this country if the British territory in South Africa were confined to Cape Town and to Simon's Bay.[2] But few persons who have studied the history of colonising races would doubt that the opinion which was thus expressed was impracticable. Nations may pass laws, emperors may make engagements, to stop the advance of their servants and lieutenants. But, when the superior race come in contact with the inferior people, the former in defiance of law and treaty will advance. The same influences which have carried the English to the Indus and the Irrawaddy, and which have brought Russia to the Oxus and the Moorghab, drove the Cape colonists to the Keiskamma and the Kei, to the Orange River and the Drakenberg Hills.

Yet, if the colony were an encumbrance to the mother country, the order which, on the whole, the mother country was able to maintain, was advantageous to the colony. It prospered, and an increasing prosperity multiplied its people. In 1795, when it was first taken from the Dutch, it contained 60,000 inhabitants: in 1806, the date of its second capture, its population had

[1] This view is stated almost in these words by Lord Grey, *Colonial Policy*, vol. ii. p. 248.

[2] Lord Grey in *ibid.*

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increased to 73,000; in 1839 it had risen to 143,000, and in 1842 to 166,000;[1] in 1856 it had increased to 267,000, and in 1865 to 582,000.[2] In 1884 nearly 1,250,000 people were living in the colony, while 424,000 persons were sustained by the adjacent settlement, Natal.

The trade of the colony had risen as rapidly as the population. In 1827 the colony consumed British manufactures worth 216,000*l.* In the next seventeen years the imports about doubled and rose to 424,000*l.* In 1865 the imports amounted to 2,125,000*l.*, and in 1879 to 7,664,000*l.* Of this vast import trade 1,700,000*l.* in the former, and 6,195,000*l.* in the latter year represented goods the produce of the United Kingdom.[3] The trade of the Cape had thus almost changed places with the trade of the West Indies; and the trade of the former colony became in 1879 as important to the mother country as the trade of the latter colonies had been in 1815.

Emigration after 1819.

The vast increase in the population of the Cape was not solely due to emigration. Emigration was, indeed, assuming new proportions, but the ministry did not repeat the experiment of 1819, or continue to convey settlers to the Cape of Good Hope. The stream of emigration was left to follow its own course; and, for many years to come, it steadily flowed to the Far West. To a slight extent it was aided by the Government;[4] and, in the ten years ending 1829, rather more than 126,000 persons left the United Kingdom for Canada, while about 72,000 persons sailed from British ports

[1] Porter's *Progress of the Nation*, pp. 778, 779. M'Culloch places the population in 1842 at 171,000, M'Culloch, *Commercial Dict., sub verb.* 'Cape Town.'

[2] These numbers do not include the population of Natal.

[3] *Statistical Abstracts for the Colonies* (1881), pp. 22 and 62.

[4] *Ante*, vol. iii. p. 94. See also, for the emigration of 1823 and 1825, the account in the *Third Report of the Committee of Emigration* for 1827. The more essential parts of the Report are reprinted, *Ann. Reg.*, 1827, Chron. p. 387.

for the United States. Vast as this emigration was, it was more than doubled in the succeeding decade, when 320,000 persons sailed for Canada and 170,000 for the United States; while, in the following seven years from 1840 to 1846, 246,000 persons went to Canada and 362,000 to the United States.[1]

The nominal destination of the emigrant did not probably always indicate his settlement; an artificial line divided the British colony from the American Republic; and there was nothing to prevent the emigrant crossing from the States to the colony or from the colony to the States. The figures, however, to some extent indicate the individual preferences of the new settlers, and unmistakably display their inclination after 1840 to select the Republic and to reject the colony.

Increasing preference of emigrants for United States.

This disposition became much more marked after 1846. In the three succeeding years, from 1847 to 1849, 182,000 persons emigrated to Canada and 550,000 to the United States, while from 1850 to 1859 258,000 persons sailed for Canada and 1,350,000 persons for the United States.

Suggestive figures of this character might furnish text for a long discourse. In this chapter it is only possible to indicate one or two conclusions to be drawn from them. And, in the first place, it should be always borne in mind that they prove that, in the truest sense, the United States are still the greatest colony, the favourite *ἀπόικια* of the English race; and that, whatever may be the fate of the colonial empire of England, the example of the United States may be cited to prove that the settlements, whether they retain or reject their old allegiance, will constantly increase the bonds of kinship which unite them to the mother country.

[1] *Encyclopædia Brit., ad verb.* 'Emigration;' cf. *Census*, 1851, vol. i. p. cxxxii.

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Such is the first and gratifying conclusion to be drawn from these figures. But the second deduction is less satisfactory. The colonists have evidently shown an increasing disposition to seek their fortunes in the United States, and this tendency will prove on examination to have been directly connected with the chronic difficulty of the United Kingdom. For, in the earlier period, the bulk of the emigrants sailed from Great Britain, and both Scotch and English preferred to seek their fortunes in an English colony. But, in the later period, the Irish famine drove shiploads of emigrants from the sister island; and the Irish, carrying with them to the new world their detestation of English rule, preferred to seek home and shelter in the American republic; and hence the gradually increasing preference which the emigrants displayed for the United States was directly associated with the increasing movement of the Irish people.[1]

Due to Irish emigration.

It does not fall within the design of this work to relate in any detail the internal history either of the great states or of the great colony which the Anglo-Saxon race is thus establishing in a new world. But it will give completeness to this chapter if the growth of these countries be very shortly mentioned. At the beginning of this century the United States contained about 5,300,000, and Canada less than 500,000 inhabitants.[2] In 1880 the United States contained more than 50,000,000, and British North America 4,500,000 people. In the beginning of this century, to put the same thing in another way, the British in the British

Increase of the English people.

[1] The nationality of the emigrants to Canada is not known. But in the ten years ending 1829, 20,294 English and Scotch, and 51,617 Irish sailed to the United States; in the decade 1830 to 1839, 10,601 English and Scotch, and 159,672 Irish sailed to the United States. The succeeding decades are affected by the Irish famine, but show, on the whole, the same extraordinary characteristic. *Encyclopædia Britannica, ad verb.* 'Emigration.'

[2] Russell placed the population of British North America in 1816 at 462,250 persons, *Hans.* cviii. p. 542.

Islands numbered 16,000,000, the settlements which men in North America had acquired contained 6,000,000 of inhabitants. Eighty years afterwards, the British Islands contained 35,000,000 and America nearly 55,000,000 of English-speaking people. If the next eighty years should show an equal progress, it is not impossible that, in the last half of the twentieth century, the United States will contain 500,000,000, the United Kingdom 80,000,000, and Canada 100,000,000 inhabitants.

But these astounding figures do not represent the whole truth. While the United States and Canada have been thus multiplying their numbers, men of English extraction have been founding another great empire in the Southern Hemisphere. British North America and the United States with Alaska may each be roughly computed to contain 3,500,000 square miles; while the third great empire, Australasia, which is in process of construction, comprises 3,000,000 square miles of territory. These three great dominions occupy nearly one-fifth of the whole land on the surface of the globe; and the two of them which are popularly known as colonies almost equal in extent, and before another century is over must, in all probability, contain more people than the whole of the Russian Empire.

Australia.

It is a fact which consists with the history of the British elsewhere, but which is none the less remarkable, that the English, who now exclusively possess the vast Australian territory, were among the last people who penetrated to it. There, as elsewhere, the Spanish, the Dutch, and the Portuguese were their forerunners: and Torres and Tasman had given their names to strait and island nearly half a century before a British buccaneer had visited the new continent. But the voyages of these early discoverers led to no results. They were in search of gold and trade; and the uncivilised savages who roamed over the New Holland were ignorant of

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the vast goldfields which later explorers were to discover; they had few wants which the merchant could supply, and fewer possessions which the trader could appropriate. Thus, for nearly two centuries after Torres' voyage, the great island, gradually assuming its real proportions in educated minds, remained undesired and consequently unappropriated.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, British energy received a fresh impulse. A brief interval of peace, following a successful war, gave the people leisure for new enterprise; and a young Sovereign who, whatever faults he may have had as a ruler, was the friend of science and the patron of art, proved himself ready to encourage discovery and research. The planet Venus at intervals passes between the sun and the earth, and the transit of her path over the sun's disc affords the astronomer a rare opportunity of correcting his calculations of the sun's distance from this globe. Imperfect observations had been made with this object in 1639 and in 1761: and in 1769, when it was ascertained that a fresh transit would occur, many nations sent expeditions to distant parts of the world simultaneously to observe and record the particulars of the fresh transit. The Royal Society of England asked George III. to assist in these investigations, and king and ministry consented to place a ship of war at the disposal of the Society for the purpose.

The transit of Venus.

This expedition was in itself a notable circumstance in the world's history. It was the first occasion on which the Governments of many nations had co-operated on a large scale for the advancement of science. But the scientific results which attended the observations were hardly commensurate with their cost. Experts were, indeed, induced to exaggerate rather than reduce the error which had previously crept into their

calculations, and to state the sun's probable distance a little more incorrectly than before. The transit of 1769 did not, therefore, add much to the world's knowledge of the solar system. But the expedition which carried the British observers proved rich in geographical discovery. For the command of it, by a happy choice, was given to Cook; and its commander was instructed, after completing his observations at Otaheite, to explore the vast and almost unknown island of which Portuguese, Dutch, and British sailors had hitherto brought only imperfect reports.

Captain Cook.

Happier choice was never made. The son of a labourer, the runaway apprentice of a little tradesman, self-taught, self-made, Cook had acquired reputation from his courage and ability, and knowledge by study and perseverance. In an age, when birth rather than merit was the usual passport for office, the Admiralty selected him for the command of perhaps the most important expedition that ever left British shores. Yet even those who launched him on his voyage hardly appreciated the full significance of the undertaking. The ship, in which Cook sailed with some eighty companions,[1] was not much larger than one of the sailing colliers which ply, and for a few years more may still ply, between the Thames and the Tyne. The voyage to Otaheite, Cook's first object, occupied eight months; and more than a year elapsed after the 'Endeavour' left England before Cook was enabled to land on the shores of New Zealand. Nearly nine months afterwards his ship was moored in the land-locked inlet which, from the variety of plants it afforded to the collector, was named by its discoverers Botany Bay. The next three months were spent in exploring the eastern coast of Australia, which Cook now took

[1] Among these companions, it ought to be added, was Banks, whose scientific knowledge was of much value.

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formal possession of in right of his Majesty King George III.; and to which, from some fancied resemblance to the Welsh coast, the explorers gave the name of New South Wales.[1]

Yet, though Cook had secured to the Crown a settlement in one of the two greatest of its possessions, seventeen years elapsed before any steps were taken to occupy it. In 1787 a new and strange use was found for the colony. The Government thought that a distant territory, having no trade with England, was a convenient receptacle for the worst classes of the population. It accordingly determined on sending Captain Phillip, an officer in the Navy, who by his conduct and capacity amply justified the choice, with 800 convicts to Botany Bay, and on forming a penal settlement at that place. Phillip ultimately fixed on a place in the neighbourhood for the settlement; to which, in compliment to the Secretary of State, he gave the name of Sydney.

A convict settlement.

Such was the unpropitious commencement of a town which is rapidly developing into one of the great capitals of the world. Such was the first foundation of a colony which has not yet completed a hundred years of history. Its annals, and those of its sister colonies, have lately been told in detail by a writer whose experience and knowledge fitted him for the task. In relating with a fulness which leaves little to be desired the material progress of the country, he has unfortunately thought it necessary to imitate the example of other historians, and load his pages with much worthless matter. He can at least plead custom and precedent as an excuse. Historians of England dignify with the name of history the doings and sayings of the monarchs whom birth or war has placed on the throne;[2] and the

[1] Cook's *Voyages*, vol. i. pp. 210–255.

[2] Burnes relates that Bhawul Khan promised him a history of his tribe, and this promise he fulfilled by transmitting a long and elaborate account of it, concluding with an enumeration of all his own successes

historian of Australia, following their example, relates in full detail the actions, wise and unwise, of the men selected for the government of the colony. Yet the words and deeds of even wise and good governors, like Phillip and Bourke, are not history; while the words and deeds of bad governors are not only not history, but they are not worth relating. Sufficient for them that their names are preserved in river and headland, in harbour and town. Let the rest which they have done or left undone be forgotten.

Yet, while governors were misusing their brief authority, other men with the labour of brain and hand were creating a history which was well worth the telling. For, in that distant land, whose very shape and nature was unknown,[1] the eternal fight between good and evil was being waged under the most unpromising conditions which the world had ever seen; and there man was destined not merely to create wealth and to found empires, but to break with the traditions of the past, and to prove that out of the worst evil good may be evolved.

Nothing good could apparently be expected from the experiment of 1787. To despatch 800 convicts to a distant part of the globe, and to leave them alone with their guards, might be convenient enough for the mother country, but could be attended with little advantage to the colony. The conditions, moreover, of the voyage were such as to harden the prisoners. The mortality among them was awful. Nearly one convict

in hunting. Burnes's *Cabul*, p. 71. Yet, though we smile at this story, Bhawul Khan has many imitators in our own language.

[1] Perhaps one of the most striking proofs of the ignorance which existed less than two centuries ago of the existence of Australia, is to be found in so familiar a work as *Gulliver's Travels*. Swift says that the 'Antelope' was driven by a violent storm to the north-west of Van Diemen's Land, and that the sailors by an observation found themselves in the latitude of 30 degrees 2 minutes South. A line drawn along this parallel passes through the whole of Australia, and is within 300 miles of Perth, Adelaide, and Sydney. Neither Swift nor any of his contemporaries had any knowledge that the hypothetical site of Lilliput was almost in the heart of the largest island in the world.

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in every eight died.[1] In 1790 a second consignment of convicts sailed, of whom 261 died on the voyage and 488 were under medical treatment on their arrival.[2] But the mortality did not cease on their reaching the colony. Out of 122 Irish convicts sent out in 1791, only 50 were alive in May 1792.[3] It was officially admitted that from 1795 to 1801, out of 3,833 convicts embarked, 385 died on the voyage, while it is claimed that things so far improved, that from 1801 to 1810 there were only 52 deaths out of 2,398 convicts.[4] But official figures cannot always be trusted to tell the whole truth. In November 1800 a vessel arrived with convicts who had suffered much on their voyage. Writing two years afterwards, the Governor did not apprehend they would ever recover strength. In June and July 1802 'the "Hercules" and "Atlas" arrived with Irish convicts after a passage of nearly seven months, with nearly the whole of the convicts in a dead or dying state; 63 out of 151 male convicts died on the voyage in the "Atlas."'[5]

Want of food among the first settlers.

But the misery of the convicts did not end with the voyage. The present generation is accustomed to think of Australia as a land capable of producing an almost inexhaustible supply of food. The British farmer, threatened with the competition of the antipodes, clamours for protection against the colony. But the men who sailed with Phillip saw only a sandy soil which they thought incapable of supporting even the scanty number of people which they had brought with them. The colony was dependent for food on other and richer lands, and was in many cases on the verge of actual starvation. Throughout the whole tenure of the government by

[1] Rusden's *Hist. of Australia*, vol. i. p. 32. A still more fearful account of the condition of these convicts was given by Sir C. Bunbury in Parliament. See the debate, *Ann. Reg.*, 1793, Hist. p. 171.

[2] Rusden's *Hist. of Australia*, vol. i., p. 59.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[4] *Ann. Reg.*, 1813, Chron. p. 527.

[5] Rusden, *Hist. of Australia*, vol. i. p. 392.

Phillip, and for many years afterwards, the convicts were chiefly dependent on imported food.

Cost of the colony.

These evils were not due to any unwise economy. On the contrary, if the results of the experiment were discouraging, its cost was extravagant. In March 1791, when rather more than 2,000 convicts had been shipped, and 1,800 others were ready for shipment, the mother country had expended 385,000*l.*, and the civil and military establishments of the colony alone were estimated to require 10,000*l.* a year for their support.[1] In 1793 it was stated in Parliament that the colony had already absorbed 600,000*l.* The journey of every convict cost 20*l.*, his maintenance in the colony 60*l.* a year.[2] In 1810 the colony still cost the mother country 70,000*l.* a year, 'in addition to a great annual expenditure incurred in the transmission of stores and merchandise, and in the freight of transports.'[3]

Failure of the experiment.

A huge expense would have excited opposition if the success of the experiment had been assured; the expense seemed the more objectionable because the experiment failed. The most hopeful projectors soon discovered that a self-supporting settlement could not be formed out of a few thousand convicts and their guards. In the very infancy of the colony, Phillip urged that free immigrants, men with capital and agricultural experience, should be sent out to him. 'Fifty farmers,' he wrote, 'would do more in one year . . . . than one thousand convicts.' A small tentative step was at once taken to carry out Phillip's wishes. A few families were embarked for Sydney, with the promise of land, labour, implements, and food.[4] Later Governors conferred grants of land on convicts whose sentences had expired, and on the officers of the regiments sent out to guard the colony.[5] Thus, in

Free settlers.

[1] *Ann. Reg.*, 1791, Chron., pp. 66–79.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1793, Hist., p. 170.

[3] Report of Select Committee of 1812, in *ibid.*, 1813, Chron. p. 532.

[4] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. i. pp. 37, 40 *note*, 160.

[5] Phillip in five years granted 3,389 acres of land to settlers; Grose, his successor, in two years 10,674

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the course of years, a population slowly grew up round the new settlements. In 1806 New South Wales is said to have contained 7,519 persons; its dependencies, Norfolk Island and Van Diemen's Land, 1,943 souls; in 1810 the population of New South Wales, according to one census, amounted to 10,454; according to another authority, to 11,590. In 1821 it had risen to 38,778 persons.[1]

In such a colony social difficulties were necessarily numerous. Immorality resulted from a disproportion of the sexes, and intemperance soon assumed a frightful character. Of the 10,454 persons living in New South Wales in 1810, 5,513 were men, 2,721 were children, and only 2,220 were women. There were, therefore, nearly 5 men for every 2 women in the colony. Such a state of things would not have tended to produce morality in any society. As the majority of the women were drawn from a degraded class, it was fruitful of gross immorality. Wise men had the good sense to see that the best chance of producing a moral atmosphere was to increase the supply of women; in 1807 the authorities allowed a number of the wives of transported criminals, who chose to do so, to accompany their husbands;[2] and the Committee of 1812, appointed on Romilly's motion, recommended that the facilities already thus afforded should be greatly extended.[3]

Disproportion of sexes.

Grave, however, as were the consequences of immorality, intemperance caused even greater misery in the infant colony. During the governorship of Phillip, indeed, sobriety was strictly enforced, and the importation of spirituous liquors prohibited. But, in the governorship of his successor, these precautions were practically removed.

acres; Paterson in nine months, 4,965 acres. Rusden's *Australia*, vol. i. p. 190. A more detailed list of the grants up to 1806 will be found in *ibid.*, p. 402.

[1] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 499, and *Ann. Reg.*, 1813, Chron. p. 415.

[2] *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, Chron., p. 362.

[3] *Ibid.*, 1813, p. 530; *Life of Romilly*, vol. iii. p. 9.

Officers of the army had always been allowed to import spirits. On their receiving land grants under Grose, they found that the cheapest and easiest way of procuring labour was to pay for it in intoxicating liquors. Hence arose a traffic which Grose took no pains to repress, which demoralised the convict, injured the free settler, produced a taste for alcohol, led to illicit distillation, and was ultimately only checked in the governorship of King, and further restricted during the rule of his successors. Intemperance has been the fruitful cause of misery and crime, but perhaps drunkenness never assumed more terrible proportions or led to greater trouble than it occasioned in the infant settlement of New South Wales.[1]

Anyone, then, who had patiently studied the statistics of Australia during the opening years of the nineteenth century, might have been puzzled to name the advantages which were likely to result from the foundation of the settlement. Yet there were, even at that time, causes in operation which were slowly securing success for the colony. In 1791 the same ship which had brought out a load of fever-stricken convicts carried a young man, John MacArthur, who had bought a commission in the corps which the Government decided to form for New South Wales, and who was resolute to seek his fortune in the colony.[2] Three years afterwards, when land was granted by Grose to officers, MacArthur purchased 'sixty Bengal ewes and lambs which had been imported from Calcutta,' and 'two Irish ewes and a young ram. The Indian sheep produced coarse hair, but by crossing the two breeds' MacArthur 'had the satisfaction to see the lambs of the Indian ewes bear a mingled fleece of hair and wool.' He had the perspicacity to infer from this circumstance that the climate

John MacArthur.

[1] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. i. pp. 162, 168, 171, 231–244.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 59.

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of the colony was suited to the production of wool, and he had the courage to speculate on the conclusions which he formed. It so happened that a flock of Merino sheep was on sale at the Cape of Good Hope, that its value was not understood by the Dutch, and that an agent whom MacArthur employed succeeded in securing five ewes and three rams from among them. Taking every precaution to preserve the breed pure, MacArthur subsequently added to his flock 1,200 sheep which he purchased at the Cape.[1] In 1801 he carried to England specimens of the wool which he had obtained from his flock; and in 1804 he succeeded in obtaining a grant of 5,000 acres of land, and an assignment of convicts for the prosecution of his experiment.[2]

The growth of sheep.

Confident as MacArthur was, he could hardly have foreseen, and he did not himself live to see, the full consequence of what he was doing. In 1800 New South Wales possessed 6,757 sheep, or probably as many sheep as there were people in the colony; in 1821 she had 120,000 sheep, or about three sheep for every person in the colony. In 1834, when the population had risen to between 50,000 and 60,000,[3] the sheep had increased to 1,000,000. In 1839, when the population exceeded 100,000,[4] the sheep numbered 3,000,000. In 1856 the colony contained 265,000 persons, and 7,700,000 sheep.[5] In the next twenty-five years the population was trebled, and the huge stock of sheep increased more than fourfold.[6]

Australian exploration.

If, indeed, the ideas of the original settlers had been correct, and if New South Wales had consisted of only

[1] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. i. pp. 211, 212; cf. *Hansard*, vol. xlviii. p. 874, where the purchase is said to have consisted of three rams and four ewes.

[2] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. i. p. 365 *sq.*

[3] There were 51,155 persons in the colony in 1831. *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 48.

[4] 119,118 in 1841. *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 191. For the sheep see *Hansard*, vol. xlviii. p. 874.

[5] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. iii. pp. 56, 57.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 58 and 620.

a belt of sandy land between the Blue Mountains and the ocean, the progress which has thus been recorded could never have occurred. And strange to say, though the colony was occupied twelve years before the eighteenth century closed, more than twelve years of the nineteenth century passed before explorers, seeking in a year of drought fresh pastures for their cattle, crossed the mountains, and learned for the first time the rich inheritance which was before them.[1] Long, however, before a few hardy men forced their way through brushwood and mountain, other travellers, with less danger, had explored the coasts of Australia, and discovered, among other things, the land-locked bay on which Melbourne now stands. The short peace of Amiens gave, indeed, an impulse to maritime discovery which had no effect on internal exploration. For Napoleon, during the brief respite, endeavoured to assert the claim of France to some portion of the great island which England was making her own; and Englishmen at home, and colonists in New South Wales, though they had themselves no use for the vast territory which was gradually gaining shape on their charts, had no mind to admit foreign and unfriendly nations to any share in it. French and English thus ran a race for the acquisition of the unsettled territory; and though Flinders, who led the British to discovery, was destined ultimately to languish in a French prison, his skill and energy secured for the British the whole southern shore of the new territory.[2]

[1] *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 508 *sq.*, and for accounts of other explorers, *Ann. Reg.*, 1816, Chron. p. 194; *ibid.*, 1818, Chron., p. 583; *ibid.*, 1819, Chron., p. 88. Romilly's Committee, writing in 1812, said, 'The settlement in New South Wales is bounded on the north, west, and south by a range of hills known as the Blue Mountains, beyond which no one has been able to penetrate the country: some have with difficulty been as far as 100 miles in the interior, but beyond 60 miles it appears to be nowhere practicable for agricultural purposes; *ibid.*, 1813, Chron. p. 518.

[2] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. i. p. 310 *sq.*

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Peace had for a moment startled statesman and colonist with the prospect of a French occupation of portions of Australia. The return of war removed all chance of foreign interference. No European nation could hope to gain a foothold in the Pacific Ocean without the leave of England; and the few thousand British who still occupied Australia were left to work out their own future undisturbed. Such a state of things, however favourable it may have been to the development of New South Wales, was not likely to encourage the formation of fresh settlements. Port Phillip, as the great land-locked inlet on the southern coast had been called, was abandoned;[1] orders were given for the evacuation of Norfolk Island;[2] and Romilly's Committee of 1812 recorded a distinct opinion that 'more benefit . . . will be derived from the cultivation and improvement of the settlements that are already formed, than from the formation of new and distant establishments, whatever may be the encouragement that a fertile soil and an advantageous situation may appear to hold out.'[3]

The advice thus given was temporarily followed; and, during the first twenty years of the century, any efforts which England made for the colonisation of Australia were concentrated on her original settlement in New South Wales. It was inevitable, however, that the conclusions which were thus pronounced should be reconsidered after the accession of George IV. Emigration was gradually becoming more fashionable, and far-thinking men were declaring that the best course to take with the thousands, for whom there was no land at home, was to settle them on the vast unoccupied territories which had been acquired by the Crown. It was, perhaps, the natural corollary of this conclusion that the emigrant who obtained most land was the most certain

[1] Rusden's *Australia*, p. 344.
[2] *Ann. Reg.*, 1813, Chron., p. 518.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 519.

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stimulated after 1815 by increasing emigration.

to succeed. Even in England few people consider the advantages which situation affords to the agriculturist; and the farmer who was prepared to place seven thousand miles of ocean between his old home and his new settlement was not likely to draw any nice distinction between the advantages of Eastern and Western Australia. Given land enough, given capital enough, given labour enough, all else, it was thought, would follow. Of land there was an almost illimitable supply; of capital the crisis of 1825 showed that there was abundance. Every ratepayer in England who studied the statistics of his poor-rate knew that there was no deficiency of labour.

It happened, too, that, with the restoration of peace, one reason for fresh movement returned. French explorers again showed an inclination to secure a foothold on Australian soil. The British had already appropriated the whole southern coast of the vast territory, but it was doubtful whether they had ever formally acquired a settlement on its northern and western shores. In 1826, however, the Liverpool Administration decided to solve the doubt by prompt and decisive action. Instructions were sent to the Governor of New South Wales to assert the claims of the British to the whole of Australia, and to occupy at once certain stations on its western shores.[1] The Governor, either in accordance with his instructions, or at any rate applying his own construction to them, directed his officers, if the French had anticipated them, to warn them that their intrusion on the possessions of the British Crown was unwarrantable.

Such was the commencement of Western Australia,

[1] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. p. 5. Mr. Rusden adds in a note: 'I observe that credit has been given to Lord John Russell for asserting the British claim. He may have made it in words, after it had been established in fact; but Lord Liverpool's ministry had placed the matter beyond doubt, and there was not room for anything afterwards except words.

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Western Australia settled.

the largest of the Australian colonies. The Liverpool Administration had, however, hardly adopted this measure before the reconstruction of the ministry led to new ideas of government. Goulburn, succeeding to the Chancellorship of the Exchequer in 1828, initiated a policy of retrenchment; and his colleagues doubted the propriety of forming new settlements in distant territories where there were no settlers. The new colony would possibly have been abandoned if some private individuals had not come forward to further the enterprise.[1] Thomas Peel, a cousin of the minister, undertook, on behalf of a Company, to carry 10,000 emigrants to the colony, and to give 200 acres to each male settler, provided the Company received, in return, a grant of 4,000,000 acres from the Crown. The proposal was not accepted, but one similar in conception was substituted for it. Forty acres of land were promised to every settler prepared to invest 3*l.* in its cultivation, and 200 acres of land were offered to any immigrant who carried with him a settler more than ten years of age. Peel himself, staking a capital of 50,000*l.* on the enterprise, and carrying with him 300 servants, received a grant of 1,000,000 acres. Captain Stirling, who was made Governor of the Settlement, was given 100,000 acres; and to other persons tracts of country were allotted on the same prodigal scale. But the gigantic experiment wholly failed. In the course of a few years, Peel found himself with his capital all spent and his servants all gone.[2] In 1838 a complaint was made in the House of Commons that the colony was costing the mother country 12,000*l.*, and that there were only 2,000 persons in it.[3] Even in 1849 there were not 5,000 persons in the whole of Western Australia.[4]

[1] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. p. 9.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 42, and *Hansard*, vol. xlviii. p. 853.
[3] *Hansard*, vol. xliv. p. 294.
[4] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. p. 427.

Wakefield.

In the same year in which this disastrous experiment was tried, a man who was then unknown, or of whom the little that was then known is best forgotten, published in London an anonymous letter on colonisation. The letter was written from Sydney; it was intended to draw attention to the mistaken policy that was being pursued in New South Wales. But those who read it—and the vigour of its language and the terseness of its reasoning procured it many readers—could not help perceiving that, if the author were right, the experiment which Peel was conducting on the Swan River was wrong. For the whole gist of the writer's argument turned on the contention that land in colonies should be sold at a sufficient price, and that the sufficiency of the price should be tested by public auction. Men had hitherto been bribed to emigrate by the prospect of obtaining land for less than its real value. Edward Gibbon Wakefield denounced the mistake, and objected to receiving emigrants unprepared to give the full market value for the land.

His theory of colonisation.

This argument, right or wrong, ran through Wakefield's pamphlet; but on the basis which he thus laid down he founded a superstructure with which his name has usually been associated. A proposal to sell land for what it was worth involved the provision of a revenue; and an obligation was almost forced on its author to consider what should be done with the money which was thus obtained. It was an obvious suggestion that it should be applied to the conveyance of British labourers to the colony. But Wakefield had the wisdom to foresee that abuses might attend the importation of labourers not dissimilar from those which had resulted from the lavish grant of land to immigrants. Just as nothing but evil had ensued from bribing persons to settle on land which could not be profitably occupied, so mischief would certainly arise from the provision of

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labourers for whom there was no work. Though, then, Wakefield was willing to allow that the money paid for land should be primarily devoted to the importation of labourers, he added the sensible condition that workmen should only be imported when there was a demand for their labour. The money not so expended could, he thought, be applied to the general purposes of the government of the colony.[1]

These suggestions, which were at once so new and which seemed so true, surprised and convinced a great many people. A Society was formed to carry out Wakefield's experiment. In 1831 a Company undertook to colonise South Australia on the system which he had advocated, and in 1834 the necessary authority was obtained from Parliament for the settlement of the territory. But the results were hardly so successful as its originators had hoped that they would prove. The directors of the Company had not always the courage of their founder. Instead of insisting on obtaining a sufficient price for land, and on testing the sufficiency of the price by public sales, they too frequently disposed of it privately below its real value; they set a bad example by speculating in land themselves; they consequently limited the resources which would otherwise have been available for the transport of labourers and for the government of the colony. Grave financial embarrassments necessarily ensued, and perplexed the administrators of the settlement; in 1841 the ministry came forward and offered to extricate the colony from its difficulties, guaranteeing a loan. It was subsequently persuaded to propose a vote of 155,000*l.*, to relieve it from its difficulties.[2]

South Australia

Yet, though the foundation of the colony was not

[1] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. p. 13. *Hansard*, vol. lvi. p. 325, and vol. lvii. pp. 243, 399 *sq.*

[2] *Ibid.* vol. ii. pp. 82, 92-94. Cf.

attended with complete success, its originators might at least boast that its future was far more promising than that of Western Australia. In Western Australia, after twenty years of settlement, the state of the colony was so alarming that men were seriously contemplating its abandonment and petitioning for the introduction of convict labour. In Southern Australia there were already, in 1840, 15,000 persons, with 15,000 cattle, 200,000 sheep, and an export and import trade amounting in the aggregate to 335,000*l.* A fair critic could not doubt that the one colony had a prospect of success before it; a prudent critic could hardly believe in the future of the other.

It would, however, be a very imperfect conclusion to suppose that the only service rendered by Wakefield to his fellow-countrymen can be traced in the progress of South Australia. His chief merit, on the contrary, consists not in what he did himself, but in what he made others do. His pamphlet directed the attention of some of the first men of the day to Australia. Many leading politicians joined the society which resulted from its publication. Men of mark were, in consequence, induced to examine for themselves the difficult problems which awaited solution in Australia, and the affairs of the new colonies became thenceforward subjects for discussion in Parliament.

Development of Australia.

Such a result, under any circumstances, would have been useful. The development of Australia made its utility more plain. During the first quarter of the present century New South Wales was the only Australasian colony of Britain. In 1825 Van Diemen's Land, or Tasmania, which had been constituted a subsidiary penal settlement in 1803, was formed into a separate colony. The Swan River, or Western Australia, it has already been stated, was occupied in 1829; Adelaide, or Southern Australia, in 1836. New South Wales

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Western, and South Australia, which would have been more accurately named Eastern, Western, and Central Australia, covered the whole expanse of New Holland. Though a few huts had already been erected on the great inlet of the sea which perpetuates the name of the first Australian Governor; though, in compliment to the Prime Minister, the settlers had given the name of Melbourne to their little enclosure, few indications could be found of the future prosperity of the new city. It was not till 1851 that Victoria, of which Melbourne is the capital, was carved out of New South Wales. It was not till 1859 that Queensland was separated from the same colony.

New Zealand.

About the time at which South Australia was first settled, and the first foundations of Melbourne were laid, an Association was formed in London for colonising another group of islands in the Pacific Seas. It either purchased, or it enabled individuals to purchase, large tracts of land from the native chieftains of New Zealand, and in 1838 it applied to Parliament for powers to govern the colony.[1] The Colonial Office opposed the proposal; a Tory member declared that we had no more right to colonise New Zealand by an act of the Imperial Legislature than to colonise France;[2] and the bill was thrown out by a large majority.[3] But in the following year the Government found itself compelled to take the step which it had properly refused to allow others to take for it. It declared New Zealand to be subject to the Crown of England, and it empowered the Governor of New South Wales to subject British residents in New Zealand to his authority. In 1840

[1] *Hansard*, vol. xliii. pp. 542, 871. The Church Missionary Society had, among others, acquired land of the native Maories. *Ibid.*, p. 873. The land was usually acquired for a nominal consideration, 'such as a blanket, a hatchet, or a gun.' Porter's *Progress of the Nation*, p. 776.

[2] Inglis, in *Hansard*, vol. xliii. p. 872.

[3] By 92 votes to 32; *ibid.*, p. 882.

it took a further step by appointing a Lieutenant-Governor of New Zealand, and soon afterwards it constituted the colony by royal charter.[1]

Blessed with a climate resembling that of England, New Zealand has been popularly regarded as the future Britain of the Southern Hemisphere. The progress which the colony has made has both encouraged and apparently justified the prediction. Yet there are few subjects on which ordinary people betray greater ignorance than on the position of New Zealand. Sir Charles Dilke has pointed out that though 'the future of the Pacific shores is inevitably brilliant, it is not New Zealand, the centre of the water-hemisphere, which will occupy the position that England has taken in the Atlantic, but some country such as Japan or Vancouver, jutting out into the ocean from Asia or America, as England juts out from Europe.' New Zealand, separated from Australia by more than a thousand miles of stormy ocean, can never prove to Australia what England has proved to Europe. Her own advantages of soil and climate may raise her to greatness. She will not rise to greatness as the emporium of Australian trade.[2]

At the time at which it became a colony, New Zealand was inhabited by men of a Malay race. The Maories, as they are called, are physically among the finest specimens of savages with whom the British have been brought into contact. In dealing with them English authorities have shown a great—Sir Charles Dilke has thought, an excessive[3]—consideration for

The Maories.

[1] Labouchere, on the 25th of June, 1839, said that steps had been taken which would probably lead to the establishment of a colony in New Zealand. *Ibid.*, vol. xlviii. p. 828.

[2] Sir C. Dilke's *Greater Britain*, p. 281.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 277. It is worth while comparing this opinion with Mr. Froude's recent account of New Zealand in *Oceana*, and especially the remark of one of his informants: 'There was one resource between them and bankruptcy. There was the native reserve. It was the richest land in the islands, and, if necessary, could be entered upon and sold.' New edition, p. 284.

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their rights. The success which devout missionaries working among them achieved gave religious England a peculiar interest in their welfare; and perhaps, in the earlier days of the colony, there was no race in the world which seemed so capable of living, and even combining, with British settlers.

But the same fate has overtaken the people and their religion. The race is disappearing, and Christianity is losing its hold on its survivors. The Malay race, of which the Polynesians and Maories are offshoots, readily accepts the truths of Christianity. But its conversion is merely superficial. 'The story of Christianity,' wrote Sir C. Dilke, 'in Hawaii, in Otaheite, and in New Zealand, has been much the same; among the Tahitians it was crushed by the relapse of the converts into extreme licentiousness; among the Maories it was put down by the sudden rise of' an Antichristian 'fanaticism.' So quick was the reaction that in a day the number of native Christians was reduced from thirty thousand to some hundreds.'[1] A whole people relapsed thus suddenly from Christianity and civilisation to their old savage habits.

Their gradual extinction.

The eventual failure of missionary effort may have been perhaps accelerated by the rapid decay of the Maori race. Before, indeed, a white settler set foot in New Zealand, the Maories were probably decreasing in numbers. Since the English have occupied the land the natives have been in process of rapid extinction. Man for man, the Maori has proved himself able to contend with the Englishman in war and to rival him in peace. But, race for race, he has fallen before the

[1] *Greater Britain*, pp. 268, 269. It may be of interest to add that, when Selwyn was appointed Bishop of New Zealand, Russell undertook to pay his salary. Stanley, succeeding to the Colonial Office, thought himself bound to carry out Russell's promise. Hume declared that, if Russell had made the promise, he ought to pay the money himself. *Hansard*, vol. lxv. p. 205.

new comer. Cannibalism, and wars waged for human flesh, kept down the population before the English came. Drink and immorality have kept down the population since their arrival. The Maori would hardly have been human if he had permanently adopted the God of a people which was supplanting his own race, and he relapsed into his old habits and his old faith.

Thus, while in a period of forty years the English population of New Zealand has risen to half a million of persons, the native population has dwindled to less than 50,000 souls;[1] and it is almost certain that in the course of time, and of a very short time, no representatives of the Maori race will survive. So rapidly is the superior superseding the inferior race, that, while only a few years ago the two races strove in constant warfare, and the English, supported by the strength and the purse of the mother country, did not always gain the upper hand, at the present time no Maori chieftain would venture on a fresh appeal to arms. Though for some years the mother country has thrown on the colony the burden of her own defence, the Maories have not ventured to renew the struggle. The increase of the new comers has insured the perpetuation of peace.

Moralists may lament the extinction of a race whose individual members have displayed qualities which command both sympathy and admiration. Ordinary people will perhaps conclude it to be neither wise nor useful to regret that a country enjoying great capacity and a fine climate should have passed into fitter hands. New Zealand, probably, at the present time contains one-tenth of the population which England and Wales possessed at the time of the Revolution. But the income and expenditure of the colony, its debt,

[1] There were 105,000 natives in the Northern Island in 1848, and only 36,000 in 1868. Cheasy's *Colonial Institutions*, p. 337.

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and its trade already far exceed the income and expenditure, the trade and debt, of England at that time. And income and expenditure, trade and debt, population and capital, are increasing with a rapidity which in the mother country is not only unknown, but would be impossible.

Colonial policy.

Thus, from 1840 downwards, the power of England in the Southern Hemisphere was rapidly developed. With this development new ideas of colonies were formed, and new demands were raised by the colonists. The growth of these ideas, the presentation of these demands, cannot be traced with precision in this chapter. Instead of attempting to do so, it will perhaps be more useful to dwell shortly on three great subjects connected with Australia. The first of these is the extinction of the native race; the second the abolition of transportation; the third the claim for free institutions and self-government.

Native races.

The researches for which the present generation is famous are gradually revealing to us the history of prehistoric man. We know enough to see that successive races, each possibly evolved from the same central birthplace, have gradually spread over the earth, and introduced, one after another, a slightly higher culture than their predecessors. Professor Boyd Dawkins has shown how in our own country palæolithic man was succeeded by neolithic man, and how a race which may be possibly identified with the Eskimo gave place to a people which perhaps has its solitary survivors in the Basque provinces, and which in its turn was succeeded by the Celt, just as the Celt was supplanted by the Saxon. These successive strata of people marked, in Western Europe at any rate, a gradual evolution. The savage was not superseded by civilisation, but only by a race a little more advanced than himself; and hence in these countries the process of supersession was in many cases

slow and in some instances incomplete. The Basque or Iberian, as well as the Celt and the Saxon, the Dane and the Norman, have, it may strongly be suspected, all left their impression on the character and capacity of the modern Briton.

A process, in one sense similar and in another sense opposite to this, is going on in our own time. The Anglo-Saxon race is rapidly spreading over a wide portion of the earth's surface. But, instead of superseding, as our ancestors superseded, men in organisation and culture only slightly inferior to itself, it has been brought into contact with whole races living much in the condition which prehistoric man occupied in these islands, thousands and tens of thousands of years ago. The modern Englishman, armed with rifle and rocket, would not have had much difficulty in conquering the primeval inhabitants of Great Britain, whose deadliest weapon was a flint-flake or a piece of wood. And the modern Englishman has found adversaries thus armed in the countries which he is occupying, and they are disappearing before him like doves before hawks.

In some cases the men whom the modern Englishman encounters are physically and mentally capable of contending with him on no very unequal terms. They go down before him from the inferiority of their organisation and of their weapons and tools. In other cases the races with whom he is brought into collision have not the physical and the mental capacity which under a higher civilisation might have enabled them to hold their own. In these cases they hardly venture on engaging with the Englishman in a struggle for existence. They were, and they are not.

The result, however, is in either case the same. Just as the husbandman, advancing his enclosure, reduces the feeding ground of the bison and the deer, so the Englishman, advancing his boundaries, drives back

the primitive races before him. The Maori, like the bison, disturbed in his solitude, turned on the aggressor, and occasionally proved his superiority. The Australian, like the deer, shrank from a contest with a newcomer whose power he felt and whose dominion he did not venture to dispute. But the angry bison is no more able than the timid deer to avert the inevitable end. The pale of civilisation thrusts it further and further back into the ever-lessening solitudes.

So it was in Australia. The great island was inhabited by an inferior race to that which in New Zealand had disputed the progress of the English on many a battlefield, and the wretched natives had no chance of withstanding the white man. At first, indeed, they only suffered slightly from the white man's advent. Australia was so vast, the new-comers were so few, that the natives, withdrawing slightly into the interior, could still hold their own. Even in those days, however, the readiness with which the men took to drink and the unchaste habits of the women, had their influence for evil. But as the English increased in numbers the process of destruction became much more rapid. The Englishman wanted the native's land; the native, perhaps, wanted the Englishman's cattle. The native was, in fact, in the way; and justice, which was administered by the English, did not penetrate far into the bush. Even, indeed, if justice had been present with her scales, it is not clear how she could have affected the inevitable end. Native cattle-stealers were not practically amenable to the ordinary courts, and the machinery of civilisation had no terrors in solitudes which it could not penetrate. The colonist had, therefore, no choice but to submit to the loss of his flocks, or to punish the thieves. When savage races are as dangerous as wolves, the men who suffer from their depredations are apt to treat them like wolves, and, when

the shepherd finds a wolf in his neighbourhood, he does not usually enquire whether the animal has been guilty of sheep-stealing. Thus, unhappily, in some cases natives were killed with as little ceremony as rabbits are shot by a country gentleman in our own time, or as the Irish were shot by the English in Plantagenet times. It was practically true in Australia a few years ago, as it was literally true in Ireland some centuries ago, that the killing of a native by an Englishman was not murder.

In Australia this unhappy story is still incomplete. The natives are not yet quite extinct, and the process of extinction is still going on. In the smaller and neighbouring island of Tasmania extirpation has been more easy and therefore more rapid, and the fate of native races may best be understood by a short summary of what has occurred in that colony.

When the English people first settled in Tasmania at the beginning of the century, it is supposed that there were 7,000 natives in the island. The new settlers were wisely instructed to treat the natives kindly. But kindness was never exercised, was perhaps never possible. An officer in charge of convicts saw a party of natives hovering around him. The apologists of the native race say, and cite many good reasons for saying, that they were attracted by curiosity, and had no hostile intentions. An English officer with only a small force under his command and a large body of convicts in his charge could not perhaps be expected to reason on their appearance. He thought the safer course was to fire on the natives and to drive them away by bloodshed. But the circumstance was none the less unfortunate. At the very outset the natives were taught to associate the new-comers with defeat and outrage. They were naturally disposed to meet slaughter with slaughter. The conditions of the colony gave them

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occasional opportunity for retaliation. The authorities were compelled to send hunting expeditions into the bush for food. These hunting parties, consisting of isolated individuals, afforded the natives an opportunity for vengeance. But, when a hunting party was thus attacked by savages, the ordinary law of self-preservation compelled the English to punish the tribe. If only one white man fell the hunters had an excuse—perhaps a sufficient excuse—for destroying some blacks. Authority was thus powerless to repress murders. British newspapers openly advocated the extinction of the natives, and the colonists were perhaps tempted to adopt the advice too literally. 'The smoke of a fire,' to quote the words of another work, 'was the signal for a black hunt. The sportsmen would discharge their guns, then rush towards the fires and sweep away the whole party The wounded were brained, the infant cast into the flames, the musket was driven into the quivering flesh.'[1] Blood begat blood, murder murder. Despite the orders of Secretaries of State and the exertions of Governors, the hunting parties continued. In 1834 a few hundred individuals, the sole survivors of the 7,000 persons who had been the possessors of the land only thirty years before, were moved to a little islet in the neighbourhood, in the vain hope of prolonging the existence of their race. There, however, within sight of their previous home, they languished and died, till at the present time no single specimen of the wretched race exists on the earth.

While the gradual extermination of the native races was proceeding, another question was approaching

[1] West's *History of Tasmania*, quoted in Rusden's *Australia*, vol. i. p. 624. If it should be thought that these atrocities were due to the depraved society of Tasmania, the reader should compare the account in the text with the recent treatment of the natives in Queensland. See the account in *ibid.*, vol. iii. pp. 231–247. He should recollect, however, that Mr. Rusden is the apologist of the native races, and, in relating their misfortunes, is apt to underrate the difficulties of the colonists.

solution. Some account has already been given of the steps taken to terminate transportation. In England it was condemned as a costly and ineffective punishment; in Australia it was denounced as a grave social plague. As the population of New South Wales increased, the immigrants saw that the taint of the convict rested on the colony. As the men seeking work grew to manhood, they found that the abundance of convict labour diminished the value of their own toil. And when the foremost men of the colony, conscious of growing strength and increasing prosperity, aspired to obtain free institutions, they were roundly told that it was 'idle to make any effort for the establishment of free institutions in New South Wales so long as transportation to it continued.' [1]

Transportation.

It consequently happened that, both in the colonies and in England, a strong feeling arose against the continuance of transportation; and in 1839 Russell, as Colonial Minister, took the bold step of declaring that, from a given date in 1840, transportation to New South Wales should cease. The transportation system, however, could not be destroyed at a blow. It was impossible to avoid sending prisoners abroad till fresh arrangements were made for their proper custody at home; and Russell accordingly, while abolishing transportation to New South Wales, retained Van Diemen's Land and Norfolk Island as penal settlements. This reservation partly diminished the value of the boon. The friends of transportation—and even in New South Wales the vicious system had its friends—complained that the colony was deprived of cheap labour, and that it was not freed from the convict taint. Convicts still remained in the colony, working out their sentences; convicts were certain to filter into it through other penal settlements. If these disadvantages were to re-

The abolition of transportation.

[1] See Charles Buller's remark in Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. p. 184.

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main, why should employers of labour be deprived of the advantage of cheap convict labour? A public meeting was held at Sydney, and a petition was signed by 4,000 persons, objecting to the abolition of transportation.[1]

Views such as those which prompted meeting and petition were not long held even among the more vicious classes in the colony. But the policy which Russell had adopted caused nevertheless grave anxiety to his successors. Van Diemen's Land and Norfolk Island were flooded with convicts, till it was obvious that they could receive no more.[2] Norfolk Island was a small place, unable to make its voice heard; but Van Diemen's Land was a large and increasing settlement, capable of insuring a hearing for its complaints. Its inhabitants declared that, in consequence of the cessation of transportation to New South Wales, they themselves had been flooded with convicts. Sixteen thousand convicts had been introduced into the island in four years; and the free population, staggered and alarmed at this vast immigration of vice, was leaving the colony. Van Diemen's Land, therefore, addressed its remonstrances to the Colonial Office and to Parliament,[3] and prayed that the plague might be stayed. Prayer and remonstrance seemed equally reasonable, and unofficial England conceived that they should at once be attended to. But official England regarded the matter from quite another standpoint. It had—whether the colonists liked the fact or not—to deal

[1] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. pp. 126-130.

[2] 67,655 convicts were sent to Van Diemen's Land from 1803 to 1853. *Ibid.*, p. 556.

[3] In presenting the petition referred to in the text to the Lords, Lansdowne said that the population of the colony from 1834 to 1840 had increased from 12,000 to 40,000 persons; the cultivated area from 25,000 to 124,000 acres; the shipping from 142 tons to 141 vessels; the imports from 62,000*l.* to 988,000*l.* In the four years during which the 16,000 convicts had been landed, only 700 persons had entered, while 2,000 had left the colony. *Hansard*, vol. lxxxiv. p. 480.

annually with some thousands of convicts. After all that had been written, it was not easy in the fifth decade of the present century to see what better means could be devised for their disposal than transportation to a colony. It was true that penal settlements had been the constant scenes of abuse. But abuses in the management of prisons were not confined to colonies, and it was reasonable to suppose that prison management in Australia was at least as capable of reform as prison management at home. It was true that there was something shocking in flooding the pure soil of a new colony with a vicious stream of hardened criminals; but, on the other hand, official England remembered that Australia would never have been settled if it had not been for convicts. The emigrants had come to the convicts, the convicts had not been brought to the emigrants; and the colonies had been sustained and fostered by the vast expenditure which the mother country had incurred in fitting them as receptacles for criminals.

So spoke or argued official England. Yet even official England was compelled to admit that the treatment of Van Diemen's Land was incapable of defence. There were men, however, who thought that the condition of Van Diemen's Land did not prove that transportation was a mistake, but only that it was an error to inflict on any one settlement more convicts than it could sustain. The absorption of convicts was like the consumption of goods. It was regulated by the demand, and it was as foolish to overstock a market with criminals as to glut it with cotton. The logical result of this reasoning was that the grave evils which Van Diemen's Land and Norfolk Island were admittedly suffering were attributable to the cessation of transportation to New South Wales; and that the remedy was to be found in shedding criminals, like a fertilising

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shower, over a continent, instead of pouring them like a destructive waterspout on a single settlement.

Animated by these views, the administration of Peel suspended transportation to Van Diemen's Land for two years, in order to give the demand for convict labour time to overtake the supply; it even seriously contemplated the formation of a new penal settlement in Northern Australia and the resumption of transportation to New South Wales. Although the first of these projects was never carried out, it was formally embodied in an official despatch. The Government, indeed, coupled this proposal with conditions which it was hoped would render it acceptable to the colony; and promised that in any event it would not resume the system of transportation in opposition to the wishes of the colonists. For a short time it seemed possible that the colony would assent to the suggestion. A committee in New South Wales was induced to support it, on condition that a large number of free immigrants were simultaneously introduced at the expense of the mother country, and that a portion of the burden of local expenditure was transferred to the imperial exchequer. The committee evidently thought that a favourable bargain might reconcile the colony to the return of the plague. But, even in the vicious atmosphere of a colony founded on crime, the common sense of the multitude is superior to the arguments of the few. The colonists in public meeting denounced the proposal as an unclean thing. Some of the members of the committee, influenced by the general indignation, changed their views, and the fall of Peel and the accession to office of a Whig ministry sealed the fate of the project.[1]

[1] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. pp. 436–443. The project of a new colony in Northern Australia was formulated by Stanley as Colonial Secretary, and adopted by Mr. Gladstone during his short tenure of the

The Whigs, in fact, were not likely to retrace the steps which they had taken before. They had abolished transportation to New South Wales in 1840, they were not prepared to resume it in 1847. Lord Grey, in introducing the Secondary Punishment Bill in that year, announced the virtual abolition of transportation to all places except Bermuda and Gibraltar.[1] But a mere announcement of this kind, though it indicated the desire of the ministry, did not settle the question. Something had to be done with the vast masses of criminals for whom there was no room in the prisons and hulks at home. An attempt was made in 1849 to meet the difficulty by sending a shipload of criminals to the Cape of Good Hope. Men at the Cape rose almost in rebellion, compelled the authorities to re-embark the convicts, and to carry them away elsewhere.[2] The officer in charge took them to Van Diemen's Land. But this step did little more than change the scene of the struggle. Mr. Gladstone had suspended transportation to Van Diemen's Land for two years. Lord Grey had formally announced the cessation of transportation to Australia. Yet, in defiance of order and promise, convicts were again arriving as in the days of old. Public opinion in Australia, strengthening with the growing strength of the country, demanded in louder and louder tones the abolition of the system. Imitating the example of their kindred at home, the colonists throughout Australia formed themselves into an Australian league, for the express purpose of insisting on its termination; and, except in Western Australia, where the colonists, preferring criminals to extinction, were regularly supplied at their own request with a few con-

Colonial Office. It was abandoned by Lord Grey after the change of Ministry. See a very interesting debate in *Hansard*, vol. ciii. pp. 383–424.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. xc. p. 898.

[2] *Ann. Reg.*, 1849, Hist. pp. 371–375, and Chron., p. 160; *Hansard*, vol. cviii. pp. 161, 777 *sq.*

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victs from 1849 to 1867, transportation to Australia was abandoned in 1853.[1]

Thus terminated one of the chief questions which agitated Australia during the first half of the nineteenth century. Its end was as memorable as its beginning. A great country in which no Englishman had ever toiled, and on which few Englishmen had ever gazed, had been deliberately set apart as a home for criminals. It had been supported by the lavish expenditure of the mother country. It had been at times the victim, at other times the spoilt child, of ministry and governor; and it had proved—if it had proved nothing else—that the whole experiment had been based on error. In the mere infancy of the earliest settlement, those who were responsible for it had seen that not merely progress but existence depended on the introduction of free labour. This view had been adopted. Free labour had been imported, and its advent had sealed the fate of the whole penal system. Men who had sought their fortunes in the colony, men even who had been born in it of vicious parents, were anxious that the taint which a penal settlement cast upon their homes should be finally removed. Every addition made to their numbers enabled them to state their objections in a louder and stronger tone, till at last the mother country could no longer overlook the wishes of her distant kinsfolk, and

[1] In addition to the references already given, see Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. pp. 430, 436, 570, 576. Cf. Sir E. Du Cane, *Punishment and Prevention of Crime*, pp. 110–151, and the debates in Parliament, *e.g.*, *Hansard*, vol. xciii. p. 344; vol. ciii. p. 383; vol. cxiv. p. 1086; vol. cxvi. p. 740; vol. cxvii. p. 543. For Lord Grey's policy of improving convict prisons at home, *ibid.*, vol. cix. p. 852, and vol. cx. p. 185. I have not attempted in the text to enter in detail into the remedial measures which it was hoped would make transportation palatable to colonists. They all proceeded on the assumption that the convict should only be sent to Australia either after he had worked out a portion of his sentence and had been reformed by discipline, or as an exile after the expiration of his sentence. For Lord Grey's proposal in this respect, see *Hansard*, vol. xc. pp. 912–916, and 1015, and cf. *ante*, vol. iv., p. 86.

was compelled at any cost and inconvenience to put an end to transportation.

Autonomy.

But the victory which the colonists thus obtained was followed by other consequences of even greater importance. So long as the colonies were penal settlements, so long even as the greater portion of their inhabitants were convicts working out their sentences, or convicts whose sentences had expired, it was absurd to suppose that the colonies could either claim or receive any measure of self-government. But, when they were once freed from the blistering plague which had been fastened on them, when they were not only freed from it, but freed from it by their own efforts, no solid reasons could be advanced for refusing them the right to manage their own affairs which the English race universally claims and as universally employs to good advantage. 'In 1828,' said the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, 'there were but two Australian colonies—New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land. Their population was 53,000, and their exports 180,000*l.* In 1848 the Australian colonies were six, their population had increased to 350,000, and their exports to 2,880,000*l.*[1] Where else in the world's history was it possible to find the record of so remarkable a development?

Some steps had already been taken to furnish two of the colonies with self-government. Two Acts of 1842, passed under the auspices of Stanley, had provided for the government of New South Wales and of South Australia. For New South Wales a Legislative Council was constituted, consisting of thirty-six members, of whom twelve were to be nominated by the Crown and twenty-four elected by the inhabitants.[2] In

[1] *Hansard*, vol. cviii. p. 543.

[2] 5 & 6 Vict., c. 76; cf. Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. p. 295 *et seq.* The Act in its title professed to extend to Van Diemen's Land. But its enacting clauses made no mention of that colony.

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the case of South Australia, the Crown was authorised under the Great Seal to constitute either a Legislative Council or a Legislative Council and a General Assembly, and to decide the manner in which either Council or Council and Assembly should be formed.[1] As a matter of fact, however, no steps were taken by the Crown to confer the advantages of self-government on South Australia under this Act;[2] and, until the accession to office of the Russell administration, New South Wales remained the only Australian colony which enjoyed the advantages of home rule. But the continuous growth of Australia made it annually more clear that the boon which had been granted to New South Wales must ultimately be extended to other colonies; and in 1849 the Russell Ministry decided on meeting a local demand by separating Victoria, or Port Phillip, as it was then called, from New South Wales, and on conferring on the new colony as well as on South Australia, Van Diemen's Land, and Western Australia, the constitution which had been already granted to New South Wales.[3] It is probably unnecessary to relate in detail the debates to which this proposal led in 1849 and 1850. It is sufficient to say that in the latter year an Act was passed in conformity with the suggestion of the Ministry.[4] But the constitutions which were thus framed had a comparatively short life. A section in the Act of 1850[5] gave the legislatures of the colonies power to alter the con-

[1] 5 & 6 Vict., c. 61.

[2] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. pp. 300–505. South Australia continued under a legislative council nominated by the Crown.

[3] Rusden's *Australia*, p. 467, and *Hansard*, vol. cv. p. 1125 *seq.*

[4] 13 & 14 Vict., c. 59. For the debates, *Hansard*, vol. cv. p. 1125; vol. cvi. p. 1115; vol. cviii. pp. 535; 611, 976, 1287; vol. cix. p. 1258; vol. cx. pp. 554, 1164, 1384; vol. cxi. p. 497.

[5] Sec. 32. In the text I have confined myself to stating the original constitutions drawn up by the colonies. They have since that time been again altered. Professor Dicey has made some remarks on the power of the colonies to change their constitutions, which are of much interest to the student of constitutional history. *Law of the Constitution*, p. 102 *et seq.*

stitutions which had been thus conferred upon them. Taking advantage of that section, the Legislature of New South Wales set the example of adopting a new constitution framed on the model of the British Parliament. In this constitution a Legislative Council, whose members were appointed by the Governor, represented the House of Lords. A House of Assembly, elected by the people, represented the House of Commons. Other colonies rapidly followed the example which was set them by New South Wales. Simultaneously they succeeded in obtaining an almost complete control over their own expenditure; and thenceforward they became and continued autonomous states.[1]

This slight sketch may perhaps be sufficient to indicate the leading incidents of a struggle in which men of British origin, under circumstances of no ordinary difficulty, gradually acquired credit, prosperity, and power. But it must not be forgotten that, as the colonists were acquiring influence and importance, an unforeseen event added largely to the strength of their position. Australia had been regarded as a pastoral country. Its wealth was supposed to consist in its flocks and herds. But in the middle of the century it was suddenly found that it was invested with great mineral wealth. In 1848 it was discovered that it was rich in copper. In 1851 it was found that it was still more rich in gold.[2]

The discovery of gold.

Some mention has already been made in this work of some of the consequences which proceeded from the discovery of gold in Australia. They were no doubt increased by the almost simultaneous discovery of gold in California. In the next twenty years the production

[1] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. iii. pp. 61–187.

[2] The chapter in Rusden's *Australia*, vol. ii. pp. 601-748, on the discovery of gold may be referred to by those who wish for more detailed information on the discovery and its consequences. For the previous discovery of copper, *ibid.*, p. 411.

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of gold in these two countries exceeded on an average 25,000,000*l.* a year; and these two countries alone probably yielded from that time nearly as much gold as the whole of the world had produced in the previous decade. There are few things which are more difficult to determine than the exact effect of this prodigious increase in the supply of the metal by which the value of most commodities is usually measured. To the present writer it seems probable, or even certain, that it terminated for the time the fall of prices which was in steady progress. When gold became more common, more gold was given for other articles, and prices in consequence rose. But, whatever may have been the effect of this discovery on the world at large, there can be little doubt of the impetus which it gave to Australian progress. In 1850 New South Wales contained 265,000 persons. In 1881, it had been divided into three great colonies which contained respectively 862,000, 751,000, and 226,000 persons.[1]

The reader who appreciates the significance of these figures, and of the events which have been imperfectly and rapidly sketched in this chapter, will have no difficulty in accepting the author's conclusion that, just as the great fact in the history of England during the eighteenth century was the rise of the United States, so the great fact in the history of England in the nineteenth century is the progress of Australia. The inhabitants of this small group of islands have shown a capacity for founding new kingdoms which no other race in the world has hitherto displayed. The day may possibly arrive when some inhabitant of New Zealand may take his seat on the broken arches of London Bridge and realise the prediction of a great historian by sketching from that standpoint the ruins of St. Paul's. But, should that day come, it is no idle boast to predict that

[1] Rusden's *Australia*, vol. iii. pp. 56, 60.

the artist will be sprung from the English and not from the Maori race—for the last Maori will have met with the fate which has already overtaken the last Tasmanian —and if he be either a wise or just man, his thoughts will turn from the decaying monuments around him to the mighty empires inhabited by men of British origin in other hemispheres; and, recognising greatness even in decay, he will pronounce his unhesitating verdict, 'Truly this was a mighty people.'

CONCLUSION.

The growth of Britain in the nineteenth century,

I HAVE now finished the task which I set myself more than twelve years ago, of writing the history of this great country during the forty years which followed the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars. I do not think it desirable to carry the narrative any further. But I should hardly accomplish the full object which I have had in view, if I did not devote a little space to the consideration of the main lessons deducible from the story. These lessons, in my opinion, are very different from those which are usually drawn from the history of the nineteenth century.

The great fact in the history of this period, which the student should never overlook, is the growth in numbers of the British people. It is far more important to realise this fact, and to understand its causes, than to obtain the most accurate knowledge of all the legislation and of all the wars of the century. He who has not grasped this circumstance in all its bearings will never understand the history of modern England. The historian who ignores it may possibly please—he will never instruct his readers.

Stated broadly, at the conclusion of the great war the British Islands contained 19,000,000 persons. In 1861 (forty-five years afterwards), they had 29,000,000 inhabitants. Three persons were living where two had lived before. The king of Brobdingnag was of opinion that 'whoever could make two ears of corn or two blades of grass to grow upon a spot of ground where

only one grew before, would deserve better of mankind and do more essential service to his country than the whole race of politicians put together.' What would he have thought of a country which had added 50 per cent. to its people in forty-five years?

and of English-speaking races.

It is true that this fact, important as it is, is eclipsed by another of still greater significance. The growth of the English-speaking race has far exceeded the growth of the English people in the British Islands. At the conclusion of the great war, there were not probably 30,000,000 persons in the world who were English in race and language. In 1861 there were nearly 70,000,000. The English-speaking races of the world have been doubling and are doubling their numbers in every thirty-three years. If anything like this progress continue, the English-speaking races at the close of the century will probably number 150,000,000 persons. Before the close of the twentieth century, they may comprise almost as many persons as are living now on the surface of the globe.

This prodigious increase in the number of the English people is not merely the chief fact in the history of the nineteenth century, it is the most important circumstance in the history of the world. Nothing like the expansion of the English race has occurred since the invasion of Europe by the Goths. And the incursions of the Goths had far less influence than the emigration of the English. The Goths swept over the smallest of continents, and they came to destroy. The English have swept over the largest portion of the world, and they have brought light instead of darkness in their wake. So far as it is possible to see, their progress is only bounded by considerations of climate, and wherever the Englishman can live and multiply, there he will go. There are men who view with alarm the advance of Russia; but Russia has never advanced

with the rapidity of the Briton. There are men who regard with anxiety the multiplication of the Russians; the multiplication of the Russians is as nothing compared with the increase of English peoples.

This history, however, is concerned with the smaller and not with the larger fact—the increase of the British at home, not their expansion abroad. Speaking broadly, the British at home increased from 19,000,000 persons in 1816 to 29,000,000 in 1861. It is this fact which the student must endeavour to realise, and which he will do well to examine.

The growth of the people confined to Great Britain.

In the forty-five years in question all parts of the United Kingdom had not added equally to their numbers. The population of England and Wales had increased from 11,000,000 to 20,000,000; the population of Scotland from rather less than 2,000,000 to rather more than 3,000,000; while the population of Ireland had decreased from about 6,000,000 to rather less than 5,800,000. The population of England and Wales increased, therefore, at the rate of nearly 90 per cent.; the population of Scotland at the rate of 50 per cent.; while the population of Ireland did not increase at all. It is worth while to investigate at the outset the reason of this difference.

Drummond, who was Irish Secretary under Normanby, and who is regarded by Irishmen as one of the best officials whom the English ever sent to govern Ireland, estimated, when he was drawing up the report of the Railway Commissioners, that the population of Ireland amounted to 2,010,221 in 1731, to 4,206,602 in 1791, and to 6,801,827 in 1821. If these estimates are correct, the population of Ireland was more than doubled in the sixty years ending 1791, and was much more than trebled in the ninety years ending 1821. It is probable that England and Wales contained in 1731 6,500,000, while it is certain that they had in 1821 almost exactly

12,000,000 persons. If Drummond, therefore, be right, the population of Ireland increased in the ninety years ending 1821 by 240 per cent., while the population of England and Wales only increased during the same period by a little more than 80 per cent.

It is clear therefore that, while in the eighteenth century there was a vast increase in the population of Ireland, there was only a slight increase in the population of Great Britain. The causes which led to the increase of the population of Ireland in the eighteenth century have already been indicated in this history. The introduction of the potato enabled the soil of Ireland to support an increased number of persons, and Irish landlords, in the first instance for the sake of obtaining a little higher rents, and afterwards for the sake of increasing their political influence by the multiplication of freeholders, sanctioned the subdivision of their estates, and consequently encouraged the growth of their tenantry.

Its causes.

Quite different were the causes which led to the increase in the population of Great Britain. The invention of the steam engine, its application to the jenny, the mule, the loom, the steamboat, and the locomotive, gave an extraordinary impulse to British industries. The population rapidly concentrated on the coalfields; and those parts of Great Britain where coal was easily procurable became more populous, more wealthy, and more powerful. Thus the increase in the population of England was an increase in the manufacturing population of the country; urban, not rural England [1] was

[1] Population of England and Wales . 8,892,536 20,066,224 *Census Report*, 1861, p. 87.
72 towns in ditto . 2,215,261 7,667,622 *Ibid.*, pp. 102, 103.
6,677,275 12,398,602

It must be recollected that the 72 towns only include parliamentary boroughs with a population of 20,000 in 1861. Such places as Barrow, Middlesborough, Newport in Monmouthshire, and a host of others, are excluded from the list.

growing with the greater speed; and the growth of rural England, such as it was, was connected with and dependent on the increase of the towns.

As the century wore on, moreover, the causes which had produced an expansion of urban England diminished the demand for agricultural labour. Machinery enabled the soil to be cultivated with fewer hands. Thenceforward the purely rural population of England, dependent on agriculture for its wages, actually ceased to grow. But the introduction of machinery into agriculture produced a much more striking effect in Ireland than in England. The English harvest had always been partly reaped by Irish labourers, and the rural population of England had been increased in harvest time by an Irish immigration. Machinery did both more economically and rapidly what the Irish immigrant had done before, and the Irish were deprived of one of the sources of profit on which they had been dependent for a livelihood. It was while this revolution was actually occurring that the failure of the potato deprived the Irish of their chief sustenance. Without labour, without food, the people were decimated by famine and disease, and the population, which for 150 years had been rapidly multiplying, began almost as rapidly to decrease.

These causes had no influence in Ireland.

It was either the fortune or the misfortune of the Irish that, at the very period at which the demand for their labour failed and the chief article of their diet was blasted, their landlords found that they could obtain more money from their estates by growing meat for English markets than by subdividing the soil among cottier tenants.[1] The disfranchisement of the freeholders by the Act of 1829, moreover, removed the only other reason for maintaining a large dependent tenantry; and the introduction of a poor law of course encouraged in Ireland, as it encouraged in England, the demolition of

[1] For the increased importation of Irish meat, *ante*, vol. iv. p. 131, *note*.

cottages and the removal of the people. Thus, while exceptional causes had led to the rapid growth of the Irish people in the eighteenth, a combination of agencies produced their decline in the nineteenth, century. Movements greater than those which 'laws or kings' can control were tending to the depopulation of the country. And the decrease of the people appeared unnaturally rapid because the increase of the people in the previous century had been unnaturally large.

It is well, at the very outset, to comprehend the causes which have of late years diminished the population of Ireland. No just man can read the treatment of Ireland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries without indignation. No humane man can read the story of Irish suffering in the nineteenth century without sympathy. But neither indignation nor sympathy should blind our eyes to the true reasons which affected the growth and decline of the Irish people.

The arrested growth of the Irish people of course influenced the figures which I am considering. If Ireland had increased as Great Britain increased, the population of the British Islands, instead of rising from 19,000,000 to 29,000,000, would have sprung from 19,000,000 to 34,000,000 in the forty-five years. It has been already shown in a previous volume of this history that the incomes of the upper and middle classes of the people increased from 150,000,000*l.* in 1816 to about 200,000,000*l.* in 1832.[1] They had further risen to 262,000,000*l.* in 1853, the year in which the income-tax was extended to Ireland, and to 335,000,000*l.* or (without the Irish assessment) to 312,000 000*l.* in 1861. While then the first great fact connected with the history of Great Britain from 1851 to 1861 is that the population increased from 13,000,000 to 23,000,000, or by rather

The increase of wealth.

[1] *Ante*, vol. iii. p. 4.

more than 75 per cent., the second great fact is that the incomes of the people of Great Britain paying income-tax rose from 150,000,000*l.* to 312,000,000*l.*, or by 100 per cent. In 1815, however, all incomes of 50*l.* a year and upwards were charged to the tax, while in 1861 only incomes of more than 100*l.* a year were assessed to the duty. With this correction, it is almost certain that the true increase in the incomes of the upper and middle classes was at least 150 per cent. The incomes of these classes were, in other words, increasing twice as rapidly as their numbers.[1]

It is possible to prove from the income-tax returns and from other sources that the additions to the wealth of the upper and middle classes were made with a regular, though slightly increasing, rapidity throughout the whole period; and it is consequently fair to conclude that these classes, measured by their incomes, were twice as well off as they had been at the conclusion of the war. But there is unhappily too much reason to fear that the same thing was not true of the labouring poor. During the first half of the period the wages of skilled labour did not increase, and the wages of unskilled labour actually decreased. During the second half of the period, the wages both of skilled and unskilled labour have grown rapidly, but they have not, even during these years, risen as rapidly as the incomes of the upper and middle classes.[2]

The condition of the labouring poor throughout the period,

This circumstance is the third great fact which the

[1] *Ante*, vol. iii. p. 4, and *Report of Commrs. Inland Revenue*, 1870, vol. ii. pp. 196, 197.

[2] There is no subject more difficult to investigate than the rise and fall of wages. Some elaborate tables of wages from 1800 to 1836 will be found in Porter's *Progress of the Nation*, pp. 456–458. I will take some of them to illustrate my meaning. The wages of carpenters, bricklayers, masons and plumbers, at Greenwich Hospital respectively, declined from 31*s.*, 30*s.* 6*d.*, 31*s.* 6*d.*, and 32*s.* 6*d.* a week in 1816, to 29*s.* 3*d.*, 26*s.* 9*d.*, 29*s.* 1½*d.*, and 29*s.* 11*d.* in 1836. The wages of unskilled labour at Manchester decreased from 15*s.* in 1816 to 14*s.* in 1825; at Bedfont, Middlesex, from 15*s.* in 1816 to 12*s.* in 1830; at Londonderry, from 10*s.* in 1821 to 7*s.* 6*d.* in 1836; at Bradford, from 16*s.* in 1824 to 15*s.* in 1833. Perhaps, on the whole, it is fair to infer from these

student of modern history should endeavour to appreciate. Its full significance will be shown later on. At the present moment, it is desirable to point out that the fall of wages in the first half of the period accounts for the misery which existed at the commencement of the present reign. I have endeavoured to make myself fully acquainted with the condition of the people of England during the whole of the period in which I have treated of their history; and I desire to express my deliberate opinion that the wretchedness of the lower orders had been constantly increasing from 1815 to 1842, and that the wave of misery in Britain reached its summit in the course of that year. At the cost of repetition, it is desirable to repeat the strange and startling fact that both pauperism and crime attained, not their relative, but their actual, maxima in 1842, till at last one person in every eleven was a pauper, and one person in every 500 was committed for trial.[1] and in 1842.

These figures are the more surprising the more they are examined. The roll of paupers in England and Wales rose in three years, from 1839 to 1842, from 1,137,000 to 1,429,000 persons, while in 1861 it had declined to 890,000 persons. In the intervening years the population had, in round numbers, increased by 3,000,000, and the pauper roll had decreased by 539,000. In the same way, while the committals rose from 4,346 in 1806 to 9,091 in 1816, to 16,164 in 1826, to 20,984 in 1836, and to a maximum of 31,309 in 1842, they decreased to 18,326 in 1861, and they have since decreased even

broken statistics that, in the twenty years ending 1836, unskilled labour, worth 15*s.* a week at the commencement of the period, was only worth 12*s.* at the end of it. I am inclined to think that the recovery during the next twenty years in the wages of unskilled labour was not greater than the fall in the preceding twenty years in the wage rate.

[1] *Ante*, vol. iv. p. 75. Pauperism was relatively higher in 1832 than in 1842; see *ante*, vol. iii. p. 91. But in 1832 relief was given in augmentation of wages, and the number of the poor in receipt of relief consequently exceeded the number who would have received it under the new system.

more rapidly. So great has the improvement been, that there is now not one prisoner where there were five prisoners fifty years ago. 'The convict population of Great Britain, in 1833, with its population of about 15,000,000,' writes the highest living authority on the subject, 'consisted of 43,000 convicts in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, besides others in the penal settlements; the convicts in ten hulks in Great Britain, of which the usual number was stated in 1828 to be 3,000 or 4,000; several hundreds in the Penitentiary at Millbank; about 900 (in 1838) at Gibraltar, and probably as many or more at Bermuda; about 50,000 in all. This large number is represented now by less than 9,000 from our population of 27,000,000, to whom should be added, say, 2,000 on ticket-of-leave.'[1] In other words, there is now only one convict to every 3,000 of the people; time was when there was one convict to every 300 of the population.

The three great facts in modern English history.

The three great facts, then, which I am anxious to emphasise, and which exceed all other matters in the period of which I am treating in importance, are: 1st, that the population of these islands increased from 19,000,000 to 29,000,000 in forty-five years; 2nd, that the wealth of the upper and middle classes increased twice as rapidly as the numbers of the population; and 3rd, that during the first twenty-five years of the period the labouring classes became more miserable, more degraded, and more vicious, while during the succeeding sixteen years the load of wretchedness was alleviated, and the morals of the people were simultaneously improved. The first and second of these facts it seems necessary to state, the third it may be requisite to explain.

Paradoxical as it may seem, I believe that the cause which on the whole since 1842 has done the

[1] Sir E. Du Cane, *The Punishment and Prevention of Crime*, p. 133.

most to improve the condition of the labouring classes is precisely that which increased their misery from 1816 to 1842. The introduction of machinery, and the application of steam to almost every industry, dislocated the labour market. The great industries of the country were, in many instances, moved to new places, and in every instance carried on under new conditions. The poor—ignorant from the neglect and dependent from the fault of the Legislature—were unable for years to adapt themselves to the new system; and machinery, multiplying production, outstripped the demand for labour. Some of these evils, from their very nature, could only be remedied by time; others of them were largely alleviated by the application of steam to locomotion. The steam-engine, whether working by water or by land, enabled the manufacturer to distribute his goods more efficiently, and therefore more widely. The demand again slowly overtook the supply. But the application of steam to locomotion effected an even greater improvement in the condition of the labouring classes. Up to 1843, rather more than 65,000,000*l.* had been expended on the railways of the United Kingdom. In 1861, the capital embarked in these enterprises amounted to 360,000,000*l.* 295,000,000*l.*, or 16,000,000*l.* a year, had been spent in the intervening eighteen years on these undertakings, and the largest portion of this sum had been used in one way or another as wages for labour. But this does not represent the whole truth. In 1842 the traffic receipts amounted to less than 4,000,000*l.*, and, though the working expenses are not known, they may be placed at half this sum, or 2,000,000*l.* In 1861 the traffic receipts had risen to 28,000,000*l.*, the working expenses of the lines to nearly 14,000,000*l.* The working expenses of a railway chiefly consist of the wages of labour and of the purchase

The effect of machinery on the labouring poor.

The effects of applying steam to locomotion.

of commodities raised or produced by labour. The railways in 1861 were, therefore, applying annually 30,000,000*l.*—16,000,000*l.* in the construction of lines and 14,000,000*l.* in the working of them—to the fund which directly or indirectly supports the wage-earning classes of the community.

It has been humorously suggested that the industrial classes of this country should annex a planet as an outlet for the commodities which this world is unable to consume. The foregoing figures seem to show that the same results may be obtained by the construction on our own globe of a network of railways.

But there is one other way by which the application of machinery to locomotion, and to other industries, has benefited labour. It is a striking fact that the labour which controls a machine is always better paid than other labour. Even in agricultural pursuits the carter commands higher wages than the ordinary farm-labourer; and, though the sempstress who has a sewing-machine may receive less for each shirt she makes, she can easily earn thrice the sum of her sister who is dependent on her unaided needle. This circumstance rests on the economical truth that the wages of a labourer who works a machine bear a much smaller proportion to the total cost of production than those of his work-fellow who uses his hands alone. Every improvement in machinery enables, or ought to enable, the employer to give the labourer higher wages.

Thus, then, the introduction of machinery, which in the first instance dislocated the labour market and degraded the labouring poor, has, in the event, increased the demand for labour and raised the wage-rate. Machinery, which at one time seemed likely to prove the labourer's chief enemy, has become his best friend. But the introduction of machinery alone would

not have accounted for the improvement in the condition of the labouring classes. It is the remarkable characteristic of the period under review that, while machinery was improving the condition of large classes of the poor, other causes were reducing the stock of redundant labourers. The first of these causes was the modification of the law of settlement. The old law had practically forced the labourer to remain in his birthplace; the new law enabled him to seek work where work was forthcoming. The second of these causes was the depletion of Ireland after the famine of 1848, and the consequent diminution of a vast flood of needy immigrants from Ireland every season. So long as Ireland threw annually her hundreds of thousands of labourers on the soil of England, there was no chance of an improvement in the wage-rate. The third and greatest of these causes was the emigration from the United Kingdom, which, in the eight years ending 1854, removed on an average more than 300,000 persons from the country every year. These circumstances reduced the stock of redundant labour, and enabled the labourers of Britain again to claim a fair day's wage for a fair day's work.

The effects of emigration.

But even these causes, if they had stood alone, would not have accounted for the whole of the improvement which took place in the condition of the people. The reform of the fiscal system under Peel did almost as much for the working classes of this country as the spread of emigration or the introduction of machinery. This is not the place for considering the rival merits of free trade and the commercial system. But it is not inappropriate in this chapter to point out that the commercial system imposed on the producing classes of this country a weight of taxation which was absolutely intolerable. This taxation was not entirely due to the corn laws. These laws, on the contrary,

The effect of Peel's commercial policy.

had a double effect. By fixing, in the first instance, a minimum price at which corn could be imported, and by subsequently imposing prohibitive duties on corn when its price was low, they encouraged a belief among agriculturists that an adequate price would be always attainable. They consequently induced the farmer to give a preference to corn crops, and to grow corn on land which could be more profitably applied to other uses. In consequence, in favourable years, the markets were glutted with corn, and the price was unduly depreciated; while, in unfavourable years, the price of corn was at once forced up to the minimum price at which it could be imported at all, or to the minimum price at which it could be imported at a moderate rate of duty.

The chief sufferers from the corn laws, therefore, on a long series of years, were not the labourers but the farmers. Their whole operations were unsettled by the sharp fluctuations in prices; and a good year, in which the valleys were thick with corn, made bread so cheap that it brought ruin to the agriculturist. To the labourer the corn laws brought suffering of another kind. The labourer could never foresee whether he would have to pay 50*s.* or 70*s.* a quarter for his wheat, and the difference between wheat at 50*s.* and 70*s.* means to a family of five persons a difference of 5*l.* a year, and is equivalent in the case of a labourer earning 20*s.* a week to an income-tax of 10 per cent. The repeal of the corn laws has benefited the working classes by cheapening food, but it has benefited them even more greatly by steadying the price of food.

But the corn laws were only a part of the system which was destroyed under Peel and Russell. From a working man's point of view, the differential duties intended to encourage colonial enterprise were almost as injurious. Take the case of two articles alone—

timber and sugar. It has been stated in the previous volume that, if these duties had been swept away, the people would have been able to have provided themselves with foreign sugar and foreign timber for 6,000,000*l.* less than they were forced to pay for colonial timber and sugar.[1] The existence of these duties did not, it must be recollected, add to the revenue of the country. On the contrary, it actually diminished the customs' receipts. If, in other words, the duties had been made equal and those on foreign commodities had been largely decreased, while those on colonial commodities had been slightly raised, there is no doubt that an immense addition would have been made to the national income. The duties were, therefore, merely maintained for protection, and it would have been better for the tax-payers of the kingdom to have voted the whole 6,000,000*l.* as an annual subsidy to the colonies, than to have maintained the injurious system under which the country was labouring.

Thus, then, the existence of the commercial system and the introduction of machinery account for the growing misery of the people from 1815 to 1842, while the application of machinery to locomotion, the destruction of the commercial system, and other circumstances, of which the increase of emigration is the chief, are amply sufficient to explain the material improvement in their condition from 1842 to 1861. Material improvement is not the same thing as moral progress. On the contrary, it is unhappily true that material improvement, by increasing the consumption of alcohol, occasionally interferes with moral progress. But it may at any rate be admitted that moral progress was impossible while the people remained in the condition in which they existed in 1842, and that in this sense

The moral progress of the people after 1842

[1] *Ante*, vol. iv. p. 132.

a material improvement in their means was an indispensable preliminary to the reform of manners.

It would be a mistake to ascribe the remarkable diminution in crime which has taken place since 1842 to any one cause; on the contrary, it is due to many causes. But I believe that these causes may be conveniently grouped under four heads, and I shall proceed to deal with them accordingly.

The causes to which it may be traced.

The first cause which has promoted the reform of manners, and has consequently led to a decrease of crime, is the material improvement in the people's lot to which I have already referred. Thus the extension of machinery, its application to locomotion, the increase of emigration, the abolition of the law of settlement, the depletion of Ireland, the repeal of the corn laws, and the destruction of the commercial system, have indirectly had the effect of emptying our gaols and diminishing the number of our criminals.

Police and prisons.

The second cause which has tended to the same result, is the institution of an efficient police and the introduction of a rational penal system. Crime has been prevented by the existence of a force charged with the preservation of order and the protection of property, and the criminal classes have been improved by well-regulated discipline instead of being debased by the awful arrangements under which they were previously held in check.

Poor Law of 1834.

The third cause which has helped to produce the result, is the poor law of 1834. Neither material nor moral progress was possible so long as the poor were degraded into dependence by the universal system of outdoor relief, which at once deprived the industrious of the fruits of their industry, removed from the idle the natural consequences of idleness, and threw an intolerable burden on the community in general. It is true that the introduction of the new law aggravated for a

time the misery of the poor, and that its maladministration gave occasionally some colour to the complaints which were made against it. But it is nevertheless certain that, under the old poor law, improvement was almost impossible, and that wise and good men look for further progress in the rigid enforcement, and not in the relaxation, of the provisions of the new law.

Education.

These three causes all tended to promote the moral progress of the people. But there was a fourth cause which did more to effect this object than the other three causes put together. The assistance which the State gave to education was at first very small, the arrangements for encouraging education were for some years very defective. Yet, from the time of the first grant made to primary schools, the cause of education grew and prospered. So deplorable was the state of education at the commencement of the period, that it was stated in 1837 in the House of Commons that 49 per cent. of the boys and 57 per cent. of the girls—thirteen and fourteen years old—could not read; and that 67 per cent. of the boys and 88 per cent. of the girls could not write.[1] The expenditure on education by the State rose only gradually, from 31,000*l.* in 1831, to 58,000*l.* in 1846, to 164,000*l.* in 1851, to 423,000*l.* in 1856, to 813,000*l.* in 1861, but the results rose as rapidly as the expenditure. 271,000 children were in average attendance in State inspected schools in 1851, 1,028,000 were in attendance in 1861.

The education of poor children had a double effect. In the first place the rising generation grew up under kindlier conditions than those amidst which their parents had been reared; and, in the next place, the children themselves brought to their own homes ideas of order, obedience, and cleanliness which had pre-

[1] *Hansard*, vol. xxxix. p. 388, and cf. *ante*, vol. iv. p. 40.

viously been strange to them. No influence is so beneficial as that of the child; and children, accustomed to kindly discipline at school, succeeded in communicating regularity and virtue to their elders. And this double advantage was accentuated by the reflection, which the poor could not avoid, that the State, and the rich men who were associated with the State, were at last awakening to a true sense of their duties to their humbler neighbours. The same generation which was promoting elementary education was encouraging the formation of mechanics' institutes, was founding baths and washhouses, was providing parks, books, and pictures for the people. The individual Englishman may not have done his duty to the poor so well as the feudal squire to the cottagers around him. But the upper and middle classes collectively were doing their duty much better. For the first time in the world's history, they were labouring as classes to promote the moral improvement of the lower strata of society.

These four causes account for and explain the improvement which was gradually effected in the moral condition of the poor after 1842. But there was another circumstance which may not have exerted so great a controlling influence, but which also deserves consideration. It is a remarkable fact that the course of legislation before 1840 had tended to cheapen the cost and facilitate the consumption of intoxicating liquors, while after 1840 the tendency of legislation was to make the more injurious spirits more costly, and to diminish the opportunities for their consumption. It is an equally suggestive circumstance that the reasons which had made tea dear and which limited its supply gradually began to disappear after 1842. These two things are so remarkable, that some people would probably place the substitution of tea for alcohol as the chief of the many causes which have led to the moral progress of the

The sale of intoxicating liquors.

people. I have not done so, because, while the improvement of manners was effected rapidly after 1842, no great stimulus was given to the consumption of tea till the Budget of 1853.

Few writers of history have devoted much space to a philosophic history of drink and drinking.[1] Yet, if the effects of intemperance on a nation's life are considered, there are not many subjects which are better worth the attention of the historian of manners. Speculation, indeed, has been busy in determining whether climate or race were the chief cause of drunkenness; and one authority has gone so far as to declare that, wherever the Teuton is, there drunkenness prevails.[2] It may be doubted, however, whether this theory has not been made to explain the facts; and whether, if Tacitus had not recorded the drunken habits of the Germans, the vice would ever have been attributed to race alone.

The history of drunkenness.

There have been frequently in the world both nations and periods in which drunkenness was a credit rather than a disgrace. The Persians were not the only people who were in the habit of deliberating upon affairs of weight when they were drunk,[3] and Idomeneus is not the only hero who was honoured with exceptional opportunities for drinking.[4] In this country 'the haunting of taverns' was made a common offence in the reign of Edward I., and seems to have been punished with the stocks.[5] But there is nothing in our literature, so far as I know, to show that drunkenness was either prevalent

[1] Mr. Lecky, in this as in other matters, is an excellent example to the contrary. His passage on the drinking of the eighteenth century may be referred to with great advantage. See *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 476.

[2] Mr. Balfour, in *Encyclopædia Britannica, ad verb.* 'Drunkenness.'

[3] See *Herodotus*, book i. ch. 133, and cf. Sir H. Rawlinson's notes on the same chapter.

[4] For Idomeneus, see the curious lines, *Iliad*, iv. 260. Darius prided himself on the amount he could drink; and Holofernes, though he was in command of 120,000 men, on the night of his murder drank much more wine than he had drunk in any one day since he was born.

[5] Paterson, *Liberty of the Subject*, vol. ii. p. 418.

in England, or was not regarded as disgraceful, till a much later period.

And there was a good reason for this circumstance. The national drink of Englishmen was ale;[1] and the ale which was commonly drunk was mild and new, and produced sleep rather than intoxication.[2] The Normans who came over with the Conqueror, indeed, set an example of drinking wine; and the marriage of Henry II. with Eleanor of Aquitaine, by connecting England with the wine-growing countries of France, increased the taste for wine; but the wines which were thus drunk were the light wines of France, and their use did not lead to any riotous drunkenness.

These conditions were, however, altered about the commencement of the fifteenth century. England lost Aquitaine, and with this loss the trade in the light wines of France decreased. In lieu of them, British merchants imported the stronger wines of Spain and Portugal; and sack—vino seco, or sherry[3]—took the place of claret. Towards the close of the century a still more remarkable revolution occurred. The hop was introduced into England. Its introduction led to the brewing of beer; and, in lieu of the light sweet ales, consumed almost as soon as they were brewed, strong beer, capable of being kept for considerable periods, was gradually brought into use.[4]

The increase of drunkenness in the fifteenth century;

Thus, in the course of the fifteenth century, by a change which was probably almost imperceptible at the time, Englishmen were gradually accustomed to stronger liquors than those which they had previously drunk. The events of the latter half of the sixteenth cen-

[1] Mead and metheglin, made respectively from water and honey, and from water, honey, and other ingredients, were equally ancient; but though they usually receive precedence in the Statute Book, 'they never have been of great importance as contributories to the revenue. Dowell, *History of Taxation and Taxes in England*, vol. iv. p. 52.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 76, 79.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

tury threw England into close communication with Holland, and the Dutch were at that time universally regarded as the hardest drinkers in Europe.[1] Possibly from the force of example, but probably also from having access to stronger drinks, and from having more money with which to purchase them, the habits of the English race rapidly changed, and, from being the most sober, they gained the reputation of being the most drunken of European nations. 'Superfluity in drink,' wrote Nash in 1595, 'is a sin that, ever since we have mixed ourselves with the Low Countries, is counted honourable; but, before we knew their lingering wars, was held in that highest degree of hatred that might be. Then if we had seen a man go wallowing in the streets, or lain sleeping under the board, we should have spet at him, and warned all our friends out of his company.'[2] 'I learned it in England,' so Shakespeare made Iago say, 'where indeed they are most potent in potting. Your Dane, your German, and your swag-bellied Hollander . . . . are nothing to your English.'[3] in the sixteenth century.

It must not be supposed that the Legislature saw with indifference the growth of drunkenness. On the contrary, from a very early period, it endeavoured to deal with it. It has already been stated that the haunting of taverns was made an offence in the reign of Edward I. In 1495, two justices were authorised to

[1] M. Rochard, in an exhaustive article on 'L'Alcool' in the *Revue des Deux-Mondes* for April 1886, p. 875, writes 'Encore est-il (l'alcool) demeuré pendant longtemps dans le domaine exclusif de la Médecine. Ce sont les Anglais qui l'en ont fait sortir, en 1581, en distribuant de l'eau-de-vie à leurs troupes qui guerroyaient alors dans les Pays-Bas.' It is questionable whether M. Rochard is right in saying that alcohol was first used in this way by the English. But there can be no doubt that he is right in tracing its use in this way by Englishmen to the Dutch wars.

[2] Isaac D'Israeli, in his chapter on 'Drinking Customs in England,' quotes, with excellent point, this passage from Nash's *Pierce Pennilesse*.

[3] Cf., a century later, Defoe's lines,

An Englishman will fairly drink as much
As will maintain two families of Dutch.

The lines are quoted by Mr. Dowell, in his *History of Taxation, &c.*, vol. iv. p. 102, a work to which I am much indebted.

'reject common ale selling and take security from sellers of ale for their good behaviour.' While in 1552, in consequence of the abuses and disorders 'had and used in common alehouses and other houses called tipling houses,' all such houses were prohibited which were not actually licensed by the justices, and the licensees were ordered to enter into recognisances against the use of unlawful games and for the maintenance of good order.[1]

This legislation, however, wholly failed to check the growing vice, and with the seventeenth century Parliament adopted other and sterner remedies. In 1603 it made the owner of an alehouse, allowing tippling on his premises, liable to a fine of 10*s.*;[2] in 1606 it imposed a fine for drunkenness;[3] and in 1623 it authorised the magistrate to convict the offender on the evidence of a single witness.[4]

These statutes, however, failed to arrest the growth of intemperance; and perhaps it is unnecessary to go beyond the Statute Book itself to ascertain the reasons of this failure. The Act of 1603, which imposed a fine on the alehouse-keeper who allowed tippling on his premises, placed a still higher fine on the licensed victualler who charged more than one penny a quart for the best beer, and one halfpenny a quart for small beer. So long as beer was cheap it was almost impossible to check its excessive consumption. In the Commonwealth, however, an excise was imposed on beer, which was continued after the Restoration. Nearly half a century later an additional duty was imposed on malt, while in 1710 a further duty was placed on hops. These successive burdens had the natural effect of increasing the price of beer. The best beer had been sold for 1*d.* a quart in the reign of James I.; the price rose to 2*d.* and

[1] 11 Henry VII., c. 2; 5 and 6 Edward VI., c. 25.
[2] 1 James I., c. 9.
[3] 4 James I., c. 5.
[4] 21 James I., c. 7.

$2\frac{1}{2}d.$ a quart in the reign of Charles II., and to $3d.$ and $4d.$ a quart in the first third of the eighteenth century.[1]

These successive additions to taxation probably did more to check the growing consumption of beer than all the tippling legislation of the reign of James I., but the increased cost of beer had probably also the melancholy effect of further encouraging the use of ardent spirits.

I am not aware that any historian of civilisation has cumbered his pages with any elaborate history of the art of distillation, but perhaps there are few subjects which have attracted so little, and which deserve so much, attention. Alcohol is believed to have been an Arabic discovery, and alchemy was its source.[2] Arnauld de Villeneuve, searching for the elixir vitæ, in the thirteenth century, distilled brandy from wine; and, rejoicing at its qualities, named it aqua vitæ, the water of life. But, for two centuries after this famous discovery, no harm to the human race resulted from it. In England, 'derived not from wine but from wine lees only, the sole material used in the manufacture by those who distilled for sale, alcohol was used almost exclusively for medicinal purposes.' But towards the middle of the sixteenth century a growing demand for this commodity induced the distillers to seek for fresh materials, and, in addition to wine and wine lees, other ingredients were extensively employed. The use of spirits which then began, slowly extended through the following century. War, among its many evils, leads to drinking; and, as the Royalists drank sack, the Parliament people drank strong waters.

The history of distillation.

Throughout this period, the strong waters which were

[1] Dowell, *History of Taxation, &c.*, vol. iv. pp. 117–123.

[2] I state this in this guarded manner, because M. Rochard in the article I have already quoted, writes 'Que l'alcool nous vienne des Chinois ou des Arabes,' &c. The name will convince most people that the invention was Arabic, however.

thus drunk consisted chiefly of French brandy, and of the inferior spirit distilled in England from malt and other far less savoury ingredients. Towards the end of the century Parliament thought proper at one time to prohibit the importation of French brandy, at another time to place prohibitory duties upon its importation. In consequence, an extraordinary stimulus was given to the British distiller, and perhaps to the British trader. Rum was imported from the West Indies, and made largely into punch; and finally gin, manufactured from malt and juniper, was introduced, and soon became 'a water more in esteem in this country, especially among the populace, than all the whole tribe of distilled waters put together.'[1]

Then began that era of fearful drinking in the eighteenth century, with which Mr. Lecky has made us familiar.[2] 'The drunkenness of the common people,' wrote Lord Hervey, 'was so universal, by the retailing of a spirit called gin, with which they could get dead drunk for a groat, that the whole town of London and many towns in the country swarmed with drunken people of both sexes from morning to night, and were more like the scene of a Bacchanal than the residence of a civil society.'[3] There is the strongest reason for fearing that Hervey did not exaggerate the orgies of the nation. Six millions of people, in 1742, are said to have consumed 19,000,000 gallons of spirits, or more than three gallons of spirits a head.[4] In 1884, the inhabitants of this country consumed about one gallon of spirits per head, or one-third of the amount which their forefathers had drunk 140 years before.

[1] Smith, *The Compleat Distiller*, quoted by Mr. Dowell, *History of Taxation, &c.*, vol. iv. p. 103.

[2] *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 476 *sq.*

[3] Lord Hervey's *Memoirs*, quoted by Mr. Dowell, vol. iv. p. 106.

[4] Porter's *Progress of the Nation*, p. 682. Mr. Lecky places the distillation in 1742 at only 7,000,000 gallons, vol. i. p. 480, but that appears to have been the consumption of London and its neighbourhood alone. McCulloch's *Commercial Dictionary*, *ad verb.* 'Spirits.'

It is difficult to believe that either the example of the Dutch or even the introduction of cheap spirits could entirely account for the wholesale degradation of a people by drunkenness, and it may be suspected that some other cause, more difficult to detect, was concurrently at work. The period, in which the taste for spirituous liquors became general, was precisely that in which economical writers were noting and deploring the aggregation of the people in towns. But the condition of the towns, their narrow dirty streets, their open sewers, their fœtid cesspools, and contaminated wells, must necessarily have produced physical weakness, which, in its turn, may have easily created a craving for spirituous liquors. The long peaceful administration of Walpole, during which drunkenness perhaps attained its maximum, increased the prosperity and therefore the purchasing power of the people; and the temptation to drink from the neglect of sanitary laws thus reached its climax at the moment when the means of purchasing drinks were the greatest.

The attempt to enforce temperance in the eighteenth century.

In 1736 the use of spirits had attained such frightful proportions that, on the advice of Jekyll, the Master of the Rolls, Parliament endeavoured to check it by imposing a prohibitory duty of 20*s.* a gallon. But the Act in the first instance led to riots, and in the second instance to illicit distillation, and its policy was soon abandoned. In 1751 a more sensible measure regulated the trade of the distiller and increased the penalties for unlicensed retailing;[1] and from that date, drunkenness, though the vice still prevailed, ceased to extend with the frightful rapidity at which it had increased in the previous half-century.

I have rapidly sketched the history of drunkenness in England, because it is a subject which is not entirely

[1] See on this legislation, Lecky, *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 481; Porter's *Progress of the Nation*, p. 681; and McCulloch, *ad verb.* 'Spirits.'

The spirit duties in 1816.

understood. At the period at which this history opens, high duties, necessitated by the war, ought to have checked the vice of drinking. Spirits in England paid no less than 11*s.* 8½*d.*, spirits in Scotland and Ireland 5*s.* 6*d.* a gallon. But these high duties, instead of checking the consumption, only led to large illicit distillation and constant smuggling. In Ireland it was estimated that, while only 3,000,000 gallons of spirits paid duty in 1822, 10,000,000 gallons were consumed; and the same effects were visible in Scotland, and to a smaller degree in England.

In consequence, towards the close of the Liverpool administration, another system was adopted. The duties on English spirits were gradually reduced to 7*s.* 6*d.*, the duties on Scotch spirits to 3*s.* 4*d.*, and the duties on Irish spirits to 2*s.* 4*d.* a gallon (they stood at these amounts up to the date of the Budget of 1839, when they were raised to 7*s.* 10*d.*, 3*s.* 8*d.*, and 2*s.* 8*d.* respectively), and the reduction, which had the melancholy effect of nearly trebling the consumption of these commodities, had the happier consequence of almost terminating the trade of the illicit distiller.[1]

Thus the tendency of commercial legislation from 1815 to 1840 had been to decrease the cost and increase the consumption of strong spirits. And the same thing

The duties on beer.

was also true of beer. At the close of the great war, beer was taxed in three ways. Its chief constituents, malt and hops, were subjected to heavy duties, and the beer itself, when brewed for sale, was also liable to duty. It has been already stated in this history, that one of the first measures adopted after the peace was

[1] From 1823, the year in which the old war duties were first altered, to 1840, the consumption of English spirits rose from 3,803,312 to 8,278,148 gallons; the consumption of Scotch spirits from 2,303,286 to 6,180,138 gallons; the consumption of Irish spirits from 3,590,376 to 7,401,051 gallons. The consumption of Irish spirits had, however, exceeded 12,000,000 gallons in 1836, before Father Mathew's labours promoted temperance among the people.

the reduction of the duty on malt to one-third of its former amount; and it has been further related that, in 1830, Goulburn, bent on effecting large economical reforms, decided on abandoning the beer duties. At the time at which he adopted this policy, he took a step of even greater significance. The sale of beer had previously been restricted to houses licensed by the magistrates. From 1830 free trade in beer was established, and anyone was enabled to open a beerhouse with a licence from the excise. This provision was consistent enough with the principles on which the Legislature acted in other matters, but it unfortunately increased to a large extent the facilities afforded for drinking; and in 1834 the Legislature was forced to draw a distinction between houses licensed to sell beer to be drunk on or off the premises, and to charge a rather higher licence to houses in the former category. In 1839, Brougham in the Lords, and Pakington in the Commons, suggested amended legislation; Brougham desired to place the beer-houses on the same footing as the licensed victuallers, and to require them to take out a license from the magistrates. Pakington proposed to allow no house to receive a licence which had not a definite rating qualification. The principle of Pakington's bill was ultimately adopted, and a slight check was thereby imposed to the multiplication of beer-houses.[1]

Free trade in beer.

This short summary is probably sufficient to show

[1] For the Act of 1830, *ante*, vol. ii. p. 546. The Act of 1834 is 4 & 5 William IV., c. 85. For Pakington's Bill in 1839, *Hansard*, vol. xlvi. p. 941. For his bill of 1840, *ibid.*, vol. lii. p. 393. For Brougham's bill of 1839, *ibid.*, vol. xlvii. p. 1236. The second reading of the bill had been postponed in consequence of the ministerial crisis, Brougham, however, saying that it was of more importance as regards the public morals than the resignation of any ministry. *Ibid.*, p. 974. The Bishops did not seem to think so, for, on a later stage, Brougham complained that only 2 out of 26 prelates sacrificed their 'dinner—their regard to their belly, which is their God,'—to support the bill. *Ibid.*, vol. xlviii. p. 321. Rice said in 1839, that there were 55,513 public-houses and 36,054 beer-houses, 18,379 of the public-houses and 15,318 of the beer-houses being under 10*l.* value. *Ibid.*, p. 978. Cf. Dowell's *History of Taxation*, vol. iv. p. 150 *sq.*

that from 1815 to 1840, or throughout the period which I have already instanced as that during which the condition of the poorer classes became more miserable and more degraded, the course of legislation tended to decrease the price of intoxicating liquors and to increase the facilities for drinking. From 1840, when the poor had almost attained the maximum of degradation, a different system was introduced. In that year, as I have just shown, legislation had the effect of suppressing the smaller beer-houses. From 1840 to 1853 no material alteration was made in the taxes on intoxicating liquors. The additional 1*s.* duty imposed on Irish spirits in 1842 was remitted in 1843. But in 1853 Mr. Gladstone introduced a new policy, by placing an additional 1*s.* on Scotch and an additional 8*d.* on Irish spirits; in 1854 the duties were further raised by 1*s.* 4*d.* and 8*d.* respectively; and in 1855 they were still further augmented by raising them for the whole of Great Britain to 8*s.* and for Ireland to 6*s.* 2*d.* a gallon. In 1858 the duty on Irish spirits was for the first time assimilated to the duty in Great Britain; and, in 1860, the duties throughout the United Kingdom were raised to 10*s.* a gallon.

The increase of the spirit duties in and after 1853.

It is possibly an irrelevant, but at any rate a most significant fact that, while high duties on alcohol had produced smuggling and illicit distillation in the first quarter of the century, they had no such effect in the third quarter of the century. The fact is partially explicable from the circumstance that the progress of society tended to increase the scale on which all industries were conducted. Small producers were unable to compete with large manufacturers, and the humble kettle contended at a hopeless disadvantage with the gigantic still. But the circumstance was much more due to the increasing power of the executive. The inventions of the century—the construction of railways and

telegraphs—as well as the legislation of the century, by instituting an efficient constabulary in every county, have strengthened the arm of authority, and enabled it to suppress practices with which it could not deal a hundred years ago.

This reflection is, however, extraneous to my immediate purpose of showing that, while the course of legislation before 1840 had tended to cheapen intoxicating liquors and to facilitate their supply, legislation after 1840 had the effect of making spirits more expensive and of reducing the supply. But it must not be forgotten that two other circumstances concurrently tended to decrease the consumption of intoxicating liquors. Foremost among these was the eloquence of a good man, and the increasing use of a non-intoxicating beverage.

Something has already been said of Father Mathew's labours in a previous chapter of this work.[1] By his zeal, his earnestness, his eloquence and his example, he accomplished a reform in manners, such as it is the lot of few men to effect. The work, which he commenced in Ireland in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, he carried on in Great Britain in the fifth decade of the century. Labouring in the great centres of population he achieved a marked and rapid success, and laid the foundation of the great movement, for promoting abstinence and temperance among the people, which has ever since been actively promoted. It was fortunate that this great movement was accompanied and followed by an alteration in fiscal policy, which tended to promote the consumption of tea. Perhaps there are few articles whose importation and whose use have been more directly affected by the progress of legislation.

I do not propose in this chapter to enter into any Tea.

[1] *Ante*, vol. iv. p. 225.

retrospective history of the British tea trade. I shall neither dwell on the famous cup of tea which Pepys tasted in 1661, or on the equally famous order which the East India Company gave for 100 lbs. of tea in 1667. I shall not describe the beneficial consequences which resulted from a large reduction of the duties in 1784 by Pitt, or on the circumstances which led to the increase of these duties during the war. I shall come at once to the state of the trade in 1816, when this history opens. In that year an *ad valorem* duty of 96*l.* per cent. was imposed on all teas, and rather more than 23,000,000 lbs. of tea were consumed in the United Kingdom. No material variation[1] was made in the duty till 1834, when the termination of the East India Company's monopoly necessitated its revision.[2] From that time till 1836 duties varying from 1*s.* 6*d.* to 3*s.* a lb. were imposed on tea; and from 1836 a uniform duty of 2*s.* was imposed on all kinds of tea, which was further raised to 2*s.* 2¼*d.* by Baring's additional 5 per cent. in 1840.

The tea duties in 1840.

From a financier's standpoint, a good deal could be said in favour of assimilating the duty on all kinds of tea. In practice, indeed, it proved impossible for the tax-gatherer to distinguish in all cases between the boheas, the congous, and the souchongs; and dearer teas were consequently admitted under the lower rates of duty. But from a consumer's standpoint the assimilation of duties was disastrous. The cheaper kinds of bohea could be sold in this country in 1836 at or under 1*s.* a lb.; a tax of 2*s.* 1*d.* a lb. was equivalent therefore to a tax of more than 200 per cent. on the

[1] The duty on tea worth 2*s.* a lb. and upwards was raised from 96 to 100 per cent. in 1819. But this alteration was, of course, very small both in its character and its consequences.

[2] The price on which the *ad valorem* duty was charged, was ascertained by the Company's periodical sales. When these sales ceased, the means of testing the price ceased also.

cheaper kinds of tea. The tax was so heavy that it virtually destroyed the advantages which would otherwise have arisen from throwing open the China trade. For the seventeen years ending 1832, the consumption of tea had only risen from rather more than 23,000,000 lbs. to rather less than 32,000,000 lbs.; from 1833 to 1836 it increased to rather more than 49,000,000 lbs. In other words, the increase in four years was nearly twice as great as the increase in the preceding seventeen years. But, under the tariff of 1836, it fell at once to 31,000,000 lbs., and the quantity retained for home consumption did not again reach 49,000,000 lbs. till 1849.

Thus, in 1842, the year in which the working classes of the United Kingdom fell to their lowest depth of degradation, the tax on a pound of tea was almost as heavy as the tax on a gallon of Irish whisky; while from 1853 to 1860 the tax on whisky was raised from 2*s.* 8*d.* to 10*s.* a gallon, or nearly quadrupled, while the tax on tea was gradually reduced from 2*s.* 2½*d.* to 1*s.* 5*d.*, or by more than one-fourth.[1] During the same period the consumption of spirits fell from ·97 to ·86 of a gallon, while the consumption of tea increased from 1·22 lbs. to 2·69 lbs. per head of the population.[2]

Their alteration in 1853.

These figures show that, concurrently with the improvement in the morals of the lower orders, a salutary alteration was also being effected in their habits, and that non-intoxicating beverages were gradually replacing the deleterious liquors which in previous generations had proved the fertile cause of crime. It is probably more difficult to determine whether this change in the

[1] The tax was further reduced to 1*s.* a lb. in 1863, and 6*d.* a lb. in 1865.

[2] The figures in each case are from 1840 and 1861. It may be interesting to add that in 1884 the consumption of spirits amounted to 1·03 gallon, that of tea to 4·87 lbs. per head of the population.

people's habits was promoting morals, or whether, on the contrary, improved manners were increasing the consumption of tea. The two causes probably acted and reacted on one another. But if it be remembered that no great change in the price either of whisky or of tea was made till 1853, and that the steady improvement in the people's morals commenced in 1843, it will probably be concluded that tea-drinking was the result of a reform of manners rather than that the reform of manners was the consequence of tea-drinking.

Other circumstances were concurrently tending to promote the comfort and welfare of the lower orders.

Sanitary reform.

Anyone acquainted with the Blue Books, with the literature, and especially with the fiction of the middle of the century, will probably have been struck by the increasing attention which statesmen, writers, and novelists were paying to social subjects. A belief was gradually arising that it was shameful for great landlords to suffer their tenantry to be lodged in insanitary dwellings or to be crowded in small cottages. The country gentlemen, who were angry with Drummond's dictum that property has its duties as well as its rights, and who forbore to notice that Drummond was expressing the opinion of his age as well as his own individual view, were themselves acknowledging the force of the precept by rebuilding the cottages on their estates. The same causes which were influencing the country gentlemen were also affecting the Legislature, and an effort was being constantly made to improve the sanitary condition of large towns.

It is related by Mr. Froude that, in the sixteenth century, the scavengers of London were 'ordered, on pain of death, to see all streets and yards kept clear of dung and other rubbish, and all other filthy and corrupt things.'[1] It may be doubted, however, whether

[1] Froude's *History of England*, vol. i. p. 52, *note*.

these regulations were ever enforced. In the middle of the nineteenth century no effort was made to observe them. Many of the London poor lived 'in courts and alleys, in the immediate neighbourhood of uncovered sewers, of gutters full of putrefied matter, nightmen's yards, and privies, the soil of which was openly exposed and never or seldom removed.'[1] In 1845 a chapel in the immediate neighbourhood of Lincoln's Inn was used as a schoolroom in the daytime and a dancing saloon at night, and in the cellars beneath this chapel 10,000 bodies had been interred in the seventeen years ending 1840, the burials were still continuing, and the old coffins were removed through a contiguous sewer to make room for new ones.[2]

It would not be difficult to accumulate evidence of the constant neglect of every sanitary law. Reform in this, as in other matters, was very gradual. In 1838 the Poor Law Commissioners drew public attention to the matter; and in 1841, Russell, as Home Secretary, ordered them to undertake the inquiry which resulted in the memorable report from Mr. Chadwick, in which the neglect of sanitary laws was charged with causing annually more deaths than the most destructive war. Russell was out of office when this report was made, and Peel decided on referring the whole matter to a Royal Commission. Many years, however, elapsed before any effectual steps were taken to remedy the evils which Chadwick's inquiry had revealed, and which the Commissioners admitted. It was only in 1847 that the Act for the Improvement of Towns was passed,[3] it was not till 1848 that a general Board of Health was instituted,[4] and it required the spur of a fresh outbreak of cholera to stop the practice of intramural interments in 1850.[5]

While slow and tentative measures were being taken

[1] *Hansard*, vol. xcix. p. 434.
[2] *Ibid.*, vol. lxxix. p. 333.
[3] 10 & 11 Vict. c. 34.
[4] 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63.
[5] 13 & 14 Vict. c. 52.

to improve the sanitary condition of the dwellings of the poorer classes, a new and beneficent discovery suddenly increased the cheerfulness of their homes. Petroleum, or rock oil, has been known to man for many centuries. Pitch wells are mentioned in Herodotus, and the properties of petroleum were evidently understood by the Jewish priests, who, at the time of the captivity, hid the fire of the altar in a pit. For, after the return of the Jews to the Holy Land, the posterity of those priests who had hid the fire found no fire in the pit, but thick water; and Nehemiah commanded the altar to be sprinkled with the water, and of course easily succeeded in creating a great fire, 'so that every man marvelled.' Nehemiah, so the old chronicler adds, 'called this thing naphthar, which is as much as to say a cleansing, but many call it nephi.'

Petroleum.

Nehemiah unconsciously stood on the verge of a great discovery. But more than 2,000 years passed before the work which he had commenced was completed and petroleum was largely used as an illuminating agent. About the middle of the century the possibility of so using it was proved both in this country and in the United States, and its use since then has increased with so much rapidity, that it has already almost entirely superseded all other oils.

The discovery was made at an eventful period. Society was gradually realising that man, like other animals, was incapable of enduring the strain of too much work; Factory Acts and trades unions were procuring the operative and the labourer a little more leisure, which the rising generation, instructed in elementary schools, was capable of employing in a rational manner. Yet the advantage which the poor were thus procuring would have been largely lost if invention had not simultaneously provided them with a new and cheap light. The work of most men must necessarily be done

Its value.

in the daytime; night, which brings them relief from toil, brings them also the chief opportunity for self-instruction; and, without a cheap light, the long hours of the evening would necessarily have been lost. The introduction of petroleum, therefore, exercised a salutary influence on the education of the poor, and it also brought comfort and warmth to their humble dwellings. In the dark we tolerate dirt and decay which seem intolerable in light. No method is so effectual to prevent crime and vice as to light our thoroughfares. What light accomplishes in public highways, it effects in humble households; and perhaps it would be impossible to name any one thing which has exerted and is exerting a more salutary and beneficial influence on society than the provision of cheap and good light by the application of petroleum to illuminating purposes.

I have now endeavoured to enumerate the many causes which have simultaneously tended to raise the condition of the poor during the present reign. I should hardly complete the list without adding to these causes that general prevalence of kindly feelings which has in itself promoted many of the reforms which I have enumerated.

The prevalence of kindly feelings.

I have, in previous volumes, frequently endeavoured to emphasise the remarkable change of thought which led to so beneficial an alteration in the treatment of the convict, the debtor, the slave, the factory child, the soldier, the sailor, and the dumb animal. Without recapitulating the various measures proposed and passed with these objects, I may perhaps, in this concluding passage, allude to two others which I have not hitherto mentioned, and which were eminently characteristic of the period under review. The first of these is the humane treatment of lunatics; the second the introduction of anæsthetics into surgery.

The cruelty with which lunatics were almost uni-

The treatment of lunatics.

formly treated only fifty years ago almost passes belief. The asylum was a prison, in which the patients were subjected to horrible restraints and tortures. Pinel, appointed to the Bicêtre in the crisis of the French Revolution, had the rare courage to order the manacles to be removed from the most unruly sufferers, and to prove to an incredulous generation that kindness was not thrown away even on the insane. About the same time Tuke demonstrated the same thing in this country. But, though these benevolent individuals had shown that it was neither wise nor necessary to manacle lunatics, nearly half a century passed before their example was widely imitated. It was only in the closing years of the reign of William IV. that the manager of a large asylum decided on abolishing the restraints which had previously been used, and it was not till the fifth decade of the nineteenth century had begun that the example which was thus set was generally imitated.[1]

The introduction of anæsthetics.

The same decade which witnessed this great reform was also memorable for the introduction of anæsthetics. Davy, indeed, in the commencement of the century, and Faraday, eighteen years afterwards, discovered the anæsthetic properties of nitrous oxide gas and sulphuric ether. But it was not till 1846 that either of these discoveries was adopted by dentist or surgeon, and it was only in 1847 that Simpson supplemented them by proving the anæsthetic properties of chloroform. When once these properties were discovered, the use of chloroform was widely extended, and surgery was

[1] Rational legislation respecting the treatment of lunatics commenced in 1828. In that year an Act (9 Geo. IV. c. 40) enabled the justices in quarter sessions to provide county asylums, and another Act (*ibid.*, c. 41) regulated the treatment of the insane in private houses. Notwithstanding the first of these Acts, Ashley, speaking in 1845, said that only 16 English counties had provided asylums: there was 'one disgraceful borough asylum' in Wales. *Hansard*, vol. lxxxi. p. 183. In Scotland, as late as 1848, it was officially stated by the Lord Advocate that many lunatics were confined in dungeons, chained on their beds of straw, and lived on garbage. *Ibid.*, vol. xcviii. p. 846.

thereby deprived of one of its worst horrors. It is perhaps an exaggeration to say that these beneficent inventions were solely due to the kindlier instincts of the age; but those readers who have followed most closely the history of discovery, and who have noticed how rarely invention precedes the demand and how rapidly it overtakes it, will probably conclude that, while the rougher tendencies of the earlier years of the century prevented the adoption of Davy's and Faraday's discoveries, the kindlier instincts of the fifth decade of the century stimulated the application of chloroform so soon as Simpson had explained the advantages arising from its use.

The kindly instincts which thus led to the more humane treatment of lunatics, and which perhaps also account for the adoption of anæsthetics, are among the chief characteristics of modern England. It is of much less importance to dwell on the main features of legislation than on the social tendencies of a generation. Yet the legislation of England, at any rate since 1820, has been marked by such striking peculiarities that it is worth while to point out the main lessons which are deducible from its study.

The destruction of privilege.

The first characteristic in the legislation of modern England is the destruction of privilege. The privileges of birth, the privileges of office, the privileges of position, the privileges of religion, the privileges of landowners, the privileges of traders, the privileges of the drama—these and many others were to a great extent swept away by the reform of municipal corporations, the abolition of sinecures, the subjecting members of Parliament to arrest for debt, the abolition of Church rates, the making real property liable for simple contract debts, the destruction of the monopoly of the East India Company, the termination of the monopoly of the patent theatres, and many other similar measures.

The removal of disabilities.

The destruction of privilege was the more marked because it was accompanied with what may be called the second characteristic in modern legislation, the removal of disabilities. The laws which disabled the Roman Catholic, the Nonconformist, the alien, and the Jew from holding certain offices, attaining certain positions, or possessing certain kinds of property, were, if not wholly, at any rate to a great extent, swept away, while even the disability under which certain classes lay from their reluctance to be sworn was removed by the substitution of an affirmation for an oath in civil proceedings in 1854, and in criminal proceedings in 1861.[1] Even those measures which we are accustomed to regard as the great reforms of the period were marked by the same characteristics, for the repeal of the corn laws was the abolition of the privilege of the landed classes to supply the people with food; while the Reform Act of 1832 removed the political disability under which the middle classes were lying, and destroyed the privileges which the borough owners had previously enjoyed.

The greatest happiness of the greatest number.

But there was another characteristic in the legislation of modern England. Up to 1820, laws, as a general rule, had been passed for the protection of the few against the many. After 1820, laws were usually passed for the protection of the many against the few. Parliament in the eighteenth century was occupied with protecting property against the people; Parliament in the nineteenth century has been protecting the people against property. In one period the slightest offences against property were made punishable with death; enclosure bills accumulated the waste lands of England on adjoining landowners; trades unions were reprobated and put down; real property was exempted from legacy duty; the stamp duties on large mortgages

[1] 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, and 24 & 25 Vict., c. 66.

and conveyances were fixed at relatively lower rates than those on smaller transactions of the same kind; while the law of settlement and entail encouraged the accumulation of estates and prevented the alienation of property. In the other period, on the contrary, the punishment of death was reserved for the gravest offences against the person; enclosure bills were discouraged, or, where they were allowed, the interests of the people were distinctly recognised; trades unions were gradually tolerated and at last made legal; the legacy duty was extended to real property; real estate was made liable to simple contract debts; the stamp duties were equalised; the smaller householders and poorer incomes were relieved from direct taxation; while the restraints on the alienation of land were removed, and settlements were made on more liberal principles. Add to these circumstances the striking facts that, in the same period, Parliament took steps to provide libraries, museums, picture galleries, parks, baths, washhouses, and schools for the people, either wholly or largely at public cost; and that, by a series of Acts for the regulation of labour, it protected the more helpless members of society against their employers and themselves, and it will perhaps be plain how largely the legislation of the century has been legislation passed by the people for the people, to promote what Bentham called the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

The reforms of the century have been due to opinion

There is, I am aware, a general but most inaccurate impression that the revolution which was thus accomplished in legislation was attributable to the Reform Act of 1832. It was due to nothing of the kind. The reforms which have been accomplished in the nineteenth century have been consequent on the increasing power of the people and the augmented pressure of external opinion on the Legislature. I have endeavoured, in the second volume of this history, to prove,

indeed, that the Reform Act of 1832 was the completion, and not the commencement, of a period of reform. I have endeavoured in the third volume to show that this Act, by creating a reaction, temporarily retarded the subsequent progress of reform. But I am far from thinking that the Reform Act did not supply a great and seasonable impulse. Before the Reform Act opinion had to overcome the passive resistance of two bodies—the House of Lords and the House of Commons—both recruited largely from the same classes, and consequently animated by similar views. After the Reform Act opinion in the House of Commons became more and more identified with opinion in the nation, and in consequence opinion, instead of finding itself opposed by two bodies, discovered in the Commons an ally to assist it in overcoming the resistance of the Lords.

Let me now, once more, recapitulate the main lessons to be drawn from the history which I have endeavoured to narrate. From 1815 to 1861—

1. The English-speaking people in the world increased from 30,000,000 to 70,000,000, and the people of the British Islands increased from 19,000,000 to 29,000,000.

2. The incomes of the people paying income-tax were doubled; in other words, the wealth of the upper and middle classes increased twice as rapidly as their numbers.

3. During the first half of the period, from 1816 to 1842, the condition of the poor became more degraded and more miserable; during the last half, from 1842 to 1861, the moral and material condition of the poor constantly improved.

4. The improvement in the material condition of the poor from 1842 to 1861 was due to—

(*a*) The extension of machinery and the application of steam to locomotion.

(*b*) Emigration.
(*c*) The modification of the law of settlement.
(*d*) The depletion of Ireland.
(*e*) The financial and commercial policy of Peel's administration.

5. The moral progress of the poor from 1842 to 1861 was due to—

(*a*) The improvement in their material condition.
(*b*) The provision of an efficient police and the institution of a rational penal system.
(*c*) The Poor Law of 1834.
(*d*) The extension of elementary education.

6. The moral progress of the people was accompanied by a striking change in their habits, which may be traced in a slightly decreased consumption of alcohol and a large increase in the consumption of tea.

7. The moral and material progress of the people was accelerated by the greater attention paid to the sanitary state of towns, and to the condition of the dwellings of the poor.

8. Throughout the period kindlier feelings arose among all classes. These feelings led among other things to—

(*a*) The abolition of slavery.
(*b*) The regulation of female and child labour.
(*c*) The limitation of capital punishment.
(*d*) The reform of the penal system.
(*e*) The abolition of cruel punishments, *e.g.* the pillory and the flogging of women.
(*f*) The abolition of imprisonment for debt.
(*g*) The suppression of duelling.
(*h*) The suspension of impressment.
(*i*) The limitation of flogging in the army.
(*k*) The prohibition of cruel sports.
(*l*) The punishment of cruelty to animals.
(*m*) The more humane treatment of lunatics.

(*n*) The employment of anæsthetics.

And to other similar changes.

9. In addition to these characteristics the legislation of the age was marked by three other features—

(*a*) The destruction of privileges.

(*b*) The removal of disabilities.

(*c*) The protection of the many against the few.

10. Legislation has been uniformly moulded by opinion outside Parliament.

Such are, as I believe, the ten great lessons to be drawn from the history of England from 1815 to 1861. Compared with them, the rise and fall of ministries and the record of Parliamentary successes and reverses are the mere 'leather and prunello' of history. Many of these results are connected with the names of no men. The annals of a nation are of infinitely more importance than the careers of its foremost citizens. Yet great men will always be associated with great events. Their part in the contest adds life and interest to the narrative; and, before I finally lay down my pen, therefore, I desire to enumerate some of the great men who have been the founders of modern England.

The greatest men of the century.

Yet the list can hardly be read without creating feelings of surprise and regret. From 1815 to 1861 the Crown created some scores of peerages, yet the greatest names will not be found amongst the peers who were thus created by the Crown. It bestowed ribands, garters, baronetcies, knighthoods, and inferior honours by hundreds, yet the greatest men lived and died without such distinction. Ministers had places and pensions for a selected few, yet the greatest names will not be found among the office-holders and the pensioners. The people have contributed their donations to erect statues and monuments to some of their heroes, yet the greatest men have in rare instances had their memory thus preserved to us in marble or brass.

For the true founders of modern England are its inventors and engineers; and the great inventors and engineers of England have been men of lowly birth who have neither coveted nor received titles and rewards. By their works alone they are known, by their works alone will they be remembered. Yet, if true greatness may be measured by a man's achievements, what man is there in the eighteenth century who stands so high as James Watt? What man in the nineteenth century can be named in the same category with George Stephenson? What other two men have exerted so great and salutary an influence on the fortunes and prosperity of modern England?

Foremost, then, among the worthies of modern England are her inventors and her engineers; and foremost among these are Watt and Stephenson. Next to these should probably be mentioned the men who have influenced thought and legislation by their writings. The great authors of an age, however, rarely or never influence its contemporary thought. The authors who exerted the chief influence on English history from 1815 to 1861 were born and worked in the eighteenth century; and foremost among them, and therefore foremost in the second category among the nation's worthies, were Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham.

There is, however, a third company of great men to whom modern England is largely indebted, composed of those persons who have worked for the good of their fellow-men. Howard, Wilberforce, Buxton, Romilly, Mathew, Owen, Ashley, are perhaps the leading persons in the small company of worthies which is included in the third category of the chief benefactors of modern England.

Behind these again stand the little company of great statesmen who have promoted the nation's progress by their measures or increased its happiness by their policy.

Four men who lived in the period of which I am treating, Grey, Peel, Cobden, and Russell, stand out prominent among these. But among the four, the name of greatest mark is that of Peel.

I have thus endeavoured, in a few sentences, to summarise the chief lessons to be deduced from the history of modern England, and to name the chief actors who have borne their part in the drama. The narrative, rightly understood, should inspire a consolation and a hope. Men there are who abandon themselves to doubt and despair from a conscious inability either to understand or relieve the vast mass of misery around them. Such men may, to some extent, be consoled by the reflection that, if thousands of their fellow-creatures are annually born in shame and reared in vice, the condition of the poor, miserable though it still be, is infinitely better than it was in 1842. Such men may perhaps be encouraged to hope that moral welfare, like material prosperity, is subject to the laws of evolution, which are as certain as they are slow in their working. Thus, strengthened by contemplating the improvement of the past, they may brace themselves for the struggle which still lies before them in the future; and carrying on the work of Watt and Stephenson, of Smith and Bentham, of Howard and Ashley, of Grey and Peel, they may labour, like these and other great men, for the furtherance of the common weal.

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